THE

SIDDHĀNTALEŚASAṄGRAHA

OF

APPAYYA DĪKSITA

VOLUME I

EDITED BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

२८५ शा.वे.

MAHENDRA SANSKRIT UNIVERSITY

Publications of the Department of Indian Philosophy
No. 4
General Editor: S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

THE

SIDDHĀNTALEŚASAṄGRAHA

OF

APPAYYA DĪKṢITA

[VOLUME I—TRANSLATION]

PRESENTED TO

MAJOR GENERAL
BRAMHA SHUMSHERE J. B. RANA.

THE

SIDDHĀNTALEŚASAṄGRAHA

OF

APPAYYA DĪKṢITA

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

Department of Indian Philosophy

VOLUME I

TRANSLATION

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS
1935

मूल्य रु. १००।-

Thompson & Co., Ltd.,
Printers,
Madras,

Acc २२३२८/२२३२४ [illegible]

MAHENDRA SANSKRIT UNIVERSITY

मण्डन:

TO
S. RADHAKRISHNAN
AND
P. T. RAJAN

CONTENTS

PAGE
Introduction 1
Analytical Table of Contents 67
Translation of Chapter I 129
„ Chapter II 245
„ Chapter III 331
„ Chapter IV 387

INTRODUCTION.

A BRIEF sketch of the life and works of Appayya Dīkṣita has been provided in the Introduction to the *Śivādvaitanirṇaya.*[1] The Dīkṣita's period was given there as 1552-1624. This traditional date was subject to questioning even then and has since been subjected to further examination.[2] The principal arguments are two, a negative and a positive; the negative one seeks to show that the traditional horoscope is a piece of guess-work based on subsequent calculation, and is a miscalculation at that, since the day arrived at would appear to belong to the cyclic year Pramādīca in the 19th century and not in the 16th; this information given to the writer of the article by the late L. D. Swamikannu Pillai is presumably correct; in that case, we have to accept the main contention of the article and accept the antedating by thirty years as very probable. On the astronomical data alleged we are not qualified to pronounce; but it is unfortunate that no upholder of the traditional view has yet questioned the statement. The positive argument, though striking, is far from convincing. It is based on an inscription in the temple of Kālakaṇṭheśvara at Aḍayapalam. The inscription records the building of the temple by Appayya Dīkṣita, who in 1582 A.D. had written the *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* as a commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's *Bhāṣya,* had been bathed in gold by Cinna Bomma, had received gifts of

नक्षत्रगणना
(जन्मपत्रिका)

---

[1] Published by the University of Madras, 1930.

[2] See "More about the age and life of Śrīmad Appayya Dīkṣita" by Y. Mahalinga Sastri, *JORM*, III, 140.

gold and lands for teaching the said *Bhāṣya* to five hundred pupils and so on; it also states that the *Dīkṣita* was the author of a hundred works such as the *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi* and the *Kalpataruparimala*. If it can be presumed that the year mentioned is the year of the inscription, then Appayya should certainly have attained the zenith of his glory by then; and it would be much more reasonable to suppose that he was born in 1522 than in 1552. But the inscription provides no evidence as to when it was itself carved, nor even as to when the temple was built (or more likely re-built). The date mentioned need relate only to Appayya's teaching of the *Bhāṣya,* his writing of the *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* and perhaps the honour done to him at Cinna Bomma's court. The word "subsequently (adukkuppin)" is vague, but not devoid of significance; and it would suggest the considerable interval that must have elapsed between this early mark of royal favour and the finishing of his hundred and more works. The building or re-edification of the temple might have fallen anywhere within this period; even if that too be fixed at 1582 A.D., it proves nothing as to the date of the inscription itself. It may well have been the pious work of sons and grandsons. Not even the first signatory can be identified with Appayya, for a certainty; for he himself is referred to as 'Appai Dīkṣitar, while the first signatory calls himself Appa Dīkṣitar. They are variants of the same name, no doubt, and there is no uniformity about the spelling even of our Appayya's name; but a variation in the course of a few words in one and the same inscription may well make us pause, especially when there is no certain means of dating the inscription itself. Other considerations based on the dates of Appayya's known contemporaries are by no means conclusive. All that is certain is that the best part of Appayya's work seems to belong to the second half of the 16th century; whether he died at the close of that century or in the first quarter of the seventeenth is uncertain.

For our purpose here, it is also immaterial. There can be no doubt that the *Siddhāntaleśa* is one of the earliest, if not the earliest of Appayya's. While showing undoubted mastery of the varieties of advaita doctrine, it exhibits very little of his own genius, except in the discussion of sarvamukti at the end of the fourth chapter. The prefatory remark that the author is setting down what he learnt from his father, for the purpose of his own mental clarification, may be taken at its face value, as indicating the comparatively early stage of the author's development. We have not yet the vigorous polemic writer; much less do we have the syncretist who blended with such an eminent degree of success the system taught by his father with the system he expounded by royal command, infusing into both the devotion to Śiva that came through natural piety. Indeed, we have yet no trace of his Śaiva leanings, but a rather marked indication of his not having developed any "sectarianism" (if it may be so called) when he speaks of the Gaṅgā as flowing from the toe of Viṣṇu. When his devotion to Śiva develops and he tries to establish the superiority of Śiva as identical with Saguṇa Brahman, not Saṃhāra Rudra, we find him elaborately trying to show that there are two rivers called Gaṅgā, that one flowed out of Viṣṇu's toe but fell down the side of Meru straight into the sea, while that which is worn by Śiva on his head is another Gaṅgā, whose fruitful waters course along different lands bringing joy and plenty everywhere before they finally unite with the sea.[3]

I

The *Siddhāntaleśa* is much more than a catalogue of varieties of advaita doctrine. The author's mind has reacted on the views expounded and some evidence of it is found in the way he arranges the views on each topic. The order is not necessarily chronological, though it may be so in a few cases. In the very first topic, for instance, the first view expounded, that study of the Vedānta is an apūrva-vidhi, is that of the author of the *Prakaṭārtha*, while the last view, that there is no injunction at all, is that of Vācaspati; and Vācaspati was certainly earlier than the author of the *Prakaṭārtha*, who abused the former in vile language for his alleged slavish adoption of Maṇḍana's views. The arrangement of the views is so made that, in most cases, each prior view comes in for criticism from the exponent of the next; criticism is thus immanent, though rarely out of the mouth of Appayya himself. In some cases, Appayya seems either not to have had access to originals or relied on a defective memory.

---

[3] See the *Brahmatarkastava*, vv. 35, 36 and 37. The same prefatory verse about the Gaṅgā flowing from Viṣṇu's toe is found in the *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi* too. This work is posterior to the *Siddhāntaleśa*, but prior to the *Śivādvaitanirṇaya*, since in the discussion of sarvamukti, the former work is referred to, not the latter (see p. 192 of the *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi*).

Thus his references to the *Brahmasiddhi* are uniformly unfortunate in the matter of both commission and omission. A verse quoted in the fourth chapter is ascribed to the *Vārtika,* while it really occurs in the *Brahmasiddhi;* a view ascribed to the *Brahmasiddhi,* as to the nature of the removal of nescience, is not distinctive of that work, and is not found stated there in the words used by Appayya; the criticism of difference is largely based on the *Tattvaśuddhi,* a work later than the *Brahmasiddhi* and expressly based on it in regard to this topic; the view that whatever is cognised is really of one nature alone, sattā, and that therefore difference has no place in valid knowledge is pre-eminently Maṇḍana's;[4] yet it is ascribed to the author of the *Tattvaśuddhi,* who derived it from Maṇḍana and did not add to it in any way.[5] But with all this Appayya is fairly reliable as a guide to the views he summarised.[6]

अज्ञान

It is often said that the Hindu habit of writing commentaries and sub-commentaries on given cryptic texts has not been favourable to originality or the development of thought. A study of the *Siddhāntaleśa* will help to dispel such delusions. Bound as the writers no doubt felt themselves to be by the doctrines of the

---

[4] "mīyamānai-'ka-rūpeṣu na niṣedho 'vakāśavān||"
—*Brahmasiddhi,* p. 58.

[5] See Appendix for quotation from *Tattvaśuddhi.*

[6] Some attempts has been made to trace Appayya's quotations, and references. As the literature is vast and much of it is unpublished, any attempt to make out an exhaustive list takes an unconscionable time. The present editor has had to content himself for the moment with the little he has done, in the hope that his further work in post-Śaṅkara advaita will help him to complete the list in the fullness of time.

Vedānta Sūtras as interpreted by Śaṅkara, they yet show considerable variation and originality in tackling the various problems in detail. The questions they solve are not merely of exegetic interest, as in the consideration of the question whether there is a vidhi in respect of Vedānta study, but of profound logical and psychological interest as well. The illusionism that they apparently profess does not blind them to problems on the empirical plane and the solutions suggested display considerable ingenuity, to say the least. No one who reads the lengthy discussion of the nature and function of psychoses[7] will continue in the belief that there is no scope for originality or progress in Hindu thought. And no one who studies the dialectic on difference[8] will imagine that the advaita is a facile intuitionism based on alleged Scriptural declarations and mystic experience, devoid of a cogent intellectual background.

II.

Even where the discussion seems to centre round what the Śruti or Śaṅkara said, it is not without considerable interest to the modern student. In the early part of the third chapter, two questions are raised—as to the competence of the śūdra for Brahman-knowledge, and as to the need for renunciation as a preliminary to Vedānta study. The treatment of both questions shows how Hindu thought has by no means been static or custom-bound. While one view holds that the śūdra is not competent to learn the Veda, that therefore he can neither know nor practise the Vedic rites that are declared to lead to Brahman-knowledge, and that consequently he cannot have Brahman-knowledge, according to another view, learning the Veda is only *one* of the means to Brahman-knowledge and though this is denied to the śūdra, he has other means open to him, such as recital of the sacred five letters (pañcākṣara), the making of gifts and so on; the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras* which denies competence to the śūdra relates only to such Saguṇa meditations as can be learnt from the Vedānta alone; knowledge of the Nirguṇa Brahman in so far as it is learnt from the Vedānta is of course excluded; but in so far as that knowledge can be acquired otherwise, the śūdra is welcome to it, and knowledge in other ways cannot be said to be impossible. We thus seem to find a liberal movement tending to conserve the old prohibitions, but restricting their scope as far as may be consistent with ancient loyalties. But the liberal tendency would not appear to have flourished without check; for, according to another view (mentioned at the close and possibly favoured by Appayya), the observances for which the śūdra is eligible cannot of themselves lead to the required knowledge, but will at best endow him in the next birth with the body of one of the twice-born castes. The movement of reaction is almost proportional to that of reform.[9]

---

[7] Chapter I, section 5 and sub-sections.

[8] Chapter II, section 1 and sub-sections.

Similar movements may be noticed in the treatment of the other question;[10] even among the twice-born, the brahmin alone seems to occupy a position of vantage; for the sake of results both seen and unseen, renunciation is prescribed as a preliminary to study (śravaṇa) of the Vedānta; but according to Scripture, the brahmin alone is entitled to renounce. The most liberal answer to this difficulty is to take Scripture to have used the word "brahmin" figuratively, as a synecdoche implying a reference to all twice-born castes; and this is the answer according to the upholders of one view. Others, no less liberal, would have it that though figurative implication may not be justly resorted to, renunciation, which no doubt is restricted to brahmins, is not a necessary preliminary to Vedānta study; where the student is eligible to renounce he should certainly do so; but kṣatriyas and vaiśyas, who are not so eligible, may proceed to the study without renunciation; else even devas, who cannot renounce, since no karma is enjoined for them, would be ineligible for study. In thus exalting the kṣatriya and vaiśya almost to the level of devas, this reformer laid himself open to a flank attack; the devas, it was said, have no need to renounce, since they do not require its result seen or unseen; they are not bound to perform any karma; hence there is no distinction to be secured by saṃnyāsa; as for its unseen result, that must have been secured by renunciation in prior existences; the devas do not have to renounce, just as they do not have to learn the Veda by rote from a teacher; but their position can be of no help in determining the competence of kṣatriyas and vaiśyas; these, like the widower, are eligible for study of a kind; that study, however, will lead not to Brahman-knowledge, but to re-birth as a brahmin. Reaction has set in with its belief in permanent hierarchies; and the belief in re-birth proves a potent weapon against reform.

---

[9] See Sections 1·421, and 1·422, Chapter III.

[10] See Sections 2·14, 2·141, 2·142, 2·143, Chapter III. One may be strongly tempted to see a chronological development in these views as presented by Appayya; but, for this, of course, there is no justification.

III.

The last part of the fourth chapter deals with the conception of release. The advaitin, believing in a single reality with which he himself is identical, may be expected to care for nothing but his own salvation of which he is eternally assured. Some advaitins do, indeed, go to the extreme of treating everything except their own selves as the presentations of a dream, refusing to admit the existence of other jīvas, released or bound; Scriptural declarations of the release of certain souls are treated as analogous to the release dreamt of in respect of dream creations. But the average advaitin is not a solipsist; the world of experience is for him relatively real; other jīvas exist; what Scripture says about certain souls having been liberated in the past is not a delusion; the present bondage of other souls is as real as his own, and their future release is as certain as his own. Release being but the manifestation of one's own nature, and nothing adventitious, cannot be denied to or withheld from any one. It is not merely the natural right of all, but a right which, being eternally attained, is now unattained as it were. Universal salvation is more than a possibility; it is a logical necessity. Different souls will, of course, require a greater or less length of time in proportion to their capacity to get rid of nescience. But the final removal of nescience is certain, since nescience is essentially indeterminable as real or unreal. So long, however, as there is a single unreleased soul, nescience is not completely destroyed and there can be no absolute release for any other soul, however far advanced on the path of perfection. For, so long as mirrors exist, there is the possibility of reflection, though with the removal of a particular mirror the reflection therein has merged with the prototype; as long as there are reflecting or distorting media, we have merger, therefore, only with what is capable of being reflected, a bimba as contrasted with a pratibimba, but not merger in that which is above both bimba and pratibimba and is the substrate of both these appearances. In other words, salvation is not the purely personal concern of each individual as such; the release of his brethren is as much to his interest as his own; for, until the final release of all, he can attain oneness not with the Absolute Intelligence, but only with the less perfect form known as Īśvara, whose reflections in nescience are the many jīvas. Nor is this merely the promise of a lesser degree of bliss. It is not that the earliest released souls become so many Īśvaras in the matter of enjoyment. They become identical with the one Īśvara and perform his functions of sustaining and governing the world. They have thus not only the privileges but also the responsibilities of lordship. It is only when by the due exercise of these functions other souls too come to realise their birthright that nescience is once for all destroyed. There is no possibility of further reflection; hence there is no more distinction of bimba and pratibimba, Īśvara and jīva, but an assured and final realisation of oneness with the Absolute. Such a doctrine, says Appayya, is not an invention of his own, but underlies Śaṅkara's own teaching, as he seeks to show by a consideration of numerous passages from the *Bhāṣya.* The conception seems to be at least as old as Vācaspati, among post-Śaṅkara advaitins. And there can be no doubt that, as elaborated by Appayya Dīkṣita, it will be eminently acceptable to monists of the present day who are required to reconcile their metaphysical conclusions with the insistent claims of individuality.

The notion is not free from difficulties, the most important of which relates to the assumption that the temporal process can come to an end in time. So long as we are concerned with the release of this or that soul, we take it for granted that the world process will go on for other souls and that for the released soul what happens is a psychological change; it is no longer aware of anything outside itself, merged as it is in pure consciousness; there is no time for it, since there is nothing for it outside of itself, but time as such is not annulled, since it continues to be perceived by other bound souls. It is *prima facie* absurd to conceive of any time when time comes to an end. Universal salvation, however pleasing as a concept, cannot be real in the sense of what can be actualised in time. Despite its appeal to the populace, it is an illogical blend of mutually exclusive concepts of time and timelessness, postulating as it does that timelessness can be achieved in time.

Two replies are possible. It is not necessary for the advaitin to say that at any particular point of time all souls will be released, though he cannot but say that release cannot be withheld from any soul that seeks it. Ultimate release, though an inevitable metaphysical assumption on advaita principles, need not be conceived as actually attained at any particular time. Viewed from the finite standpoint, progress towards absolute perfection may be but asymptotic, while for him who achieves the absolute view-point, perfection is eternally attained. And since all sacred teaching is for the unreleased, it is surely reasonable to teach that what is achieved by each jīva through striving and enlightenment in time is lordship (Īśvaratva), not the non-temporal Brahmanhood. Transcendence of time is implied only when there are no more souls to be governed and Īśvaratva automatically comes to an end. But this is no more than a logical possibility. The jīvas in actuality are so numerous and of such different grades of perfection, the path to perfection is beset with so many difficulties and dangers, and the activities of souls in the acquisition and enjoyment of karma seem to involve so much more of backsliding than progress, that the sublimation of Īśvaratva into Brahman-hood can hardly be contemplated as anything more than a bare possibility.

Such a reply is certain to provoke the rejoinder that what is questioned is not the actuality but even the logical possibility. If universal release is logically possible, that should also become actual at some time, however distant. It may not be near enough to rouse hope or to instil fear; but at some time it is bound to occur; else there is no meaning in talking of it as a possibility. And when it does occur, what happens to time? Does not your statement come to this—that time at a particular point of itself annuls itself? And is this not the very absurdity which is being criticised?

Granted that this is an absurdity, it is difficult to see how it can be avoided on any variety of advaita doctrine. For any soul that is released the temporal process ceases to be; this cessation comes about in and through time; good works are performed in time, the desire to know arises in time, knowledge is acquired in time, and release (whether in embodiment or on the perishing of the body) is secured in time. For that soul, then, time has ceased to be, by acts in time and at a particular point of time. If this conception is contradictory and unintelligible, then advaita should be abandoned, not merely a particular variety thereof; for all advaitins hold that the real is the timeless, that though attained it is unattained, as it were, and that the temporal process leads to that attainment, that is to say, to its own annulment. And it is a commonplace that this doctrine of reality is based on an extensive critique of categories like space, time and cause. Turn which way he will, the advaitin of whatever shade of thought has to say that finite activities in time cause the attainment of the infinite a-temporal Brahman. It is irrelevant to say that time continues to exist for the unreleased soul; for the question is whether it exists for the released soul, and if not, how it came to annul itself by temporal processes and at a point of time. The appeal to unreleased souls is as ineffective as the Berkeleyan appeal to other souls and to God to conserve the reality of a world which had first been dissolved into ideas. And this is the second reply which the advocate of universal salvation may give to his critics.

But the *tu quoque* argument, though rhetorical, can hardly be conclusive. It can only give room to the non-advaitin to tell the advaitin "Despite your vaunted criticism of the categories and your insistence on intelligibility you are in an *impasse* as great as any you brought us to. On your principles, we cannot see how *any* of you can be saved, to say nothing of *all*. Eternal damnation rather would seem to be the lot of all of you, for you condemn time while yet you cannot transcend it". Assuming the validity of the advaitin's criticism of whatever is phenomenal, including time, let us see more closely what happens in release. By constant meditation on the defective nature of the phenomenal and on the one true Reality which is perfect, infinite, timeless and identical with himself, the jīva attains that supreme self; this attainment is called release; it is the dawn of perfect unshakable realisation; it may or may not synchronise with physical death; where it precedes disembodiment we speak of the jīvan-mukta. But when the light has dawned, is there any distinction of time? Does he say, "Yesterday I was not released, today I am released, tomorrow my body will perish and I shall be fully released"? A person may conceivably say this, but there is no justification for calling him a released person on advaita principles. When really there is attainment, the mukta does not see himself as different from others; for him there can be no before and after; he cannot preach, for there is none to preach to; he cannot talk of his bondage, for that was in his ignorance, and ignorance has ceased to be, and he cannot intelligently speak of the non-existent; by constant contemplation of the true and the timeless as the substrate of the fleeting and the temporal, he has become the timeless; for him timelessness alone is real, not the becoming; it is we who say he was released at a particular time; in his own realisation release has not *come to be;* it was, is and will ever be; if the body continues he does not cognise it as such; it is we who sometimes see it functioning and imagine that there is a further degree of release to be secured or resecured at its death; but the attainment of release *in time* whether at death or at a previous instant is purely a creation of our imagination still obscured by nescience; for the released soul there is no time, not because time committed suicide in time, but because *for him* time was not, is not and will not be. If this is the explanation of individual salvation, it may be extended to universal salvation too. Timelessness appears illogically enough to be achieved in and through time. But the appearance and its illogical nature last only so long as we stand over against it as finite spectators bound in nescience. When we are all released, the temporal process would not appear as such at all. We shall be conscious only of timelessness, not of timelessness as produced by and in time, for the concepts of time and production would alike have been transcended. To put it in other words: the world of time coming to an end in time would arouse logical difficulties only on the assumption of a finite mind like ours bound in the categories of nescience; but on the hypothesis of universal salvation there will be no such mind left when the world of time comes to an end; for the released soul there is no problem calling for reconciliation; the unreleased soul which has problems exists no longer since it too has been released. Whence then the difficulty? As we are at present situated, the concept of the transcendence of time presents, no doubt, difficulties enough.[11] But these are not peculiar to the view of universal salvation. And they are not greater than the difficulties in conceiving time to be real. We are forced to take time to be an appearance of the non-temporal. How exactly the latter appears as the former we with our finite intelligence are unable to say, though we feel ourselves forced to stop nowhere short of the assumption of the timeless. But even if, in the last resort, we are compelled to liken the transcendence of time to suicide, that does no violence to commonsense; knowledge that arises in time may consume time, even as the fire that breaks out in the bamboo forest does not spare the bamboos that generated it.

The doctrine of universal salvation (sarvamukti) is clearly favoured by Appayya. Throughout the present work, that is the only doctrine for which his personal preference is clearly indicated; and this preference is further shown by the statement and defence of it in the *Śivādvaitanirṇaya.* It is in the light of this doctrine that he discards certain views of the relation of Īśvara and the jīva, though he says nothing about it where he expounds those views; and, wherever possible, this may be used as a test of Appayya's own attitude towards certain advaita doctrines,—whether they square with the doctrine of universal salvation.[12]

---

[11] In the last resort, problems like those of time are insoluble by mere Logic; for, the Logical concepts, which are in and of the phenomenal world, can at best indicate but not grasp the noumenal substrate. A philosophical pursuit of Logic will, however, lead to the favouring of those concepts which by their coherence clearly indicate their own fulfilment in what is above Logic.

IV.

A word may be said about jīvan-mukti before we pass to a consideration of other topics. Consistently with the theory above set forth, we shall have to hold that the jīvan-mukta is he who has really found release and has consequently no longer any conceit of "I" and "mine" in the body etc.; and he who has such a conceit, however perfect he may otherwise be, can be treated only as on the path to release, though release be imminent; he may be figuratively spoken of as already released, in order to hearten those who are much farther removed from the goal. Such a view is maintained by Maṇḍana Miśra and mentioned as a possible view by Sarvajñātman; but there is no indication of Appayya having adopted it unless it be the mention of it last in his own treatment of the topic[13] and the accord of that view with what he says, later, that release consists in the attainment of the state of Īśvara. For, the continued existence of the body for a while may be explained as due to the residue of prior momentum, on the analogy of the potter's wheel, while the apparently intelligent functioning of that body may well be due to its control not by a jīva who has a conceit of identity therewith, but by Īśvara with whom that jīva has become one by intuitive realisation. The main reason for formulating jīvan-mukti is the need for reliable preceptors of advaita, persons who can speak with certitude from experience, not from mere intellectual cognition. If the released person lives no more as one of us, he cannot teach us; and no one else is qualified to teach us; how then can advaita be taught, much less realised? This difficulty disappears on the above view, since there can be teaching through the bodily frame of the released soul, as inspired by the Lord with which that soul has become one. There is nothing repugnant to the lordship of the supreme māyin in thus actuating a product of māyā; and in certain theistic systems like the Śaiva Siddhānta it is the Lord himself who is acknowledged to act as the preceptor whether in a divine or a human garb.[14] The majority of advaitins, however, have held that in the so-called jīvan-mukta there is a trace or residuum of nescience and for this residue they have sought various explanations and analogies. They have sought to separate the projective energy of nescience from its obscuring energy and maintained the continuance of the former even when the latter is removed; an

---

[12] A writer in the *Indian Culture*, (Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 243—246) attempts a critique of Appayya's doctrine of release without a clear understanding of that doctrine or its antecedents. The conception of universal salvation is not specifically Śaiva. There is talk of sarvamukti as early as Vācaspati. A dilemma (on p. 245) is supposed to clinch the argument: if the released soul feels his continuity with what he was, as conditioned, he is not wholly released, since, in release, there are no upādhis; if he does not feel that continuity, he cannot be omniscient and hence cannot be Īśvara; hence, release must be identification with Pure Consciousness, in which case, the above question does not arise. But is it not possible for the Lord to be aware of Himself as continuous with the bound soul, without Himself being bound? May he not have the knowledge "That which appeared to be bound was Myself"? Is it not analogous to the experience of the ordinary intelligent man who says "That which appeared to be in the mirror was my face"? The dilemma will not hold water.

[13] See sections 1·1 to 1·4, Chapter IV.

[14] See, further, section X of the Introduction to the *Bhāmatī Catussūtrī* (Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, 1933).

example is the continued perception of reflection so long as a mirror or other reflecting medium is present, even though the illusion that the reflection is an independent entity has been removed. But the perception of the reflection here is due to the presence of a limiting adjunct, an upādhi, viz., the mirror; is the jīvan-mukta similarly conditioned by upādhis? If so, how can he be said to be "released?" The same difficulty applies to all other illustrations, such as the smell of garlic in a vessel that once contained it.

V.

Release is characterised as happiness or bliss; it is not mere cessation of misery; grades of happiness are admitted by the advaitin, but there can be no gradations of mere non-existence.[15] The conception of the goal as positive is significant, marking off advaita, as it does, from nihilistic Buddhism and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the topic has not been treated at any length. Here again, the discussion would have greatly benefited from a reference to the *Brahmasiddhi*,[16] a work mentioned elsewhere in this chapter without much point. Absence of misery, says Maṇḍana, is not happiness, for the two, misery and happiness, may be experienced together by a person half immersed in a cool tank on a hot day. If mere absence of misery constituted any kind of happiness, he who is being tortured in one hell ought to be happy, because, at least for the time, he is spared other tortures elsewhere. Further this alleged negative nature is inconsistent with the experience of grades of happiness derived from different objects and through different means. If all that is sought be the cessation of a particular want, say hunger, why should there be the search for rich or tasty food? It may be said that not everything pleases, but only the object desired; and this causes happiness by satisfying and thus extinguishing the desire that was the cause of tension and misery; it is therefore the extinction of desire and the consequent extinction of misery that constitute happiness. This might be so, Maṇḍana replies, if enjoyment of the desired object extinguished desire. But the reverse is notoriously the case; enjoyment becomes a habit and is repeatedly sought after. And, on the other hand, desire may cease, not through enjoyment, but through realising the worthlessness of what is desired. In such a case, absence of desire does not equate with happiness. Nor is it true that, in all cases, happiness is proportionate to desire and effort. Very often that which is gained with less tension and effort gives us greater happiness; and what is greatly desired and sought may cause misery in the end; further it is truer to say that happiness conditions desire rather than that desire conditions happiness; it is true that because of our station in life we desire certain things straightaway without knowing that they will cause happiness; but this is because of our experience in a previous birth; this is intelligible since those very experiences condition our present station in life. Attachment to happiness has no doubt been condemned; but what is meant is the seeking after the lower, impermanent and impure forms of pleasure; attachment to the Highest which is Bliss is not rāga any more than turning away from saṃsāra is dveṣa. It is because the Highest is Bliss, and because we are identical with the Highest, that even in bondage the self is the object of supreme love (parama-premā-'spada); and it is because all finite things partake, in some measure, of the nature of the Supreme, that all creatures are declared to subsist on a fraction of that Bliss. It will easily be realised how far such a notion is from nihilism or pessimism.

---

[15] See section 2·42, Chapter IV.

[16] See the Brahmakāṇḍa, pp. 1—3.

VI.

The need for constant reference to two planes of thought introduces some confusion in the description of the attainment of release. Is it really attained or is it only attained as it were? Both modes of speech are justifiable. And thus we find different schools, some maintaining that attainment is figurative, while others say that the word is used in the primary sense.[17] The justification for the former view is that in truth release is eternally attained, that it is like the forgotten golden ornament round one's own neck and that there is but realisation of what already exists. Some adherents of the latter view hold that though release is not produced (for, it would then be subject to destruction), it is legitimate to speak of it as caused by cessation of ignorance with the dawn of knowledge; for there is a causal connection between A and B, if when A exists B comes to be at the very next instant, though B is essentially such that it does not derive its existence from A. Yet others say that in the state of bondage consciousness (cit) alone is manifest, but not bliss (ānanda); and since in release there is genuine manifestation of bliss, release may be said to be *attained* by knowledge. It is worth noting that this last view is rejected by Vācaspati for very valid grounds. It is not true that cit alone is manifested, not ānanda;[18] it is a commonplace of experience insisted on by śruti that the self is experienced as the object of supreme love and that there is happiness, however imperfect, derived from the essential bliss of the self. Vācaspati himself inclines to the first view that attainment of release and abandonment of transmigration are figurative.[19] A fourth view takes the empirical point of view that bliss, though eternal, is not *immediately* manifested in saṃsāra; and since release brings about such manifestation, it may be really said to be the attainment of the unattained. This view too fails to recognise that we do have experience of happiness and that for all its imperfection it is yet a fraction of the bliss that is Brahman. It may be urged that from bondage to release there is a real progress in that we advance from fractions to the whole:

---

[17] Sections 3·1, 3·2, 3·31, 3·32, Chapter IV.

> "On earth the broken arcs, in heaven the perfect round."

But that would be to understand the Absolute as a sum of parts. It is not that the whole does not exist or results from the addition of parts; though eternal, it is manifested but partially to us in bondage. And since manifestation too is not an added virtue, but is of the essential nature of the Absolute, we seem forced to say in the last resort that, from the absolute point of view, attainment is but figurative.

---

[18] See the *Bhāmatī*, p. 40 (*TPH*).

[19] *Bhāmatī*, pp. 155, 156 (*TPH*).

VII.

This "attainment as it were" and "abandonment as it were" are due to knowledge. But, as Vācaspati says, "Even a thousand rope-cognitions cannot, indeed, alter the character of the really present snake. In the case, however, of those, which being super-imposed are desired to be either attained or abandoned, it is possible to attain as it were or abandon as it were, by the mere intuition of the truth, without dependence on any extrinsic observances. For they exist by the superimposition alone."[20] The demonstration that the world of difference is but superimposed on the single absolute self is thus of cardinal importance and has exercised the minds of many advaitins, beginning at least as early as Maṇḍana. Some of Maṇḍana's arguments will be found summarised in the Introduction and the notes to the *Bhāmatī*, reference to which is invited. Appayya naturally devotes some space to this topic in the early sections of the second chapter. He draws principally on the *Tattvaśuddhi* and the *Nyāyasudhā*. As already noted, the former draws its inspiration from the *Brahmasiddhi*. Difference is not established either by perception or by inference. Perception is of the one real, differences being subsequently superimposed thereon. We see that the pot is real, the cloth is real, and so on; the reality that is constant in all these is the true content of perception. When the true content of all perception is thus one, there is no room for negation or difference. Let us assume for a moment that difference too is perceived. Then perception would have two functions, positive and negative, the former relating to the proper nature of what is perceived, the latter to its difference from others. These two functions, affirmation and negation, cannot obviously be simultaneous; one must come first. Now negation cannot be the first, since it involves the positive knowledge of what is denied and that of which it is denied (the niṣedha-pratiyogin and the niṣedha-viṣaya). These must depend on an antecedent perception, about which there arises the question whether it is primarily affirmative or negative; unless we admit the primary function to be affirmative we seem condemned to an infinite regress. Granted this primary affirmative character, there is no room for negation too being a function; for cognition does not arise first and then function; it arises as affirming or denying; when once it has arisen as affirmative, it is idle to contend that it subsequently denies as well, for that would be to urge that the same cognition is born twice over, affirmatively as well as negatively; that is absurd in the case of cognitions, which are momentary; if negation be said to be the function of another cognition, that again pre-supposes an affirmation and we are in the old round. Nor can we say that affirmation is itself negation; is it negation of everything else in the world? If so what is the justification for calling this perception? For perception is cognition of what is in sense-contact and the negative cognition of everything else in the world obviously includes much that is not and cannot be in sense-contact. Therefore, difference is not established through perception. Much less can it depend on inference, since inference is based on concomitance of the perceived;

---

[20] *Bhāmatī*, p. 156 (*TPH*).

where perception can establish no difference at all, inference is no more capable of it. Further, inference proceeds on a basis of difference, that between *probans* and *probandum* and subject, that between positive and negative instance and so on; if inference were invoked to establish difference it would be a case of *petito principii*, since it would pretend to prove what it is itself based on. As for testimony, it has been shown by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the samanvaya-sūtra[21] that the harmonious purport of all Vedānta texts is non-dualism.

VIII.

There can be no objection to the superior validity of śruti in matters like the present which are supersensuous. It is of greater value than other pramāṇas since it is admittedly free from defect; and, as this cognition arises subsequently to perception and inference, it, like the cognition "This is not silver", occupies the position of sublater with reference to the other two. The principle of the subsequent sublating the earlier is known as the apaccheda-nyāya. It holds where the later cannot arise except as contradicting the earlier cognition, as in "This is silver" and "This is not silver." Where the subsequent cognition can come into being even otherwise and the whole context is governed by syntactical unity with the sense of what comes first, then the initial cognition is predominant and overrules whatever comes later. This is the principle known as upakrama-nyāya. In the present case, scriptural cognition of non-difference cannot come into being except as contradicting the alleged perceptual cognition of difference; hence the apaccheda-nyāya applies and the latter is sublated by the former.[22] Nor is it the case that the former cannot arise except in dependence on perceptual knowledge of words, sentences etc., for, even if we do not agree with those who hold that there is only such perception of words etc., as is common to valid knowledge and delusion, there is no need to concede more than empirical reality to perceptual cognition; and this reality is not inconsistent with it, being transcended on the realisation of non-difference.[23]

---

[21] *Vedānta Sūtras,* I, i, 4. On the whole topic of this paragraph see I: 6 and section 1 and its sub-sections in Chapter II.

It is not that Scripture overrides perception in every case. We certainly do not admit its authority where it contradicts experience saying that "stones float" or asks us to "cook the golden grains." In such cases we say that there is no purport in the literal sense of śruti, as the six marks of purport are not coincident; or even if it be difficult to deny purport we say that śruti trespasses into the limited field of empirical reality which we have marked off for perception; the heat of fire, the hardness of gold, the weight of stones, these are definitely within the sphere of perception, and Scripture has no application thereto; or our denial of the application of śruti may be due to our incapacity to do what we are asked to do by Scripture; cooking in the sense of softening is impossible in the case of golden grains; we therefore interpret it to mean nothing more than heating. On any one of these views may be justified our adoption of secondary implication (lakṣaṇā) for Scriptural passages that conflict with perception. When, however, perception pretends to declare the nature of ultimate reality, it is obviously doing something outside its scope; and its sublation of śruti is legitimate.

---

[22] Sections 1·6, 2·1, 2·2 and sub-sections of 2·3, Chapter II.

[23] Section 3, 3·1, 3·2 and 3·3, Chapter II.

IX.

The world of perception is illusory. There is not much discussion of different views of illusion. But the view of anirvacanīyakhyāti is mentioned and justified in the case of some delusions like reflections and dreams. According to this view, the content of the delusive cognition is neither real nor unreal nor a combination of both, but is something which is originated at the time. If it were unreal it would not admit of empirical usage; for the same reason it cannot be what is real at some other time or place, for no such thing can be cognised as immediate or cause practical activity; if it were real, it could not be sublated; to say that it is real and unreal is to violate the law of contradiction; hence it is something indeterminable and originated.

This view of the creation of the illusory has not been consistently adhered to by the advaitins. The view of anyathākayāti, apprehension of what is elsewhere or what is otherwise, has found favour in the explanation of certain illusions, which seem to be manifestly due to external circumstances, like the flower beside the crystal in the cognition of the crystal as red. These are called instances of sopādhika-bhrama; in the explanation of these it is the quality of the upādhi that is said to be apprehended erroneously in the pure substrate. Many of the explanations offered by Vācaspati[24] are of this nature, so much so that his commentator, Amalānanda, feels called upon to defend him against the charge of maintaining anyathākhyāti.[25] This is Vācaspati's explanation of the delusion that a perceived conch-shell is yellow: "the yellow, which resides in the bile that is in contact with the exceedingly pure rays going forth from the eye, is experienced in dissociation from the bile; the shell too is experienced (but) with the whiteness concealed by a defect (in the sense-organ); the non-relation of the yellow colour to the shell is not experienced; because of similarity in respect of non-apprehension of non-relationship, the appositional relation previously seen (in experiences) like 'yellow mass of gold, yellow *bilva* fruit' is imposed on yellowness and shell-ness and one speaks of the yellow shell."[26] Similar explanations are given of the delusion in dreams and in reflections. There are assumed two psychoses in any such explanation, one which apprehends the "this" (in the experience "this is silver"), or the colourless shell (in the experience "the shell is yellow"), and the other, which apprehends the silver-ness or yellowness present elsewhere. Now, in one way or another, it is the business of a psychosis to remove ignorance. Does the first psychosis of the "this" perform this function? If it does not, it is no psychosis. If it does, then ignorance being destroyed there is no longer the material cause of delusion; hence there can be no illusion of silverness or yellowness.

---

[24] *Bhāmatī*, pp. 18—19 (*TPH*).

[25] *Kalpataru*, p. 24 (Anantakṛṣṇa Sastri's edn.).

[26] *Bhāmatī*, p. 18 (*TPH*).

At least two attempts are made to conserve the view of two psychoses.[27] According to one of these the "this"-psychosis does remove ignorance, but only about this-ness, not about the variety of the content. Another view says that though ignorance is destroyed in its obscuring (āvaraṇa) aspect, it is not destroyed in its projective (vikṣepa) aspect. Hence it is that in spite of the cognition of "this" as "this" it continues to be perceived as silver or as yellow. A *modus vivendi* by sub-division and adjustment is always interesting, but does not take us far in the present instance. The explanation would be satisfactory, if a cognition of the bare "this" were possible at any time. We never have a perception of a bare "here" and "now", super-adding to it a cognition of "thus" or "thus". From its very origination our cognition is of a "that-what", though the "that" and the "what" fall apart on reflection and are found to be inadequate each to the other even in what we call true cognition. But it runs counter to experience to say that the "that" and the "what" are the contents of different psychoses. What, for instance, can be the nature of the psychosis of the shell in the delusion "The shell is yellow"? The whole experience is visual; the first psychosis too is obviously visual. But can there be any visual psychosis which does not apprehend some colour? If not, what is the colour apprehended? It is not white, else there would be no delusion. It is not yellow, else there would be no second psychosis apprehending yellowness. It is not some other colour, as that is contrary to experience. It cannot be cognition of the colourless, as there can be no visual cognition of such a nature.

---

[27] Sections 5·151 and 5·152; Chapter I.

In truth, then, there is only one psychosis, whether of the form "The shell is yellow" or of the form "This is silver". When there is defect, like bile in the sense-organ, or like desire, greed etc. in the percipient, and the sense-organ comes in contact with the object, there is set up an agitation in nescience, the material cause of delusion, and there results a transformation thereof. This transformation is a "that-what", which on analysis is found to comprise a sense-element and a memory-element, the "that" being sensed and the "what" remembered. But the "what" though supplied by memory is cognised not as part of another remembered object, but as part of a present content, the indeterminable transformation of nescience. If it related merely to what exists elsewhere, this view would be identical with anyathākhyāti and would fail to explain the practical efficiency of the cognition. Though in delusions involving similarity, as in "This is silver", there would seem to be some case for admitting an initial cognition of the substrate as a mere "this", we have to remember the other cases of delusions where such a characterless cognition of the substrate is obviously impossible, as in "the shell is yellow"; and economy would compel us to assume as the cause of illusion what is common to all cases, not what is peculiar to one set alone.[28] Modern psychological knowledge would not warrant the assumption of a psychosis cognising the characterless substrate. Further, the explanation here suggested by Kavitārkika Cakravarti Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya would certainly be more in conformity with the advaitin's general tendency to explain the cognition of attributes as arrived at not by an independent psychosis, but by *analysis* of the indeterminable manifold given in sense-perception.

X

The indeterminable being admitted to be the content of illusory cognition, the insistence on the uniform adoption of this in explaining all illusion seems to have come only from later advaitins. Thus both Vācaspati and Padmapāda look on the reflection not as an indeterminable creation but as identical with the prototype, with certain properties such as facing oneself, being located in the mirror etc., superimposed thereon. As against this, the Advaitavidyācārya[29] maintains that the reflection is but a creation. It is not true that there is no cognition of the reflection as something other than oneself. Children and other unsophiscated persons look for the reflected face in or behind the mirror. When the sublating cognition comes, therefore, it denies the reality of the reflection itself, not merely the location of the original face in the mirror. The identification of the reflected face with the original is due to a later mental process. No doubt in order that there may be a superimposition, residual impressions of past experience are a necessary factor. No one has had in the past a direct visual experience of one's own forehead; in the absence of any such experience or the impression consequent thereon, it may seem impossible to account for the creation of a superimposed forehead in the proximity of the mirror. But there is no rule that superimposition requires as its cause a residual impression of the experience of the very object superimposed. Impression from visual experience of other persons' foreheads, combined with the experience of one's own forehead through senses other than sight, may well account for the superimposition. When we create a chimaera in our imagination, it is not because we have actually had experience of the chimaera, but because we have had

---

[28] On the whole topic see section 5·153, Chapter I; also an article by the present writer on "A Little Known Advaitin", *Journal of the Madras University*, Vol. III, No. 1.

[29] This Ācārya is cited extensively by Appayya and, in nearly every instance, to clinch an argument by stating the final view. It is possible in the nature of things that Appayya refers thus to his own father who was his guru and whose teachings he is trying here to set forth compendiously. We are also told by Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, Appayya's brother's grandson, that Appayya's father, Raṅgarāja Makhin, was the author of several famous works, such as the *Advaitavidyāmukura*, and the *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa* (see *Nalacaritranāṭaka* of Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, Balamanorama Series, p. 3: "tasya ca pañcamaḥ sūnur advaitavidyāmukuravivaraṇadarpaṇādy-aneka-prabhanda-nirmātā śīlita eva śrī raṅgarājādhvarī"). Some Mss. of Nalacaritranāṭaka refer to the *Advaitamukura*, and it is under this name that a very imperfect but interesting Ms. is found

---

in the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Mysore. It runs only to the end of the first pariccheda and the material therein gives no room for a positive identification. Of the other work, *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa*, an imperfect Ms. in Nandināgari is to be found in the Tanjore Palace Library (see No. 7064 of the Descriptive Catalogue by P. P. S. Sastri, Vol. XXI, p. 5206). There is a reference to the *Vivaraṇaprakāśa*, as another book of Raṅgarāja's in the available fragment of the *Advaitamukura;* this is probably another name for the *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa.*

experiences of the several elements which we put together in our imagination to constitute the chimaera. The advocates of the *Vivaraṇa* view set up a wholly implausible theory when they say that, in reflection, rays of light proceeding from the eyes of the observer are turned back by the reflecting medium, go back to the prototype face and apprehend it. Do these reflected rays go straight back to one's own face and nowhere else? If so, how is it that we see reflections of other objects too by the side of our reflected face? If the rays be admitted to reach the other objects as well, how is it that they do not reach to one who is right behind us and cause the apprehension of his face too? Again, in looking at a clear sheet of water, how is it that some rays from the eyes are reflected back while others penetrate the water and apprehend the sandy bottom? If it be said that some rays are turned back because they are exceedingly delicate, how is it that these same delicate rays go up against the much stronger rays of the sun, reach and apprehend the solar orb, thus causing the cognition of the reflection of the sun? Again, if the reflection is identical with the prototype, should not the former have the properties of the latter? Yet who ever heard of a reflection of the moon being cool, as the moon is? For these and other reasons the Advaitavidyācārya has no hesitation in rejecting the teaching of the *Vivaraṇa* school on this point.

The view that the reflection is an illusory creation offers some difficulties on the view that the jīva is a reflection; for then the jīva too would be illusory and there would be none to be released. Our Ācārya gets over the difficulty saying that it is peculiar only to the view that holds the jīva to be a reflection and that there is no such difficulty on the avaccheda view, according to which Pure Consciousness is defined as it were in the form of the jīva. From the position which he assigns to it in the discussion and the elaborate way in which he explains it, Appayya would seem to have considerable sympathy with the view of reflection as an illusory creation. But we have seen in dealing with sarvamukti that he is forced to reject the avaccheda view, while the present view of reflection seems to go with the rejection of the view that the jīva is a pratibimba. It is difficult, therefore, to say whether he definitely accepts here the theory of Advaitavidyācārya or whether he merely states it as a view worthy of consideration. What is interesting in this view of reflection is the attempt to affirm one uniform principle in all illusion, whether due to an external adjunct (sopādhika) or otherwise. It cannot be that in certain cases there is transference of attributes from elsewhere, while in others the content is an illusory creation.

It is worth examining whether this uniformity cannot be secured without making out the content of the superimposition to be wholly illusory. When there is experience of nacre-silver, what is it that is created—silver or silver-ness? We cannot say that there is experience only of a "this," that "silverness" belonging somewhere else is brought over here and associated with the "this"; for, we are active in regard to "this", and not because of its "this-ness", but because of *its* "silverness"; the "silverness" that belongs elsewhere cannot cause activity here and now. We have already, in discussing the Cakravarti's view, seen reason to reject the hypothesis of two psychoses one relating to the "this" and another to "silver". We have, then, a single psychosis of the form "this-silver", a "that-what". The "that"-element of this indeterminable "that-what" need not itself be illusory; it is the "what"-element, the silverness, that is illusory. In the whole experience, it will be sufficient to postulate the illusory creation not of silver but of silver-ness. Similarly, when it is said that the jīva is a reflection, illusoriness follows not for the jīva, but only for the jīvatva of Pure Consciousness. That this jīvatva is an illusory creation any advaitin may admit without fear of denying the possibility of release.

It is by no means certain either that the avaccheda view is inconsistent with sarvamukti. As Appayya himself has shown towards the close of his *Parimala* on I, i, 4, Vācaspati holds the avaccheda view, though, following the Sūtrakāra, he uses the analogy of reflection legitimately enough. The jīva *is* not a reflection, but he may be likened to a reflection for purposes of exposition. And Vācaspati would appear to be a believer in universal salvation, though he develops the doctrine nowhere and makes only a casual reference to it.[30] But it is evident that to him at least no inconsistency was apparent in holding together the views of avaccheda and sarvamukti. Appayya's own criticism of the avaccheda view is not quite sound.[31] The point

[30] See the *Bhāmatī* on *Ved. Sū.*, II, iii, 40 (Anantakṛṣṇa Sastri's edition, p. 617).

[31] See foot-note to the translation of section 4·21, Chapter IV, also Acyuta Kṛṣṇānanda's comment. The latter is translated here. "This is to be considered here: intelligence is of itself eternally released. For

of that criticism is the contingence of fresh bondage for the released soul, if a multiplicity of souls be admitted, and the souls treated as Pure Consciousness defined by, not reflected in, nescience or its product, the internal organ. But as noted by the commentator, Acyuta Kṛṣṇānanda, the alleged contingence is not at all clear. It is true that even when definition by one internal organ has ceased, there may be definition afresh of Pure Consciousness by another internal organ; but with this there is not proved fresh bondage for the jīva that was released. According to Appayya, it would follow that on the avaccheda view release of any kind is not possible, no matter whether it be the attainment of Īśvaratva or the merger in pure intelligence. Our author has evidently a long way to travel before he comes to a

this, as beginninglessly defined or conditioned or defined by an adjunct, there is the state of the jīva and bondage; this is settled. And thus that part of intelligence for which, as dependent on an adjunct, there was bondage prior to release, not for that can fresh bondage be brought about. For, through the removal of that adjunct at the time of release, there is removal (also) of the former locus of bondage, dependent on that (adjunct). Nor is it possible to bring about that (fresh bondage) to the released pure intelligence. For, even when for that there is attainment of the status of another jīva on the conjunction of the adjunct of some other bound jīva, since there is no contingence of bondage for *him* who was formerly bound and then released, the statement 'because of the contingence of fresh bondage' is not possible. Further, when for the released intelligence there is, through conjunction of another internal organ, the attainment of the state of some other jīva having that (organ) as adjunct, there is not possible the recollection 'I who was formerly a transmigrator and was somehow released, I myself have again reached to transmigration'; for there is no identity of adjunct as between the bound jīva and the released jīva. And thus, since this attainment of the state of another jīva can do nothing, it does not import any defect. Similarly, even the earlier mentioned attainment of the state of another jīva of the nature of a reflection can do nothing (to import a defect into the theory)."

proper appreciation of the avaccheda view, as found in the *Parimala*.

XI.

The avaccheda view is not based solely or mainly on the difficulty mentioned above that if the jīva be a reflection and if reflections are illusory creations, there would be none to be released. The more serious difficulty it alleges against the reflection theory is the impossibility of a reflection of intelligence. Reflections are invariably of objects possessing colour in media possessing colour. When neither the prototype (intelligence) nor the reflecting medium (nescience) possesses colour, how can there be a reflection of one in the other? As the Bhāṭṭas ask "For sound, odour, taste and the like, how can there be reflectedness?" The apparent limitation of the impartible ether affords a closer approximation to the truth. Though ether is one and indivisible, we treat it as if defined by a pot, a room etc. When a pot is carried from one place to another, it is the pot alone that is moved, not the ether; how can the pervasive ether be moved from place to place? In the same way pure consciousness is defined, as it were, by nescience or its products, the diverse internal organs. Which is accepted as the limiting adjunct depends on whether nescience is admitted to be one or many. On the former view, the internal organs are the adjuncts and on the latter view, the nesciences themselves function as the adjuncts. Even on such a view, there is possibility of sarvamukti; for the latter is based on the conception of man's nature as eternally and essentially intelligence.

The realisation of this is release; it may be delayed more or less, but can never be denied. Since the avaccheda view has no objection to employ reflection as an illustration, here too may be accepted the view that till the final release of all, release consists in attaining the status of Īśvara, though this is most intelligible on the view that the jīva is a reflection of Īśvara.

What causes real difficulty, however, is the position of Īśvara on the avaccheda view. Pure intelligence is Brahman; defined intelligences are the jīvas; where does Īśvara come in? The difficulty seems great on the views which recognise a single māyā or nescience and locate it in Brahman. Brahman as defined by māyā in its totality appears as Īśvara; as defined by the many parts of māyā, it appears as the jīvas; as undefined it is Brahman. Such a solution is possible even on the hypothesis of a plurality of māyās or nesciences; as defined by those māyās taken collectively, Brahman will be Īśvara; as defined by them singly, it will be the jīvas. Ākāśa as defined by a group of trees is called a forest; as defined by each particular tree, it is called a tree. On this analogy, then, Īśvara, who is Brahman defined by māyā, would be a kind of collective jīva. He would stand to the jīva in much the same relation as Society or Humanity to individual men. Such a conception is hardly adequate. Creation and destruction generally attributed to Īśvara can hardly be attributed to a collective soul. Society may conserve men and govern them; it can hardly be said to make them or destroy them except in a figurative sense. This is, however, not a serious difficulty for any Hindu philosophical system, since no such system admits the creation or destruction of souls. As for the creation of the material world, since even individual souls are seen to be capable in some measure of fashioning their objects of enjoyment, it does no great violence to imagine the collective soul as creating and destroying the material universe. The more serious defect of the view, however, is that Īśvara thus conceived can hardly occupy the same place as the God of religion. The collective soul is sure to command a certain degree of loyalty even as Society and Humanity; but it can command little of religious awe and adoration. God has to be not merely immanent, but also transcendent; the transcendence is secured in that the collective soul is more than the individual; but the transcendence is not great enough to constitute a marked difference of quality as well; for it is this difference which is implied by the conception of God as a *more,* not a difference of degree alone. That is why movements like the Religion of Humanity can never secure a permanent foundation. Īśvara cannot be merely a collective soul.

It is possible to over-emphasise this aspect of transcendence. This is done by the view which holds Īśvara to be Brahman's reflection in māya, while the jīvas are Brahman's reflection in avidyā; avidyā is distinguished from māyā in that while pure sattva is predominant in the latter, impure sattva is dominant in the former. Such an account would be defective in two ways. Reducing Īśvara too to a reflection, it would make him almost as helpless as the jīva. Such an Īśvara could hardly control the jīvas; for, who ever heard of one reflection controlling another? Much less can He sympathise or help. Whatever may be the merits of the reflection theory, there is little to be said for that variety of it which holds Īśvara too to be a reflection.

Coming back, then, to the avaccheda view, we shall have to turn to some form of it which gives Īśvara a better position than that of a collective soul. The view that nesciences are many and that they are located in the jīvas would seem to be more suitable. On this view, Īśvara is the content of the nesciences, while the jīvas are their loci. Neither Brahman nor Īśvara may be treated as the locus, since this would conflict with their eternal perfection. We have to say, of course, that ignorance like everything else is *in* Brahman, but this is different from the assertion that it *belongs* to Brahman. It belongs to the jīvas; and since jīvas are many, a plurality of nesciences is also assumed.[32] The content of the nescience is Īśvara. This is what it means in other words: for Brahman as pure intelligence there is no question of attributes like omniscience, omnipotence etc. It is the jīva who suffers from his finitude, and feels the lack of these perfections. If they did not belong to his essential nature he would never know of their non-existence; even in feeling their absence, he transcends his apparent finitude; if he does not realise them fully in his own nature it is because of his ignorance; this ignorance *belongs* to him as jīva; it *relates* to the perfections which he lacks and which he considers as embodied elsewhere; the embodiment of these is Īśvara who is thus the *content* of nescience, as contrasted with the jīva who is but the locus. While the loci of the various nesciences are different, their content is in all cases the same Īśvara. Every nescience is bipolar, with Īśvara at one end and a particular jīva at the other.

---

[32] The assumption of many śaktis for one avidyā may reconcile the singleness of avidyā with the plurality of the jīvas; on such a view, however, we have still to say that a śakti of avidyā is destroyed when a particular soul is released; though this is not to say that avidyā itself is destroyed (thus implying the simultaneous release of all jīvas), it is yet difficult to see how a śakti can be destroyed without affecting the possessor of the śakti, for śakti and its possessor are fundamentally non-different. From this point of view, it is simpler to assume a multiplicity of nesciences, one of these being destroyed on the release of each jīva.



When knowledge comes to any jīva there is realisation of the perfection about which there was ignorance; and there is merger of that jīva with Īśvara. But so long as even a single nescience exists the polarity of Īśvara-jīva persists; and the jīva that has attained the status of Īśvara cannot move further and be identified with Brahman. This final merger will be possible only when the said polarity disappears by the ultimate destruction of all nesciences. The view, therefore, that release until the final release of all is but the attainment of the state of Īśvara squares even with this variety of the avaccheda theory of the jīva. A further merit of the present view is that it avoids the defects of overstressing the aspects of God's immanence or transcendence. God is immanent in this view since He is the internal ruler; He is not merely the content of their ignorance, but also the inspirer of their limited knowledge and activity; the jīvas would not know, feel or act even to the limited extent that they do but for their fundamental identity with the omniscient and omnipotent God; the life of the jīva as jīva is possible only because his energies are fragments of the energies of the Lord. But at the same time the jīva is ignorant of the Lord; between his capacities and the Lord's, the difference is great enough to be one of quality; He is more than any jīva or all jīvas put together; for of all the nesciences together He is the wielder,[33] while the jīvas are not the controllers of the nescience said to be located in them, but are under its influence, on the contrary.[34] A collective jīva would be under the influence of collective māyā, whereas Īśvara is the overlord of māyā. The avaccheda view of the jīva is thus more in unison with the essentials of our conception of God, while it makes room for the doctrine of universal salvation so convincingly pressed by Appayya.[35]

---

[33] "māyinam tu maheśvaram": *Śvet. Upa.*, IV, 10.

[34] The jīva would not be what he is but for nescience; in a sense he is the product of nescience; how then can he be the locus of nescience? The answer lies in pointing to the beginningless nature of nescience. An earlier nescience produces the jīva who becomes the locus of subsequent nescience. This means infinite regress, which, however, is no defect in what is admittedly phenomenal and indeterminable. That, indeed, constitutes the nescience-character of nescience; tad evā 'vidyānām avidyātvam.

[35] For a statement of all views as to the relation of the jīva and Īśvara, see section 2·31 and its sub-sections, Chapter I. The sub-sections of section 2·32 discuss the unity or plurality of the jīva and of nescience. A fuller statement of the other views has been avoided in the Introduction.

XII.

The entire choir of heaven and furniture of the earth being reduced to illusion by the advaitin, he has

since it will lead to undue prolixity besides serving no purpose. A great deal of unnecessary refinement was introduced about the time of Vidyāraṇya. Such, for instance, is the tendency to recognise a kūṭastha intelligence or a witness-intelligence as distinct from the jīva, Īśvara and Brahman. Fortunately the interests of parsimony have repeatedly prevailed and we find the counter-tendency to assimilate these extraneous entities to those already recognised. Thus the witness-intelligence has been sought to be identified with a form of Īśvara or a form of the jīva (see sub-sections of section 5·141, Chapter I). There is a variety of the pratibimba-vāda, known as ābhāsa-vāda; the ābhāsa is considered to be wholly illusory, while the reflection, in some views, is real, being identical with the prototype; hence the distinction between the two theories; this view is not noted by Appayya, but is mentioned by Madhusūdana Sasaravatī in the *Siddhāntabindu;* the following is a translation of what he has to say on the whole topic of the distinction between jīva and Īśvara; "The self conditioned by ignorance, who has come to be identified with ignorance, is, because of non-discrimination from the appearance (ābhāsa) of the intelligence that is Himself, called the internal ruler, the witness, the cause of the world; and he, who is conditioned by the intellect, who has come to be identified with that, is, because of non-discrimination of the appearance (ābhāsa) (therein) of the intelligence that is Himself, called the jīva, the agent, the enjoyer, and the cogniser; thus the Vārtikakārapāda. Because of the difference of the intellect with each body, there is difference in the appearances of intelligence present therein; hence even the intelligence non-discriminated therefrom is cognised as if different. Because of the non-difference, however, of ignorance, and because of the non-existence of difference in the appearance of intelligence present therein, in the case of the witness-intelligence non-discriminated from that (ignorance) there is at no time whatever the manifestation of difference. And on this view, in respect of the words 'That, thou' etc., there is but exclusive secondary implication; for, in respect of the conditioning adjunct together with the appearance (therein), there is abandonment of the sense expressly signified (by those words); while the appearance too is indeterminable, as distinct from the inert and the non-inert. That is stated in the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*: 'Again, when the word Brahman comes to have for express significance ignorance together with the appearance therein (of to account for successful practical activity in the world. There is no doubt that even the illusory is practically

intelligence), then the word *I* comes to have individuation for its express significance; but on that view there is exclusive secondary implication.' Nor may it be said that since bondage is for the appearance alone, while there is release for pure intelligence, there is difference of loci for bondage and release, as well as the unintelligibility of activity (on the part of the appearance) for its own destruction; for, bondage is admitted even of pure intelligence, through the channel of the appearance. That has been said by the Vārtikakārapāda: 'This alone is what is evil, according to us, viz., the experience of the self as a transmigrator'. Therefore it is only the (defective) appearance of pure intelligence that is bondage; and the removal thereof is release; thus there is nothing irreconcilable. Or else, even the intelligence non-discriminated from the appearance is the express significance of the words 'That thou art'; therefore, since there is non-abandonment of part of what is expressly signified, on this view there is but the exclusive-non-exclusive secondary implication; hence there is no defect whatsoever. It is this view which is called *ābhāsavāda*. The prototype intelligence conditioned by ignorance is Īśvara; intelligence as reflected by ignorance defined by the internal organ and its residual impressions is the jīva: thus the author of the *Vivaraṇa*. Intelligence reflected in ignorance is Īśvara; intelligence reflected in the intellect is the jīva; the prototype intelligence conditioned by ignorance is the pure: thus the author of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*. On these two views, the diversity of the jīvas is because of the differences of intellect. Because of the reality of the reflection, in respect of the words 'That, thou' etc., there is but exclusive-non-exclusive secondary implication. It is this view that they call the *pratibimba-vāda*. Intelligence made the content of ignorance is Īśvara: and that which is the locus of ignorance is the jīva; thus says Vācaspati Miśra. And on this view, because of the diversity of ignorance, there is diversity of jīvas. And for each jīva the world is different, since material causality of the world belongs to the jīva alone, as conditioned by his own ignorance. (This is only one possible interpretation of Vācaspati's view. For another, perhaps a sounder, view, see Brahmānanda's commentary on the *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 117; also the introduction to the *Bhāmatī*, *TPH* edn.). And even recognition (of a common world) is because of similarity, while Īśvara's causality is figurative, as being the substrate of the jīva's ignorance together with the world created (therefrom). It is this which is the *avaccheda-vāda*. The prototype intelligence conditioned by ignorance is Īśvara and intelligence reflected in ignorance is the jīva; pure intelligence unconditioned by efficient to a limited extent. The water of the dream quenches the thirst in the dream. But is practical efficiency limited to the same grade of reality as that which is efficient? While some schools incline to this opinion, the Advaitavidyācārya holds that practical efficiency may be even of a higher grade of reality. The need for such a view comes thus. The hostile critic of advaita wants to know how non-dualism is known to be the truth. Presumably because it is based on a valid means of knowledge, say, revelation. But now we have revelation as pramāṇa, non-dualism as the prameya, he who apprehends non-dualism as the pramātṛ; in spite of this three-fold distinction how can it be said that non-dualism is the truth and that it is established by Scripture? The only answer is that all these distinctions, though existent, are not absolutely real. The pramāṇa, then, is not absolutely real; how can it tell us anything valid about absolute reality? The reply would be that though belonging only to the empirical grade of reality, the practical efficiency of the pramāṇa may be that of a higher grade, that though pramāṇa can never be absolutely real, it may yet make known the absolutely real. For such a position, analogies are not wanting in ordinary experience. The dream of a damsel produces consequences which, far from being sublated, persist in waking experience; similarly in the case of a snake-dream. In the former we have a persistent mental exaltation, in the latter we have a

---

ignorance is Īśvara, what is conditioned by ignorance is the jīva; either of these, as the principal conclusion of the Vedānta, is what is called the eka-jīva-vāda. It is this that they call dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda".... (pp. 112—118, Advaitamañjarī edition). For further information about the dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, see section 3·71, its subsections, and section 3·72, Chapter II.

persistent bodily trembling etc., consequent on fear. It is true that trembling etc. continue even after the illusory snake of waking experience is known to be illusory; here the persistence is explained on the basis of residual impressions (saṃskāra). But where the snake was dreamt of, the trembling and the snake belong to different orders of experience. The appeal to saṃskāra is therefore not possible; even if such an appeal is made it comes only to this—that residual impressions belonging to one grade of reality can produce practical effects of another grade of reality; and this is just the conclusion sought to be established. If there were not such practical efficiency, why should people desire pleasant dreams and hate unpleasant dreams? Nor may it be said that even in dream there is something real, viz., the cognition of the dream content and it is that which accounts for the practical efficiency; for this cognition is no more than the cognitive aspect of the dream-experience; and when the experience as a whole is said to be illusory, that aspect too is but illusory and assumptive. The fact of immediacy may perhaps claim not to be assumptive; for it is a fact that the dream is experienced. But immediacy as such cannot adequately account for the practical effects in their gradation. He that has kissed a girl in the dream has more happiness than he who has merely seen one; he that has been bitten by a snake in the dream has more fear than he who has merely touched one. The immediacy is common to all these without distinction, but the practical efficiency varies as shown by the grades of happiness and fear. It is established thus that the practical efficiency of an experience may belong to a higher grade of reality than that experience. The merely apparent have empirically real effects and the empirically real may culminate in absolute reality. The proposition will not appear so paradoxical if we remember that when we speak of effect, we mean not a bare consequent in time, but the manifestation of what is latent. And *ex hypothesi* what is latent being absolute reality, there is no contradiction in its becoming manifest in the highest type of empirically valid experience, viz., Brahma-sākṣātkāra.

It is possible to go a step further and say that far from practical efficiency requiring to be explained in the case of the indeterminable, it is the indeterminable alone that can be practically efficient. For, the efficient is neither real nor unreal. If it were wholly real it would be perfect, partless, free from change. Whence then can there be activity or efficiency? The self alone is the real, and the self knows no change. It is no good to itself or another; not to itself because it has no wants to satisfy, not to others, since there are no others. The unreal, again, like the horns of a hare cannot be active or efficient, since it is non-existent. Efficiency then requires existence, short of reality; it is only that which is neither real nor unreal that can possess practical efficiency. This interesting argument is developed in the *Advaitavidyāmukura* but does not figure in the *Śiddhāntaleśa,* though one might have expected it there.

XIII.

A more fundamental objection to the illusion doctrine attacks the status of that doctrine itself. Is that illusory or not? If not, we have, besides Brahman, at least one other reality, viz., this doctrine; hence non-dualism fails. If, on the other hand, that too is illusory, then the world, whose illusoriness is illusory, is consequently real; thus again non-dualism has to be abandoned. The present work gives two replies, both of which are interesting. What is denied by us is the reality of the world, and that which denies, viz., illusoriness, need not be more real than what is denied; instances are known of error and delusion being removed not by absolute truth, but by other error and delusions; the illusoriness of the world may then have the same grade of reality as the world of ether etc., not absolute reality.[36] On the face of it, the argument is not very satisfactory. One would expect the sublater to have a higher degree of reality than the sublated. Further, while the proof is not yet complete about the world of ether etc. not being real, it would seem to be begging the question to say that illusoriness may be of the same grade of reality as the world of ether etc., and need not be absolute. If illusoriness had been proved, it would be valid to maintain that that itself may be illusory; but illusoriness cannot be proved until there is resolved the apparent absurdity of illusoriness being illusory without the content being absolutely real.

The other answer mentioned by Appayya is a trifle more subtle. We say that nacre-silver is illusory, since when nacre is cognised to be such, *i.e.,* when there is the right intuition of the substrate of the nacre-silver experience, there is conflict with non-nacreity; the silverness, which is illusory, is not opposed to the non-silverness of the substrate. When there is cognition of the world, its illusoriness is not removed, as nacreity is not removed when nacre is perceived to be such; hence it is opposed to the non-illusoriness of the world, in the same way as nacreity is opposed to non-nacreity. The very cognition of the world, then, makes out both itself and its illusoriness to be illusory.[37] Here again, it is difficult to see how the *petitio principii* is avoided. When nacre is perceived as nacre, its nacreity cannot be removed; that is self-evident if not tautologous. The parallel statement would be "When the world is perceived as the world, its worldliness cannot be removed." What is actually stated, however, is that its illusoriness cannot be removed; and what we are opposing all the time is the possibility of asserting illusoriness intelligently in respect of the universe. If the world were apprehended as illusory, its illusoriness would be opposed to non-illusoriness; but according to the critic the world cannot be apprehended as illusory, since the concept of illusoriness cannot intelligibly fit in with non-dualism. We seem to be really in an *impasse*.

---

[36] See section 4·51, Chapter II.

To do the advaitin justice he has independent proofs of the illusoriness of the world. The criticism of the allegation that perception cognises a world of difference has been already set forth. Other proofs depend on the fact of the world being the object of finite cognition, on its being sublatable and so on. But all these proofs have to surmount the logical obstacle set up by the critic, an obstacle based on the Law of

---

[37] See section 4·52, Chapter II.

Excluded Middle. If your illusoriness is itself an illusion, the world must be real; if not, illusoriness itself is real; in either case, non-dualism is impossible. The discussion in the *Advaitavidyāmukura* is fuller and more interesting. This is the nerve of the argument. The difficulty seems to arise from our imagining that a qualification can apply only to something other than itself, not both to itself and others; illusoriness is a qualification we predicate; and the subject of that predication cannot itself be illusory; the illusory illusion must be real. But surely nothing can be farther from truth. When we predicate "reality" or "knowability" do these qualifications have to apply only to what is itself not real or knowable? Do we not say that Reality is real, just as much as that it is knowable? And, on the contrary, would it make any sense if we maintained that the subject of the predication of reality is other than real? The illusoriness of illusion is a paradox assuredly, but no greater paradox than the affirmation of the reality of the real. The whole of finite experience abounds in such paradoxes, just because it is finite and mediated, while absolute experience is impartite. Our knowledge itself is a paradox; for it cannot be of the unknown, since there can be no activity (not even cognition) in respect of what is unknown; nor can it be in respect of the known, that being already known; if it be said to be of the partly known, does the cognitive activity apply to the known part or the unknown? In either case we have the same difficulties over again. The conclusion that we are driven to is not that our knowledge is perfect, but that it is an imperfect relational appearance of the supra-relational perfect knowledge. We draw a similar conclusion in respect of the illusoriness of illusion. In any case the appeal to Excluded Middle is beside the point. If the advaitin said that the illusoriness of illusion is true, absolutely real, then the critic might argue to the reality of the substrate of the illusion. But just as illusoriness may be illusory, this illusoriness may again be illusory; and the possibility is not inherently absurd since as we have said "illusoriness", like "reality" and "knowability", may be predicated both of itself and others.

The critic may put the difficulty in this way; we say that a particular experience, say that of nacre-silver, is an illusion; we predicate illusoriness of it; in proving that predicate, illusoriness of the illusion is the *probans*; is this illusoriness itself illusory? Then, not merely nacre-silver and the like but even real experiences like that of a pot may be substrates of this illusory illusoriness; thus the *probans* as residing both in the real and in illusions would be inconstant; even the real colour of pot etc. is copresent with a substrate which is illusorily illusory. Such an argument proceeds on the assumption that we prove illusoriness because of illusoriness and that this *probans* if illusory would be inconstant. We do not start proving illusoriness by illusoriness, because of infinite regress. Our proofs of illusoriness are based on other well known grounds, such as being the object of finite cognition; and illusoriness being so cognised is also proved to be illusory on the same ground. Nor does the alleged inconstancy of the *probans* amount to anything; for in our final conclusion, we do not admit the pot etc. or its colour etc. to be real. The whole world we say is illusory. Illusoriness is not something outside of this world, but part of it; hence there is nothing repugnant to reason in that too being illusory. No doubt, within our finite experience we have a difference established between nacre-silver and its illusoriness. The former is merely apparent (prātibhāsika) while the latter is empirical (vyāvahārika). But this difference is established by a pramāṇa, whereas there is no pramāṇa for distinguishing the illusoriness of illusoriness from illusoriness.

It may be argued that if nacre-silver, the substrate of illusory illusoriness, is illusory, the self too may be illusory, as the substrate of illusory illusoriness; for, some systems do hold the self to be illusory; and that belief is illusory according to those who believe in the self; but on this very ground, it ought to be an illusion in the same way as nacre-silver. It is clear that such an argument can at best show the *possibility* of the self too being delusive; it cannot establish it as a certainty. For we do not say that nacre-silver is illusory, *because* it is the substrate of illusory illusoriness; we say rather that, as it is an illusion, it is the substrate of illusory illusoriness. To argue back to the self being an illusion because it is the substrate of illusory illusoriness is wholly unjustified. But there is certainly a possibility, because of similarity to nacre-silver in this respect. This possibility is, however, negatived by Scripture which teaches the reality of the self, and by reasoning, which demands both a witness of and a limit to the process of sublation. We do not say that the self is real because it is unsublatable, but because, as the witness even of sublation, it is self-certifying and self-evidenced. Everything finite perishes up to the self;

but the self does not perish, even because it is the self of all, yea, even of the doubter. Non-contradiction or coherence (the two are negative and positive aspects of one and the same principle) is of itself barren as the test of truth; its complement is self-manifestation. The self alone is self-manifest; and if we hold that the self is not illusory, it is not merely because it is unsublated, but because it is self-manifest *and* unsublated. Descartes was fundamentally right when he asserted the impossibility of thinking away the thinker. His error lay in constituting an independent reality of this self after eliminating everything that could possibly be its content. The advaitin uses nearly the same words and appears to follow the same path; but he is saved from the final error when he equates the individual with the universal self and identifies it with experience, not with one aspect of it—the experiencer.

XIV.

The self is one, infinite, universal. Nor because of this is there the contingence of all persons having the same experience of pleasure or pain at the same time; for these are qualities of the internal organs, which define the one Self, and hence vary with each jīva as defined by the respective internal organs. Agency and enjoyership do not belong to pure intelligence; they belong to it as identified with the body, mind etc., or as transferred to it by superimposition from the body, mind etc. It does not follow that because the body, mind etc. are the loci of the above-mentioned distinctions, they themselves are real; for the distinctions being assumptive, their loci too may be assumptive. He who is dissatisfied with this explanation of distinction (vyavasthā) can find no greater satisfaction in the hypothesis of a plurality of selves—infinite or atomic. Apart from the difficulty of conceiving plurality together with pervasiveness, we find that the latter attribute stands in the way of distinguishing the experiences of different souls; for, being infinite, every soul is without distinction capable of being in contact with everything—an object in the present, an impression of the past or the unseen potency due to past acts. Nor does the atomicity of souls offer a way out. How can the atomic Caitra have experience of pleasure or pain or both together in different parts of his body? If somehow he may be said to have such experience, why should he not experience Maitra's pleasure and pain as well, since the different parts of his own body are not less removed from him than Maitra's body? When along with atomicity there is also the relation of part and whole (aṃśa and aṃśin) as between jīva and Brahman, the possibility of explaining the distinction of happiness and misery (sukha - duḥkha - vyavasthā) disappears altogether. For, between part and whole there is a relation of difference *cum* non-difference. The jīva's experiences would thus be shared by Brahman; even if they should somehow be compensated in the total perfection that is Brahman, another jīva in so far as it is non-different from Brahman would share the experiences of the original jīva, which too is non-different from Brahman; thus there would be intermixture of the happiness and misery of different jīvas even on this hypothesis.[38]

---

[38] See sections 5·2 to 5·215 and 6·61 to 6·6222, Chapter II.

XV.

Ignorance of one's essential nature being the cause of all superimposition and consequent misery, release consists in the destruction of that by knowledge. The knowledge meant is the immediate, final and unshakable intuition of oneself as identical with the one real that is neither knower nor known, neither agent nor enjoyer nor object of enjoyment, but Pure Consciousness, the substrate of the appearance of all these distinctions. The distinctions, however, persist up to the said realisation; and the activities consequent on the distinctions, such as engaging in ritual and so on, have their own contribution to make in arriving at that realisation. According to one main school, that of the *Vivaraṇa,* knowledge itself is the result of such activities, through the purification of the self, while, according to the other school, that of the *Bhāmatī,* such acts instil only the desire to know.[39] The fact that independent fruit of various kinds is prescribed for the various rites does not stand in the way of their subserving knowledge too; for, the latter results only when such activity is aided by suitable auxiliary causes like hearing the Vedānta, reflection thereon and repeated contemplation of the truth taught therein. In any case since the subsidiariness to knowledge is only through the channel of purification, these activities are not proximate (sannipatya) but remote auxiliaries (ārād-upakāraka). For renunciation too, as for the performance of karma, there is need; the two may belong either to different classes of people or to different stages of life; and its utility may be through an apūrva generated thereby or through the seen fruit of securing non-distraction[40] from the hearing (study) of the Vedānta.

---

[39] See sections 1·1 and 1·2, Chapter III.

The study etc., of the Vedānta would seem to be in any case the indispensable preliminary to realisation. It is, however, maintained by Bhāratītīrtha that this is only one of the two paths taught by the Lord, viz., sāṅkhya and yoga. The path of yoga is that of contemplation, whose object is the attributeless Brahman, not the lower Brahman, as in saguṇa meditations. The possibility of such contemplation is mentioned in the Praśna Upaniṣad and the negation of it elsewhere is only apparent, being on a par with statements that Brahman is not that which is known. The path of yoga leads to the same goal as that of sāṅkhya; there is need for two paths because of difference in the capacity of those interested (adhikārins). Yoga is suitable for those who, because of dullness of intellect, failure to find a skilled preceptor and so on, are not able to engage in inquiry into the Vedānta, though from the Vedānta learnt by adhyayana they have a superficial knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and the self. On the face of things it would appear that such a person cannot successfully intuit Brahman. He sets forth armed with ignorance, not knowledge; his method is hit or miss guess-work; but none the less he will succeed, though with some delay; for, even guess-work is not destined to fail invariably; it very often succeeds.[41]

---

[40] Sections 1·21, 2, 2·11, 2·12, 2·13, Chapter III.

[41] See section 3·1, Chapter III.

What is valuable about this position is the liberalising tendency it indicates. The supreme truth of non-dualism is not the prize of the few; it is not the treasured possession of intellectual aristocrats. If it is true that reality is one and that the jīvas are identical with that one, no self can be hopelessly far from the realisation of that unity. It may be that those of keener and clearer intellect are much nearer the intuition; the paths followed by others are none the less paths to the one goal, despite their circumlocution. Truth being a perfect orb, you are bound to encompass it sooner or later, no matter where you start from and in which direction you go. This is all in the true catholic spirit of Hinduism. But there is room to doubt whether intellectual certitude is not a necessary preliminary to the final realisation. A man may happen to make a correct guess; but that guess is of no value to him or others until it is verified by observation; and when it is verified we have intellectual certitude. It may, of course, be said that this ascertainment has not been arrived at though intellectual processes. There is the guess followed by the experience which guarantees the guess; in the light of that experience the intellect too may be satisfied secondarily; but the certitude which is given in experience has not been arrived at *through* the intellect. There is assuredly a great deal to be said for this point of view. All that a true philosopher can insist on is the synoptic vision; he need not and indeed should not insist that this should be an intellectual vision too. The man who trades in concepts is not intrinsically superior to him who trades in sounds and colours. The vision beatific may come through artistic as through intellectual channels;[42] and the truly moral man, who has lost all thought of himself in the narrow sense, is not necessarily farther from realisation than the artist or the philosopher. This much, however, the philosopher can claim, viz., that his particular weapon, the intellect, is the sole critic of all achievement and that where this critic does not function the chances of going astray are much greater. But this comes to nothing more than the admission of Bhāratītīrtha that the path of yoga involves delay.

XVI.

About that which is directly the instrument (karaṇa) of intuition there are divergent views, some holding that deep meditation is the karaṇa, while others claim that position for the mind or the principal texts of the Vedānta. There is no doubt about the need for everyone of these factors, the dispute being only about the primacy of one or the other. Of special interest in this connection is the discussion as to whether the mind is or is not a sense-organ and whether verbal testimony can of itself generate immediate apprehension. The *Bhāmatī* school holds that the final intuition cannot be effective in destroying ignorance, which is immediate, unless it is itself immediate, that the immediacy can come only from the functioning of a sense-organ, and that, since no other sense-organ is operative in the process of intuition by contemplation of the truth of non-dualism, the mind must be admitted to be a sense-organ. It is true, as the objectors would say, that the mind is active in mediate cognition too. This need not, however, stand in the way of its recognition as a sense-organ; for, immediate cognition is not an invariable consequent of the functioning even of the recognised sense-organs, since immediacy may be obstructed by a defect in the sense or the object. It is not every ear that can appreciate music, but only the trained ear; the trained sense, like that of the yogin, can have immediate cognition of what we cannot perceive; the perfected mind of the siddha can intuit the Absolute though our minds cannot; the need for discipline does not detract from the sense-character of mind.

---

[42] To Madhusūdana Sarasvatī belongs the credit of claiming non-dual realisation to come through the channel of devotion (bhakti). The language he employs is strongly suggestive of artistic experience. See his *Bhaktirasāyanam*; also the *Siddhāntabindu*, translated by P. M. Modi, Appendix II. The view marks yet another stage in the liberalising of advaita, and seems to derive some inspiration from Bhāratītīrtha.

Even granted this character, is it the mind that is directly the cause of intuition or is deep meditation the cause? Both views seem to find favour with different writers. The school of thought which insists on deep meditation (prasaṅkhyāna) as the direct cause, claims Maṇḍana as its strongest if not earliest adherent. This view came in for extensive criticism even as early as the time of Sureśvara who condemns it in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. If the final intuition is true knowledge one would expect its karaṇa to be a recognised means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and prasaṅkhyāna is not a pramāṇa. The admission of mind as a sense-organ would get over this difficulty, because contact of sense with object is perception, and this is what happens when the mind through contemplation envisages the Absolute. In this case, we recognise no new pramāṇa, but only a new variety of a well-known pramāṇa. The *Vivaraṇa* school, however, holds that the principal texts of the Vedānta, such as "That thou art", are themselves directly the cause of the intuition, and that, though they work through the mind, the latter is not a sense-organ or the direct cause of immediate apprehension. According to this view, verbal knowledge may of itself be immediate, though its content be not sensed. In the well known story of ten foolish men who started counting themselves after crossing a river and every time counted only nine since the enumerator was left out in each case, when the stranger starts counting, comes to the tenth man and says "Thou art the tenth", there is immediate realisation of the whole party being safe and sound, though there is no sense-apprehension over and above what existed already without producing the said realisation. The followers of the *Bhāmatī* view say that this is to beg the question; for the statement "Thou art the tenth" produces no intuition except through the mind; and we say that the mind is capable of producing that intuition because it is a sense-organ. The story of itself cannot negative our contention. The only legitimate criticism may direct itself to the presence or functioning of mind in mediate as well as immediate apprehension; and the reply to that has already been stated.[43]

XVII.

However final or superior or ultimate this intuition may be, it is yet in the form of the conditioned; it is not free from distinctions of knower and known; though *of* the impartite, it is itself not impartite. Two questions naturally arise out of this position. When knowledge that destroys appearance is itself of the form of appearance, does it not require another agent for its own destruction? and if so, what is that other agent? Again, if the final cognition is impure, what is it that figures as the object of knowledge therein? It seems contradictory to assert that the pure is that object of knowledge. What appears in a conditioned mode of cognition must itself be the conditioned. If so, how can there be realisation of the pure unconditioned Absolute? And failing such realisation, how can there be release?

---

[43] On the whole topic see sections 4 and 5 of Chapter III, together with the sub-sections, the *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī*, pp. 116, 118, Śrīraṅgam edition, the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 43—46 (Bombay edition with the *Śikhāmaṇi*) and *The Six Ways of Knowing* (D. M. Datta), pp. 53—58.

It is admitted by all schools of advaita that the final psychosis, called the intuition of Brahman, has the capacity to annul not merely the rest of the world of appearance, but itself as well. Various analogies are employed to illustrate this. The power of the clearing nut when mixed with muddy water, precipitates both itself and the mud already in the water; poison, administered as a drug, expels both itself and the poison already present in the system; when grass is completely burnt up by fire, the fire too dies out. It is not true that for the destruction of the final psychosis, something over and above that psychosis is needed; this something other is undoubtedly required when a pot etc. is destroyed, but to insist on that here would be to argue from illegitimate analogy; one may as well argue that the final psychosis cannot be destroyed except by blows from a hammer or the like. The co-operation of time, unseen potency etc. is not denied, for they too exist prior to the destruction of the final psychosis along with the destruction of the universe. Those who are still unsatisfied maintain that what destroys both the universe and the intuition of Brahman is not the psychosis itself, which is inert, but the Brahman-intelligence, associated with that psychosis. Thus is avoided the apparent absurdity that the final psychosis causes its own destruction. Though, in its own nature, Brahman-intelligence is not inconsistent with error and delusion, being the substrate thereof, yet as associated with the final psychosis it destroys them; just as the sun which by itself does not destroy a piece of cotton yet does so when its rays are focussed thereon through a burning glass.[44] Another ingenious solution would have it that the psychosis directly destroys ignorance alone; but since ignorance is the material cause of the entire universe of which the final psychosis too is a part, with the destruction of ignorance this psychosis too is destroyed. It should be noted that here too the psychosis is itself the cause of its own destruction, though indirectly; the difficulty if any in such a notion is only postponed by a stage. Its only merit, then, lies in its allowing for the continuance of the world-presentation for a while, even after the dawn of the final psychosis. But the persistence of the world *for* the released soul (not merely *in respect of him* and for others who are lookers on and unreleased) seems an unprovable and unnecessary hypothesis. We cannot experience what the released souls experience; while as for what they *say*, much of it may depend on our imaginative interpretation, even if we admit that those who make the statements are really released and not merely on the *brink* of release. The doctrine of jīvan-mukti has been noticed earlier. All that may be noted here is that there is no need to bolster up that doctrine by the hypothesis that Brahman-intuition destroys ignorance alone and not the universe.

---

[44] For the whole topic see section 7 and sub-sections, Chapter III.

The second question offers greater difficulties. If Brahman is known as the content of a psychosis, how can it be pure and unconditioned? That which enters into a relation as the content thereof must surely be conditioned by that relation. This is the position of Vācaspati Miśra who says that the final intuition is of the conditioned (upahita).[45] If the relational form persists even here and what is intuited is not the Absolute, what is the justification for calling this intuition final? The reply is that here there is no awareness of the condition or the conditioning, while there is awareness of Brahman alone. This is its distinction from psychoses of lower grades. Where the relationing has become so tenuous that it does not obtrude on consciousness, it is ready to be transcended in the fulness of the experience that is Brahman. It is not unintelligible that such knowledge takes us to the threshold of release. But an awareness of the conditioned which is yet not an awareness of the condition or the conditioning seems very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from an intuition of pure Brahman. Between the view which maintains the intuition of pure Brahman and the *Bhāmatī* view set forth earlier, the difference would thus seem to be more verbal than real. The truth seems to be this; so long as one looks for what is apprehended *in* knowledge, even the highest knowledge can give only the conditioned Brahman, since we continue to look for what can enter into the knowledge-relation; but when we seek what is to be realised *through* knowledge, as the fulfilment of knowledge through its transcendence in the infinite, impartite experience, what is thus known is the pure Brahman. The differences of view would seem to depend on the stressing of one or the other of the abovementioned aspects. But in any case the path to release is *in* and through knowledge; no other path exists (nā 'nyaḥ panthā 'yanāya vidyate).

---

[45] See the *Bhāmatī*, p. 78 (*TPH* edition). The note thereon, as also the relevant portion of the *Kalpataru* may also be looked up.

In the preparation of this edition the following Manuscripts and printed texts have been used.

1. A palm-leaf manuscript in Grantha characters, No. xxv B 10 of the Adyar Library, cited as A_1.

2. A palm-leaf manuscript in Grantha characters, No. xxvi B 33 of the Adyar Library, cited as A_2.

3. A palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu characters, No. DC 4766 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore, cited as E_1.

4. A palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu characters, No. DC 4764 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore, cited as E_2.

5. A paper manuscript in Devanāgari script, No. R 1885 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore, cited as E_3.

6. The Kumbakonam edition (Advaitamañjarī Series), (cited as K).

7. The Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition, (This constitutes the basic text, cited as V, though in some ways it is very unsatisfactory).

8. The Chowkhamba Press edition, (cited as B).

9. The Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara edition, Calcutta, (cited as C).

10. The Vāṇī Vilās Press edition, Śrīraṅgam (incomplete, cited as Ś).

The editor takes this opportunity of thanking the Hon. Director, Adyar Library, the Curator, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore, and the Manager, Vani Vilas Syndicate for their kindness and courtesy.

Views and quotations have not been traced with as much success as could be wished. It is hoped to carry on the work of identification and publish a short Appendix at a future date. The rather elaborate division into sections and sub-sections will prove useful in such a case. The translation made in the pages of the *Pandit* is incomplete; and in most places it is too much of a paraphrase. An attempt has been made in the present translation to keep close to the text. The transliteration tries to make the text more easily intelligible by splitting up long compounds into their components joined together by hyphens. This has necessitated the use of a double hyphen (=), where a word is broken up solely because the end of the line has been reached; thus while "ajñānāśraya" is ordinarily printed "ajñānā-'śraya", where the end of the line is reached with "ajñā", it is printed "ajñā=nā-'śraya". The editor tenders his heart-felt thanks to all the scholars, both in the University and outside, who gave him their unstinted help.

NOTE.

The *Siddhāntaleśa* seems to have had more than one commentary. The best known is that by Achyuta Kṛṣṇānanda; it is found in most printed editions of the text. There is, in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, the Manuscript of a commentary by one Viśvanātha Tīrtha (I A 10). Tradition ascribes a commentary to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī; no trace of this has been found so far. The well known advaitin, Sadāśiva Brahmendra, wrote a verse compendium of this work, called the *Siddhāntakalpavallī*. A prose compendium by Vāsudeva Brahmendra Sarasvatī, an advaitin who lived till recently, and another verse compendium by one Gaṅgādhara Sarasvatī are also in print; the former is called *Siddhāntaleśatātparyasaṅgrahaḥ*, and the latter *Vedānta-siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*.

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

1·1	Nature of injunction in respect of hearing (studying) the Vedānta.
1·11	Three kinds of injunction, apūrva-vidhi, niyama-vidhi and parisaṅkhyā-vidhi.
1·12	Which of the above three is the śravaṇa-vidhi?
1·121	*Prakaṭārtha* view that it is apūrva-vidhi.
1·122	Refutation of the above.
1·131	It is a niyama-vidhi: one variety, to insist on the study of Vedānta.
1·132	Another variety: to insist on study of non-dual texts.
1·133	A third variety: to insist on study under a guru.
1·134	A fourth variety: to insist on the study of the Scriptures in the original.
1·135	A fifth variety: to insist on the study of the śruti, as contrasted with itihāsas, purāṇas, &c.
1·136	A sixth variety: to insist on hearing, as productive of immediate knowledge, in conjunction with reflection and contemplation.
1·137	A seventh variety: to insist on hearing, as instrumental to mediate cognition alone.

1·138 An eighth variety: to insist on hearing, as certainly productive of immediate knowledge, co-operating with the mind.

1·139 A ninth variety: hearing means inquiry which is insisted on for the removal of doubt and error.

1·14 It is a parisaṅkhyā-vidhi to prevent distraction by other activities.

1·15 There is no vidhi at all.

1·151 Study under a preceptor established otherwise.

1·152 Study and adoption of dualist texts can be avoided only by the Lord's grace, not by a śravaṇa-vidhi.

1·153 Freedom from distraction established otherwise.

1·154 Exclusion of works in the vernacular tongues secured otherwise.

1·155 The need for inquiry &c. established by their utility, observed in experience.

2·11 Definition of Brahman; creation etc. each a definition.

2·12 All three activities together constitute the definition.

2·21 Brahman is the material cause.

2·22 Is it pure Brahman or Īśvara or the jīva?

2·221 Pure Brahman as upādāna.

2·222 Īśvara as upādāna.

2·223 Both Īśvara and the jīva as material causes. Difference between avidyā and māyā.

2·2231 Another variety of the above view.

2·224 Both are material causes though there is no distinction between māyā and avidyā.

2·225 Īśvara as the cause of the empirical and jīva as the cause of the illusory world.

2·226 Jīva alone is the cause of all, even Īśvaratva being posited by himself in himself.

2·23 Is not māyā the material cause?

2·231 Māyā as pariṇāmy-upādāna, Brahman as vivarto-'pādāna.

2·232 Brahman alone as upādāna.

2·233 Māyā is only dvāra-kāraṇa.

2·234 Māyā is only an auxiliary (sahakāri).

2·235 Māyā alone is the upādāna; Brahman is so only figuratively.

2·31 Distinction between jīva and Īśvara.

2·311 Īśvara and the jīva are both reflections.

2·3111 *Prakaṭārtha* view: Īśvara is the reflection in the single māyā, jīvas reflections in its many diverse parts called avidyās.

2·3112 *Tattvaviveka* view: prakṛti wherein pure sattva is predominant is māyā; that wherein it is overpowered by rajas and tamas is avidyā; reflection in the former is Īśvara, that in the latter is jīva.

2·3113 Prakṛti as projective is māyā; as obscuring it is avidyā. Reflection in the former is Īśvara; in the latter, jīva.

2·3114 Reflection in avidyā is Īśvara; reflection in its product, the internal organ, is the jīva; *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* criticism of avaccheda view as occasioning destruction of acquired karma and influx of the non-acquired.

2·3115 *Citradīpa* distinction of four forms: kūṭastha, the substrate of the gross and subtle bodies; jīva, the reflection in the internal organ posited in the kūṭastha; Brahman the undefined pure intelligence; Īśvara, the reflection in the impressions of the intellects of all beings, such impressions being present in māyā located in Brahman. Jīvatva, experienced as "I-ness", is the super-imposed element and is destructible. Appositional designation with Brahman intelligible, since apposition is not through bare non-difference, but through sublation. Even on the former view of apposition, "jīva" may secondarily denote the kūṭastha. Īśvara identical with the blissful self of the sleep state described in the Māṇḍūkya.

2·3116 *Brahmānanda* view: the blissful self of sleep is but the jīva. Explanation of the Scriptural attribution of sarveśvaratva etc. Example of the artistically worked cloth. Adhyātma forms are shown by Śruti as included in the adhidaiva forms to facilitate the passage from the conditioned to the unconditioned.

2·3117 *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka* includes kūṭastha under jīva, of which there are three kinds: absolute, i.e., what is undefined; empirical, i.e., reflection in the internal organ posited in māyā; the merely apparent, i.e., one who has the conceit of the 'I' in dream-bodies etc., posited by sleep, a mode of māyā.

2·312 *Vivaraṇa* view: Īśvara is the prototype, jīva the reflection.

2·313 Jīva is intelligence as defined by the internal organ; what is not so defined is Īśvara. There can be no reflection of what has no form. Īśvara's antaryāmibhāva not more intelligible on the reflection theory. What is reflected is only that portion which is outside the reflecting medium. Avidyā, not the internal organ, may be treated as the defining adjunct. The defect of kṛta-hāna etc. has to be met in any case by the real identity of the jīva: and this explanation is possible even if the internal organ be the adjunct. There is no conflict with texts or aphorisms; authority of the aphorist in *Vedānta Sūtra,* III, ii, 20 and III, iii, 43 and of the *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad.*

2·314 Brahman itself through its avidyā appears to be the jīva and by its own knowledge is released as it were. Example of Kaunteya's conceit of himself as Rādheya.

2·32 Is the jīva one or many?

2·3211 A single jīva animating one body alone; other bodies non-animated, similar to bodies seen in dreams; no distinction between the bound and the released; the release of Śuka etc. assumptive, as of persons seen in dreams.

2·3212 Hiraṇyagarbha, a reflection of Brahman, is the one principal jīva; other jīvas are reflections of this; all bodies are animated, but with a distinction.

2·3213 A single jīva animates all bodies without distinction; non-recollection of one another's happiness etc. is due to difference of bodies. Even here, no distinction between the bound and the released.

2·322 Jīvas are many, as defined by the internal organ etc. Distinction between bondage and release recognised.

2·3221 Ignorance though one has parts; and is removed in part when Brahman-knowledge arises.

2·3222 Brahman-knowledge destroys the mind and thence is destroyed the conjunction of ignorance with intelligence.

2·3223 Ignorance resides in the jīvas, not in Brahman; it is fully present in each jīva, like jāti in the particular, and abandons some enlightened jīvas, as the jāti abandons a destroyed particular.

2·3224 Ignorances are many, one for each jīva.

2·32241 All the nesciences together create the world; when one is destroyed, the world is destroyed, but is immediately re-created by the surviving nesciences.

2·32242 Each nescience creates a different world for each jīva; only a delusive sense of identity, as in an illusion seen by several persons.

2·32243 Māyā, located in Īśvara, is the cause of the empirical world; avidyās cause obscuration alone and the projection of the merely apparent.

3·0 What is agency?

3·1 Possession of such knowledge, desire to act and volition as is favourable to what is to be done.

3·2 Possession of knowledge alone, such as is favourable to what is to be done.

3·3 Possession of knowledge of the form "This is to be created."

4·1 Brahman's omniscience intelligible though there is no internal organ as for the jīva; for Īśvara's adjunct is ignorance associated with the impressions of the intellects of all beings: Bhāratītīrtha.

4·2 *Prakaṭārtha* view: there are transformations of māyā which reflect intelligence; through the manifestations reflected therein, Īśvara sees the world in all three times; hence omniscience.

4·3 *Tattvaśuddhi* view: in the above manner, Īśvara perceives the entire world of the present; through impressions produced thereby there is memory of everything past; prior to creation māyā transforms itself into the presentation of all things to be created in accordance with the adṛṣṭa of jīvas; hence knowledge of the future.

4·4 *Kaumudī* view: Brahman's essential knowledge manifests everything related to it; even the past and the future are related to it as existing in avidyā in the form of impressions; omniscience is not through cognition due to psychoses; Brahman is of the nature of the knowledge of everything but not the cogniser of everything.

4·5 Vācaspati's view: Brahman may be said to be even the agent in knowledge since that knowledge though in its essence not a product is yet a product of Brahman, as defined by what is seen.

5·0 Why does the jīva need psychoses?

5·1 *Vivaraṇa* view: jīva's intelligence unlike Brahman's is not the material cause of all things, is not in identity with them and cannot manifest them; but (a) there is conjunction of the jīva with the internal organ, whose transformation, the psychosis, goes out through the senses to the object and pervades it; associated with this psychosis the jīva cognises that object. (b) *Or,* the conditioned jīva is finite and has no relation with objects, but psychosis manifests its non-difference from the object-defined-intelligence; and thus the jīva illumines the object. (c) *Or,* the psychosis destroys the ignorance veiling the jīva; and the jīva, being manifested then, illumines that object alone.

5·11 What is the association with intelligence?

5·111 The relationship of subject and object.

5·112 For that relationship the psychosis need not go forth; but when the psychosis is related to the object, there is an indirect relation to the object even for the jīva-intelligence in proximity to the object, since the psychosis is in identity with this.

5·113 Direct relation necessary for immediacy; hence when there is conjunction between psychosis and object, for the jīva too there is a conjunction born of a conjunction.

5·114 Identification with the object secured through non-difference between manifesting intelligence and Brahman-intelligence; though the jīva is omnipresent, he cognises objects only as conditioned by the internal organ; difference from the view (b), where souls are finite.

5·12 What is the manifestation of non-difference?

5·121 The identification through the psychosis of intelligences as defined by the object and by the internal organ; analogy of tank water and field water becoming one through a channel.

5·122 The object-defined-intelligence creates a reflection of itself in the proximate part of the psychosis; with this there is identification of the jīva, not with the object-defined-intelligence itself.

5·123 The object-defined-intelligence itself is identified with the jīva, but the former is considered not as *qualified* by its being the prototype, but as qualified *per accidens* thereby.

5·13 What is the removal of obscuration? If ignorance is destroyed, why is not the world too destroyed?

5·1311 Of a small part alone there is destruction as of darkness by a glow-worm, or a rolling up as of a mat, or a retreat as of frightened soldiers.

5·1312 Object-defined-intelligence, when in conjunction with a psychosis, cannot be obscured by ignorance; this is the removal of obscuration; ignorance need not obscure that wherein it is located.

5·132 What is destroyed by a psychosis is not primal ignorance, but a mode thereof and its destruction alone is the removal; the ignorances to be destroyed are as numerous as the cognitions.

5·1321 These modal ignorances too are beginningless.

5·1322 They have a beginning; illustration from sleep which causes dreams and the experience "I slept well."

5·13211 Each cognition destroys one ignorance alone, as it destroys one prāgabhāva alone, other prāgabhāvas being seen to continue, as capable of originating doubt etc.

5·13212 All ignorances do not obscure all things at all times; when one ignorance is destroyed by a psychosis, when this latter ceases, another ignorance obscures the object. When Brahman-knowledge arises all surviving ignorances are destroyed, being dependent on primal ignorance destroyed by that knowledge.

5·13213 The cognition while destroying one ignorance, drives away the others too in the sense of obstructing their obscuring capacity so long as the cognition lasts.

5·132131 Difficulty in a continuous stream of cognition. When the psychosis ceases, ignorance re-obscures; therefore even second and subsequent cognitions are the causes of non-obscuration.

5·132132 *Nyāyacandrikā* view: each cognition destroys one ignorance alone; the other ignorances obscure the nature of the object only as qualified *per accidens* by their respective times; and cognition destroys all ignorances that obscure the thing qualified *per accidens* by the time it lasts.

5·132133 The essential nature of the object is obscured by that ignorance alone which is removed by the first cognition; the second and subsequent cognitions remove ignorances relating to the object as qualified by space, time etc. In the continuous stream of cognition, a multiplicity of psychoses is not admitted; or even if multiplicity be admitted, there may be not many instantaneous psychoses, but five or six, each lasting for some time, so that each has some gross time for content. Even if they be instantaneous and thus do not remove obscuration, there is no harm, since as relating to the already known they are not authoritative.

5·1321331 Obscuring ignorance is two-fold located in the object and located in the knower; in the case of mediate psychoses, the latter alone is destroyed, not the former, since the psychosis does not go forth.

5·1321332 There is only one ignorance, located in the knower; the illusion is a transformation of Brahman as the content of the ignorance located in the knower; even mediate psychosis destroys modal ignorance, but another mode of it projects what is not true.

5·1321333 Obscuring ignorance is present in the object alone; though modal ignorance is not related to the witness conditioned by the internal organ, primal ignorance is so related; and thence comes the experience "I do not know nacre" etc., since even nacre etc. are non-different from the intelligence that is the content of primal ignorance; and in any case there is non-difference between the mode and that which has modes; as for the mediate psychosis, it does not remove ignorance and its appearing to do so may be delusive. The rule about removing ignorance applies only to immediate psychoses, but not to all immediate cognitions like the witness's perception of nescience etc.

5·141 Who is the witness?

5·14111 *Kūṭasthadīpa* view : the kūṭastha is the witness. The two bodies are manifested at intervals by psychoses of the internal organ; at other times, they are manifested together with the absence of psychoses, by the witness. Individuation etc. constantly associated with the witness; hence not subject to doubt etc., and subject to recollection of continuity contemporaneously with a continuous stream of cognition of some other object. Unlike the jīva, the kūṭastha is an indifferent spectator. *Nāṭakadīpa* too distinguishes the witness from the jīva; the witness is the *kūṭastha,* compared to a lamp in a theatre. *Tattvapradīpikā* too says that the inner self is the witness as non-different from the jīva. In all three views, the Lord is not the witness.

5·14112 *Kaumudī* view: the witness is some form of the Lord, which is yet not the abode of causality. In sleep, he is known as Prājña.

5·14113 *Tattvaśuddhi*: the witness though really of the constitution of Brahman appears to be of the constitution of the jīva, in the same way as the this-ness, which while really belonging to nacre appears to belong to silver.

5·14121 The nescience-conditioned jīva is the witness, the jīva in his own nature being indifferent.

5·14122 The jīva is the witness, but as *conditioned* by the internal organ, not by the omnipresent nescience; the jīva as *qualified* by the internal organ is the cogniser.

5·1421 If nescience obscures the witness, how are nescience etc. manifested by the witness? Even by the light that it obscures, in the same way as Rāhu.

5·1422 Another view: nescience obscures but to the exclusion of the witness. Even the bliss that is of the nature of the witness is certainly manifested, since there is seen unconditioned love for the self.

5·14231 If bliss is manifest even here, what is the difference between bondage and release? The undefined nature of Brahman-bliss does not count, since "not being defined" is not of itself a human goal; though

Brahman-bliss, as contrasted with material happiness, is unsurpassable, you admit the real identity of all forms of happiness; nor may grades be admitted because of differences in the manifesters, since the illustration is not accepted; and even if it were, the state of bondage as one of clearer happiness would be superior to the free state where happiness is not clear, because undefined. Therefore the witness-bliss is not unobscured.

5·14232 Advaitavidyācārya's reply: analogy of the reflection in mirrors of different degrees of purity; superiority and inferiority in the happiness may be superimposed because of the purity or impurity of the reflecting intellect.

5·14233 Bliss is certainly experienced as obscured; the witness is unobscured as intelligence, but as bliss it is obscured; obscuration is seen only where there is (partial) manifestation, as in "I do not know the sense stated by you". As intelligence is not wholly obscured, so bliss too is not wholly obscured but only to the exclusion of the particular psychoses of happiness.

5·1424 Since individuation etc. are continuously presented to the witness, since they do not pass out to make room for memory-impressions, how can they be recollected?

5·14241 Individuation etc. are also manifested, by the witness as defined by them, as transformed into psychoses with the forms of objects. This witness being impermanent, recollection is possible.

5·14242 Recognition of a psychosis of nescience, with the form "I" such as is necessary to explain the recollection of nescience etc. in sleep.

5·14243 This psychosis with the form "I" is a modification of the internal organ (not of nescience), but is not cognitive, not being guaranteed by any ascertained means of cognition.

5·14244 Even this psychosis is cognitive, because of the experience "I know myself"; the mind itself should be assumed to be the instrument for this cognition.

5·15 Removal of obscuration would seem to belong only to psychoses relating to external objects.

There is not even this rule, since in delusion the psychosis of the "this" does not remove ignorance, as otherwise the delusion would have no material cause.

5·151 Ignorance about the this-element is certainly removed, but not about nacreity; that is the material cause of the delusion; hence the distinction in the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* between the adhiṣṭhāna and ādhāra of delusion.

5·152 The ignorance of the this-element is itself the material cause; though removed in its obscuring aspect, it is not removed in its projective aspect; the distinction between the removal of these two aspects has to be recognised to explain jīvan-mukti and the persistence of the delusion in reflection.

5·153 Kavitārkika-Cakravarti Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya's view: no experience of a psychosis of "this" as distinct from "this is silver". It is not to be assumed from the effect, since its causality of the delusion is not evidenced. The contact of a defective sense is alone established as the cause. The cognition of the substrate cannot be the cause of such delusions as yellow shell or blue water, since there can be no visual perception of what is colourless and the white colour is not experienced at the time of the delusion. Contact with a defective sense-organ applies to all cases of delusion and parsimony dictates its choice as the cause. Nor may it be said "Cognition of the substrate is a necessary cause in super-impositions dependent on similarity, e.g. nacre-silver; and similarity is not a defect in the object, since even delusive similarity may cause superimposition; and superimposition is not dependent on the nature of the object, since on the same cloth there may or may not be superimposition, according as there is or is not similarity." Cognition of similarity may be a cause only in what is hindered by specific cognition, not in delusions like the yellow shell; and the causes of specific cognition would themselves explain, by their own presence or absence, the absence or presence of the superimposition; no need for the cognition of similarity. A piece of iron in contact with the sense of touch is not perceived as silver, since there is the possibility of its being perceived as any other piece of metal, copper etc., and hence is the object of doubt; in the neighbourhood of silver, it is perceived as silver. The unhindered contact of the this-object with a defective sense sets up an agitation in nescience, whose consequent transformation has the delusive content, silver etc., too for content, not the this-element alone; the delusive content is experienced as sensory. This sensory nature cannot be explained merely from the sense-contact of the this-element alone, as, in yellow shell etc., the this-element alone cannot be sensed as colourless and is not sensed as white; nor is the sense of sight needed for the perception of the yellowness alone of the bile in the eye, as then both the shell and its conjunction with yellow would be non-perceptual. Nor does the yellow go through rays from the eyes and pervade the object, as then every one should see it as yellow like a gold-plated object. No violation of the supposed causal laws in respect of perception in general, perception of a substance and perception of silver. No law about perception in general in the absence of the ascertainment of a single mode of contact common to saṃyoga etc. As for contact with a substance being the cause of perception of a substance, it is enough if the contact be with that on which substanceness is superimposed. There is no room for a further law about perception of specific substances. Even if such laws be recognised they should be restricted to empirically valid perceptions, in view of such experiences as "I see blue water," which cannot be explained by such laws. This view is not to be confounded with anyathākhyāti, for silver present elsewhere (as on the anyathākhyāti view) cannot be perceived here and now, and we admit its indeterminability to explain both its perception and sublation. The non-superimposition of tin etc. at the same time as of silver is due to the absence of such defects as human desire in relation to the former.

5·154 Others hold the psychosis with the form of silver etc. to be superfluous; the witness manifested by the this-psychosis itself manifests the silver superimposed thereon; and this psychosis may itself account for the memory-impressions of silver.

5·155 View of two psychoses, one of the form "this" and the other of the form "This is silver," not of silver alone.

5·156 The cognition of silver need not have the "this" as content; for silver there is the appearance of conjunction with the thisness of the substance; similarly, for the cognition of silver, there may be the appearance of conjunction with the this-ness of the substrate as content; the two—the substrate and the superimposed—need not appear in a single psychosis, since though the psychoses are different, they appear in the one witness manifested by the psychosis with the form "this".

5·16 Objection: why is a psychosis needed in addition to the witness? Even if it accounts for memory-impressions, it need not go forth. Distinction between mediate and immediate cognition may be due to difference in the instrument; like the distinction between knowledge from verbal testimony and inferential knowledge.

5·161 Reply: object-defined-intelligence alone manifests the object; where with that a direct relation of identity is possible as in perception, no other relationship may be assumed; this relationship is brought about by the going forth of the psychosis; in mediate cognition there is no observed channel for going forth; hence some other relation *sui generis* is assumed there.

5·162 Individuation etc. are immediately cognised, only because of direct conjunction with intelligence; hence only in conjunction with objects, can it manifest objects; for the manifestation of this conjunction there is going forth.

5·163 In perceptual cognition there is definiteness, not in other cognition; for, in the latter there is a continuance of the desire to know. Definiteness results from identity with manifested intelligence; for the manifestation of this identity there is the going forth.

Objection: the psychosis need not go forth to remove the ignorance veiling the object, as this may be removed even by a mediate psychosis.

Reply: cognition, if it is to remove ignorance, should have the same locus and content as the latter.

Objection: even Devadatta's cognition of pot and Yajñadatta's ignorance of it have both the same content and the same locus, viz., intelligence as defined by pot; so having the same locus does not count in the removal of ignorance by cognition; but the cognition that is to remove should belong to the same person and refer to the same object as the ignorance; this is possible even for psychoses that do not go forth.

Reply: this would imply removal of ignorance even by mediate cognition. Nor can immediacy be added as a qualification of the cognitions; for immediacy cannot be defined as a jāti or upādhi. For us, immediacy will be shown to be what is produced by removal of ignorance; hence it cannot be a qualification of what causes that removal. The cognition that removes ignorance must have come into being by invariable conjunction with the intelligence that is the locus of that ignorance. For the sake of this invariable conjunction the psychosis goes forth.

5·164 Parsimony prescribes the same locus for the ignorance of the object and the cognition that removes it; hence the going forth of the psychosis.

5·165 Identity of locus for cognition and ignorance established on the analogy of external light and darkness; hence the going forth.

5·166 The going forth is needed either for association with intelligence or for the manifestation of the non-difference of the cogniser-intelligence from the Brahman-intelligence manifesting the object.

6·0 The non-difference of the jīva from Brahman has the authority of the Vedāntas, interpreted by the canons of purport, as shown in *Ved. Sū.*, I, i, 4.

CHAPTER II.

1·0 How can Vedāntas have non-duality for purport? Conflict with perception.

1·1 *Tattvaśuddhi* view: perception apprehends bare reality, the constant substrate in pot, cloth etc. The co-presence and co-absence of the sense-organ serves only in the apprehension of bare reality, pot etc. being delusively presented. Absence of sublating cognition is no defect. Differences cannot be cognised through perception, because they are apprehended only together with the counter-correlates, many of which are remote in space and time; nor is it apprehended through memory, since there is no memory-impression of its being qualified by the counter-correlate as such; nor can it be inferred, since inference proceeds on the apprehension of difference; counter-correlates are but delusive appearances; hence, differences and their correlates are also delusive; hence no conflict of Scripture-declared non-duality with perception.

1·2 *Nyāyasudhā* view: perception does cognise the particulars as real, but only as interpenetrated by the reality of the one substrate; hence assumption of reality in the particular too is superfluous; Scriptural authority for this; distinction from other attributes of the particular, for the existence of which in the substrate there is no Scriptural authority.

1·3 *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* view : perception does cognise the reality of the particular; but as relating to external objects it has no authority in respect of the inner self, the sole reality, wherein Scripture alone is authoritative. The imperative in draṣṭavyaḥ indicates not a command, but the worthiness of the object.

1·4 Such reality as is recognised by perception is not inconsistent with illusiveness, for, perception relating to the present alone cannot apprehend non-sublatedness in all three times.

1·5 Even if non-sublatedness be apprehended by perception, yet because of Scriptural declarations of superiority and inferiority as to reality, it follows that the non-sublatedness of pot etc. is of limited duration till Brahman-knowledge arises.

1·6 Where there is conflict Scripture alone is stronger than perception, since the former is free from defects and rises subsequently, as the sublater;

apaccheda-nyāya. Even objects of perception have to be investigated in the light of valid teaching, e.g. the perception of odour in water or blueness in the ether. Scripture superior; no upajīvya-virodha, for, the *existence* of letters, words etc., is what is depended on by revelation, not their *reality*.

2·1 If Śruti is superior to perception, why the resort to secondary implication in cases of conflict with perception?

2·2 *Bhāmatī* view: Scripture is of force only where it is purportful; perception is stronger where there is no purport for Scripture, as in mantras and arthavādas; and for these, where they conflict with perception, secondary implication is adopted.

2·31 *Vivaraṇavārtika* view: lack of purport is not the test, since purport exists even for what is understood by lakṣaṇā. Freedom from defect and posteriority in time constitute the basis of the superiority of Scripture; but perception though sublated should have a suitable content assigned to it; hence there is assignment of empirical content capable of practical efficiency, or adoption of secondary implication for what is declared in Śruti.

2·32 The resort to secondary implication in "Cook the golden grains" etc., is due to inability to perform what is expressly enjoined.

2·321 Explanation of the apaccheda-nyāya and its applicability; perception thus sublated by Śruti is not contentless, but has an empirical content.

2·3211 Objection: no sublation in the apaccheda-nyāya, but statements of what are real at different times.

2·3212 Reply: *Śāstradīpikā* passage explained in the light of the context: earlier obligation not admitted to exist in fact; analogy of the black and red colours of the cherry shown to be inapplicable.

2·322 Why should not perception be stronger, on the upakrama-nyāya?

2·323 Reply: syntactical unity needed for the application of the upakrama-nyāya; illustration; no suspicion of syntactical unity between perception and non-dualist revelation; hence apaccheda-nyāya alone applies.

3·0 Alleged superiority of perception as upajīvya; distinction from cases where the apaccheda-nyāya applies; it is not the truth-aspect alone which is denied by Scripture, but existence as well.

3·1 Reply: in śabda, what is depended on is only such cognition of letters etc., as is common to valid knowledge and delusion; even existence of letters etc. may be denied.

3·2 Capacity at least should exist for sounds to convey their sense. This may be recognised consistently with non-dualism, according to which, the universe, which persists up to Brahman-knowledge, is practically efficient and other than the unreal. Non-existence may subsist together with its counter-correlate, till sublation of the latter. Definition of unreality, as being the counter-correlate of negation in all places and times, objected to.

3·3 Scripture denies the reality, not the existence, of the world; negation and counter-correlate cannot co-exist. Perception has empirical reality for content: viṣaya-vyavasthā.

3·4 Non-acceptance of three grades of reality--absolute, empirical and merely apparent; conceit of reality in pot, etc., and in nacre-silver etc., even because of association with Brahman and non-discrimination therefrom. Hence negation of their reality is neither irrelevant nor contradictory.

3·41 Origination admitted of the merely apparent, in order to account for its immediacy.

3·411 Is origination admitted for the reflection of the face? Immediacy not possible for such portion of one's own face as the forehead etc. The reflection cannot be the merely apparent, as then the jīva who is a reflection would also be so.

3·4111 *Vivaraṇa* view: the reflected face not other than the prototype; differences of position etc. are super-imposed thereon; immediacy possible for one's own face, since it is apprehended by rays of light from the eyes, turned back by the mirror etc.; such apprehension needed to account for the memory-impression, which is one of the three causes of superimposition.

3·4112 Advaitavidyācārya's view: reflection is illusory and different from the prototype; reference to it as one's own face is of secondary import; conflict within experience on the *Vivaraṇa* view. Memory-impression, as cause of superimposition, need not be of the specific object super-imposed. Illusoriness does not result for the jīva, as the reflection theory is not accepted.

3·412 Criticism of the view that reflection is real, being a variety of shadow.

3·413 Nor is the shadow of a substance other than darkness; nacre-silver too would be real.

3·414 What ignorance causes this delusion? By what knowledge is it dispelled?

3·4141 Ignorance of the adhiṣṭhāna, persisting in respect of projective energy, causes the reflection; knowledge of the substrate removes it when aided by non-proximity of the image.

3·4142 Removal merely of obscuring energy is due to obstacles posited by primal ignorance which alone is the material cause of the superimposition of reflection; difference from empirical reality in that for the latter non-generation by a defect is a further condition; sublation of prātibhāsika superimposition consistent with non-removal of primal ignorance.

3·51 Dreams too the product of primal ignorance and removable by Brahman-knowledge alone; merely apparent character due to the additional defect, sleep.

3·52 Dream sublatable by waking cognition; true knowledge of the substrate not necessary for the removal of delusion, which may be removed even by another delusion.

3·53 Primal ignorance not the cause, but a mode thereof, viz., sleep; that sleep is a mode of ignorance established by the delusions in dreams due to obscuration of the empirical world and jīva; a prātibhāsika jīva too projected as the spectator of dreams; because of their spectator being super-imposed on the empirical jīva, the latter recollects the dream on waking.

3·541 Objections to dream being super-imposed on (1) undefined intelligence, or (2) intelligence defined by individuation: in (1) the dream elephant would require a psychosis of the internal organ to be manifested by ahaṅkārā-'vacchinna-caitanya, and no psychosis is possible in sleep; in (2) there is the contingence of the experience "I am an elephant" not "I possess an elephant."

3·5421 Reply to the first objection. Substrate of dreams is intelligence not as outside the body, but as within it, hence psychosis possible without dependence on external sense.

3·5422 No psychosis not generated by valid testimony can have undefined intelligence as its sphere, hence that intelligence is the substrate, as of itself immediate, not as manifested by a psychosis; what is obscured is Brahman-intelligence, not the jīva-intelligence which is a reflection thereof.

3·543 The substrate is intelligence conditioned, not qualified, by individuation and reflected therein; hence no experience of the form "I am an elephant."

3·5431 Even nacre-silver is super-imposed on the reflection of intelligence defined by the this-element of the nacre.

3·5432 Nacre-silver superimposed on the prototype intelligence; others do not cognise at the same time, as each one can perceive that alone which has *his* ignorance as material cause.

3·6 How to account for the visibility of dream-elephant etc.?

3·61 There are not prātibhāsika indriyas, for the prātibhāsika has no ajñāta-sattva, while indriyas are uncognised; the empirical senses are then quiescent; no subtle sense-organs known to exist.

3·611 Scripture declaring self-luminosity in the dream-state rules out the psychoses of the empirical senses.

3·612 Internal organ does not fail to be eliminated by above-cited texts, because that cannot be instrumental to cognition except in dependence on an external sense; or because that organ through its transformation stands as the object of cognition; recollection on waking is due to memory-impressions consequent on avidyā-vṛtti or on the destruction of the dream-state.

3·613 Even admitting a psychosis of the internal organ, its distinction from the jīva is not well-known; hence elimination of other luminaries secured by the said Śruti.

3·62 Co-presence and co-absence of the functioning of the senses with the dream experience; this too may be dream-delusion, analogous to seeing the nacre-silver.

✓ 3·71 Dṛṣṭi contemporaneous with sṛṣṭi; even the elephant of waking experience not an object of the sense of sight.

3·711 Who posits the waking world? Not the unconditioned self as transmigration would persist even after release; nor the conditioned self, because of reciprocal dependence.

Reply: the stream of conditioning is beginningless and he who is conditioned by the earlier posited nescience posits the subsequent nescience.

3·712 Nescience and five others are beginningless; not in respect of them is perception simultaneous with creation.

3·713 What is the basis of the Śruti declaration of sequence in creation?

3·7131 Reply: purport of Ścripture is identity of self with niṣprapañca Brahman; identity known through adhyāropa and apavāda; hence the mention of creation etc.; discussions as to the sequence intended by Śruti assume purport therein for Śruti and have the purpose of making clear the principles of interpretation.

3·7132 Declarations of attainment of fruit by jyotiṣṭoma etc., parallel to the attainment in dreams. Those texts are authoritative since the observances prescribed purify the intellect and lead to realisation of unity with Brahman.

3·72 Dṛṣṭi is itself sṛṣṭi.

3·8 Dṛṣṭi is of the created. Creation is by Īśvara and in the stated sequence. Illusoriness of the world though not generated by the three causes thereof; removable by knowledge alone; or different from both the real and the unreal; or is the counter-correlate of that negation in all three times, which occurs in the locus of what is cognised.

3·81 Even individuation etc. are illusory like nacre-silver, since they are cognised by the witness alone.

3·82 They are not illusory in the same way, not being sublated in waking; the *Vivaraṇa* declaration of the three-fold cause of their super-imposition is a prauḍhivāda.

4·0 How to account for the practical efficiency of the illusory?

4·1 As in dreams, practical efficiency is of the same grade of reality as the experience itself.

4·2 Advaitavidyācārya: even dream experience causes effects not sublated in waking, e.g., the dream-damsel; it is not that the *cognition* of the damsel in the dream is the cause and that that is real, for that too is assumptive; nor is mere immediacy the cause of happiness, since there are grades of the latter, though none in the former; hence practical efficiency of a higher grade of reality is possible.

4·3 Analogy of the darkness that obscures objects in a dimly lit room, for one who comes in from bright light; this has the same practical efficiency as well-known darkness.

4·41 What subserves practical efficiency is bare existence, not reality; no practical efficiency for the mirage etc., since water-ness etc., are absent therefrom.

4·42 Others: water-ness etc. do exist, as otherwise activity in respect of mirage etc.

would be impossible; non-existence of practical efficiency may be due to various special causes, e.g., destruction of the super-imposition by specific cognition; not that which is unsublated in all three times, but that which is not generated by special defects is practically efficient; hence, even the illusory may be practically efficient.

4·5 Illusoriness too is illusory. Objection: illusory illusoriness not opposed to the reality of the world.

4·51 *Advaitadīpikā*: illusoriness negates the reality of its substrate—the world; that which denies reality, illusoriness, need possess only the same grade of reality as the substrate, the world of ether etc., not absolute reality.

4·52 What cannot be removed by the intuition of its own locus negates any attribute opposed to itself; nacreity in nacre opposes non-nacreity, while its silverness is not opposed to its non-silverness; illusoriness of the world is not removed by the cognition of the world and hence negates its non-illusoriness; but Brahman's saprapañcatva is removed by the intuition of Brahman.

4·53 *Objection*: verbal testimony as the evidence for Brahman should be real.

Reply: even the empirical and unreal

is practically efficient; the Vedāntas teach Brahman by such terms as "real" not found in connection with the agnihotra etc.; texts of non-duality are of greater force; even the validity of knowledge about Brahman is less than real, as involving Brahman-hood which, as distinct from Brahman, the sole real, is less than real.

5·1 Intelligent beings not illusory as else there will be none to be released; nor can they be one with Brahman, in view of their reciprocal difference.

5·2 Reciprocal differences due to differences of upādhi.

5·21 Difference must be in the loci, not in external adjuncts.

5·211 Reply of some: distinctions of happiness etc. are certainly due to differences in the adjunct, the internal organ, since they are declared by Śruti to belong to this; apposition of bondage and intelligence due to superimposition of the identity of the internal organ with intelligence; transmigration of the latter consists in being the substrate of the superimposition of identity with the knot of individuation; as for the evils, so even for reciprocal differences there is the conceit of belonging to the self; the witness experiences happiness, misery etc., only as identified with and differentiated by the internal organ.

5·212 Others: not the internal organ, but the reflection of intelligence therein is the locus of bondage; these reflections are diverse.

5·213 Yet others: the enjoyer is intelligence as endowed with body and organs and identified with the mind.

5·214 Still others: in the proximity of the internal organ, the real locus of agency etc., agency etc. may be superimposed even on pure intelligence as the locus; analogy of flower and crystal.

5·215 Distinction (vyavasthā) may be due to difference whose locus is assumptive, *i.e.*, external adjuncts; example of the lamp appearing nearer or farther away.

6·0 Which adjunct accounts for one jīva not recollecting another happiness etc.?

6·1 Difference in the abode of enjoyment is the upādhi; the hand goes forth to pluck the thorn from the foot, because of the non-difference of these organs from the organism, the body; no such non-difference as between Caitra and Maitra; nor do their bodies belong to a common organism.

6·2 Difference due to disjoining of adjuncts is the upādhi; though the mother and the child in the womb are not disjoined, they are not united as organs of a single organism.

6·3 Identity or difference of bodies constitutes the upādhi; no difference between the bodies of youth and old age; growth is not by increase of parts.

6·4 Difference or non-difference of the internal organ is the upādhi.

6·5 Avidyās are manifold, one for each jīva; hence the non-recollection of one jīva's experience by another.

6·61 Vyavasthā not more intelligible on the basis of a plurality of pervasive selves; unity of the self favoured by Śruti and parsimony.

6·62 Nor can selves be atomic as happiness or misery throughout the body would be unintelligible.

6·621 Objection: Śruti and Smṛti support atomicity.

6·6221 Reply: vyavasthā not established even thus: Caitra may recollect Maitra's pain even as he recollects pain in different parts of his own body.

6·6222 *Objection*: pure difference conditions vyavasthā.

Reply: is it non-concomitant with the relation of part and whole or non-concomitant with non-difference? Not the first, since the jīva is said to be a part of Brahman and there would be confusion between the experiences of the jīva and of Brahman; interpretation of aṃśatva as similarity together with inferiority; this itself is the relation between the alleged members of the jīva and the jīva. Aṃśatva is not difference *cum* non-difference: possibility of confusion among the experiences of various jīvas and as between the experiences of the jīvas and of Brahman; the diverse jīvas are non-different too in respect of intelligence; illustration of the members of an assembly; hence too, since there is not difference non-concomitant with non-difference there should be confusion.

6·623 *Objection*: it is *perception* of non-difference that accounts for recollection.

Reply: on our view too it is failure to perceive non-difference that accounts for non-recollection.

6·624 According to you the Lord should grieve through perceiving His real non-difference from the jīvas; but according to us, He will not, perceiving the illusoriness of misery.

6·625 *Objection*: knowledge which is pervasive may be the substrate of all differences.

Reply : experience of happiness etc. cannot arise in dependence on knowledge; if that be an attribute of knowledge, diversity should result for knowledge, not for the self.

6·6261 Difference between Īśvara and the jīva not any more intelligible on this view: Īśvara too declared by Śruti to enter into creation and to be atomic.

6·6262 *Objection* : other texts establish Īśvara as all pervasive; further He is the material cause of the Universe; hence texts about atomicity etc. to be secondarily explained.

Reply : why not secondary explanation apply also to similar texts about the jīva?

Objection: the going up of the jīva is mentioned even before the going up of the adjunct, the intellect; departure is declared even after the release from name and form.

6·6263 Reply: of the jīva too pervasiveness is declared; further for you the material cause is prakṛti, not Brahman; even if atomic, Brahman might be the material cause, as the atomic jīva is alleged to be the material cause of happiness and misery present in a plurality of bodies; secondary interpretation is possible of both sets of texts; if attainment is opposed to the pervasiveness of the jīva, it is opposed to the pervasiveness of Brahman too; pervasiveness is the proper nature of the jīva though he is finite as conditioned by adjuncts.

CHAPTER III.

1·0 Knowledge is the sole path to the attainment of Brahman; karma useful indirectly.

1·1 *Bhāmatī* view: karma useful in generating the desire to know; desire to know, prior to performing karma, is like the general inclination for food in the case of one who has become lean through distaste for food.

1·2 *Vivaraṇa* view: karma useful in generating knowledge itself; the suffix expressing desire not primary in this case; analogy of "He desires to go on horseback."

1·21 Such utility of karma not inconsistent with the need for renunciation, the two belonging to different stages. Karmas are practised only till desire for knowledge is generated; but the fruit persists till knowledge is generated through removing obstacles and securing favourable conditions for study etc.

1·3 What karmas are to be performed?

1·31 Āśrama-karmas.

1·321 *Kalpataru* view: even those outside āśramas (widowers etc.) are eligible for knowledge; hence not āśrama-karmas alone are meant; even varṇa-dharmas, e.g., japa etc., are of use; but obligatory rites alone are potent to produce knowledge.

1·322 *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* admits the potency of both obligatory and optional rites; the principle of transfer from prakṛti to vikṛti does not apply here, since sacrifice is prescribed in general terms by Śruti, as subserving knowledge.

1·41 How is it that Janaka is said to have reached perfection by karma alone? Is it because the path of knowledge is only for brāhmaṇas? No, "brāhmaṇa" includes all the twice-born castes.

1·421 The śūdra not competent for such karma, since he has no knowledge of the Vaidika rites through adhyayana.

1·422 Others: even for the śūdra there is competency for such karma as subserves knowledge, e.g., meditation of the pañcākṣara, making gifts etc.; study of the Veda not necessary, instrumental suffix being added separately to each—vedānuvacana, dāna, yajña etc. Imparting knowledge of Vaidika rites is alone prohibited. The apaśūdra section denies competency for saguṇa meditation or the acquisition of nirguṇa knowledge through the Vedānta. Practice of karma subserving knowledge may endow the śūdra with the body of a twice-born in the next life.

2·0 How does renunciation subserve knowledge?

2·11 By producing an apūrva that alone destroys some of the sins which obstruct knowledge; hence renunciation necessary at least in a past or in a future life.

2·12 Apūrva from renunciation is a special qualification of him who is competent for śravaṇa etc.

2·13 Utility through seen channels, securing undistracted study &c.

2·14 The brāhmaṇa alone being competent to renounce, how can the kṣatriya or vaiśya be competent for study etc.?

2·141 "Brāhmaṇa" is upalakṣaṇa for kṣatriya and vaiśya as well; these too are competent to renounce.

2·142 Others: the brāhmaṇa alone competent to renounce. In the case of the knower who renounces there is no distinction of competency based on caste; but not in the case of him who seeks knowledge; kṣatriyas and vaiśyas are competent for study; but saṃnyāsa is not a qualification of their competence, any more than for those who have attained to the status of divine beings on the path of release by stages.

2·143 Eligibility for study belongs only to him who has renounced; for kṣatriyas and vaiśyas, as for widowers, there is permission for such study as will bring about a brāhmaṇa body in another life.

2·1431 How can study in this birth produce knowledge in another? Where there are obstacles in the present birth, the Sūtra declares realisation in the next birth, through the generation of an apūrva or niyamā-'dṛṣṭa by hearing etc., carried on in this birth; what is devoid of renunciation cannot generate this adṛṣṭa.

2·1432 Apūrva due to previous sacrifice etc. leads to hearing etc. in the present birth; this apūrva itself may lead to realisation even in another birth; this explanation alone acceptable where no injunction is recognised in respect of śravaṇa etc.

2·1433 The *Vivaraṇa* view: the above explanation holds even where a niyama-vidhi is recognised, for the restriction is secured with repetition, not with the bare commencement of śravaṇa; analogy of pounding; hence the niyamā-'dṛṣṭa does not arise, for the most part, prior to the attainment of the fruit.

2·144 Vedānta-śravaṇa, though having a visible result has also an unseen potency of its own. Only through this do śravaṇa etc. subserve the attainment of knowledge in a hereafter.

3·0 Bhāratītīrtha's view: yoga a means to attainment like sāṅkhya; latter signifies śravaṇa etc., and the former signifies contemplation of Nirguṇa Brahman; such contemplation mentioned in Śruti, supported by the Bhāṣyakāra and the Sūtrakāra; if Śruti denies Brahman to be the object of contemplation, it denies its being the object of knowledge too; if its being the object of knowledge is well known, the contemplation thereof is also well known from other texts; such contemplation is suitable for those who, because of dullness of intellect, failure to find a skilled perceptor etc., are not able to make an inquiry into the Vedānta, but have a superficial knowledge of the one-ness of Brahman and the self from the Vedānta learnt by the adhyayana; even such contemplation may lead to fruition; analogy of guesses that turn out correct; the path of inquiry is quicker for him who has no obstacles; that of contemplation involves delay.

4·0 What is the karaṇa of Brahman-intuition?

4·1 Deep meditation (prasaṅkhyāna); evidenced by Śruti and by the lover's experience.

4·11 Prasaṅkhyāṇa not enumerated as a pramāṇa; the success of guess work is due to mere chance and it cannot generate valid knowledge, though the content may not be sublated.

4·12 Reply: There may be valid postulation of what is not established by a pramāṇa, e.g., Īśvara's mayā-vṛtti. The knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and the self being based on the Vedānta, the intuition of that unity by meditation is certainly well-based.

4·2 The mind alone is the karaṇa; deep meditation is an auxiliary thereto, as causing mental concentration.

4·3 Only the mahāvākyas are the karaṇas; instrumentality of the mind denied by Śruti; instrumentality of verbal testimony at least in respect of mediate knowledge has to be admitted here by those for whom mind is the karaṇa; intuition of the sense is not through śakti, but lakṣaṇā; the mind too is a cause, but not the karaṇa.

5·1 How can verbal testimony generate immediate cognition? It may do so in conjunction with the concentrated mind;

immediacy of knowledge necessary to remove error which is immediate; and for Brahman there is no pramāṇa other than the Upaniṣads.

5·2 It may do so in conjunction with intense contemplation, as the mind does in the case of the lost damsel.

5·3 Immediacy of the cognition consists in the immediacy of the object and Brahman is eminently immediate. Immediacy is non-difference from the cognising intelligence.

5·4 Advaitavidyācārya: immediacy of the object is its non-difference from such intelligence as is helpful to empirical usage in respect of itself; immediacy of cognition is non-difference of such intelligence, as is helpful to the respective empirical usages, from the respective objects. Immediacy an attribute of intelligence, not of a psychosis. Hence immediacy possible for happiness etc., which are witness-revealed; jīva in saṃsāra does not realise Brahman, because of obscuration by ignorance; ignorance not an obscuring agent for Īśvara, and only for him to whom it is an obscuring agent does it present difference from the object-defined intelligence. That knowledge, which arises only as in conjunction with its own content, destroys ignorance; and Brahman-knowledge, though from verbal testimony, arises thus in conjunction with Brahman-intelligence, the material cause of all. Though adhyayana may give superficial knowledge and śravaṇa may give certitude of existence, ignorance is not removed, because of the defect of mental distraction, for the removal of which reflection and contemplation are necessary; the virtues of these may have been acquired by practice in a previous birth.

6·1 Why not pot-cognition etc. remove ignorance about Brahman?

6·2 Intelligence not the content of a psychosis of the senses. Modal cognitions dispel modal ignorances which have pot etc. for content; ignorance as relating to the inert has to be admitted indirectly, if not directly; on the strength of observation, primal ignorance can be removed only by that knowledge whose contents are not the products of that ignorance; or pot etc. are contents of modal ignorances alone; this position established on the analogy of sight of sandal-wood, wherein there is no perception of its smell too; modes of ignorance, through differences of content, as through differences of cognisers.

6·3 Because of the restrictive injunction about study of the Vedānta, that knowledge alone as aided by the niyamā-'pūrva can remove ignorance about Brahman.

6·4 The sphere of primal ignorance is oneness of the jīva and Brahman and can be removed only by knowledge having the same sphere, not by modal cognitions teaching the bare existence of intelligence. Non-difference is not something over and above intelligence; knowledge of non-difference is that whose content is intelligence through a special svarūpa-sambandha controlled by special causes; difference in the knowledge, as occasioned by a svarūpa-sambandha exemplified from the cognition of the qualified (viśiṣṭa) and from doubt.

6·5 *Objection*: Even Brahman-knowledge cannot remove primal ignorance, since the effect cannot conflict with its material cause.

Reply: There *is* a conflict here, due to knowledge and ignorance having the same content; conflict even between effect and cause exemplified from cloth and conjunction of cloth with fire; doctrine that destruction of the effect is due to destruction of the cause not accepted.

7·0 How is Brahman-knowledge itself destroyed?

7·1 Analogy of the clearing-nut which precipitates the dirt in water and precipitates itself.

7·2 Analogies of water consumed by heated metal and of grass burnt up by fire.

7·3 Destruction not invariably generated by what is other than its counter-correlate. No undue extensiveness is not assuming other causes in addition; for (1) need for another cause is not denied in all cases; (2) analogy of the destruction of a pot cannot establish the need for another cause in the present case, as, then, hammer-blows will also be needed to destroy Brahman-knowledge; (3) the destruction of the fire-cognition may have an additional cause, just as fire which has fuel needs an additional cause for being quenched; (4) destruction even at the moment succeeding its origination is a contingence of the acceptable in the case of Brahman-knowledge; in the moment prior to its destruction, time, unseen potency etc. also exist; hence they too may be causes of the destruction; "removable by knowledge alone" as the definition of the "illusory" means "removable by knowledge while not being removable by any accessory of knowledge except when conjoined with knowledge."

7·4 Ignorance and the universe are removed not by the inert psychosis, Brahman-knowledge, but by the intelligence associated with that; analogy of the sun's rays burning when focussed through a burning glass; thus intelligence removes the final psychosis as well.

7·5 Brahman-knowledge removes ignorance alone; and this material cause being destroyed, the world too is destroyed along with Brahman-knowledge which is a part of it; even after the rise of the final psychosis, prārabdha-karma may account for the continuance of a trace of nescience, because of which there may continue the appearance of a body etc.; hence the phenomenon of jīvan-mukti.

CHAPTER IV.

1·1 The persistent trace of nescience is an element of the projective energy of primal nescience.

1·2 It is the impression left behind by nescience, like the smell of garlic.

1·3 It is primal nescience itself like a burnt cloth retaining its configuration.

1·4 Sarvajñātman: no trace of nescience can survive knowledge; jīvanmukti is taught by way of eulogising the injunction to study; this is not his final view.

2·0 What is the removal of ignorance?

2·1 Nothing other than the self: *Brahmasiddhi;* it is *effected* by knowledge on the principle "yasmin saty agrimakṣaṇe yatsattvam" etc.

2·2 It is other than the self, and of a fifth mode which is not real, nor unreal, nor real and unreal, nor indeterminable: Ānandabodha.

2·3 Advaitavidyācārya: removal of nescience is certainly indeterminable, but it does not persist and hence its material cause need not persist; removal is a modification of existence relating to the last instant alone; the conjugational suffix signifies relation to present time etc., only as attaching to the sense of the stem; refutation of pradhvaṃsā-'bhāva as permanent; prāg-abhāva too may be rejected.

2·31 Prāg-abhāva and pradhvaṃsā-'bhāva not needed to distinguish the past from the future.

2·41 Momentariness of the removal of nescience does not involve impermanence of release; for when there is its removal by knowledge, what results is not a production but a manifestation of eternal, impartite bliss and the cessation of misery.

2·42 Citsukha: cessation of misery not the human goal, but only as subsidiary to happiness; but happiness is not subsidiary thereto; gradations not possible in *non-existence* of misery as a human goal.

3·1 Bliss, though eternally attained, is unattained as it were, because of nescience; analogy of the forgotten golden ornament round one's neck; attainment is *figurative.*

3·2 Non-existence of bliss in transmigration patent to all, because of ignorance, which posits non-existence of Brahman-bliss; this ceases with knowledge; and on the principle "yasmin saty agrimakṣaṇe" etc., attainment is in the *primary* sense.

3·31 No immediacy for bliss in transmigration; hence it is not then the human goal; non-obscuration is present only with knowledge; hence bliss as the human goal is *attained* by knowledge.

3·32 In transmigration, difference is superimposed between intelligence and bliss; this is removed by knowledge; hence the attainment.

4·0 Is release the attainment of the state of Īśvara? or subsistence as pure intelligence?

4·1 Eka-jīva-vadā can admit only subsistence as pure intelligence.

4·21 Even so on the nānā-jīva-vāda, in that variety of it which holds Īśvara too to be a reflection.

4·22 Release, until the final release of all, is attainment of the state of Īśvara, according to the view in which Īśvara is the prototype of which jīvas are reflections; analogy of reflections in many media.

4·221 The Lord's Īśvaratva is due not to His nescience, but to the nescience of others, and so long as these persist, He will continue to be Īśvara.

4·222 Difference from the fruit of saguṇa meditation; no intuition of the impartite in the latter; hence no destruction of ignorance; no unlimited Lordship.

4·223 Ignorance etc. do not attach to Īśvara though in incarnations He seems to be ignorant, to suffer and so on; this is mere acting; hence no contingence of fresh bondage for those who have become Īśvara.

4·2241 Conformity of this view with Śruti, Sūtra, Bhāṣya etc. Illustration from the Bhāṣya on the dahara section of the first chapter;

4·2242 from the aṃśa section of the second chapter;

4·2243 from the dream section of the third chapter;

4·2244 and from the section about the form of manifestation in the fourth chapter.

4·2245 Support of the *Bhāmatī* and its followers.

4·2246 Erroneousness of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* view that statements about manifestation of Īśvaratva are assumptive and made for argument's sake.

4·23 Impossibility of attainment of Īśvaratva is the defect on the view of Īśvara as a reflection. Same defect in the eka-jīva-vāda and in the view of absolute difference between jīva and Īśvara.

4·231	Apahatapāpmatva etc. cannot attach to the jīva in release, on the dualist hypothesis; adventitiousness of these attributes conflicts with Śruti and Sūtra; if they are eternally established, bondage is illusory.
4·2311	Hence non-difference of the jīva from the Lord is difficult to avoid.
4·23111	Apahatapāpmatva, satyasaṅkalpatva etc. conceived as special powers which come into being for the jīva at his release; no contingence of non-difference from Īśvara.
4·23112	No authority for such interpretation of the words; in transmigration sin does attach; when knowledge arises, even because of knowledge, sin does not cling; the assumption of a power is futile.

ABBREVIATIONS.

A_1,	Adyar Ms. No. xxv B. 10.
A_2,	Adyar Ms. No. xxvi B 33.
AKS,	Mahāmahopādhyāya N. S. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī's edition.
Āp. ŚS,	Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtras.
B,	Benares Chowkhamba Press edition of *SLS.*
Bh. G.,	Bhagavad Gītā.
Bṛh.,	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Bṛh. Vārt.,	Bṛhadāraṇyaka - upaniṣad - bhāṣya-vārtika.
C,	Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara edition of *SLS.*
Chānd.,	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
E_1,	Oriental Mss. Library Egmore Ms. No. DC 4766.
E_2,	Oriental Mss. Library Egmore Ms. No DC 4764.
E_3,	Oriental Mss. Library Egmore Ms. No. R. 1885.
K,	Advaitamañjarī edition of *SLS.*
Kaṭha,	Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
Māṇḍ.,	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
Mem. Ed.,	Memorial edition of Śaṅkara's works, Vāṇī Vilās Press.

ABBREVIATIONS.—(*Contd.*).

MNP,	Mīmāṃsāṇyāyaprakāśa.
Muṇḍ.,	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
Nṛs. Ut.,	Nṛsiṃha Uttaratāpanīya Upaniṣad.
Pat.,	Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya.
PM,	Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras.
Praśna,	Praśna Upaniṣad.
SB,	Siddhāntabindu (Advaitamañjari edition).
SLS,	Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha.
SŚ,	Saṅkṣepaśārīraka.
Ś,	Śrīraṅgam edition of *SLS*.
Śvet.,	Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
TPH,	Theosophical Publishing House.
Taitt.,	Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
Taitt. Sam.,	Taittirīya Saṃhitā.
V,	Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition of *SLS*.
VPS,	Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha (*VSS*).
VSS,	Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.
Ved. Sū.,	Vedānta Sūtras.

OM

SIDDHĀNTALĒŚASAṄGRAHA

CHAPTER I.

Victorious is the auspicious birth-destroying discourse (the *Sūtrabhāṣya*), which issues from the blessed lotus face of the Bhagavatpāda, has for its sole purport the non-dual Brahman, and is diversified a thousand-fold on reaching the (numerous) ancient preceptors (who expounded it), in the same way as the river (Gaṅgā), which, issuing from the foot of Viṣṇu,[1] is diversified on reaching different lands. (1)

Manifold are the ways disclosed by the ancient ones, who, intent only on the establishment of the unity of the self, paid no heed to what is established in empirical usage; some of the different conclusions which lie at the base of these (differences) and which have been made known to me by the exposition of my revered father, I here compendiously bring together for the clarification of my mind. (2)

I write this not too extensive work, establishing (therein) through arguments, according to the best of my lights, such positions as require so to be established. (3)

1·1 Now, there is considered first what kind of an injunction it is that, in the form "The self, verily, is to be seen, heard, reflected on," appears to be prescribed in respect of the hearing (study) of the Vedānta, for the sake of knowing that (Brahman-self), in the case of one who has learnt (by adhyayana) his own section of the Veda together with its subsidiary studies[2], and in whom there has arisen the desire to know the Brahman-self known superficially through the Vedāntas[3].

---

[1] See the Introduction; compare also the *Brahmatarkastava*, vv. 35—37.

1·11 Three, verily, are the varieties of injunction—the injunction of the novel, the restrictively complementary injunction, and the exclusive injunction. Of these, the first is that injunction whose fruit is the establishment of what is not established in any way in all the three times; for example, "He sprinkles the paddy-grains."[4] Here, for the purifactory act of sprinkling the paddy-grains, in the absence of an injunction, there is no establishment in any way by other evidence. The second is that injunction whose fruit is the complementation of the unestablished element, in respect of what is established in part; for example, "He pounds the paddy-grains." Here, even if there were no injunction, the establishment of the pounding of the paddy-grains would come about even as presumptively implied for the production of the rice, the basic material of the puroḍāśa (sacrificial cake); hence the injunction is not for the establishment of that; but, when pounding is established by presumptive implication, in the very same way, husking with the nails and so on would also be established in part, there being no distinction in respect of the causality as understood from experience; since thus there is an element of non-establishment in respect of pounding, that (injunction) has the fruit of complementing that element (making pounding the sole means).[5] The third is that injunction which, when there is constant relation of one subsidiary to two principals or of two subsidiaries to one principal, has the fruit of removing the other principal or the other subsidiary (whichever is superfluous in the case); for example, (the injunction) in the agnicayana "He takes hold of the reins of the horse with the words 'they seized the bridle of the right'"; or (the injunction) in the gṛhamedhīya, a particular rite included in the cāturmāsya, "He sacrifices with the two ghee-portions." Two acts are to be observed in the agnicayana, viz., taking hold of the reins of a horse and taking hold of the reins of a donkey. Of these, since in the taking hold of the reins of a horse the hymn "They seized" etc. is constantly established even because of the characteristic mark, consisting in its capacity to make known the taking hold of the reins, the injunction is not either for the establishment of that or for the purpose of complementing any non-established element therein; but since the hymn might, because of the characteristic mark being non-distinctive, be established even in the taking hold of the reins of a donkey, that (injunction) is for the purpose of removing this (possibility). Similarly, since the gṛhamedhīya has the darśa-pūrṇamāsa for its archetype, the ghee-portions are constantly established (for it) even by transfer;[6] hence the injunction there is not for the purpose of establishing those (portions) or for the purpose of restricting them(as the sole material for the sacrifice); but since by transfer even the fore-sacrifices[7] etc. might be established, that (injunction) is for the purpose of removing this (possibility). This example which conforms (only) to the *prima facie* view of the section on the gṛhamedhīya, is cited in the view that an example may be cited (for the present purpose) from anywhere (whether *prima facie* view or final view).

---

[2] The subsidiary studies (aṅgas) are: phonetics, liturgy, grammar, prosody, and astronomy.

[3] In so far as they have been learnt by rote, not critically examined.

[4] In all such texts, the imperative should be understood as the real purport, though the indicative alone is used.

---

[5] The term niyama-vidhi literally means injunction of restriction. With this much, however, there is not secured its distinction from parisaṅkhyā-vidhi, since there cannot be restriction without exclusion. The differentia of the niyama-vidhi is that it completes what is otherwise incomplete; hence it may be said to be "restrictively complementary." This equivalent is, however, not used throughout, since it is rather cumbrous. But the function of complementation should be understood wherever the term "restrictive injunction" is used.

Nor may it be objected that even in the restrictively complementary injunction, when, for the pounding established in part, the part that is non-established is made up, that (demand for a means) is satisfied, that consequently there is obtained also the removal of husking with the nails etc., which are the other means established in part, and that, therefore, no discrimination is possible in effect between restriction and exclusion, there being no distinction (between them) in their having the removal of the rest as the fruit. For, in the absence of the restrictive complementation resulting from injunction, as to the pounding, it would not be possible to exclude husking with the nails and so on, which are obtained by presumptive implication; therefore, the restriction, whose nature it is to complement the non-established element, comes first; and, as present in the pounding that is enjoined, it is proximate; hence, that (complementation) alone is admitted to be the fruit of the restrictive injunction; therefore, the exclusion of others, which originates in dependence on that (restriction) and is non-proximate, as present in what is not enjoined, is not appropriately the fruit, when a proximate fruit is possible.

---

[6] Certain rites, all of whose subsidiaries are laid down explicitly and *in extenso* by Scripture constitute the archetypal (prakṛti) rites; others modelled on them are called vikṛtis. The Scriptural directions as to the latter not being complete, they have to be taken over *mutatis mutandis* from the archetype. This process of taking over or transfer is called atideśa.

[7] The darśa-pūrṇamāsa consists of two sets of three rites. To each of these sets there belongs a set of five subsidiary rites called fore-sacrifices (prayājas). They are mentioned in this order: samidho yajati, tanūnapātam yajati, iḍo yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāram yajati. They should be performed in this order.

Of the three kinds of injunction, thus distinguished, of which kind is the injunction of hearing (study) recognised to be? 1·12

Some, like the author of the *Prakaṭārtha* say thus: this is an injunction of the novel, since it (the hearing) is not established (otherwise). Indeed, in respect of the hearing (study) of the Vedānta being the cause of the intuition of Brahman there is not the evidence of co-presence and co-absence; for, in ordinary experience, even for him, who has heard (studied), that (intuition) does not arise for the most part, while for Vāmadeva, 1·121 present in the womb, that arises, though he has not heard (studied), and thus there is inconstancy both ways.[8] Nor is there a general rule, apprehended from the hearing (study) of other sacred teachings, that hearing (study) in general is the cause of the intuition of the thing that has to be heard about,—in which case, it may be doubted that, though here there be no means of apprehending the causality specifically, causality may (yet) be established at least through generality (i.e., resemblance to other sacred teachings). For, even though, in the case of the hearing (study) of the science of music etc., there be admitted causality of the intuition of the ṣaḍja note etc., yet, since, from the hearing (study) of the section relating to ritual etc., there is not seen to result the intuition of its object, Religious Duty etc., there is inconstancy. Therefore, this is certainly an injunction of the novel. In the *Bhāṣya* too, in the section "There is the injunction of some other auxiliary, partially, which is the third for him who has that (knowledge); as in the case of injunctions and the like," it is only an injunction of the novel that is recognised in respect of hearing (study), denoted by the word pāṇḍitya, (in the following words): "In the case of mauna, the auxiliary to knowledge, an injunction alone is to be recognised, as in the case of a childlike state and pāṇḍitya, since it is non-established (otherwise)".[9]

---

[8] *I.e.*, both in the positive and in the negative instances, the *probans* is not constant to the *probandum*.

[9] For a proper understanding, the whole section should be studied in the *Bhāṣya*. The question is whether of three auxiliaries mentioned in the Śruti, bālya, pāṇḍitya and mauna, there is injunction of any, other than the first, the injunctive term being explicitly used in relation to that alone. The final view is that they are all enjoined as auxiliaries. The

/

That the hearing (study) of the Vedānta is the cause of the intuition of the eternally immediate Brahman is not non-established, since, in maintaining the immediacy of knowledge through verbal testimony, it is settled that for that (Vedānta study), defined as a means of valid knowledge whose content is an immediate object, the causing of the intuition (of that object) is established. It is for that purpose, indeed, that there is the commencement of that (topic).[10] Nor may it be said that, though with this much, as being a means of knowledge relating to Brahman, there may be established causality in respect of a superficial realisation consisting in an intuition of Brahman in a general way, there is not established of that hearing (study) the causing of that intuition consisting in the certitude of existence, which is to be desired for the sake of the 1·122

---

word mauna, meaning the state of a muni, should be taken to mean not "silence", but pre-eminence of knowledge. Pāṇḍitya is not mere learning, but study of the Vedānta; bālya is a child-like state. Mauna is the third auxiliary for him who possesses the other two. Mauna is taken to be enjoined, in spite of the absence of an injunctive word, because it is novel and non-established otherwise. Since the injunction is for him who already possesses that (knowledge), it may be thought there is no novelty; hence the word "partially" indicating that the injunction is for those who, because of distractions, have not yet attained to pre-eminence of knowledge.

[10] Nescience, which is realised as immediate, can be removed only by immediate knowledge of the kind perception gives us. Brahman, however, is the sphere of verbal testimony alone, which, like inference, is ordinarily supposed to give us but mediate cognition. While certain advaitins hold that this mediate cognition becomes immediate by long uninterrupted contemplation pursued with faith, another school holds that even testimony can give immediate knowledge, where the object is immediate. Brahman being the eternal, all-pervasive sole reality, there can be no question as to its immediacy, though at first it is not realised. Śabda, as the sole pramāṇa for Brahman, does give intuition of Brahman. For a fuller discussion of these views, see Chapter III.

removal of nescience; for, it being established that inquiry in general is the cause of the ascertainment of what is inquired into and that the means of knowledge relating to Brahman is the cause of the intuition of that, it is established of hearing (study), which is of the nature of knowledge of the words of the Vedānta as subjected to inquiry, that it is the cause of that (certitude of existence). Nor is there the afore-mentioned inconstancy both ways; for, the inconstancy in the co-presence is not a defect, being due to lack of the auxiliary (e.g., inquiry); while, in the case of him who remembers other births, the fruit being possible because of hearing (study) in another birth, there is no inconstancy in the co-absence. Otherwise, causality being sublated even by inconstancy, not even through express statement would there be possible the knowledge instrumental to that (removal of nescience).[11] And even the inconstancy in co-absence is not a defect, since it may be doubted that like the sense of touch (present) over and above the sense of sight in the perception of the pot, there is some other means over and above hearing (study) in the intuition of Brahman.[12] And thus, because of (the result) being established, there is no injunction of the novel. Hence it is that, in the commentary on the section "Repetition (is required) because of the teaching more than once," in the words

---

[11] If inconstancy really ruled out the causal efficiency of śravaṇa, not even an express statement in the form of an injunction of the novel could establish that efficiency.

[12] In the case of Vāmadeva it is possible to imagine some other cause of intuition such as the might of austerities performed in a previous birth, just as it is possible for one to perceive the pot by touch, though not by sight, because of being blind.

"Hearing (study) and the rest, which indeed culminate in intuition, are (processes) which have to be repeated and have a visible result, like pounding etc., which culminate in the production of rice", repetition is taught of hearing (study), which is for the sake of the intuition of Brahman, since, because of its having a visible result, the principle of the pounding in the darśa-pūrṇamāsa applies (to it). If, however, there were an injunction of the novel, like the pounding of the (mortar containing) sarvauṣadha,[13] this would not fit in. In the agnicayana, in the words "Having filled it with all the herbs, he pounds it; then he places it near," pounding is prescribed for the purpose of the purification of the mortar that is to be placed near; of this, since it has no visible result, it is indeed established in the *Tantralakṣaṇa*[14] that there is no repetition.

Therefore, this is certainly a restrictive injunction. 1·131 For, in the absence of that, just as a person who sees something with the sense of sight, when told by some one of some subtle peculiarity there not apprehended by himself, proceeds to employ that same sense of sight with concentration in order to know that, even so, having heard in the case of the jīva, apprehended by the mind as "I", that it is of the nature of attributeless Brahman-intelligence propounded by the Vedāntas apprehended through adhyayana, a person might, in order to know that, sometimes proceed to employ therein the mind alone with concentration; hence, the engaging in the hearing (study) of the Vedānta would be partial (i.e., optional). As for (the text) "Not attaining (they return) together with the mind,"[15] it is possible to doubt that it applies to the mind that is not concentrated, since it is also declared in Scripture "By the mind alone is it to be perceived" and "But it is seen by the concentrated intellect."

---

[13] *I.e.*, all the herbs needed in the sacrifice.

[14] The eleventh chapter of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, dealing with tantra, the principle of serviceability to many by a single application or functioning, as a lamp is of service to many who surround it; cp. *Nyāyamālāvistara* on *PM* XI, i, 1—4.

1·132 Or else: from such Scriptural declarations as "When he sees the excellent one, that other, the Lord, he attains His glory, he becomes sorrowless", there is the possibility of the delusion that release results from the knowledge of the self as different (from the Lord); then, for the sake of the knowledge instrumental to release, there would be partial (optional) activity even in respect of the hearing (study) of other sacred teachings consisting in an inquiry into the self as different (from the Lord); hence there may be a restrictive injunction in respect of the hearing (study) of that Vedānta whose purport is the non-dual self; for, here, the term "self" has for purport the non-dual self, as seen from a consideration of such topics as "That which is all this is this self." It is not indeed an invariable feature of (restrictive injunctions as) a class that there is a restrictive injunction only where a real alternative means is established; in that case it might be doubted that since, in order to secure purportfulness for the restriction as to the hearing (study) of the Vedānta, it has to be admitted of that hearing (study) of the Vedānta that by that alone can be accomplished the intuition of Brahman, consisting in the certitude of (its) existence, through the hindering impurities being removed by the unseen potency (resulting from) the restriction, there would not exist any real alternative means for that (intuition), and therefore no restrictive injunction would apply; rather is it that there is a restrictive injunction where, because of the partial establishment of what may possibly be considered an alternative means, the partial non-establishment of the means desired to be enjoined cannot be avoided (otherwise); for even with this there results the fruit of that (injunction), viz., complementing the unestablished element.

---

[15] Which seems to rule out the activity of the mind in the apprehension of Brahman.

Or else: immediate knowledge of Brahman, consisting in the certitude of (its) existence, is possible from inquiry into the Vedānta, even as accomplished by a learned man merely by his own efforts, as much as through that (carried on) under instruction from a preceptor; but the unseen potency (consequent on) the restriction as to the hearing (study) of the Vedānta texts under instruction from a preceptor is of service in the removal of nescience through destroying impurities; hence (the inquiry conducted without instruction), being obstructed by the non-existence of that (destruction) does not remove nescience and remains equivalent to mediate knowledge. Nor with the dawn of knowledge is the non-removal of nescience unintelligible; for, the non-existence of obstacles being needed everywhere (as a cause), the non-removal of that (nescience), even 1·133 where there is specific perception (of the object), is intelligible because of hindrance by an external adjunct, like the non-removal of the delusion of a reflection.[16] Thus, in the same way as there is a restrictive injunction to learn Scripture by rote under instruction from a preceptor, because of the possibility (otherwise) of apprehending one's own section of the Veda from the written versions (thereof), let this be a restrictive injunction as to the hearing (study) under instruction from a preceptor, since there is partially established the inquiry into the Vedānta through one's own (unaided) effort alone, in order to attain that intuition of Brahman, which consists in the certitude of (its) existence. Nor may it be objected that since even by the injunction to approach a preceptor, in "For the sake of the knowledge of that, he is certainly to approach a preceptor", there is secured the exclusion of inquiry without a preceptor, the (present) restrictive injunction is futile; for, the approach to a preceptor being subsidiary to hearing (study), when there is no injunction as to this (latter), there can be no injunction at all as to that (former); hence, there is no contingence of the futility of the latter, because of the former. Otherwise, since, even by the injunction to approach, which is subsidiary to the learning by rote, there is the exclusion of the study of written versions etc., the restrictive injunction even as to learning by rote (under instruction from a preceptor) would be futile.

---

[16] One may know that reflections have no independent reality and that they do not exist in the media; in spite of this knowledge, one continues to perceive reflections so long as there are reflecting media and the objects reflected are proximate to them.

Or else, there being a partial establishment of the hearing (study) of works in the vernacular languages, whose purport is the non-dual self, let there be a restrictive injunction as to the hearing (study) of the Vedānta. Nor is there the non-establishment of that even from such prohibitions as "He is not to speak a barbarous tongue"; for, in the case of him, who, because of dullness in the learning of the sacred teaching, feels that the hearing (study) of the Vedānta is not possible (for him), and who, even transgressing the prohibition which is for the sake of a human goal,[17] desires to know the non-dual through works in the vernacular tongues, there is the possibility of his engaging himself therein, and hence the fruitfulness of the restrictive injunction is intelligible. Though, as explained in the section about the agent (in sacrifices), there is, for the sake of a human goal, the prohibition of the utterance of falsehood, yet, since, for some reason, there may be, for him who transgresses even this accepted prohibition in his desire for the proper completion of the rite, engaging in the utterance of a falsehood, there is again, in the section on the darśa-pūrṇamāsa, a prohibition for the sake of the rite, "Utter no falsehood"; thus the prohibition for the sake of the rite is indeed admitted to be fruitful. 1·134

---

[17] A prescription or prohibition may serve human good generally or the interests of a particular rite. In the former case, it is puruṣārtha, in the latter, it is kratvartha. The fact that there is already a prescription or prohibition, which is puruṣārtha, does not exclude a fresh prescription or prohibition of the same in the interests of a particular rite. This is exemplified in the next sentence, with reference to the full and new moon sacrifices and the prohibition of the utterance of falsehood.

1·135 Or else, just as there is the restriction "By hymns (mantras) alone should be called up the memory of the objects connected with the hymns", because of the partial establishment of what is based on those (hymns), such as sentences from the manuals of ritual and the instruction of friends, similarly, (here) there is the possibility of the partial establishment even of epics, purāṇas and (other) works of human origin based on the Vedānta; therefore, let there be this restriction (to the Vedānta).

In any case this is certainly a restrictive injunction. As for the statement, in the *Bhāṣya* on the section "There is the injunction of some other auxiliary partially" etc., that there is an injunction of the novel, that is in the view that there is partial non-establishment, even if it be a restrictive injunction, as is made clear even there by the construction of the word "partially" in the aphorism, whose purport is to state partial non-establishment. Thus say the followers of the *Vivaraṇa*.

1·136 For him who has heard (studied), from the verbal testimony there arises at first mediate knowledge alone as free from doubt, since verbal testimony, being of such a nature as to generate mediate knowledge (alone), cannot transcend its settled capacity. For him, however, who has subsequently performed reflection and contemplation, because of the presence in abundance of these special auxiliaries, from that alone arises immediate knowledge. Just as the sense-organ, though incapable of generating the cognition whose sphere is the element of "that-ness," yet generates recognition because of the co-operation of the memory impression which has that capacity, similarly in the case of verbal testimony, though of itself incapable of generating immediate knowledge, the generation of immediate knowledge stands to reason, because of the co-operation with intense meditation which is settled to be capable of that (generation of immediate knowledge), as in the immediate presentation of the damsel contemplated intensely by the bereaved lover. And thus, since it is established of verbal testimony that of itself in respect of its own content it generates mediate knowledge, while, when it is defined as the instrument of knowledge co-operating with intense meditation, it generates immediate knowledge, like the internal organ of the bereaved lover, there is a restrictive injunction as before (in respect of the study of Vedānta). Thus say some of those (followers of the *Vivaraṇa*).[18]

The intuition of Brahman is not through the hearing (study) of the Vedānta, but only through the mind; because there is the Scriptural text "By the mind alone is it to be perceived"; and because there is the statement in the *Bhāṣya*[19] on the Gītā: "the instrument for seeing the self is the mind purified by the sacred teaching, the 1·137 preceptor's instruction, calmness, equanimity etc." Hearing (study), however, is for the sake of mediate knowledge free from doubt; hence, for the sake of that alone is there a restrictive injunction; thus say some.

---

[18] These would not seem to have understood the true doctrine of the *Vivaraṇa*, according to which the major texts of the Upaniṣads are of themselves capable of generating immediate knowledge. The present school holds that there is no injunction of the novel, since it is established in experience that verbal testimony gives rise to mediate knowledge and that, as aided by contemplation, it gives rise to immediate knowledge. What is possible and necessary is, therefore, a restrictive injunction as to the obligatory exercise of inquiry, reflection and contemplation, in respect of the texts of the Vedānta.

[19] Here, as elsewhere, in this work, reference to the *Bhāṣya* is always to Śaṅkara's commentary.

1·138 Only for the sake of immediate knowledge is there a restrictive injunction in respect of hearing (study), because of the statement of the fruit "(The self) is to be seen." And its being for the sake of that is not directly, but in co-operation with the mind which is the instrument; because immediate knowledge is not recognised (to result) from verbal testimony. Nor is there the contingence of an injunction of the novel on the ground that its being for the sake of that (immediate knowledge) in that form (i.e., in conjunction with the mind) is not established; for, by the sense of hearing in co-operation with the study of the science of music, whose object is the removal of the superimposed reciprocal non-discrimination among the notes heard, such as ṣaḍja, there is the immediate realisation of their true nature free from reciprocal confusion; hence, it is settled that, where there is a science whose object is the removal of super-imposed non-discrimination in respect of a thing which is manifest, the study of that (science) is useful as an auxiliary to the sense-organ that generates the intuition of that (thing); thus say others.

1·139 For hearing (study) which consists in a special mental psychosis of the nature of inquiry into the principles favourable for the ascertainment of the purport of the Vedānta texts about the non-dual Brahman, neither mediate nor immediate knowledge in respect of Brahman is the fruit, since this is the fruit of means of valid knowledge like verbal testimony. Nor may it be said: " Let hearing (study) be but knowledge from verbal testimony as qualified by the purport determined by inquiry of the aforesaid character; for that Brahman-knowledge is appropriate as the fruit"; for, in respect of knowledge, an injunction is unintelligible, and since it is admitted of the injunction to hear (study) that it is the basis of the aphorism about the desire to know (Brahman), which enjoins the obligatoriness of inquiry, it is appropriate to treat as hearing (study) that inquiry alone, which consists in a mental activity of the nature of the acceptance (of the principles of reasoning) and rejection (of false principles). Nor may it be said "Let Brahman-knowledge be the fruit of the inquiry itself either through the ascertainment of the purport or through the removal generated thereby of obstacles consisting in human failings, such as delusion as to purport"; for, it is not admitted of the knowledge of purport that it is instrumental to the knowledge from verbal testimony,[20] and it is not admitted of the absence of obstacles that it is anywhere the cause of the effect; hence, either of the two serving as a channel (to Brahman-knowledge) is unintelligible. And if Brahman-knowledge were generated by an extraneous cause consisting in inquiry, then, for the validity of that (knowledge from verbal testimony) there would be the contingence of being extrinsic.[21] Therefore, there is a restrictive injunction as to the hearing (study), consisting in inquiry, only for the sake of removing human failings through the ascertainment of purport. As for the text "(The self) is to be seen", that is but mere eulogy (of the self) as worthy of being seen, not the statement of the fruit of hearing (study); thus say the followers of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*.

---

[20] See the topic in the fourth varṇaka of the *Vivaraṇa*; the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* accepts tātparya as a cause of valid knowledge from verbal testimony, but explains the Vivaraṇakāra's position (p. 255) on the ground that the latter understood tātparya to mean "being pronounced with a desire to cause the cognition of that"; see also *VPS*, pp. 175, 176.

1·14 For him who is engaged in the hearing (study) of the Vedānta for the sake of Brahman-knowledge, in the same way as for him who is engaged in the study of the works of Caraka, Suśruta etc., for the sake of medical knowledge, there would at intervals be the contingence of engaging in other activities; hence, the text "(The self) is to be heard", which has the fruit of removing that (distraction), is an exclusive injunction; for, in the Chāndogya text "He who is well-established in Brahman attains immortality," it is restrictively laid down that not having any other activity is the means to release; since the word "tiṣṭhati" preceded by "sam" signifies fulfilment, the fulfilment in Brahman signified by the word "brahma-saṃsthā (being well-established in Brahman)" consists in not having any other activity; and in the Ātharvaṇa text "Know that alone, the self, give up all other forms of speech", other activities are explicitly prohibited; and there is the text of the traditional code "Up to his sleep, yea, up to his death, let him spend his time in reflecting on the Vedānta." Nor may it be said (they urge) that, since, of any such other activity not helpful (of itself) to Brahman-knowledge, there is no establishment in conjunction with hearing (study) in respect of a single result, an exclusive injunction for the exclusion of that (activity) does not stand to reason; for, in the aphorism "There is the injunction of some other auxiliary" etc., and in the words of the commentary thereon—"in that case where, because of the predominance of the perception of difference, he does not attain that" there is a restrictive injunction—since, for him who has accomplished hearing (study) and imagines that what is to be achieved has been achieved even by the mere knowledge through verbal testimony, there would be no engaging in contemplation, helpful in the intuition that removes nescience, there is admitted a restrictive injunction in respect of contemplation, merely because of the partial establishment of what is not instrumental to that; hence, on that principle, when there is establishment in conjunction even with what is not instrumental, an exclusive injunction whose fruit is the exclusion of that (asādhana) is possible. Thus say some who adhere to the statement of the *Vārtika*, "The purport of the injunction there (in 'The self is to be heard' etc.) may be a restriction; or it may be an exclusion, since, by the non-perception of the not-self, we devote ourselves to the supreme self."

---

[21] According to the advaitin, who follows Kumārila in this respect, validity does not require to be produced or revealed by any factors other than those which enter into the original cognition itself; it is not made known, for instance, by inference from practical efficiency; nor is it produced by the repeated contact of the sense-organ with many parts of the object perceived; the cognition comes to us as valid; its validity is intrinsic, not extrinsic. See further, the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 291—297.

The hearing (study) that is laid down as relating 1·15 to the self in "The self is to be heard" in the same way as reflection etc., is simply knowledge of the self, as generated by revelation and the instruction of the preceptor, but is not of the nature of inquiry into the purport; hence in respect of that, there is no injunction whatsoever. Hence it is that in the aphorism about harmony (of the texts), after the refutation of an injunction in respect of knowing the self, there is the (passage of the) *Bhāṣya* beginning: "For what purpose, then, are there texts like 'The self is to be seen, heard' which have the appearance of injunctions? For the purpose of turning one away, we say, from the objects of natural activity." If hearing (study) were the inquiry into the purport of the Vedānta, then, through the ascertainment of the purport, its fruit would be only the removal of obstacles consisting in delusion and doubt as to the purport, not the removal of any other obstacle, nor the realisation of Brahman. And its having that fruit is established even in experience, and no other means is established whether optionally or in conjunction (with this); hence there is no scope there for any of the three injunctions.

1·151 Though there be no injunction as to inquiry, the approach to a preceptor enjoined for the sake of knowledge culminates in the goal of knowledge only through the inquiry into the Vedānta under instruction from a preceptor, since when a seen channel (of instrumentality) is possible, the assumption of an unseen channel does not stand to reason. For the same reason there is the exclusion of inquiry accomplished by one's own efforts. If, however, there were no injunction to learn by rote, then, the approach (to a preceptor), that is enjoined, since it is not enjoined for the sake of knowing the letters (alone of the Veda), would not for the sake of that (knowledge) make a channel of learning by rote, consisting in pronouncing (the texts) in the manner pronounced by the lips of the preceptor; hence there would not be established the exclusion of the study of written versions; hence, the restrictive injunction as to learning by rote is fruitful.

Nor may it be said "For him who seeks the inquiry into the Vedānta for the sake of removing delusion as to purport etc., sometimes there may be the engaging even in the sacred teachings of dualists, since there too there is inquiry into the Vedānta through constructions acceptable to them; hence, a restrictive injunction as to that inquiry into the Vedānta, whose purport is the non-dual self, is fruitful"; for, in the case of that (dualistic teaching) which is of itself the cause of delusion as to purport, there is not the removal of that (delusion); hence there is not the establishment of any other means.[22] Nor is it even the case that through the delusion as to its removing (delusion as to purport) there would be the engaging even therein, in the case of some one, and that with this much there is the admission of a restrictive injunction in "(The self) is to be heard;" for, in the case of him who is devoid of the faith in non-dualism that is gained (solely) by the grace of the Lord,[23] even in respect of the text "(The self) is 1·152 to be heard'', because of the construction acceptable to the adversary, the delusion is possible that the purport is an injunction to inquire into the self that has a second; for, engaging in other pursuits, as prompted by delusion, cannot be restrained even by hundreds of injunctions.

---

[22] Which would have to be ruled out by the restrictive injunction.

[23] Cp. *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, para 163, v. 25:
īśvarā-'nugrahād eṣā puṃsām advaita-vāsanā|
mahā-bhaya-kṛta-trāṇā dvi-trāṇām yadi jāyate||

1·153 Nor does it stand to reason that it is an exclusive injunction for the purpose of the exclusion of other activities; for, in the case of him who has not renounced, the exclusion of other activities is not possible, while, in the case of him, who has renounced, the exclusion of that is established by the Scriptural text ''He who is well-established in Brahman attains immortality'', which enjoins renunciation together with being well-established in Brahman; in view of this other text enjoining renunciation, the teaching of the exclusion of other activities through the text ''(The self) is to be heard'' would be futile.

1·154 Nor may it be doubted that though there be no injunction in respect of inquiry, a restrictive injunction is possible as to Vedānta being the content of the inquiry, since there are objects of exclusion like works in the vernacular tongues; for, since the restriction to the Vedānta is obtained even from proximity, it cannot be the content of an injunction; further, even because of the force of the restrictive injunction ''One is to study one's own section of the Veda'', whose purpose is the comprehension of the sense, this sense is obtained that the knowledge of the meaning generated from the Veda apprehended through learning by rote is what culminates in the fruit, not that (knowledge) which is generated from any other cause; hence, in respect of Brahman that is the sense of the Veda and is to be known for release, there is no establishment for vernacular works etc.

1·155 Nor may it be said that in the section "There is the injunction of some other auxiliary", an injunction is recognised in respect of hearing (study), reflection and contemplation, signified by the terms bālya, pāṇḍitya and mauna; for, that inquiry is the cause of the ascertainment of the purport of what is inquired into, that reflection consisting in recalling reasonings favourable to the establishment of the object and contemplation consisting in the repetition of the cognition of that (object) are causes of the clarity of comprehension of the object, these are established in experience; and hence, in respect of them, an injunction is not required; merely as producing excellence of activity (in respect of them) through praising (them), there is the empirical usage of injunctiveness (in respect of them), as in the case of arthavāda (eulogistic or condemnatory) passages having the semblance of injunctions. And thus, since there is non-injunction in respect of hearing (study), like the inquiry into the section about ritual, the inquiry into the section about Brahman too has for its basis the injunction as to learning (one's own Veda) by rote; thus say those who follow the position of the preceptor Vācaspati.

2·11 Of Brahman, that is the object of inquiry, the definition has been stated to be the causality of the creation, sustentation and destruction of the world, by the Scriptural text "That, verily, from which these beings originate" etc. Of the creation, sustentation and destruction of the world, the causality even of each one, since it does not attach to any other (except Brahman) is capable (of itself) of being the definition; if this be said, true, this is certainly a three-fold definition, each of which is independent of the others. Hence it is that in such sections as "The eater (is Brahman), because of the mention of the movable and the immovable," the destruction of all and so on are mentioned separately as characteristic marks of Brahman; thus says the author of the *Kaumudī*.

2·12 Others, however, say thus: since causality of creation and causality of sustentation are common to the efficient cause (too), in order to make known material causality, there is shown the dissolution of the world in Brahman. "Let Brahman be the material cause of the world; (but) in respect of its creation, like the potter in respect of the creation of the pot, and in respect of its sustentation, like the king in respect of the sustentation of the kingdom, the efficient cause may certainly be other than the material cause"; in order to remove this doubt, the control of the creation and sustentation of the world is declared of that (Brahman) alone. And thus, this definition which is but single, qualifies *per accidens*[24] the non-dual Brahman as that which is without differentiation the material and the efficient cause.

---

[24] The non-dual Brahman cannot have any qualities which are real, as there would be loss of non-duality. Hence, the causality of creation etc. is not a real qualification (viśeṣaṇa), but is only an *accidens* (upalakṣaṇa). It necessarily falls short of what it qualifies, but is nevertheless able to give us a glimpse of the nature of that subject.

And the material causality of Brahman, of the nature of the non-dual, immutable intelligence, does not consist in origination, as by the primal atoms,[25] nor does it consist in transformation, as of Primal Nature;[26] but it is characterised by being illusorily transformed through nescience into the form of the universe of ether etc. That change, which is of the same grade of reality as the thing, is transformation; what is not of the same grade of reality is illusory manifestation; or, change, which is of the same nature as the cause, is transformation; what is of a different nature from that is illusory manifestation; or, the effect which is non-different from the cause is a transformation; the effect, which even without being non-different from that (cause) is yet difficult to state apart from that, is an illusory manifestation; such is the distinction between transformation and illusory manifestation. 2·21

Now, is the pure Brahman recognised as the material cause, or in the form of the Lord (Īśvara) or in the form of the jīva? 2·22

Here, some of the followers of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* say thus: the pure (Brahman) alone is the material cause, since in the aphorism about the origination etc. (of the world) and in the *Bhāṣya* thereon, material causality is declared to be the definition of the Brahman that is to be known. And thus, in such statements of causality as "From the self ether originated," 2·221 words like the "self" whose expressed sense is what is associated (with nescience) signify (here) only the secondary implication in respect of the pure (Brahman).

---

[25] Of the Naiyāyikas, who hold that by the combination of atoms something new and previously non-existent is produced.

[26] Recognised by the Sāṅkhya.

2·222 The followers of the *Vivaraṇa,* however, think thus: because of such Scriptural texts as "He who knows all generally, who knows everything in detail, whose austerity is of the form of knowledge, from him proceed this brahma (i.e., the Veda), name, form and food (i.e., the earth)", the material cause is only that form of Brahman which is the Lord (Īśvara) as qualified by omniscience etc., and associated with māyā. Hence it is that in the *Bhāṣya,* in such sections as "The one within (the sun and the self), because of the qualities of that being declared" and "(That which consists of mind etc. is Brahman) because of there being taught here what is well known everywhere", it is said that being the self of all, which is declared in such Scriptural texts as "That alone is the ṛk, that is the sāman, that is the uktha, that is the yajus, that is brahma, that is all actions, all desires, all odours, all flavours," and which is consequent on being the material cause of all, is a characteristic mark of the Lord, to the exclusion of the jīva. If, however, intelligence as such, common to the jīva and the Lord, were the material cause, that (being the self of all) would not be the characteristic mark of the Lord, to the exclusion of the jīva. Even the refutation of the material causality of the associated (Brahman) in the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* is with the view of refuting the material causality of what is qualified[27] by māyā, but does not have for purport the refutation of the material causality of intelligence in the form of the Lord, as distinguished (from māyā); for, even in that (work), at the close of the first chapter, it is said of the material causality of the world that it is present in the (expressed) sense of the word "That".[28] And thus, causality though present in the Lord is capable of defining *per accidens* the impartite intelligence that is present with that (Lord), as the bough (defines) the moon; hence the statement of that as a definition of the Brahman that is to be known.

Since the universe of ether etc. is a transformation of māyā located in the Lord, in respect of that, the Lord is the material cause. Since, however, the internal organ etc. are products of the subtle elements produced by the jīva's nescience in conjunction with the gross elements which are the evolutes of the māyā located in the Lord, in respect of them there is material causality for both (the jīva and the Lord). Hence it is that in the Scriptural text "Even thus, these sixteen digits 2·223 of the seer, that go towards the person, reach and sink into the person,'' it is shown of the vital air, the mind etc., denoted by the word "digit", that, at the time of release from the body for the enlightened one, they are destroyed by knowledge, in view of that aspect of them which is the product of nescience, removable by knowledge; in another text "Gone are the fifteen digits to their elements," there is shown their resolution into their respective material causes, in view of that permanent aspect of them which is not removable by that (knowledge) and consists in the transformation of the gross elements that are products of māyā; thus say those who maintain a difference between māyā and nescience (avidyā).

---

[27] If Īśvara qualified by māyā were the material cause, material causality would pertain in part to the qualification too, māyā. This is what is said to be refuted in the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*. Īśvara, that is associated with māyā, is the material cause, but not *as associated* with māyā; rather is He to be distinguished from the latter, when upādānatva is predicated of Him.

[28] In the text "That thou art" the expressed sense of "That" is the Lord characterised by omniscience, omnipotence etc., while the expressed sense of "Thou" is the apparently finite jīva. The secondary implication of both terms is the pure Brahman. The expressed sense is understood here, since in respect of secondary implication there is no difference between the two terms and the reference to the term "That" would in that case be futile.

2·2231 Just as, because the universe of ether etc. is a transformation of māyā located in the Lord, the Lord is the material cause in respect of that, similarly, because the internal organ etc. are transformations of the nescience located in the jīva, the jīva alone is the material cause in respect of that. Nor is it the case that if the gross elements too, the products of māyā, did not enter into the internal organ etc., the distinction between the two Scriptural texts cited would be unintelligible; for discrimination is clearly established, in the *Bhāṣya* on the section about the resolution of the digits, that the Scriptural text about the destruction of the digits by knowledge refers to the vision of him who knows the truth, while the Scriptural text "Gone are the fifteen digits" refers to the cognition of a dull person, since, when a knower of the truth dies, the persons near him think that his body etc. too are resolved into earth etc., in the same way as a pot that is destroyed; thus say some of those who maintain a difference between māyā and nescience.

Even among those who maintain their non-difference, some say thus: though of the universe of ether etc., the Lord is the material cause, yet, of the internal organ etc., the jīva alone is the material cause, because of the cognition of (their) identity with the jīva; hence it is that in the *Bhāṣya* on superimposition, there is shown the super-imposition of the internal organ etc. on the jīva alone; and in the *Vivaraṇa,* in the pratikarmavyavasthā,[29] there are mentioned, in the case of the intelligence that is Brahman, the connection with pot etc., through being their material cause, and, in the case of the jīva, though not connected therewith, the connection with the internal organ etc. 2·224

Because of such Scriptural texts as "From this proceeds the vital air, the mind and all the organs, ether, air, fire, water, earth which is the support of all" Brahman alone is the material cause of the entire empirical world; but the jīva (is the material cause) of the merely apparent dream world. (This is so because of the following reason); in the section "There is contingence (of transformation) of the whole or conflict with the Scriptural declaration of (Brahman) being without parts", the *prima facie* view being that, if Brahman be the material cause of the world, on the 2·225 transformation of the whole of it in the form of the world there would be contingence of the non-existence of Brahman over and above the transformations, or on the transformation of it in part there would be the contingence of conflict with the Scriptural declaration of (its) being without parts, it is established as the final conclusion by the aphorism "For, just as in the (jīva-) self, there are variations, even so (it may be in the supreme self)", with the doctrine of illusory manifestation in view, that, like the creation of the dream world of many forms in the jīva-self, that sees the dream, without any destruction of its own nature, the creation of ether etc., in Brahman is (also similarly) intelligible; thus say others.

---

[29] *I.e.*, that part of the treatise which shows how for the jīva, though essentially one with the impartite intelligence, there is yet distinction (vyavasthā) in respect of objects (karma) cognised at different times and places and in different ways.

2·226 The jīva himself being, like the seer of dreams, he who posits in himself everything like lordship, is the cause of all; thus too say some.

2·23 Now, because of the Scriptural text "Know māyā to be prakṛti (the primal cause)" and because of the persistence of the inertness of māyā in pot etc., māyā is cognised to be the material cause of the world; how (then) is Brahman the material cause?

2·231 Here, the author of the *Padārthatattvanirṇaya* says; Brahman and māyā are both the material cause, and hence there is the intelligibility of both texts, as also the intelligibility of the persistence of both attributes, namely, reality and inertness. Of these, Brahman, as illusorily manifesting, is the material cause; and nescience, as transforming itself. Nor is material causality a mere matter of terminology in the case of the substrate of illusory manifestation, since there is no distinction even there in respect of the definitive characteristic of material causality, viz., being in itself the cause of the origination of the effect.

Some, however, accepting even the aforesaid teaching, mention another definition common to both illusory manifestation and transformation: material causality is the generation of an effect non-different from itself. And, for the world, there is non-difference from the real Brahman through (its) illusory manifestation, and from the inert ignorance through (its) transformation; for, there is experience of apposition, in the form "the pot is real," "the pot is inert." Nor may it be said that, because (in the comments) on the aphorism "Non-otherness therefrom, because of Scriptural texts like that about origination (ārambhaṇa)", there are the statements "Non-otherness means non-existence as distinct from Brahman," and "Indeed, by non-otherness we do not declare non-difference, but we deny difference," which belong (respectively) to the *Bhāṣya* and the *Bhāmatī*, and deny of the world non-difference from Brahman, the acceptance of non-difference would be an unwelcome conclusion; for, the purport of those two statements being the denial of non-difference of the same grade of reality as the substrate, namely, Brahman, there is no conflict in accepting merely apparent non-difference, as between nacre and silver. 2·232

The author of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, however, says thus: Brahman alone is the material cause; since, in the case of the immutable, independent causality is 2·233 unintelligible, māyā is the subsidiary cause; the subsidiary, though not the cause,[30] is yet present in the effect, since there is seen in the pot persistence of the softness etc. (of the clay), as of the clay (itself).

2·234 Vācaspati Miśra, however, says thus: Brahman, that has been made the content of the māyā located in the jīva, is the material cause, since of itself it illusorily manifests itself in the form of the world, the locus of inertness; hence māyā is merely an accessory, not a subsidiary cause persistent in the effect.

2·235 The author of the *Sidhāntamuktāvalī,* however, says thus: the energy māyā is alone the material cause, not Brahman, because of such Scriptural texts as "This Brahman has neither an earlier nor a later, neither an outside" etc., and "Of that, there is neither effect nor cause"; but, as being the substrate of māyā, the material cause of the world, it (Brahman) is figuratively the material cause; such material causality alone is intended to be declared in the definition (of Brahman).

2·31 Now, who is the Lord, and who is the jīva?

2·3111 To this, it is said thus in the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*: the beginningless, indeterminable primal cause of beings, which is associated with intelligence as such,[31] (that) is māyā; the reflection of intelligence therein is the Lord; the reflection of intelligence in the limited innumerable parts even of that (māyā), which (parts) are endowed with the obscuring and projecting energies, and are called nescience (avidyā), (that reflection) is the jīva.

---

[30] That is to say, not the *material* cause; even the subsidiary is *a* cause.

[31] Not intelligence as delimited or as reflected or as the prototype of a reflection.

In the *Tattvaviveka,* however, (it is thus): of the primal cause, made up of the three constituents,[32] two distinct forms are established by the Scriptural text "It creates the jīva and the Lord as reflections, and itself becomes māyā and nescience (avidyā)"; what is principally constituted of pure sattva, not overpowered by rajas and tamas is māyā; that, whose sattva is overpowered by those (two) and is (consequently) impure, is nescience; postulating this distinction between māyā and nescience, it is said that the reflection in māyā is the Lord and the reflection in nescience is the jīva. 2·3112

The one primal cause itself is, through the predominance of projection, called māyā and is the adjunct of the Lord; through the predominance of obscuration, it is called nescience or ignorance and is the adjunct of the jīva; hence it is that though it is associated with intelligence as such, common to both the jīva and the Lord, the experience of conjunction with ignorance, in the form "I am ignorant," is for the jīva alone, not for the Lord; such a distinction between the jīva and the Lord is set forth in some (works). 2·3113

In the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka,* however, following the Scriptural text "This jīva has the effect for adjunct, the Lord has the cause for adjunct," it is said thus: the reflection of intelligence in nescience is the Lord; the reflection of intelligence in the internal organ is the 2·3114 jīva; nor may it be said that since the definition of intelligence is possible by a substance, namely, the internal organ, in the same way as of ether by a pot, the jīva may be but intelligence as defined; for, because of the difference here and hereafter between the parts of intelligence defined as the jīva, there would be the contingence of the destruction of the (karma) acquired and the influx of the non-acquired; the reflection, however, is not differentiated by the incoming or outgoing of the adjunct, in the same way as what is defined (thereby); hence, there is not this defect in the reflection-theory.

---

[32] Sattva, rajas and tamas.

Thus, in the above-mentioned views of the jīva and the Lord as varieties of reflection, Brahman, that is in the position of the prototype, is the pure intelligence which is attained by the released.

2·3115 In the *Citradīpa,* the teaching of a three-fold division into jīva, the Lord, and pure intelligence is abandoned, and a four-fold division of intelligence is assumed (in the following way): for example, the ether though in fact one alone is yet four-fold, as (i) the pot-ether, i.e., the ether defined by the pot, (ii) the water-ether, i.e., what is reflected together with the clouds and stars in the water located in that (pot-ether), (iii) the undefined ether at large, and (iv) the cloud-ether, i.e., what is reflected in the watery parts of that (cloud), which are of the form of dew, and which are inferred (to exist) in the region of the clouds, that exist in the ether at large, because of their effect, namely, rain; similarly, there are (i) the immutable (intelligence), i.e., the intelligence which exists as the substrate of both the gross and the subtle body, is defined thereby and stands unmodified like an anvil, (ii) the jīva, i.e., the intelligence reflected in the internal organ posited in that (immutable intelligence) and associated with transmigration, (iii) Brahman, i.e., the undefined intelligence, and (iv) the Lord, i. e., the intelligence reflected in the impressions of the intellects of all beings that exist in the darkness of māyā which abides in that (Brahman); and thus, there is shown the difference between the jīva and the Lord through differences in adjunct, as between the internal organ and ignorance coloured by the impressions of the intellect.

And this is another peculiarity of what is said in that (*Citradīpa*): among the four kinds of intelligence, the jīva, which appears as the "I", is, like silver on nacre, superimposed on the immutable (intelligence), the element whose distinctive form of untainted bliss is obscured by nescience. Hence it is that, as in the case of "this-ness" and "silver-ness," there is in "I myself act" etc., the appearance together of the feeling of "one-self" and the feeling of "I", which are of the nature of the substrate that is the general element and the superimposed that is the special element. It is, indeed, the feeling of "I" which is of the nature of the superimposed special element, being variable, since one person cannot have the empirical usage "I" in respect of another person. And the feeling of "oneself" is the counter-correlate of "other-ness" and of the nature of the substrate that is the general element, since it is present, in the form "Devadatta himself goes," in the empirical usage relating even to another person. Thus, even because of reciprocal super-imposition, there is, for men of the world, non-discrimination between the immutable (intelligence) and the jīva. And the distinction between them is clear in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, through the teaching " As a mere mass of sentiency, rising from those elements, perishes even in their wake" in respect of the jīva, that it perishes in the wake of the perishing of the adjunct, and through the teaching "Imperishable, verily, is this self" in respect of the immutable (intelligence), that it is imperishable.

If the denotation of the "I", the jīva, be perishable, how is there non-difference from the imperishable Brahman? (The reply is): this apposition (we teach) is not in the view of non-difference, but in the view of sublation.[33] Just as by the cognition of manhood in "What was (taken to be) a post is a man", the cognition of post-ness is removed, similarly, by the cognition of the immutable Brahman-nature, in " I am Brahman," there is removed the superimposed nature of the denotation of "I"; for, there is the statement of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*: " As in 'What was a post is a man' the cognition of the post (is removed) by the cognition of a man, so by the cognition 'I am Brahman,' the cognition of 'I' is, indeed, removed without residue." And if, in the manner mentioned in the *Vivaraṇa* etc., this be apposition in the view of non-difference, then, let the word "I" denoting the jīva have the immutable

---

[33] Of one of the terms in the appositional relation; when it is said "the post is man", what is intended is not the non-difference of the two as such, but the sublation of the prior cognition of the post; there was really no post.

(intelligence) for purport through secondary implication, since this (latter), which is not superimposed, is capable of non-difference from Brahman. As for the Lord who is said to be comparable to the cloud-ether and a reflection in the impressions of the intellect, he is of the nature of the bliss of sleep, as established in the *Māṇḍūkya* text "Having sleep for his abode, one in form, a mere mass of sentiency, blissful, the enjoyer of bliss"; for, even in that (Upaniṣad) immediately after that (text), it is declared "He is the Lord of all, he is omniscient, he is the internal ruler, he is the cause of all origination and absorption of beings"; and in the case of him, who has for adjunct the impressions of the intellects of all beings, having all things for their content, omniscience, and for that same reason even universal agency etc., as well, are intelligible. Nor may it be said that omniscience is not experienced in the case of any one who is conditioned by the impressions of our intellect; for, impressions being mediate, what is conditioned thereby is also mediate.[34]

---

[34] The objection is "How is it that no one experiences in sleep 'I am omniscient,' if conditioning by the impressions of the intellect accounts for omniscience?" The reply one would expect is "Because in the case of each individual being, the conditioning is not by the impressions of all the intellects of all beings." The reply given in the text, however, seeks to go deeper. The denotation of "I" is what is conditioned by the internal organ, which in waking is gross and perceptible. But in sleep it is subtle, being of the nature of an impression; hence there cannot be immediately experienced either that or what is conditioned thereby; thus there being no experience of the "I" in sleep, how can there be the experience "I am omniscient"? This reply raises other questions: (1) if there is no experience of "I" in sleep, how are we to account for the experience "I slept soundly"? If the "I" here belongs to the subsequent waking stage, should not one be similarly able to say "I was omniscient"? (2) If he who is conditioned by vāsanā cannot have the experience of "I", can Īśvara who is also conditioned by vāsanās have the experience "I am omniscient?" These may not be unanswerable, but no reply is indicated in the text or commentary.

2·3116 In the *Brahmānanda,* however, it is said that, because of association with sleep, the blissful being mentioned in the *Māṇḍūkya* is the jīva. It is thus: the internal organ, which, on the cessation of the karmas that bring about enjoyment in waking etc., is absorbed in the form of sleep, becomes solid (i.e., patent), when there is awakening, because of karma which brings about enjoyment afresh; then, the jīva, who has that adjunct, is said to be of the nature of cognition (vijñānamaya). He himself, earlier, in the state of sleep, having an adjunct in the state of absorption, is said to be blissful. He alone is set forth in the *Maṇḍūkya* (text) "Having sleep for his abode" etc.

This being so, how can we reconcile the statement of his lordship over all and so on? Thus. There are two sets of three forms with attributes of the supreme self, the cosmic (adhidaivata) and the personal (adhyātma). Four forms, the cosmic three of the above and pure intelligence, are established in the *Citradīpa,* with the illustration of the artistically worked cloth. For example, the naturally white cloth is washed, made stiff with starch, marked by the application of what is of the nature of ink, and coloured by the use of colours; thus, there are four states even of the single artistically worked cloth; similarly, the supreme self devoid of māyā and the adjuncts produced by it is pure; as conditioned by māyā, he is the Lord; as conditioned by the collective subtle body, the product of the non-quintuplicated elements, he is Hiraṇyagarbha; as conditioned by the collective gross body, the product of the quintuplicated elements, he is the Virāṭ self; thus there are four states even of the single supreme self. And in this supreme self, which is in the position of the artistically worked cloth, what is in the position of the picture is the entire universe, consisting of the immovable and the movable. Just as for the men in the picture there are delineated likenesses of clothes, of a nature like to that of the cloth that supports the picture, even so, for the embodied ones superimposed on the supreme self, there are posited likenesses of the intelligence that is the substrate; and these, which go by the name of jīvas, migrate. As for the personal (adhyātma), it is of three forms, being divided into Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña. Of these, Prājña is the witness of bare ignorance, when the internal organ is absorbed in deep sleep, and that (intelligence) is here said to be blissful. Taijasa is that which in dreams has conceit in the individual subtle bodies. Viśva is that which in waking has conceit in the individual gross bodies. Here, the *Māṇḍūkya* text "This self has four quarters" begins with the difference of four states, as Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña and Turīya in the case of this self that appears in the experience of the "I"; (next) for the sake of convenience in the attainment of the fourth quarter, of the nature of Brahman without relation to the world, through the merger of each earlier quarter (in the next), it includes Virāṭ etc. in the Viśva etc., because of (their) similarity in respect of having adjuncts which are (respectively) gross, subtle and more subtle; (and thus it) establishes the quarters, Viśva etc., in "He who seated in waking (experience) cognises the external" and so on. Therefore, with the intention to declare the inclusion of the unmanifest Lord in the blissful (one) denoted by the word Prājña, there is the statement there of the attributes of that (Lord), such as rulership over all. Thus alone has it been explained by the Bhagavatpāda in the commentary on (the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* of) Gauḍapāda.

2·3117 In the *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka,* however, there is this difference that the immutable (intelligence) set forth in the *Citradīpa* is included in the jīva-aspect and the teaching of only a three-fold division[35] of intelligence is adhered to. There, indeed, it is said that since, on the analogy of the sheet of water, waves and bubbles, there is positing of one on another, the jīva is three-fold, as absolutely real, empirically real and merely apparent. Of these, the one defined[36] is the absolutely real jīva; for, in this, though what defines is assumptive, that (self), which is to be defined, being non-assumptive, is non-different from Brahman. The likeness of intelligence (which appears) in the internal organ posited in the māyā which stands obscuring that (absolutely real jīva) and which has the conceit of "I" because of getting identified with the internal organ, is the empirically real (jīva); for, that, though the product of māyā, persists as long as there is empirical usage. That which has the conceit of "I" in the dream-body etc., posited by sleep, which is of the nature of a particular state of the māyā that in dreams stands obscuring even that (empirically real jīva), is the merely apparent

---

[35] Into pure intelligence, jīva and the Lord.

[36] By māyā.

(jīva); for, on waking, there is, along with the dream-world, cessation even for the jīva that is the seer thereof.

Thus have been shown these differences in the views of those who maintain the Lord to be a reflection.

The followers of the *Vivaraṇa*, however, say thus: since by the traditional code[37] "When the ignorance that generates difference is absolutely destroyed, what can produce the non-existent difference between the self and Brahman?" it is taught of only a single ignorance that it is the condition of the difference between the jīva and the Lord, the difference between the jīva and the Lord is through their being prototype and reflection, not through both of them being reflections, it being impossible for both to be reflections, in the absence of two adjuncts. Here too, the reflection is the jīva; what is in the position of the prototype is the Lord. Only when this is the case, on the analogy of prototype and reflection in ordinary experience, do the freedom of the Lord and the dependence of the jīva on Him stand to reason. And the aphorism "But (the creative activity of the Lord is) mere sport, as in the world" also fits in, in the manner stated in the *Kalpataru*: "Just as a man plays with the changes, straight, crooked etc., occurring in the reflection, even so does Brahman with the changes in the jīva." Of the jīva that is a reflection in ignorance, the particular transformation of ignorance, which is of the form of the internal organ, is the place of distinctive manifestation, as the mirror is for the sun's light that 2·312 is all-pervasive. Hence too the empirical usage of that (jīva) as having that (internal organ) for adjunct. Nor with this is there the abandonment of (the view of) ignorance being the adjunct; for, if intelligence, as delimited by the internal organ alone as the adjunct, were the jīva, the yogin's control of a host of bodies would be unintelligible. Nor may it be said that, since, by the might of yoga, the yogin's internal organ attains the pervasiveness capable of manifestation in a host of bodies, for what is defined by that (internal organ) the control of a host of bodies stands to reason; for, in the penultimate section of the sacred teaching,[38] "The entrance is like that of a lamp, for so it is shown (in Scripture)", in the *Bhāṣya* etc. thereon, there is described the creation, through the might of yoga, of the internal organ which like the sense of sight is certainly different for each body in the host of bodies. Since, in the reflection, difference from the prototype is alone superimposed, that is real in respect of its own existence; hence, on the ground that for the jīva, which is of the nature of a reflection, there can be no connection with release, there need not be assumed over and above that, in order that there may be connection with release, either another defined jīva or another (variety of) intelligence called the immutable, over and above the jīva that is a reflection, and different from both the jīva and the Lord. The Scriptural declaration "Imperishable, verily, is this self" has this for purport, that for the jīva, on the removal of its adjunct, though there is cessation of its condition of being a reflection, its existence does not perish; it does not have for purport (the existence of) another intelligence, over and above that (jīva) and called the immutable. The intelligence defined by the jīva's adjunct, the internal organ etc., is but the Lord that is the prototype; for, even by the texts "He who stands in cognition"[39] etc., existence in the midst of modifications is declared of the Lord alone, in the (very) proximity of the jīva,[40] through being the internal ruler thereof.

---

[37] The verse comes from the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*.

---

[38] The *Vedānta Sūtras*,

Others, however, prefer the (following) view. In 2·313 the case of what is not conditioned by colour, a reflection does not stand to reason; much more is this so, in (a medium) which is colourless. Even the example of the reflection of the sky does not stand to reason, for, when the sun's rays pervading the expanse of the sky are reflected in water, the empirical usage that the sky is reflected is grounded on mere delusion. Even the view that letters are reflected in (the audible) sounds does not stand to reason; for, (sound) being the manifester (of the letters), in the case of attributes of sound like high pitch, their imposition on letters is intelligible through mere proximity, and hence there is no evidence for the assumption that sound takes on the reflection of letters. The echo too is not a reflection of the earlier sound; according to the doctrine of quintuplication, the sounds of the drum, the sea etc. are sounds of the earth, water etc., while the echo alone is the sound of ether, and hence it cannot be the reflection of any other sound. Even the echo in the form of a letter is not the reflection of a previous letter; for, the echo, which is caused by an audible sound manifesting a letter, may, even like the original audible sound, intelligibly be the manifester of the letter.[41] Therefore, the intelligence, which like the pot-ether is defined by the internal organ, is the jīva; what is not so defined is the Lord. Nor may it be said "Since thus the intelligence that is within the world is defined in its entirety in the form of jīvas, by the respective internal organs as adjuncts, for the Lord, who is of the nature of intelligence devoid of that definition, there would be existence outside the world alone; hence there would be contradicted the declaration of existence in the midst of modifications as internal ruler, in 'He who stands in cognition (i.e., the jīva-self)' etc.; on the reflection-theory, however, since the reflected ether is seen even while there does exist the natural ether present in the water, the existence in two forms in one place is intelligible." For, even on the reflection theory, it is only of the intelligence not within the adjunct, that reflection in that (adjunct) may be declared, but not the reflection of the whole, on the analogy of the moon in water; for, of the portion within that, reflection therein is not possible. Verily, not like the reflection of the ether or light defined by the cloud, in water, is there seen the reflection therein even of what is within the water. Nor, of the face etc., is there reflection even when under water, as when they are outside. Therefore, as in the case of the cloud-defined-ether etc., in respect of the reflection in water, so, in respect of the reflection in such adjuncts as the internal organ, the prototype-character would belong only to what is not within that (adjunct); hence what is of the nature of the prototype could not exist in the midst of modifications; hence there is parity (between the two theories) in the failure of the text about the internal ruler to harmonise with (the conception of) the Lord. Hereby is refuted (the objection) that if the defined be the jīva, then, because of the difference in the portions of intelligence defined by the internal organ here and there,[42] at the times of agency and enjoyership there is the contingence of the destruction of the acquired (karma) and the influx of the non-acquired. Even on the reflection-theory, since there has to be declared the reflection in the internal organ of that portion of intelligence which is not within (the adjunct) itself and is proximate to it, when the internal organ moves here and there, because of the difference in the prototype, there would necessarily be difference of the reflection too; (and thus) there is parity of this defect (for both theories). Nor may it be said: "Though there be parity of defect on the view that the jīva is a reflection in the internal organ, yet, on the view that the jīva is a reflection in nescience, and that, of this, the internal organ which moves about here and there is the cause of distinctive manifestation here or there, like the moving bright light above the mass of clouds in the case of the reflection of that (mass of clouds), there is not this defect; for, since there is no motion for nescience, as (there is) for the internal organ, there is no contingence of difference in the reflections." For, in the very same way, even on the definition theory, it is possible to admit that the jīva is what is defined by nescience;[43] and, since there too, in order to remove such defects as the destruction of the acquired, in that for a single jīva there is agency in one place and enjoyership in another place, the identity of the jīva in fact has to be resorted to, on that analogy, even on the view of the internal organ as the adjunct, it is possible to remedy that defect[44] by recognising as helpful (thereto) the identity of intelligence in fact and the identity of the defining adjunct. Nor on the definition-theory is there conflict with the Scriptural text and aphorism—"As this one resplendent sun becomes differentiated in manifold ways in the water, so this shining unborn self creates in the bodies different forms through adjuncts," "Hence it is there is the analogy of the reflections of the sun and so on"; for, in the aphorism "But since there is not apprehended (any medium) like water, there is not that nature (of being a reflection)", which succeeds immediately on the aphorism cited, there is stated the impossibility of reflection, since, just as in the case of the sun that has colour, water is apprehended as capable of generating a reflection, being at a

---

[39] The term "cognition (vijñāna)" here means the finite self.

[40] The Lord's controllership is exercised not from a distance, but in the very presence or proximity of what is controlled.

---

[41] That is to say, the letter manifested by the echo need not be a reflection.

---

[42] That is to say, in this life and in a future one; definition is understood on a spatial analogy, and the absence of identity between one limited space and another is urged as an objection to the use of that analogy for the jīva, who is conceived as identical in several lives.

---

[43] Not by the internal organ.

[44] Destruction of the acquired karma etc.

distance from that (sun) and (itself) possessing colour, there is not similarly in the case of the omnipresent self anything at a distance from it capable of generating reflection; and in the aphorism immediately succeeding that, "The experience of increase and decrease is because of being within (limiting adjuncts), thus there is accord of both (the illustration and what is illustrated)", the aphorist himself states the purport of those (texts) to be but the definition-theory, in that just as the sun which is reflected in the water increases as it were with the increase of (the volume of) water, and decreases as it were with a decrease of (the volume of) water, and moves as it were with the motion of the water, and consequently the experience of its increase, decrease etc. concomitant with (that of) the water is of the nature of superimposition, similarly, in the case of the self, since, as defined by the internal organ etc., it is within adjuncts, there is the experience of increase, decrease etc. concomitant with that (adjunct) and of the nature of superimposition; and, since thus there is accord between the illustration and what is illustrated, there is no conflict; and the definition-theory alone is accepted by the Scriptural text "As when a pot is moved, the pot alone is moved, not the ether enclosed in the pot, so too is the analogy of the jīva with the ether" and by the aphorism "(The jīva is) a part, because of the declaration of difference". Therefore, in the case of the omnipresent intelligence, definition through the internal organ etc. happens of necessity; because of (this) necessity, the jīva is what is defined.

2·314 Others, however, hold thus: the jīva is neither a reflection nor the defined; but, like Kaunteya's[45] condition as Rādheya, it is for the untransformed Brahman itself that there is the condition of the jīva, because of nescience; for, it is taught in the *Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* that, on the analogy of the prince brought up in the family of hunters, Brahman alone, through its own nescience, migrates, and, through its own knowledge, is released; and it is said in the *Vārtika* "Just as for the king's son, on regaining his memory, the condition of being a hunter ceases, even so for the ignorant self (there is release) because of such texts as 'That thou art'". And thus, since it is only by Brahman, as having attained the condition of the jīva through its own nescience, that there is the positing of the entire universe, the Lord too, together with the attributes of omniscience etc., is an assumption of the jīva, like the deity perceived in a dream.

2·32 Now, is this jīva one or many?

2·3211 Some, who hold to the view mentioned just before, adopt the unity of the jīva and say thus: the jīva is one; and therefore, it is only one body that has a jīva; others, like the bodies seen in dreams, have no jīvas; the world is posited by the ignorance of that (jīva); for that (jīva) there is empirical usage as long as there is nescience, as in the case of dream-perception; there is not even the distinction between the bound and the released, because of the unity of the jīva; even the release etc. of Śuka is assumptive, like the release etc. of persons other (than the dreamer) in dreams; and the washing off of the mire of all objections that may occur to this (view) is to be effected solely in the continuous torrent of the dream-analogy.

---

[45] The son of Kunti; here, Karṇa, who though born to the Sun-god and Kunti, was brought up by a charioteer, in ignorance of his true status as the son of Kunti; this state of ignorance is what is designated in the text as the condition of Rādheya, Rādhā being the wife of the charioteer and the foster-mother of Karṇa.

Others, however, not gaining mental faith in this view of a sole (animated) body and a sole jīva, and thinking that there is conflict with such aphorisms as "But (the Lord is) more, because of the designation of difference," "But as in the world, (the creative activity is) mere sport," which teach that the Lord, who is more than the jīva, is alone the creator of the universe, not the jīva, and that though, because of having His desires (already) realised, there is no fruit for Him, there is creation of the world merely in sport, adopt the (following) view of a single jīva with many distinctive[46] bodies: Hiraṇyagarbha, the sole reflection of Brahman, is the principal jīva; others, however, which are of the nature of reflections of that (Hiraṇyagarbha), are apparent jīvas, similar to the apparent clothes put on the bodies of human beings sketched on an artistically worked cloth, and are subject to transmigration etc. 2·3212

Yet others, however, thinking that, because of the difference of Hiraṇyagarbhas in each aeon, there is 2·3213 nothing to determine which Hiraṇyagarbha is the principal jīva, prefer the (following) view of a single jīva (animating) many bodies without distinction: a single jīva alone controls all bodies without distinction; nor thus is there the contingence of the remembrance of one another's happiness, in spite of the difference in bodies, just as (there is remembrance) in the case of the different parts of a body; for, since there is not seen the remembrance of the happiness etc. of another birth, it is settled that difference of body is the cause of the non-remembrance of that; in the case of yogins, however, the remembrance of the happiness etc. of a host of bodies is, like the apprehension of objects at a distance, conditioned by the might of yoga, and hence that is not an instance (to the contrary).

---

[46] The bodies are distinctive (saviśeṣa) in that they are all animated (sajīvāni); so says the commentator. One is tempted to disregard this and take "saviśeṣa" with "vādam" so as to mean "distinctive view", the distinction from the other eka-jīva-vāda being manifest; a better interpretation, perhaps, is to take it to mean that the many bodies are "differently" animated, one by Hiraṇyagarbha and the rest by his reflections.

2·322 Still others, however, who are dissatisfied, since here too there is parity in the non-existence of the distinction between bondage and release and hence there is non-accord with the Scriptural text "He who, among the devas, is enlightened, he alone becomes that" and with the *Bhāṣya* on the section "If it be said that it is denied, no (we reply), since it is from the embodied," which teaches the release of the bound, resort to the view of many jīvas, through the admission of the internal organ etc. as adjuncts of the jīva, and obtain the distinction of the bound from the released.

2·3221 Of these, some say thus: though ignorance, which has the pure Brahman for locus and content, is but one, and only the destruction of that is release, yet, because of the admission of the persistence of a trace of ignorance in the state of release while embodied, ignorance has parts; hence that itself, when, in some adjuncts, there is the rise of the understanding of Brahman, ceases in part, while in other adjuncts it persists as before through (its) other parts.

Others, however, say thus: just as, in the view of some Logicians, the determinant of the presence of the absolute non-existence of pot on the ground is the non-existence of conjunction with the pot and hence the absolute non-existence of pot which exists in association with many places possessing that [47] is not in association with some places, when by the rise of conjunction with pot that non-existence is removed, similarly, since for the presence of ignorance in intelligence the determinant is the mind, the ignorance that exists in association with parts of intelligence, through that adjunct,[48] is not in association with some[49] when, by the rise of the realisation of Brahman, the mind is removed, in the manner declared by the Scriptural text "The knot of the heart[50] is cut"; elsewhere it remains as before; it is only the association and non-association with ignorance that constitute bondage and release. 2·3222

Yet others, however, say thus: ignorance does not have pure intelligence as locus, but has the jīva for locus and Brahman for content; and that (ignorance) being, like generality in the particulars, separately 2·3223 realised in all the jīvas which are reflections in the internal organ, abandons some one for whom knowledge has arisen, as generality (abandons) a destroyed particular; this alone is release; in others it resides as before; this is the distinction.

---

[47] Absence of conjunction with the pot.

[48] *I.e.*, the mind.

[49] Parts of intelligence.

[50] By "heart" is here meant the internal organ; it is spoken of as a "knot", since it is a superimposition on intelligence and is of a compound nature, the "this" (the object) and the "not-this" (the subject).

2·3224 Still others, however, establish the distinction between bondage and release only by admitting a different nescience for each jīva, and the persistence and removal of that (individual nescience).

2·32241 On this view, by whose nescience is the world effected? If this be asked, (the reply is), since there is no determining consideration, it is effected by the nesciences of all, and is on a par with a cloth caused by several threads. When, on the release of one (person), his nescience is destroyed, then, as for the cloth when a single thread is destroyed, there is destruction of the world common to him; even at that time, like (the origination of) another cloth by the other existing threads, there is the creation of another world, common to all the rest, by the other nesciences: thus say some.

2·32242 Like the merely apparent silver produced by the respective (individual) ignorances, and like the duality which, in the view of the Logicians, is produced by the respective (individual) enumerative cognitions,[51] the universe of ether etc., produced by the respective

---

[51] The phrase "enumerative cognition" has been taken over from Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar's *Primer of Indian Logic;* it is hardly satisfactory; what is intended is this: the notion of duality arises not in dependence on things, as they appear, but in dependence on a subjective desire to enumerate the things.

(individual) nesciences, is different for each individual; there is only the delusion of identity, as (in saying) in respect of nacre-silver "The silver seen by you that itself (is seen) by me too"; thus say others.

Māyā alone, which is different from the host of nesciences located in the jīvas and is (itself) located in the Lord, is the cause of the universe; as for the nesciences of the jīvas, they are of service in bare obscuration and in the projection of the merely apparent nacre-silver etc.: thus say yet others. 2·32243

(The topic of) material causation is concluded together with what is related directly and indirectly.

Now, of what nature is the agency? 3·0

Some say thus: because of the Scriptural declarations "That saw," "He desired," "That of itself made itself," that (agency), as in the system of the Logicians, consists in the possession of such knowledge, desire to act and volition as is favourable to the (production of the) effect. 3·1

Others, however, say thus: if in order to explain agency in respect of the desire to act and volition, there be needed another desire to act and volition, there is the contingence of infinite regress; hence the agency of Brahman is but the possession of knowledge favourable to the effect; nor is there this contingence in the case of knowledge too, since that, being of the nature of Brahman, is not an effect; and thus, the statement in the *Vivaraṇa* that the jīva is the agent in respect of 3·2 happiness etc.,[52] and the statement in the *Kalpataru* that since they can be produced by a mere glance, ether etc. are (His) glance, while the physical world is (His) smile, since through the channel of Hiraṇyagarbha it has to be produced with greater effort than a glance,[53] are in accord (with reason).

3·3 Yet others, however, say thus: agency consists in the possession of knowledge which is favourable to the effect and is of the nature of a consideration that it is to be created; it is not merely the possession of knowledge favourable to the effect, since, in the case of nacre-silver, dreams and other such delusions, there is contingence of agency for the jīva as possessing such knowledge of the substrate as is favourable to the super-imposition; nor may it be said "this is a contingence of the acceptable, since it is of the jīva that agency is declared in respect of the dream-world, even by the Scriptural text 'Now, he creates chariots, horses and roads: he, indeed, is the agent'"; for, this has been explained thus by the commentator:[54] "agency is merely figurative, as in 'the plough supports the cow etc.,' since (the jīva is) the efficient cause of the appearance of chariot etc."

---

[52] The jīva has knowledge of happiness etc., as the witness thereof, but does not will them; yet he is said to be the agent; this is intelligible only on the view that agency requires the possession of favourable knowledge alone. It may not be objected that the jīva does will the means to happiness, for, what is denied is volition whose sphere is the internal organ, the material cause of happiness etc. The position thus set out by the commentator is unacceptable to the modern psychologist.

[53] Here too, the assumption of this school (and of the commentator) is that a glance requires no effort at all and is of the nature of bare knowledge, while a smile does require effort. The position has no support either from modern psychology or from the text of the *Kalpataru*.

[54] Śaṅkara.

Brahman's omniscience, which results by implication from this very agency in respect of the creation of the entire universe, is established in the section "Because of being the sacred-teaching-source", even through the authorship of the Vedas.

Now, how does Brahman's omniscience accord (with reason), since knowership itself is impossible, there being no internal organ as for the jīva? 4·1

In reply to this, there has been already shown the view of Bhāratītīrtha and others that the Lord is He whose adjunct is ignorance in association with the impressions of the intellects of all beings having all things for content, and that, therefore, there is omniscience for Him, as the witness of the impressions of all contents.

The author of the *Prakaṭārtha,* however, says thus: just as for the jīva, because the transformations of its adjunct—the internal organ—take on reflections of intelligence, there is cognisership through association with that (adjunct), similarly, since for Brahman there are transformations of its adjunct—māyā, which take on the reflections of intelligence, there is omniscience, because the universe, though existing in the three times, is immediately known through the flashes (of intelligence) reflected in that (māyā). 4·2

The author of the *Tattvaśuddhi,* however, establishes omniscience thus: since, in the manner mentioned, 4·3 perception of the entire existent world is possible for Brahman, and since as possessing impressions produced thereby, remembrance is intelligible, there is established the cognition of all past things; since, prior to creation, māyā is transformed, in accordance with the unseen potencies of the jīvas, in the form of cognitions of all objects, for Brahman too, which has that (māyā) as adjunct, there results, as witness thereof, instrumentality in respect of that (transformation), and hence cognition relating to future things is intelligible.

4·4 The author of the *Kaumudī*, however, says thus: since even by the knowledge that is Brahman's nature everything in relation to that is manifested, there is omniscience; for, even in the case of the past and the future, association with that is intelligible since they exist, in the form of impressions, like a sketched but unfinished picture painted on the wall of nescience; but His omniscience is not through cognitions through psychoses, because of conflict with the restrictive Scriptural text "That alone shining, all else shines after it"; and since, prior to creation, in accordance with the restriction in "one alone, without a second" there has to be declared the absorption of cognitions through psychoses, in the same way as of the gross elements, there is the contingence of the non-existence of Brahman's omniscience at that time and consequently the contingence of the non-existence of creatorship in respect of the seeing, that is of the form of the first transformation of māyā, and in respect of the gross elements etc., which are preceded by that (seeing). If it be said "This being the case, for Brahman there would be only being of the nature of knowledge relating to all, not omniscience consisting in the knowership of all", true, Brahman is certainly of the nature of knowledge relating to all, not the knower of all; for Him, there is not knowership of the nature of agency; hence it is that in the section "Because of the agreement of texts" it has been said by the commentator that cognisership is a characteristic mark of the jīva; even the Scriptural text, "He who is omniscient" has to be construed only in the view of His being of the nature of knowledge.

Though Brahman even by the intelligence that is His own nature is the manifester of everything in association with Himself, yet that (knowledge), though in its own nature not an effect, is still, in its nature as defined by what is cognised, an effect of Brahman; hence there is no conflict whatever even with the text "He who is omniscient" which declares agency in respect of the generation of knowledge: thus says the preceptor Vācaspati Miśra. 4·5

Now, why does not the jīva too, like the Lord, manifest objects even by the intelligence which is of his nature, without requiring a psychosis? 5·0

To this it is said thus in the *Vivaraṇa*: Brahman's intelligence being in identity with everything, as the material cause of everything, manifests everything associated with itself; not (so) the jīva's intelligence, for, though omnipresent as having (the omnipresent) nescience for adjunct, yet, as not being the material cause, it is not associated 5·1 (with those objects). Just as the generality "cowness," which is omnipresent, though by nature not associated with particulars like horse, is yet associated with a particular possessing a dewlap, similarly, the jīva, though by nature not associated with objects, is yet associated with the internal organ. And thus, when the transformation of the internal organ, in the form of a psychosis, goes out, through channels like the eyes, extends up to the object quickly in the form of long rays of light like the rays from the sense of sight, and pervades the object, then, as associated therewith, (the jīva's intelligence) has that object for the sphere (of cognition). Just as grass etc., though not combustible by pure fire, are yet combustible by fire in association with an iron ball, though pot etc. are not manifestable by the pure intelligence of the jīva, it stands to reason that they are manifestable by that (intelligence) in association with a psychosis of the internal organ.

Or else, as having the internal organ for adjunct, the jīva is finite; therefore, because of absence of association, he does not manifest pot etc.; but when, through the channel of the psychosis, there is manifested the non-difference from Brahman's intelligence as defined by the object associated with that (psychosis), it (the jīva's intelligence) manifests that object.

Or else, the jīva, though omnipresent, is yet not manifest himself, because of being obscured by nescience; hence he does not manifest objects; because of the association with a psychosis in respect of a particular object, the obscuration being removed, he is manifest there alone and manifests that object alone. And thus, for the sake of association with intelligence, or for the sake of the manifestation of non-difference from object-(defined) intelligence, or for the sake of the removal of obscuration, the going forth of the psychosis is required and there is manifestation of that object alone which is in association with that (psychosis); hence, even the parviscience (little-knowingness) of the jīva is intelligible.

On the first of these views, in the case of the omnipresent jīva, what is the association with an object dependent on a psychosis? For, even by a psychosis it is not possible to bring about identity or conjunction as between the jīva-intelligence and the object-intelligence, both of which are already established and devoid of activity. 5·11

To this some say that the relation is only that of object and subject. 5·111

Others, however, say thus: if the psychosis were determinative of the relation of object and subject alone, then, the determination of that by a psychosis of the sense, even when it does not go forth, would not bring about undue extension; hence there is the contingence of the futility of the admission of its going forth; therefore, that (view) is not acceptable; but, when the psychosis, which has attained identity with the jīva-intelligence proximate to the object, is in conjunction with the object, for that (jīva-intelligence) too, there results through the channel of that (psychosis) an indirect relationship; hence 5·112 this (relationship) alone is what is acceptable as the association with intelligence.

5·113 Yet others, however, say thus: since immediacy is seen for happiness etc., only in the case of what is in direct association with intelligence that is immediate, direct association is required in the case of objects (of) immediate (experience); therefore, since, when the psychosis is in conjunction with the object, there results a definition (of the jīva), consisting in the psychosis, as so defined, even for the jīva, who is the material cause of that,[55] there occurs a conjunction (with the object) born of a conjunction (between psychosis and object); for, just as from the conjunction of a cause and a non-cause there results the conjunction of an effect and non-effect, there stands to reason, because of parity of reasoning, the admission even of the conjunction of a cause and a non-cause from the conjunction of an effect and a non-effect.[56]

5.114 A section, however, says thus: what is acceptable as the association with intelligence is but the production of identity with the object, through the manifestation of the non-difference of the intelligence, which is conditioned by the internal organ and manifests the object, from the Brahman-intelligence that has been identified with the object; though the jīva, as omnipresent, is in proximity to all objects, if in that (jīva) form he could manifest objects, that (form) being common to all, there could not be the distinction of immediacy for different persons, and hence only in that form of his, conditioned by the internal organ, does he manifest objects; and thus, the final view that, in the immediate experience of objects, a superimposed relation is the determinant, is also in accord (with reason); nor is there thus confusion with the second view (as to the function of the psychosis), since there is certainly this difference between the two, viz., that the first view is (based) on the omnipresence of the jīva, the second on its finitude.

---

[55] As a substrate of the illusory presentation in the form of the psychosis.

[56] From the conjunction of the psychosis, an effect of jīva-intelligence, with the object, which is not such an effect, a conjunction is sought to be inferred as between the jīva, which is a cause of the psychosis, and the object, which is a non-cause. The illustration runs thus: when the hand is in contact with a tree, the hand is a cause, the tree a non-cause; because of their conjunction, there is conjunction between the body (an effect of the hand) and the tree (a non-effect of the hand). The body being an avayavin is the *effect* of the avayava (hand).

Now, on the second view, what is the manifestation of non-difference? 5·12

Some say thus: the identification of the object-defined and internal-organ-defined intelligences through a psychosis, like (the identification) of the waters of the tank and the field through a channel, is the manifestation of non-difference; and thus, though the object-defined Brahman-intelligence is alone what manifests the object, yet the jīva manifesting objects is intelligible, since by the identification (with the jīva) through the psychosis, the nature of the jīva is brought about (for that Brahman-intelligence). 5·121

Others, however, say thus: the manifestation of non-difference is not the identification of Brahman, 5·122 which is in the position of the prototype and is object-defined, with the jīva, who is in the position of a reflection, since their identification is impossible so long as there exists a distinguishing adjunct, like a mirror (in the case of a reflection); and if by the psychosis-produced manifestation of non-difference there result the nature of the jīva for the object-defined Brahman, then, there being no conjunction for Brahman at that time with that object, cogniser ship of that would be impossible and there would result non-existence of His omniscience. Rather is it that the object-defined Brahman-intelligence causes in the proximate part of the psychosis associated with the object a reflection that manifests the object, and hence there is the identification of that reflection with the jīva; and thus is intelligible even the non-confusion among the intelligences defined by the internal organ, its psychosis and the object, these being respectively in the positions of knower, means of knowledge and object known; nor may it be said "If the psychosis-conditioned intelligence be valid knowledge of the object, since there is not for it, as for the intelligence that is the substrate of the object, a superimposed relation with the object, the superimposed relation would not be the cause of the immediacy of the object"; for, since in the psychosis there is reflection only of that intelligence which is the substrate of the object and which is defined by the object, because of their non-difference,[57] there exists that relation (of superimposition).

---

[57] That is, non-difference of the reflection in the psychosis from the original, viz., the intelligence that is the substrate of the object

Yet others, however, say thus: what manifests objects, through a direct relation[58] of superimposition, is but the intelligence which is in the position of the prototype and is the substrate of objects; though there is difference (between it and the jīva) in its character as (really) qualified by being the prototype, yet in its nature as intelligence characterised *per accidens* by that (being the prototype) there is identification, which alone is the manifestation of non-difference; nor is there thus confusion between the jīva and Brahman, nor conflict with Brahman's omniscience, since that continues as before, in the nature of prototype. 5·123

Now, on the third view, what is it that is said to be the removal of obscuration? If it be said to be the destruction of ignorance, even by the cognition of the pot there would be removed the universe grounded on ignorance; if this be said, some say to this— 5·13

that of the ignorance which obscures intelligence in its entirety, there is, through knowledge in the part defined by the object, destruction in part as of total darkness by the light of a glow-worm etc., or a rolling up as of a mat, or a retreat as of a frightened soldier; this is the removal. 5·1311

Others, however, say thus: if ignorance be destroyed in part, then, because of the non-existence of the material cause, there could be no fresh origination (of obscuration) there; hence, when once removed, there is the contingence of the non-existence of obscuration 5·1312 even at other times; and, in the case of what is non-active, retreat and rolling up are impossible; hence, removal of the nature afore-mentioned is not possible. Therefore even of the ignorance that obscures intelligence in its entirety, the removal consists only in its nature of not obscuring the object-defined intelligence, which stands associated with the psychoses having the respective forms (of the object); nor may it be objected "In the case of ignorance which, like the cloth concealing an object, stands located in the object-intelligence, how does the non-obscuration of that (intelligence) stand to reason?"; for, by the cognition " I am ignorant," it is understood that even while located in the intelligence that is manifest in the experience of " I ", there is non-obscuration of that (jīva) by that (ignorance).

---

[58] Not a relation of superimposition in respect of a reflection, as on the preceding view.

5·132 Yet others, however, say thus: what is experienced in the form " I do not know the pot ", as in opposition to the knowledge of the pot, and as removable by that (knowledge), in the form " when there is knowledge of the pot, the ignorance of the pot is removed " is not primal ignorance, since this (latter) which has pure intelligence for content and is removable by the knowledge of that (intelligence) cannot be of that character.[59] Rather is it another ignorance, of the nature of a particular mode of primal ignorance, having pot-defined intelligence for content; hence, the destruction of that alone is the removal; nor thus, when that is destroyed by a single cognition, is there the contingence of the non-removal of obscuration by other cognitions, since it is admitted that as many as the cognitions are the ignorances removable by them.

---

[59] *I.e.*, removable by cognitions of particulars like the pot,

These ignorances, which are of the nature of modes, are, like primal ignorance, beginningless, since they are (of the nature of) ignorance: thus say some. 5·1321

Sleep, which obscures the empirical world and jīva and projects the world and jīva in the dream, is of the nature of a particular mode of ignorance, because of being endowed with the obscuring and projecting capacities; similarly, even the state of deep sleep is, like primal ignorance, certainly a mode of ignorance experienced in the period of deep sleep, since there is seen the reflection "I slept well, I did not know anything," when the internal organ etc. are merged; since these two (modes of ignorance) arise only when there is quiescence of the karma that causes enjoyment in waking life, they have a beginning; hence, even other ignorance, of the nature of a mode, has a beginning; thus say others. 5·1322

Now, it may be said "On the view of beginninglessness, in respect of a pot, even by the cognition that arises first, there would be the destruction of all ignorances about it, because of the absence of any determination,[60] and because without the destruction of all ignorances obscuring the intelligence defined by that (pot), the manifestation of the object would be impossible; therefore, in the case of the subsequent cognitions, the (defect of) non-removal of obscuration certainly continues as before". 5·1323

---

[60] As to which ignorance is to be destroyed by which cognition.

5·13211 To this some say thus: just as even though there are many antecedent non-existences of cognition, when a single cognition arises, only a single antecedent non-existence ceases, and though there exist other antecedent non-existences, which are of the nature of obscurations of that (object), as capable of producing doubt etc., there is the manifestation of the object, similarly, when a single cognition arises, a single ignorance alone ceases; and though there exist other ignorances, there is manifestation of the object.

5·13212 Others, however, holding that " the immediacy of what is obscured is self-contradictory, and when a single cognition arises, though other antecedent non-existences exist, yet, because of the specific cognition (of the object), there is not that obscuration which is of the nature of the entirety of the non-existence of specific cognitions," say thus: when a particular ignorance obscures, then by the cognition of that, there is the destruction of that (ignorance) alone; and all (ignorance) does not obscure all the time, because of futility; rather is it that when the obscuring ignorance is destroyed by a psychosis, and when there is a cessation of that psychosis, another ignorance obscures; nor when this is the case is there the contingence that at the time of the rise of Brahman-realisation, even by that there would not be the removal of those ignorances which remain without obscuring; for, these, though not directly opposed to that (realisation), are dependent on primal ignorance which is removable by that, and hence even by the removal of that (primal ignorance) their removal is intelligible, as in the case of the relation of ignorance and so on;[61] it is only for the sake of this, that, as of the nature of particular modes thereof, their dependence on that (primal ignorance) is recognised.

Yet others, however, holding that "since it is of the nature of ignorance to have a content, as a general rule, all (of it) certainly obscures all the time; nor may it be said that, since prior to the origination of the object there is nothing to be obscured, obscuration (then) does not stand to reason, since even then it exists in a subtle form,"[62] make the following assumption; just as in a place where many persons are gathered together, the thunder that falls on some one's head drives away others too, or just as the medicine that cures sannipāta,[63] while remedying one evil, drives away another evil (too), similarly cognition, while destroying one ignorance, subjugates other ignorances as well; and the subjugation consists in counteracting the obscuring capacity, so long as the cognition lasts. 5·13213

Now, this being the case, in the case of a continuous stream of cognition, there would be futility for the second and subsequent cognitions, as not removing obscuration, since obscuration in its entirety has been removed even by the first cognition, through removal and subjugation.

---

[61] When ignorance is destroyed, the relation of ignorance to the self is also destroyed therewith and does not call for another agent of destruction.

[62] The Vedāntins, unlike the Naiyāyikas, are satkāryavādins, and maintain the pre-existence, in a subtle form, of the effect in the cause.

[63] A combined derangement of the three humours of the body, causing fever of a dangerous kind.

5·132131 To this they say thus: ignorance, though subjugated by the psychosis, yet, on the cessation of that, obscures again, as does the darkness subjugated by a light, when the light goes out; but if at the time of the cessation of a psychosis another psychosis arises, the ignorance that has been subjugated remains in that condition alone, as does darkness when another light comes in at the time one light goes out; and thus, in conformity with the definition common to whatever maintains antecedent non-existence,[64] viz., that that of which there is existence when there is existence of another at the previous instant and of which there is non-existence in the absence of that (other), is the product of that (other), it follows that non-obscuration is the product even of the second and subsequent psychoses; hence, there is not their futility.

5·132132 The author of the *Nyāyacandrikā*, however, says thus: by a particular cognition, there is but destruction of a particular ignorance, but not the subjugation of other obscuring ignorances as well; and thus, even in the case of the second and subsequent psychoses in a continuous stream of cognition, there is fruitfulness, as each destroys a single ignorance; nor is there thus the contingence of the non-manifestation of the object because of the possibility of obscuration even on the rise of knowledge; for, ignorances which are of the nature of modes, obscure the nature (of things) as qualified *per accidens* by the respective times, and cognitions destroy all ignorances that obscure the object as qualified *per accidens* by their own times;[65] and thus, when a particular cognition arises, because of the destruction of the ignorance obscuring the object at that time, and because of the other existing ignorances being such as obscure the object at other times (alone), there is no unintelligibility whatsoever in the manifestation of the object at that time; like the proximity in time in respect of rain, the fruit of the Kārīrī (rite), the respective times are but qualifications *per accidens* in respect of pot etc., the objects of ignorance, and hence do not enter into the constitution of the objects; hence there is no unintelligibility whatever even in the removal of ignorances by the second and subsequent cognitions of a continuous stream, which (cognitions) do not have for content the subtle differences among the various times.[66]

---

[64] If an expiatory rite is performed, there is no misery; if it is not performed, there is misery. Hence the performance of the rite is said to be the cause of the non-existence of misery, though what happens is but the perpetuation of the antecedent non-existence of misery, and antecedent non-existence is beginningless. The empirical usage of the causal concept in such cases is based on the definition of causality here formulated: that of which there is existence etc.

Some, however, (say thus): it is only the ignorance removable by the first cognition that obscures the bare existence (of the object); but what are removed by the second and subsequent cognitions are those whose objects are qualified by space, time and such attributes. 5·132133

---

[65] *I.e.*, the time during which each cognition lasts.

[66] The difference between each instant in a continuous stream is not cognised; if these differences in time were really attributes of the object, ignorance could not be removed by the cognition not aware of the temporal differences; hence the attempt to show that temporal differences are but qualifications *per accidens*, on the analogy of the Kārīrī rite, whose object is to produce rain; what is intended is no doubt rain immediately, not in some distant future; but since this temporal qualification by itself cannot be accomplished by a rite and may occur independently of the rite, it is an upalakṣaṇa, not a viśeṣaṇa.

Hence it is that when there has once arisen the perception of Caitra, which is of the nature of the certitude of existence and removes ignorance, there is not experienced the obscuration of existence in the form "I do not know Caitra," but only the obscuration of the qualified, in the form "I do not know where he is now" and so on. If it be the case with some forgetful persons that there is seen obscuration of existence in the form "I do not know", even in respect of what was once seen, let it be so in their case; elsewhere, when (an object has been) once seen, cognitions and ignorance have but the qualified for objects. Nor may it be said "This being the case, for the second and subsequent cognitions of a continuous stream, there would not be the removal of ignorance, since ignorance as qualified by gross (i.e., perceptible) time has been removed even by the first cognition, while, of the ignorance qualified by the subtle time other than those of the earlier and later cognitions,[67] the removal is impossible by the second and subsequent cognitions which do not have that (time) for content;" for in the case of a continuous stream, since it is possible even for the psychosis, that arises first, to last for that period,[68] no differences of psychosis are admitted; even if that were admitted, since it may possibly be of the nature of five or six psychoses, each lasting a long time, it is intelligible that they may have contents differentiated by such qualifications as gross time differentiating them one from another; and even if it be admitted to be of the form of a succession of many psychoses rising at each instant, since, for the second and subsequent psychoses, as having for object only a thing already known, there is no probativeness, there is no harm even if they do not remove obscuration. Indeed, probativeness does not consist merely in non-sublation of content, for, in the case of the hill and the fire thereon, which are (respectively) previously cognised and non-cognised, and are the content of inference, there being no distinction as to non-sublation, there is the contingence of the probativeness of inference in respect of both. Nor is this a contingence of the acceptable; for there is not seen the empirical usage " in respect of the hill too, inference is the means of valid knowledge " as (there is seen the empirical usage) "in respect of fire, inference is the means of valid knowledge"; and it is said in the *Vivaraṇa* in the case of ignorance (directly) established by the witness that, though the content of inference etc., whose object is to make known the exclusion of non-existence (from it), it is not the object of knowledge for any means of valid knowledge. Therefore, since for the second and subsequent psychoses, as for psychoses like contemplation, there is no probativeness, there is no harm even if they do not remove ignorance,

---

[67] The later cognition destroys, if at all, the ignorance qualified by the time intervening between the lapse of the earlier cognition and the coming into being of itself; this, it has been said, is momentary and too subtle to be perceived. Since thus the cognition does not have that time for content, how can it destroy ignorance as qualified by that time? This is the objection.

[68] *I.e.*, the period of the entire cognition. For a further exposition of this view, see the *Vedāntaparibhaṣā* and the *Śikhāmaṇi* commentary thereon (p. 23 *et. seq*). Most of the difficulties met here are due to the conception of present time as a bare instant. But the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins rightly recognise what is called the "specious present" as containing a residuum of the past and a foreshadowing of the future. On the subject of temporal perception and the "specious present," see *Indian Psychology, Perception*, pp. 153—162.

Acc 22328

since the removal of that is admitted only in the case of probative psychoses.

Now, there is not even this rule; for, a mediate psychosis (though probative, as in inference) since it does not go forth, does not remove ignorance; if this be said—

5·1321331 in reply to this some say thus: the ignorance that obscures objects is of two kinds; one is located in the object, is of the nature of the material cause of the projection associated with rope etc., and is assumed because of the product (i.e., the delusion); the other is located in the person and is known from the experience "I do not know this"; since for what is located in the person material causality is not possible in respect of the projection associated with the object, and since for what is located in the object there can be no conjunction with the manifestation "I do not know this," which is of the nature of the witness, there is necessity even for both kinds (of ignorance); and thus, since there is no going forth of the psychosis, in the case of the mediate (cognition), and since, in respect of the tree at a distance, though the particular size is understood from the testimony of a reliable person, there is seen the projection of a size contrary thereto, (it follows that) even when the ignorance present in the object is not removed, there is certainly the removal of the ignorance present in the person; for, in the case of the ignorance experienced in the form "I do not know the meaning of the sacred teaching" its removal is experienced immediately after the teaching of that (meaning); hence it is that for the *Vivaraṇa* (passage) "in inference etc., there is [not] removal of suṣupti (lit., *sleep*)," it is said in the *Tattvadīpana* that the meaning is "there is (not) removal of the ignorance present in the object of that (inference etc.)"[69]

Others, however, say thus: ignorance located in the person alone, like the film in the eye, is what obscures objects; there is no evidence for an ignorance which is over and above that and is present in the object; nor may it be said: "for what is located in the person transformation into the projection present in the object is not possible; or, if it were possible, then, in respect of the size of the tree at a distance, when ignorance is removed by mediate cognition, the projection of a contrary size would not be possible"; for, since, in the doctrine of Vācaspati, the whole universe is an illusory manifestation of Brahman which has been made the content of the ignorance located in the jīva, similarly, it is intelligible that nacre-silver etc. are illusory manifestations of Brahman made the content of the ignorance located in the person;[70] and by a mediate psychosis, though a particular mode be removed, yet 5·1321332

---

[69] The word "not" has been introduced in square brackets in the translation to correspond to the negative particle in the original texts; the mutilated quotation in the present work makes sense only in conjunction with the commentary; what is expressly stated in the *Tattvadīpana* is only the non-removal of ignorance; but because inferential knowledge too is knowledge and because of the use of the words "tad-viṣayā-'jñāna" it is inferred that the removal of some other ignorance (puruṣa-gatā-'jnana) is meant.

[70] It is only if the concept of transformation (pariṇāma) is adopted and a pariṇāma-kāraṇa looked for, that ignorance resident in the object would have to be treated as a material cause of the projection; no such assumption is necessary on the hypothesis of illusory manifestation.

/

the projection of a contrary size is intelligible, through another mode (of ignorance).

5·1321333 Yet others, however, say thus: because of its according with the intelligibility of the transformation into nacre-silver etc.,[71] it is only the ignorance present in the object that obscures it, like a cloth that covers the object; nor may it be said that if that be the case, there would be the defects, viz., the unintelligibility of the manifestation of ignorance because of its non-conjunction with the witness that is conditioned by the internal organ, and the impossibility of (its) being removed by mediate psychoses; for, though for ignorance in the form of modes there is no conjunction with the witness, yet the manifestation "I do not know nacre" is certainly intelligible in the case of primal ignorance, which is in conjunction with that (witness); for, even in the case of nacre etc., since they are non-different from the intelligence that is the content of primal ignorance, there is no contradiction in their being experienced as the content of that (primal ignorance); and the evidence of the perception "I do not know this" is exhibited in the *Vivaraṇa* etc., only in the context of establishing primal ignorance; even if there be admitted the distinction that only the experience of ignorance in general, in the form "I am ignorant", is the content of primal ignorance, while the experience of ignorance as embracing particular objects in such forms as "I do not know nacre," is the content of the modal ignorance, yet, whether because of the conjunction of primal ignorance with the witness, there being non-difference between modes and that which has modes, or because of the identity in fact between the witness-intelligence and the object-intelligence,[72] it is intelligible that even the modal ignorance present in the object may have the witness for content; though mediate cognition does not remove ignorance, the experience of its removal thereby is intelligible as a delusion conditioned by non-experience caused by the obstacle, viz., the mediate psychosis of the nature of certitude of existence; for immediate cognition alone is admitted to remove ignorance as a rule.

---

[71] If nacre-silver is to be conceived as the product of a transformation, it must be the product neither of nacre nor of ignorance located in the subject, but of ignorance located in the nacre.

Now, there is not even this rule, since, in the case of the perception of nescience, individuation and its attributes of pleasure, pain etc., the removal of ignorance is not admitted; if this be said, no; the perception of nescience etc. being of the nature of the witness, there is no detriment to the rule that immediate cognition in the nature of a psychosis does remove obscuration.

Now, who is this witness, who is spoken of over and above the jīva? 5·141

To this it is said thus in the *Kūṭasthadīpa*: the immutable intelligence, which is the substrate of the 5·14111 two bodies,[73] since it directly sees the two bodies that define itself, and since it is free from modification, is said to be the witness. In ordinary experience too, the character of being a witness is well-known to consist only in indifference and knowledge. Though for the jīva there are psychoses which manifest the two bodies, yet the two bodies which are certainly manifested to some extent all the time by the all-pervasive immutable intelligence as defined by themselves, are (also) manifested through psychoses-cognitions which go forth at intervals from the internal organ, which is the womb (as it were) of the reflection of intelligence constituting the jīva; but in the intervals, they are manifested, along with the non-existence of psychoses, by the immutable intelligence alone. Hence it is that individuation etc., being always in conjunction with the manifestation, are not the sphere of doubt etc., and there is the recollection in the case of the individuation contemporaneous with continuous cognition of something else "for so long I was certainly perceiving this." Nor may it be doubted how, in the case of what is manifested by the immutable, there could be empirical usage, memory etc. for the jīva; for, through identification with the jīva by reciprocal superimposition the immutable is proximate to[74] the jīva. Nor may it be said "let the jīva intelligence itself be the witness, why the immutable?"; for, in the case of that (jīva), the agent in empirical usage, worldly and Scriptural, indifferent spectatorship is impossible, and hence the character of the witness, as declared in the Scriptural text "Witness, intelligence, pure and free from guṇas", is impossible; further, in the text "Of the two one eats of the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating," the witness, of the nature of indifferent manifestation, is mentioned as distinct from the jīva, the enjoyer of the fruit of karma.

---

[72] Since there is non-difference between primal ignorance and its modes, and since primal ignorance is in conjunction with the witness, modal ignorances are also in such conjunction; this is the first explanation. The witness-intelligence is in reality non-different from the object-defined intelligence; modal ignorance located in the latter is, therefore, in conjunction with the former too; this is the second explanation.

---

[73] The gross and the subtle.

[74] That is to say, is not external to the jīva, as Devadatta and Yajñadatta are external to each other. In the latter case, what is manifested by one could not serve the other's empirical usage or memory.

In the *Nāṭakadīpa* too, the witness is shown as distinct from the jīva, by the example of the lamp in the theatre. It is thus: "The lamp present in the theatre illuminates without distinction the master (the owner of the show), the audience and the *danseuse,* and illumines even in their absence." Similarly, the jīva, of the nature of individuation qualified by the appearance of intelligence, is comparable to the master who has a conceit (of ownership) in the dance, since he possesses joy and grief produced by the conceit (of ownership) in the perfection or imperfection of the enjoyment of objects; objects are comparable to the members of the audience, since though existing close to that (jīva) they are free from that (joy and grief); as possessing manifold changes, the intellect is comparable to the *danseuse;* that which illuminates all these and shines in sleep etc., even when individuation etc. are absent, is the witness, which is of the nature of the immutable intelligence, the substrate of the jīva-delusion consisting in individuation qualified by the appearance of intelligence.

The witness thus distinguished from the jīva does not belong to the constitution of Brahman either, but is intelligence untouched by the distinction of jīva and the Lord: thus is it said in the *Kūṭasthadīpa.*

In the *Tattvapradīpikā* too, it is said that since in the case of the Supreme Lord, associated with māyā and endowed with attributes, the qualifications—pure, without guṇas—would be unintelligible, the pure Brahman, who is the inner self of all, gets to be the witness, because of non-difference from the jīva.

5·14112 In the *Kaumudī,* however, it is said thus: because of the Scriptural declaration of divinity etc., in "The one divine being, concealed in all beings, all-pervasive, the inner self of all, the supervisor of (all) action, the abode of all things, the witness, intelligence, pure, without guṇas", what is called the witness is but some particular form of the Supreme Lord, who knows continuously the jīva's engaging in and desisting from activity, himself being indifferent; and he, as not being the abode of such attributes as causality (of the world),[75] is immediate; and, as manifesting the ignorance etc. persent in the jīva, he is proximate to the jīva; and in sleep etc., when there is quiescence of the effect and the cause,[76] it is he who manifests the ignorance present in the jīva and is called Prājña; in the section about deep sleep and departure, it is ascertained that what is taught by the two Scriptural

[75] The witness, as the knower of the jīva's ignorance etc., is proximate to the jīva, while the Lord, the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the world, is remote from the jīva. How, then, can the Lord be the witness? The answer is that the witness is not the Lord, but a mode of the Lord, in which mode there are not such attributes as causing the world.

[76] The effect is the body, and the cause signifies the organs (the indriyas).

texts—" Just as he, embraced by the woman he loves, knows nothing outside nor anything within, even so this person, embraced by this Prājña self, knows nothing outside nor anything within ", " He goes forth making a great noise, mounted by the Prājña self"—as different from the jīva in the states of deep sleep and departure, is the Supreme Lord; this (ascertainment) too has the witness for purport.

In the *Tattvaśuddhi* too, this view alone is established by the following statement: just as, in the delusion " This is silver", the this-element, though really included in the constitution of the nacre, is apparently of the constitution of silver, even so, the witness, who is certainly of the constitution of Brahman, is apparently of the constitution of the jīva; hence its service in the empirical usage of the jīva's happiness etc. 5·14113

Some, however, say thus: the nescience-conditioned jīva alone is the witness, because of being directly the spectator; for, in ordinary experience too, the character of being a witness is well known to be spectatorship without agency; and that is directly possible only for the jīva, who is of the nature of unattached, indifferent manifestation, since the jīva, though subject to the imposition of agency etc., through getting identified with the internal organ, is in himself indifferent; as for the hymn " The one divine being etc.," that teaches the character of being the witness in the case of Brahman, with reference to its condition as the jīva; the hymn " Two birds etc.," on the principle of the section of (the persons in) the cave, has for 5·14121 purport both the jīva and the Lord;[77] or, in the manner explained by the *Paiṅgirahasya-brāhmaṇa* cited in the commentary on the section of the cave, it has for purport both the jīva and the internal organ; hence, there is no conflict whatever.[78]

5·14122 Others, however, say thus: true, the jīva alone is the witness, but not in his form as conditioned by omnipresent nescience, as there is contingence of the perceptibility of one person's internal organ etc., by another person, there being no difference in the conjunction with the witness that manifests one's own internal organ; nor is there non-contingence of this, since, through difference in the internal organ, there is difference in the cogniser; for, in respect of the internal organ etc., which are to be manifested by the witness, when the witness is non-different throughout, the difference in the cogniser is of no avail; therefore, it is as conditioned by the internal organ that the jīva is the witness; and thus, whether because of the non-conjunction of one person's internal organ etc., with another person's witness, because of the witness being different for each person, or because of the impossibility of that (perceptual relation),[79] the non-manifestation is intelligible; since the internal organ exists in a subtle form even in sleep, the witness conditioned thereby certainly exists even then; nor may it be said "since the internal organ-conditioned is the cogniser, he is not the witness; and since in sleep, though there is no cogniser, the witness exists, their difference should necessarily be declared"; for the difference between attribute and adjunct being acceptable to the final position,[80] the difference (between cogniser and witness) is intelligible in the form "what is qualified by the internal organ is the cogniser; what is conditioned by that (internal organ, as an adjunct) is the witness."

---

[77] That is to say, the witness is the Lord in the jīva-condition, so that there is no need to identify the bird that does not eat with the Lord exclusively.

[78] The jīva meant by the *Paiṅgi-rahasya-brāhmaṇa* is the reflection of intelligence in nescience, not in the internal organ; the latter cannot be said not to eat; the former is unattached and indifferent and hence may be identified with the witness without contradicting Scripture.

[79] In the case of other persons' internal organs etc.

Now, if, for the witness of the nature aforementioned, obscuration by ignorance, that obscures intelligence in its entirety, is unavoidable, how, then, is there the manifestation of nescience, individuation etc. by what is (itself) obscured? If this be asked, some say that, like Rāhu,[81] nescience is manifested by the light obscured by itself. 5·1421

In fact, ignorance obscures intelligence only to the exclusion of the witness-intelligence, which is the manifester of nescience, the internal organ and its 5·1422 attributes; because of this being postulated in conformity with experience, there is no defect. Hence it is, because of the conjunction of these (nescience etc.) all the time with unobscured manifestation, that they are not the sphere of ignorance, erroneous cognition or doubt. If it be said that if the witness-intelligence be unobscured, there is the contingence of the manifestation even of the bliss that is of its essential nature, no (that is not a defect); for, it is a contingence of the acceptable; for, in respect of the self there is seen unconditioned love due to the manifestation of the nature of bliss, and there is the *Vivaraṇa* statement "There is certainly manifested happiness characterised by being the abode of supreme love."

---

[80] Of the advaitins. The distinction is thus: what persists in the effect is an attribute (viśeṣaṇa), like the blueness of the lily; what does not persist is either an adjunct (upādhi) or qualification *per accidens* (upalakṣaṇa); of these, the adjunct lasts at least as long as the effect, not so the upalakṣaṇa; when we say "bring the red crystal", the redness, though not natural to the crystal, lasts till the crystal is brought; but when Devadatta's house is indicated as that which has a crow sitting on it, the crow may not remain there till the house is reached. See the *Kalpataru*, pp. 420, 421 (*AKS*).

[81] Rāhu is not seen except by the light of the luminary which it obscures (in eclipses).

5·14231 Be this so; if happiness be manifest even now, there is the contingence of non-distinction between release and the state of transmigration. Now, though the bliss of the witness, wherein difference is posited,[82] is manifest, the undefined Brahman bliss, which is obscured, is not manifest in the state of transmigration, and hence there is distinction; if this be said, no; for, the element of undefinedness in bliss is not a human goal, while the mere immediacy of bliss exists even now.[83]

---

[82] From the bliss that is Brahman, which as reflected in nescience constitutes the bliss of the witness; the latter is different from the former, as a reflection from the prototype; but in both cases the difference is assumptive.

[83] The bliss of the witness is experienced by the different jīvas; this experience has two aspects, immediacy and reciprocal difference. The former aspect is present even now, in bondage; as for the latter, the absence of the difference, which is posited in the self, is not of itself a human goal. If, however, differentiation be an *essential* characteristic of the bliss we experience, then, our bliss should be radically different from Brahman-bliss.

Now, the defined bliss of the witness is surpassable, is not very clear, since it is common to sleep, and since in the happiness from material objects there is experience of its being surpassed; whereas the undefined Brahman-bliss is unsurpassable, since in the *Ānandavallī,* the description of the hundredfold superiority of each succeeding stage beginning with human bliss culminates in Brahman-bliss. If this be said, no; for, the bliss of the witness, bliss from material objects and Brahman-bliss being in fact identical according to the final position, superiority and inferiority are impossible. If it be said that Scripture declares the progressive superiority of each later stage beginning with human bliss, who is it that says Scripture does not declare it? But it is said that it cannot be justified on the view of non-dualism. Now, since in the case of the sun's light, which is but one, there are seen degrees of manifestation, as conditioned by differences in the manifesters, such as the palm (of the hand), a crystal and a mirror, in the case of bliss, though one, the possession of superiority and inferiority, consisting in degrees of manifestation as conditioned by differences in the manifesters, the psychoses of happiness, stands to reason; if this be said, no; for, the illustration is not admitted; in the case of the sun's light, which spreads everywhere, which shines (but) not clearly in the sky without relation to the palm etc., when the passage is obstructed by relation to the palm, as in the case of water running in deep places, there is greater manifestation because of intensification; when the passage is obstructed by relation to a bright mirror etc., there is even greater manifestation than in that (other case), because of intensification and because of the addition of the brightness of that (mirror); hence there are not admitted here degrees of manifestation as conditioned by the manifesters;[84] and, if the illustration were admitted, since, like the sun's light spreading in the sky, undefined bliss would be not clear, while of the bliss defined by the psychosis of happiness there would be greater manifestation, as of the sun's light defined by the palm etc., the state of transmigration itself would turn out to be more desirable than release. Hereby is refuted even the view that bliss, though manifest in the state of transmigration, yet, being disturbed by illusory cognition and its impressions, like the light of the lamp disturbed by a stiff breeze, is not clearly manifest, while in release, because of the absence of that (disturbance), it is manifest as it is (truly); for, if the distinctionless essential bliss be manifest, therein is not possible an excellence which, because of the defect of disturbance is not manifest, but attaches to (i.e., is manifest in) the state of release. Therefore, the assumption that the bliss of the witness is unobscured does not stand to reason.

5·14232 To this the Advaitavidyācārya says thus: just as when the very superior white light which is but one is reflected in many mirrors possessing different degrees of impurity, because of the different degrees of impurity of the adjuncts, the inferiority of whiteness is superimposed in different degrees on the respective reflections, even so, when the essential bliss, which is really unsurpassable and one alone, becomes the bliss of the witness, as reflected in the internal organ, and becomes the bliss due to material objects, as reflected in that psychosis of the internal organ, which is of the nature of happiness associated with different degrees of purity, consisting in superiority and inferiority of the element of goodness (sattva), caused by the contact of different objects under the influence of merit acquired in a previous life, then, because of the defect of degrees of impurity in the adjunct consisting of the constituent darkness (tamas), inferiority is superimposed in different degrees (on that one bliss); hence, in bliss, though manifest in the state of transmigration, there is no satisfaction, since through the superimposed degrees of inferiority, it is surpassable; on the rise of knowledge, since all superimposition of inferiority ceases and the superimposed surpassability is lost, there is the accomplishment of what was to be accomplished; this distinction being intelligible, the bliss of the witness, which is manifest as the sphere of unconditioned love, is certainly unobscured.

---

[84] That is to say, we have in the alleged examples, cases not of delimitation, but mechanical intensification.

Others, however, say thus: bliss, though manifest, is certainly obscured, because of the experience "in me it is not, it is not manifest"; since even in one and the same witness, differences of aspects posited by nescience are possible, there is no conflict between non-obscuration in respect of the intelligence aspect and obscuration in respect of the bliss aspect; and since the manifestation of the essential nature (of Brahman) does not remove 5·14233 obscuration,[85] there is no conflict in the obscuration (of bliss) when that (essential nature) is manifest; and obscuration is seen only in respect of what is manifest, as in "I do not know the sense stated by you." Nor may it be said that, in that case, there is experienced the obscuration of the specific alone as defining the unobscured general form; for, it would be an undue extension for the obscuration of one to appear as what defines another. Nor may it be said that (here) what controls (that appearance) is the relationship of the generic and the specific and that consequently there is no undue extension; for, since there is no relationship of the generic to the specific other than that of the pervaded and the pervader, there is the contingence that the ignorance which obscures smoke would be experienced in the form "I do not know fire."[86] Therefore, that by which ignorance appears as defined, that alone is obscured; hence ignorance is consistent even with what is manifest. And ignorance, just as it obscures intelligence to the exclusion of the witness element, even so it obscures bliss too only to the exclusion of what have been appropriated by the various psychoses of happiness. This alone is the removal of obscuration in the case of bliss from (material) objects. And this removal of obscuration, like the removal of outer darkness at dawn, comes in increasing degrees, under the influence of different psychoses due to different causes. Thence results the reciprocal difference between essential bliss and the bliss from (material) objects, as also among the (various) blisses from (material) objects.

---

[85] Obscuration can be removed by psychoses alone, not by the essential self-manifestation of intelligence; for the latter co-exists with error, which is superimposed thereon.

[86] For, fire and smoke are in the relation of pervader and pervaded and this is the only relation between the generic and the specific; if ignorance of the specific may determine the obscuration of the generic, then ignorance of the pervaded (smoke) should appear as ignorance of the pervader (fire); but this is absurd.

In any case, the witness-intelligence being unobscured, the manifestation of individuation etc. thereby is certainly not in dependence on a psychosis: this is certainly common (to all the positions).

Now, thus, how is there recollection of individuation etc., since impression, which is of the nature of cognition in its subtle state, is impossible when cognition exists, while its production by the witness, who is eternal, is impossible? 5·1424

To this some say thus: individuation, which is always manifested by the witness in association with itself, is manifested by the witness even as defined by itself, as transformed into the forms of the psychoses having the various pot etc. for objects; hence, because of the non-eternality of this (witness), the production of impressions is possible, as in the case of objects like pot. There is indeed no rule that the production of an impression which has oneself for its sphere should be by the witness only as defined by a psychosis having the form of oneself; for, if that were the case, an impression with a psychosis for its sphere being impossible, there would be the contingence of non-remembrance in the case of a psychosis, while, because of the contingence of infinite regress, the (existence of a) 5·14241 psychosis having another psychosis for its sphere has been refuted through the refutation of reflective cognition. But, when by intelligence as defined by a psychosis something is manifest, by that psychosis there is the production of the impression whose sphere is that (thing); this alone is the rule. And thus, even cognition, happiness etc., which are psychoses of the internal organ, are manifested by the non-eternal witness defined by themselves, in the same way as the sparks proceeding from the red hot iron ball (are manifested) by the fire defined by themselves; hence, the production of impressions even among these (psychoses) stands to reason. As for the views, stated in the (following verse of the) *Kūṭasthadīpa* " Intelligence present in the cognition with the sole form of the pot, would manifest the pot alone; the known-ness of the pot is made manifest by the Brahman-intelligence ", that cognition which is an attribute of the object is manifested by Brahman-intelligence as defined by the object, and the view stated in the *Tattvapradīpikā* that cognition, desire etc. are manifested by the eternal witness, of the nature of undefined pure intelligence, even according to those two (views), association with psychoses should necessarily be declared, since intelligence is of the nature of the immediacy of what is in association with itself;[87] hence, because of the existence of a non-eternal form, as associated with those (psychoses), there is no unintelligibility whatever in the production of impressions in respect of them.

---

[87] According to both views, there is immediate experience of knownness, or of cognition, desire etc.; this immediacy would not be possible but for their association with intelligence; hence there is association of intelligence with psychoses; and, as so associated, a non-eternal form of intelligence should be admitted.

Others, however, recognising the psychosis of nescience, with the form "I", postulated in order that there may result recollection of nescience etc., (existing) even during sleep, explain (through that) the impression whose object is the "I". Nor on this view is there the unintelligibility of the recollection of the object "I" contemporaneous with the continuous cognition of another (object), in the form "for so long I was certainly perceiving this"; for, like the contemporaneity of happiness and misery through the difference of what defines (them),[88] there is no conflict in the contemporaneity even of two psychoses; hence, even at the time of the continuous cognition of another (object), the succession of psychoses of nescience with the form "I" is possible. 5·14242

Yet others, however, say thus: the psychosis with the form "I" is but a psychosis of the internal organ; but like the psychosis of contemplation etc., it is not cognition, since it is not generated by the settled cause of that (cognition); indeed, such means of valid perceptual knowledge as the sense of sight are not possible there; nor inference etc., since the recollection of individuation is seen even in him who is deviod of the knowledge of inference etc.; nor is the mind the instrument (of valid knowledge), since for that which is the material cause (of the psychosis), instrumentality is not settled in any case whatever. If it be said "Then, 5·14243 even the recognition of the object 'I' would not be cognition," no; though, in respect of the I-element, the nature of cognition does not belong to it, it is of the nature of cognition in respect of the element of thatness, as generated by the impression which is settled to be the instrument of memory; in the same way as between mediacy and immediacy, validity and invalidity, present in a cognition[89] through differences of aspect, there is no conflict even as between being a cognition and not being a cognition.

---

[88] *E.g.*, happiness as defined by the foot may co-exist with misery as defined by the head.

5·14244 Still others, however, say thus: even the psychosis in the form "I" is certainly cognition, because of the experience "I know myself"; nor is there impossibility of an instrument, since, in conformity with experience, instrumentality too is assumed of the mind itself, the internal organ.

5·15 This being the case, a rule about the removal of obscuration results for those immediate psychoses alone which have external objects.

Now, there is not even this rule, since, in the case of nacre-silver, the psychosis in the form "this" does not remove ignorance, as, otherwise, because of the non-existence of the material cause,[90] the creation of silver would be impossible. If this be said....

5·151 to this they say thus: though by the psychosis in the form "this" there is removed the ignorance about the this-element, since ignorance about the specific element, nacreity etc., is not removed, that itself is the material cause of silver; for, there is experience of the superimposition of silver when there is ignorance of nacreity etc., and of the non-existence of that (superimposition) when there is knowledge of that (nacreity etc.); and in the *Vivaraṇa* on the explanation[90a] of the *Bhāṣya* on superimposition, material causality, in respect of the superimposition of silver etc., is declared of that ignorance alone whose co-presence and co-absence are experienced; for this very reason, there is made in the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* the distinction that the nacre-element is the support, the this-element the substrate, that the content of ignorance together with its elaboration is the support, and that what appears superimposed in the intellect, as of a particular form though not (really) of that form, is the substrate.[91]

---

[89] The cognition "The hill is fiery" is immediate in respect of the hill and mediate in respect of the fire; similarly, in the delusion "This is silver", the cognition is valid in respect of the this-element and invalid in respect of the silver-element.

[90] *I.e.*, ignorance,

Others, however, say thus: for the silver, which is cognised, in the form "this is silver," as identical with the this-element, the material cause is only the ignorance of the this-element; and of that (ignorance), though the obscuring capacity alone is removed by the psychosis in the form "this", there is continuance together with its projecting capacity; hence there is no impossibility in its being the material cause; in the superimposition of a tree as upside down as reflected 5·152 in water and in the superimposition of the world that continues in release while embodied, even though there is the removal of obscuration that comes into being immediately after the intuition of the substrate in its entirety, there is admitted the material causality of ignorance as conjoined with the projecting capacity alone.

[90a] *I.e.*, the *Pañcapādikā*.

[91] If ignorance of nacre be the material cause, the delusion should be of the form "nacre is silver", not "this is silver". To meet this objection there is the distinction made between the substrate and the support, the latter merely underlying the superimposition, and the former appearing therein.

5·153 Kavitārkika-Cakravarti Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, however, thinks that, since, prior to the creation of silver, there is not at all, as distinct from the delusive psychosis "this is silver," a psychosis in the form "this," the inquiry as to whether it has or has not the capacity to remove ignorance is baseless. It is thus: a psychosis in the form "this", as distinct from the delusive psychosis, is not established in experience, since there is no experience of a duality of cognition.[92] Nor may it be assumed from the effect, that the cause of superimposition is the cognition of the substrate in its generality, since there is no evidence in respect of this (latter) being the cause of that. Nor is this the evidence, viz., the non-creation of silver etc., in the absence of contact with the substrate, since therefrom results the causality in respect of superimposition, only in the case of the contact with a defective organ. Nor may it be said: "Contact is not what pervades delusion everywhere, whereas the appearance of the substrate (in the cognition) pervades even the superimposition of individuation etc. on the self-luminous inner self"; for, that too does not pervade the superimposition of pot etc.; for, prior to the perception of pot etc., a visual psychosis, whose sphere is the colourless Brahman that is the substrate of that (perception), is impossible, while the natural luminosity (of that substrate) is obscured; if mere manifestation of the substrate, such as is common to the obscured and the unobscured, be the cause of superimposition, then, even prior to the contact with the this-element of nacre, since there exists the obscured natural luminosity of the intelligence defined by that (nacre), even then there is the contingence of superimposition.

---

[92] As "this" and "this is silver".

Nor may it be said: " In respect of superimposition in general, manifestation in general of the substrate is the cause; in the superimposition of the merely apparent, the explicit manifestation of the substrate (is the cause); hence there is no undue extension, since there is appropriateness in the causality of the general in respect of the general, and of the specific in respect of the specific "; for, even thus, there is no pervasion of the merely apparent superimpositions of yellowness on the shell, blueness on well-water and so on; visual cognition (of what is) unconditioned by colour being impossible, and the cognition of the whiteness present in the shell etc., being non-existent at that time, there is not, prior to the superimposition, the possibility of a psychosis whose sphere is the colourless substrate such as the shell etc.

Nor may it be said " Even among the merely apparent, only in the case of superimpositions like silver, let there be the above-mentioned special cause"; for, in that case, in order that there may be the contingence of the superimposition of yellow shell etc., prior to contact, it will necessarily have to be said that the cause of that superimposition is the contact with a defective organ; and when for this itself there results, because of parsimony, causality in respect of all merely apparent superimpositions in general, it is possible to explain even the occasional nature of the silver-superimposition[93] from this alone; hence, for the manifestation of the substrate, whether in general or specifically, there does not result causality in respect of superimposition.

But now, though not a cause in other superimposition not dependent on similarity, in the superimposition of silver etc. dependent on that (similarity), the cognition in general of the substrate, consisting in the cognition of the substrate as qualified by a particular colour etc. constituting the similarity to silver etc., should necessarily be said to be the cause; for, if the contact with defective organ be alone the cause, there is the contingence of the superimposition of that silver on a cinder, as on nacre. Nor may it be said that similarity too is a cause, as a defect of the object; for, even between dissimilars there is superimposition, when there is the delusion of similarity, since there is seen the imposition of a dark rocky surface on the distant expanse of the waters of the ocean.[94] Nor does it stand to reason to say, on the principle of the cause of that alone (being the cause),[95] that the causal aggregate of the cognition of similarity may be the cause of superimposition; for, it is not seen anywhere that the causal aggregate of a cognition is the cause of a thing, and there is parsimony (in the assumption of causality) in the case of the cognition of similarity itself. Nor may it be said "It is only on pure water, though itself white and present in a white silver vessel, that there is the superimposition of blueness, not on a pearl: like this distinction, there is (also) the distinction that there is the superimposition of silver on nacre, not on cinder etc., even because of the nature of things, but not because of dependence on the cognition of similarity"; for, though on a piece of cloth as such there is no superimposition of being a lotus bud, yet since the superimposition of that is seen on that form of it (the cloth) fashioned by scissoring, it is ascertained that that superimposition does not conform to the nature of the thing, (but) conforms to the existence or non-existence of the cognition of similarity; otherwise, at other times too, there would be the contingence of that superimposition thereon.

---

[93] That is to say, why it occurs at certain times, not at others.

[94] Here, similarity of colour is alone the cause, and that is not based on a defect in the object, since water is really colourless.

[95] Let the cause of that alone be the cause, why that other cause in the middle?

The reply is: even on the view that the cognition of similarity is the cause of superimposition, its causality may be declared only in the superimposition of silver etc., which are obstructed by specific cognition (of the substrate),[96] but not in the superimpositions of yellow shell etc., which are not obstructed thereby, because of impossibility (of the said causality). And in the case of what are obstructed by specific cognition, there being the rule that the causal aggregate of the obstructing cognition is also an obstruction, the causal aggregate of the specific cognition should also be said to be an obstruction; hence, all distinctions being intelligible even from this, what (is the object) of the assumption of causality in the case of the cognition of similarity? It is thus: when, in respect of cinder etc., there is contact with the sense of sight, since there exists the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of its dark colour etc., there is no superimposition of silver; even on nacre etc., when there is such contact with the sense of sight as pervades the dark portion etc., then, because of the existence of that (causal aggregate), there is not the superimposition of that (silver); (but) when there is contact with only that portion which is similar (to silver), there is superimposition, because of the absence of that (causal aggregate). If it be said that because of the existence even then of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of nacreity,[97] there is the contingence of non-superimposition, no; for, the cognition of nacre being absent at the time of the superimposition, the non-existence of that causal aggregate must be stated even by you. "By me there is the admission of the non-existence at that time of the causal aggregate of the cognition of nacreity, because of the obstruction by the defect, viz., the cognition of similarity, which is the cause of the superimposition; but if by you there be such an admission, it would be the story of returning to the toll-gate at break of day"; if this be said, no; for, nacreity being cognised immediately on drawing near, even when there is seen the glitter constituting the similarity to silver, it is non-established of that (cognition of similarity) that it is an obstacle to the causal aggregate of that (specific cognition); hence, the non-existence of that causal aggregate should be said to be either because of obstruction by such defects as distance or because of non-attention to what apprehends[98] the dark under-side etc., which manifest (nacreity). Similarly, because of the defect which causes the invariable superimposition of blue colour on the waters of the ocean, and because of non-attention to what apprehends the waves etc., which manifest the wateriness at a distance, there is non-existence of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of a white watery expanse etc., and hence there is the superimposition of dark rocky surface etc. In the spread-out cloth, because of the existence of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of extendedness, there is not the superimposition of being a lotus bud etc.; because of the non-existence of that (causal aggregate) in that form of it fashioned by scissoring, there is that superimposition.

---

[96] *E.g.*, when there is specific cognition of the nacre as nacre, not merely as a bright white substance, silver cannot be superimposed on it.

---

[97] The existence of this causal aggregate at that time is a mere assumption on the part of the objector.

Now, thus, on a piece of iron felt with the hand,[99] because of the non-existence of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of its dark colour, why should there not be the superimposition of silver, since the cognition of similarity is not required (according to you, for superimposition)? If this be asked, that does happen, (we reply); but, because of the non-existence of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition that excludes copper etc., that superimposition too might come into being; hence, in some cases, where there is the superimposition of many, it becomes the sphere of doubt; but in some cases where there is abundance of silver, as in a treasury etc., there is only the superimposition of silver; there is no harm even if in some cases a superimposition does not originate, like the non-origination of superimposition sometimes on nacre etc., because of the non-existence of defect in the cause etc., though there is cognition of similarity. Therefore, the psychosis in the form "this" is not to be assumed from the effect.

---

[98] That is to say, to the sense-contact.

[99] That is to say, when the tactile sense alone is operative and there is no perception of colour, in respect of which there may be similarity with other metals.

Nor is it to be assumed from (its) cause, the unhindered contact with the object "this"; for, in respect of the psychosis "this", even as arising from that (contact), it is declared by us that the content is the silver, which is a transformation of nescience as agitated by contact with a defective organ and is contemporaneous with itself (i.e., the psychosis); and though, in the silver which originates at the same time as the cognition and exists only as long as the mere appearance, there is not any contact prior to that (origination), yet the apprehension of that too by the sense of sight is intelligible even because of the contact with the object "this", the locus with which that (silver) is identified; for, in the case of the merely apparent silver, there is the experience of visibility in the form "I see the silver with the sense of sight", even in the absence of the contact of itself (with the sense-organ).

Nor may it be said " Even because of the sublater, the non-existence of contact, that (silver) is not an object of the sense of sight; nor is it originated by contact with a defective organ, simultaneously with the psychosis ' this ', since sense-contact, which is a cause of cognition, is not settled to be a cause of an object; it is, rather, subsequent to the psychosis ' this ', generated by that, and manifested by that, since it is superimposed on the witness manifested by that (psychosis); as for the experience of its being an object of the sense of sight, that is merely through the indirect dependence on the sense of sight, as being generated by the psychosis ' this ', which manifests the intelligence that illumines (the silver) itself "; for, if that be the case, in the delusion of the yellow shell, there is the contingence of non-requirement of the sense of sight; for, in that case, there is no requirement of the sense of sight in the apprehension of the shell, since, of the mere shell without colour, apprehension by the sense of sight is impossible; nor in the apprehension of yellowness (is there that requirement), since in what is imposed, its being an object of a sense-organ is not admitted.

Nor may it be said: " Yellowness is not superimposed as such; but in respect of the experienced yellowness of the bile present in the eye, there is superimposed the conjunction alone with the shell; hence there is the requirement of the sense of sight for the experience of the yellowness alone"; for, if that be the case, there is the contingence of the non-perceptibility even of shell and its conjunction; for, not being conjoined to the witness manifested by a psychosis having the form of the yellowness of the bile present in the region of the eyes, being manifested thereby is impossible in their case; further, there is not admitted a single psychosis whose sphere is the shell conjoined to yellowness.

Nor may it be said: "It is not admitted that, of the yellowness of the bile present in the region of the eyes, there is, because of a defect, a superimposition of relation on the shell; but of that (yellowness) which has gone forth together with the rays from the eyes and pervaded the object, there is the superimposition of relation there, as in the red cloth made red by the dye; hence, conjunction with the witness manifested by the psychosis in that form is possible;" for, if that be the case, in respect of a shell seen by an eye affected by bile, there is the contingence of the cognition of yellowness, for others too, as in respect of what is covered with gold. Nor may it be said: "That yellowness, like the bird which has flown high up in the sky, can be apprehended at a distance, only when apprehended close by; and in the case of the others (not affected by bile) there is no apprehension (of yellowness) close by." For, there being proximity to yellowness even in the case of those others who place their sense of sight in the neighbourhood of that (affected) sense of sight, the apprehension of that (yellowness by them too) cannot be avoided; thus too, in the superimposition of blueness on the pure river water flowing on the exceedingly white sandy surface, and in the superimposition of blueness on the sky, and in the superimposition of darkness on red clothes, at night by moonlight, since it is not possible to declare the superimposition of what is (perceptually) experienced, if there be not admitted in these cases a visual psychosis, whose sphere is the substrate in conjunction with blueness, the non-utility of the sense of sight could not be avoided (in any way); further, by the words of the *Pañcapādikā,* which proclaim that, in the case of the infant who has not (yet) tasted bitterness, the appearance of bitterness in what is sweet has for its cause the impression of experience in another life, it is made clear that only the taste of bitterness, which is superimposed as such,[100] is of a sensory nature, as otherwise the functioning there of the sense of taste would be unintelligible. Therefore, in the cited cases of the superimposition of blueness, the superimposition, which, even because of the contact with the substrate, arises simultaneously with the psychosis of the sense of sight whose sphere is that (substrate), is the content of that psychosis, and hence should be admitted its being the object of the sense of sight; for, there being no psychosis whose sphere is the bare substrate, without colour, there is no manifestation of the object-intelligence, and consequently manifestation by that (intelligence) is impossible in the case of the water, the blueness superimposed thereon etc. In the case, however, of the superimposition of bitter taste, since for the substrate and the superimposition there is not apprehension by the same sense-organ, when, by the psychosis which is generated by the tactile sense and whose sphere is the substrate, there is manifested the intelligence defined by that, even because of contact with the sense of taste affected by bile, there arise simultaneously the superimposition of bitter taste and the taste-psychosis whose content is that alone; hence must be admitted bitterness being an object of the sense of taste; for, in the bitter taste manifested by the intelligence manifested by the psychosis which is generated by the tactile sense and whose sphere is the substrate, since there is no need for the sense of taste even indirectly, it is impossible to establish in any other way (except the one mentioned) the experience of being an object of the sense of taste (in the case of that bitterness). Silver too as an object of the sense of sight being intelligible even in the same way, the experience " I see " is not to be sublated.

---

[100] That is to say, its sensory nature is not due to its being experienced along with something else, *e.g.*, bile present in the tongue.

Nor may it be said " If the silver not in contact be an object of the sense of sight, there would be violation of the law apprehended about different effects having different causes, such as that in respect of perception in general the contact of object with the sense is the cause, that in respect of the perception of substance the conjunction with that (substance) is the cause, and that in respect of the perception of silver conjunction with silver is the cause." For, there being no single mode of contact common to conjunction etc., the first law is non-established. The second law relates to that which is the locus of substance-ness from an empirical point of view, since, as in the case of darkness according to the Logicians,[101] the superimposition of substance-ness is possible in some cases even on what is not capable of conjunction and is not a substance; and, in the case of the merely apparent silver, the cognition of substance-ness is admitted to be due to the superimposition even of that present in the substrate, in the same way as of the this-ness (present in the substrate); because of (both) these, there is no conflict with the second law. The postulation of a special relationship of effect and cause, other than the general relationship of effect and cause, in the form of the second law, being set aside by (considerations of) prolixity, the third law is non-established. Even the principle that where the general is the cause of the general, the specific is the cause of the specific, relates to cases where, as on the admission of a general relationship of cause and effect between seed and sprout, there is the contingence of the origination of a different sprout from a different seed; therefrom cannot be established any special relationship of effect and cause, which is (otiose and) comparable to the fleshy protuberance on the goat's neck. Nor may it be said that even here, on the admission merely of the general law that, in respect of the perception of substance, conjunction with substance is the cause, there is undue extension in that there is the contingence of the perception of one substance from the conjunction with a different one;

---

[101] The Naiyāyikas hold that darkness is not a substance,

for, the law is admitted that in respect of the perception of various substances conjunction with the respective substances is the cause, as otherwise undue extension could not be avoided even if the third law were admitted. Therefore, there is no contingence of the violation of any settled law.

Further, there would be no harm even if a settled law were violated here; for, in the case of the experience " I see this silver," "I see the blue water " etc., which is not otherwise explicable, explanation would be impossible unless laws, such as that, in respect of perception in general, contact with the object is the cause and so on, though primarily apprehended, are restricted to empirically valid contents.

Nor, if this is the case, does there result the view of (erroneous cognition as) cognition otherwise, since the assumption is possible even of this restriction that contact is the cause in respect of valid knowledge, not in respect of delusion, and there is the contingence of the superimposition here of that silver alone which is not in contact and is present in some other place; for, in the case of the silver which is devoid of identity with the intelligence manifested (by the psychosis) and is present in some other place, immediacy is unintelligible; further, it is established, through such considerations as the unintelligibility (otherwise) of cognition and sublation, that the content of delusion is indeterminable.

Nor may it be asked: " If the sensory nature of the merely apparent be admitted merely because of the contact with the substrate, at the time of the superimposition of nacre-silver, why should there not be the visibility of tin too which is superimposed even there at some other time?"; at the time of the superimposition of silver, though there is no distinction in the perception of the glitter common to tin and silver, yet there is not then the superimposition of tin, because of causes like the non-existence of human defects such as desire (in relation to tin), and for that very reason, there is admitted by me even the non-origination of a psychosis whose content is that (tin).

Therefore there is only one sense-generated psychosis whose sphere is the silver in identity with the this-element; prior to that there is no psychosis in the form "this"; hence the inquiry is not to be made as to the existence or non-existence of the removal of ignorance even there.

Others, however, accept a psychosis in the form "this", since the cognition of the substrate is the cause of superimposition, and think that the psychosis in the form of silver is futile, because by the witness even as manifestated by that (psychosis in the form "this") the manifestation is possible of the silver superimposed on that, and because the production of the impression whose content is silver is intelligible even by that "this"-psychosis, which manifests the witness that illumines it. **5·154**

On the view of two cognitions, one psychosis (of the form) "this" is the cause of the superimposition, the second psychosis (of the form) "this is silver" has the superimposed silver for content; it does **5·155** not, however, have for its sphere merely what is superimposed, without the this-element, since, in the form "I cognise this silver," it is experienced to have for content the silver that has been identified with the this-object: thus say some.

5·156 Others, however, say thus: just as the nescience present in intelligence as defined by the this-element is transformed into the form of silver, even so the nescience present in intelligence as defined by the cognitive psychosis whose content is the this-element is transformed into the illusory cognition of silver; but there is not, like the psychosis of the this-element, a non-superimposed cognition of silver; and thus, like the manifestation of silver as in conjunction with the this-ness present in the substrate, in the case of its cognition too, there is intelligible the manifestation of conjunction with having for content the this-ness present in the substrate; and hence that too is not to be admitted as having the "this" for content; nor may it be said that since, like silverness, the conjunction of silver and this-ness is the sphere of the silver-cognition, the this-ness too, which is the counter-correlate of that (conjunction) should be said to be the content of that (cognition); for, there would be no undue extension if even because the locus of its identity has "this-ness" for content, it should have its conjunction for content[102]; nor may it be said that, since there is taught in the *Vivaraṇa* on the *Bhāṣya* about the possibility (of superimposition) the rule about the substrate and the superimposed appearing in a single cognition, there should be declared (their) being the content of a single psychosis; for, in spite of difference of psychoses, there is admitted the manifestation of both in the single witness manifested by the psychosis in the form "this."

---

[102] The question is whether the illusory cognition should have "this-ness" for content; the answer is that it need not, since the cognition of the this-element, which is the locus of the illusory cognition and is in a relation of identity with it, has the "this-ness" for content, and with this much it is possible for the illusory cognition to have the conjunction (of "silverness" and "this-ness") for content; in "the locus of its identity", "its" refers to the illusory cognition, "the locus" being the cognition of the this-element; "it" in "it should have" refers to the illusory cognition.

Now, since the manifestation of all things is intelligible even because of the clarity of the witness, what (is the use) of the psychosis? Though it be needed for the intelligibility of the production etc. of residual impressions whose contents are pot etc., the admission of its going forth is futile; for, as in the case of mediate cognition, the manifestation of pot etc. too is intelligible, even by the witness as defined by a psychosis that has not gone forth. Nor in that case is there the unintelligibility of the difference between mediacy and immediacy, since, as between knowledge from verbal testimony and inferential knowledge, that (difference) is intelligible even because of the difference in psychoses due to the different instruments. 5·16

To this some say thus: in the case of perception, the intelligence, which as the substrate of the object is defined thereby, is alone the manifester of the object, since where a relationship of identity is directly possible, it is impossible to assume a relation *sui generis* or some other (relation); hence, for the sake of the manifestation of that (identity), the admission of the psychosis going forth stands to reason; in the case of mediate cognition, in respect of the fire etc., which are 5·161 remote, the conjunction of the psychosis being impossible, and there not being cognised any channel for the psychosis to go forth, such as is capable of co-presence and co-absence in the same way as the sense-organ, it is intelligence only as defined by the psychosis that has not gone forth that is presumptively admitted to have the object for its sphere through a relation *sui generis,* there being no other way.

5·162 Others, however, since, in respect of individuation, happiness, misery etc., which are directly conjoined to intelligence, immediacy is settled, and consequently in respect of pot etc., too, the cause of immediacy is intelligence only as conjoined with the object, establish the going forth of the psychosis as for the manifestation of that (intelligence).

5·163 Yet others, however, explain thus the going forth of the psychosis: in what is understood by perception, as compared with what are understood by verbal testimony and inference, a (certain) definiteness is experienced. Indeed, in respect of the particular taste, fragrance etc. of the mango, there is not, even if taught a hundred times by a trustworthy person, such definiteness as in what is understood by perception, since the desire to know persists even after that, in the form "how is it?" Nor may it be objected: "Though sweetness etc. in general may be understood from verbal testimony, yet, since there are no words expressing particular sub-classes such as the sweetness of the mango, and since even if they existed their relation (to what they signify) would not have been apprehended by the hearer, there is not through verbal testimony the understanding of sweetness as defined by particular distinctive classes; hence the persistence of the desire to know stands to reason''; for, from the statement that in the mango there is a particular sweetness excelling all else, there is understood even the particular sub-class (of sweetness) present in it. This statement does not, indeed, leave out the particular (sweetness) present therein, and make known there the particular present elsewhere; because there is the contingence of non-authoritativeness. Nor may it be said " Even the particular present there it makes known in its general nature as a particular, but not as particularised;[103] hence the desire to know ''; for, since even by perception the particular class of the attribute, sweetness, is made the content only in its own nature (as generality), and since some other particularity present in the particular class is not made the content,[104] there is the contingence of the persistence of the desire to know (even in the case of perception). Therefore, in what is apprehended by perception, there is, because of identity with manifested intelligence which is of one consistency of immediacy, definiteness capable of removing the desire to know; because of the non-existence of that in what is known through verbal testimony etc., there is indefiniteness; this distinction is to be accepted. Hence it is that for happiness etc., known by the witness, there is definiteness; for Brahman there is indefiniteness, since, though known by psychoses due to verbal testimony, ignorance is not removed prior to reflection etc., and there is definiteness when that (ignorance) is removed subsequent to that (reflection etc.).

---

[103] That is to say, all that words can tell us is the existence of a particular variety of sweetness in the mango, but they cannot tell us more specifically what it is; we know, in other words, not the particular sweetness, but that the sweetness has a particularity.

[104] What the objector seems to require for the removal of jijñāsā is a cognition of the particularity of the particular class; and the reply is that not even perception can give us this cognition.

Now even with this the statement made that the going forth of the psychosis is for the sake of the removal of the ignorance obscuring the object, that does not stand to reason; for, there would be no undue extension even if there be admitted the removal of the ignorance, which is present in the object-defined intelligence and obscures it, by a psychosis which has not gone forth. Nor may it be said: "In that case, there is the contingence of the removal of Yajñadatta's ignorance of the pot by Devadatta's cognition of the pot, since there exists (the feature of) their having the same content, while both having the same locus is not the ground of their opposition (such that one can remove the other), since the cognition and the ignorance present (respectively) in the denotation of 'I' and the object-defined intelligence have different loci (and are yet opposed so that the cognition removes the ignorance)"; for, even if there be admitted the going forth of the psychosis on the recognition that the ground of opposition between cognition and ignorance is their having the same locus and the same content, the undue extension continues as before, because Devadatta's pot-psychosis and Yajñadatta's ignorance of the pot come to have a single locus, intelligence defined by the pot; hence, only a separate ground of opposition has to be stated in the form "When ignorance obscures a particular object in respect of a particular person, that (ignorance) is to be removed by that person's cognition of that object"; hence, having the same locus is not needed.

To this they say thus: if the going forth of the psychosis be not admitted, the very ground of opposition between cognition and ignorance could not be determined. If it be said that that (ground) has been stated as "When ignorance obscures a particular object in respect of a particular person" and so on, no; for, there is the contingence of the removal of ignorance present in the object, even by mediate cognition. If it be said that immediacy too is an attribute of the cognition that removes (ignorance), what is that immediacy? It is not a generality; for, in the visual cognition "This is a person who had a staff", whose content is a person qualified by a staff brought to mind by memory-impression, if that (generality) be present in respect of the element of the staff too, even in that (element) there is the contingence of the removal of ignorance present in the object, and there is the (consequent) contingence of the experience of immediacy in respect of that element too, in the form "I see the staff." If, even though there is no experience (of immediacy), memory-impression be assumed to be a mode of contact and there be admitted an assumptive immediacy because of (the cognition) being generated by sense-contact (understood thus), there is the contingence of the recognition of that (immediacy) even in inferential knowledge etc., by assuming knowledge of the *probans* etc. to be a mode of contact; if, however, there be no immediacy in respect of the staff-element, that (immediacy) could not be a generality, because of the rule that generality exists pervasively; even if there were not this rule, it could not be a generality existing non-pervasively, since there is not determined any special defining adjunct.[105] Nor is it (immediacy) an upādhi,[106] this being undefined. If it be said to be generation by the senses, no, since it is not pervasive of perception by the witness, and since, in the perception of the pot qualified by heaviness etc., brought to mind by inferential knowledge and knowledge from verbal testimony, there is over-pervasion of the attribute-element. For, though mediate in respect of that element, yet because of the non-existence of any other instrument (of cognition), generation (of the cognition) belongs to the senses alone, through the capacity of the accessory that brings to mind; further, since there is not apprehended any common property defining the generation, sense-generation itself is difficult to apprehend in many cases; and, if such (defining property) were apprehended, that itself being primarily cognised would intelligibly be of the nature of immediacy, and it would not be proper to assume in the case of sense-generation, which is not capable of being perceptually experienced, that it is of the nature of immediacy, which is so capable (of being experienced). Hereby is refuted this doubt too, that immediacy consists in generation by sense-contact, and that in respect of the immediate element in what is generated by the sense as aided by association, there is no generation by contact, since, presentation through association being present even in inferential knowledge, association, which is (thus) common to other means of knowledge as well, is not a mode of contact; and (this is refuted) also because (origination by sense-contact) is not common (to all cases of immediacy), no (single mode of contact) being common to conjunction etc.[107] If it be said "what is acceptable to you as immediacy, let that be for me too", no; for, that (immediacy), which is to be taught in connection with the ascertainment of the immediacy of knowledge from verbal testimony,[108] is, in the manner to be shown even there, the consequence of the removal of ignorance and hence cannot be an attribute of the cause of its removal. Therefore, since the Brahman-knowledge, which is declared in the Scriptural text "He who knows the self crosses sorrow" and is invariably conjoined to Brahman, the locus of primal ignorance, the material cause of all, is what causes the removal of primal ignorance, there should be admitted the rule that psychoses of the senses, because of the capacity of the respective sense-contacts, arise only in conjunction with the intelligence as defined by the respective objects, and invariability of conjunction with the intelligence that is the locus of ignorance should be said to be the attribute of the cognition that removes (ignorance). And thus, the ground of the opposition between cognition and ignorance comes to be determined in the form: "When ignorance obscures a particular object in respect of a particular person, that is removable by his cognition, which relates to that object and comes into being as invariably conjoined with the intelligence that is the locus of that ignorance." Nor, if this is the case, is there the contingence of the capacity to remove ignorance even for the verbal cognition about the nature of the veins (nāḍīs) and the heart; for, though for that (cognition) there may result by chance conjunction with either object, the veins or the heart, yet since verbal cognition is possible even without conjunction with the object, there does not result (for that cognition) the coming into being as invariably conjoined with that. Therefore, in order to explain the opposition between cognition and ignorance, the going forth of the psychosis should be declared.

---

[105] Immediacy and its non-existence cannot be present in the same locus, unless the locus is defined in different ways for the two predicates; and he who asserts their co-presence should state the defining adjunct if any; no such adjunct is determined by him.

[106] This is difficult to render into English. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar defines it as "an attribute which is not a jāti". Unlike the jāti, it is related to the particulars not by inherence (samavāya), but by a relation *sui generis* or some indirect relation. See *A Primer of Indian Logic*, pp. 24, 25.

---

[107] *I.e.*, to the several modes of contact recognised by the Logicians, viz., conjunction (saṃyoga), inherence in what is conjoined (saṃyukta-samavāya) and so on.

[108] See Chapter III, sections 5·1 to 5·4.

5·164 Others, however, say that, since it is established by parsimony that the ignorance present in the object is removable by cognition in the same locus, the going forth of the psychosis is fruitful.

5·165 Yet others, however, say that the going forth of the psychosis is established because of conformity to the illustration that external light is seen to be capable of dispelling external darkness only where there is the same locus (for both).

Some, however, say that though there be no need of the going forth of the psychosis for the sake of the removal of obscuration, yet there is need of it either for the sake of association with intelligence or for the sake of manifesting the non-difference of the cogniser-intelligence from the Brahman-intelligence manifesting the object. 5·166

Now, this non-difference of the jīva from Brahman, which is manifested by the psychosis, what evidence has it? That it has the Vedānta for evidence has been loudly proclaimed as with the pealing of bells. All the Vedāntas, whatsoever, examined with the marks of purport such as the unity of the initial and concluding passages, harmoniously lead to the non-dual Brahman, non-different from the inner self. How this is the sense (of the Vedāntas), that has been elaborated in the sacred teaching itself, in the chapter on harmony;[109] for fear of prolixity it is not set forth here. 6·0

---

[109] Saṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on *Ved. Sū.*, I, i, 4.

END OF CHAPTER ONE

प्रत्यक्ष सत्ताको
शाब्दबोध ...?

CHAPTER II.

Now, how can the Vedāntas harmonise in respect of the non-dual Brahman, that being opposed to perception etc.? If this be asked, no (we reply); for, through the Scriptural texts and reasoning of the ārambhaṇa section, illusoriness is understood of the world known through perception etc., as being of the nature of an illusory manifestation of Brahman. Now (it may be said) the illusoriness of the world cannot be made known by Scriptural texts and reasoning, that being opposed to perception etc., which, in forms like "The pot is real", apprehend the reality of pot etc. **1·0**

To this, the author of the *Tattvaśuddhi* replies thus: perception apprehends neither pot, cloth etc., nor their reality, but bare reality which is constant in pot etc., as their substrate. And thus perception too is but favourable to the establishment of non-dual Brahman of the nature of reality. "If it be so, there would be perception only of the form 'real, real,' not perception of the form 'the pot is real', concomitant with the presence or absence of the sense-organ". If this be said, no (we reply); for, just as in delusions, for the this-element, the substrate, there is apprehension through perception, and the presence and absence of the sense-organ are exhausted therewith, while for the imposed silver-element there is presentation through delusion, even so it is admitted that everywhere there is apprehension of bare reality through perception and 1·1 that the functioning of the senses is in respect of this alone, while the presentation of different things like pot is through delusion.

Now, if it be said that, since no sublation is seen here as there (in the case of the delusion), the admission itself is baseless, no (we reply); for, though no sublation be seen, the very incapacity of diverse things like pot to be perceived, in the same way as things remote in space and time, is the basis of that (admission). It is thus: pot etc., which are cognised immediately after the operation of a sense-organ, are cognised as certainly different from everything else, since no doubt or error is then seen in respect of that difference of pot etc. Where in respect of post etc., there is doubt as to its being a man and so on, even there, difference from those which are other (than these) does certainly appear, not being subject to doubt or error. And of difference, which is invariably cognised along with the counter-correlate,[1] apprehension through perception is not possible; for, there is the possibility even of counter-correlates which are not in contact, being remote in space and time. If it be said "Let the knowledge of difference be of the nature of memory, since it is dependent on recollection for the counter-correlate element, in the same way as recognition for the element of that-ness", that is not (so); for, even thus, there is no residual impression of the element of being qualified by the counter-correlate, which

---

[1] For, difference is a relation; and cognition of a relation has for content all the relata and is determined by cognition of all the relata.

(element) is present in difference[2]. Nor is there the possibility of that impression as the conclusion of an inference in the form "The golden hill is a counter-correlate of difference because it is a thing", the sphere of which (inference) is the being qualified by the counter-correlate of difference; for, since inference cannot set out in the absence of the knowledge of difference, self-dependence would result; for, where there is the delusion of non-difference in respect of the subject, *probandum, probans,* presence (of *probans*) in the subject etc., inference cannot set out, because of (the defects of) establishing what is (already) established and so on; hence, the knowledge of their difference is needed to dispel the knowledge of their non-difference.

If it be said "Then, as for the element of difference, even for the element of being qualified by the counter-correlate, let there be perceptual character", no (we reply); for, where the counter-correlate is unperceived, being qualified by that cannot be perceived; for, in the absence of the perception of both relata, perception of the relation is impossible. Therefore, for the counter-correlates incapable of being perceived, there is but appearance, of the nature of delusion; consequently, difference, which is invariably cognised in the same cognition as those (counter-correlates), and pot etc., which are invariably cognised in the same cognition as difference, are the content of delusion alone; therefore, perception, which apprehends distinctionless bare reality, is favourable to the establishment of non-dualism.

---

[2] Since perceptual cognition of all counter-correlates is impossible, there cannot be impressions either, in the case of many of these; hence, cognition of difference cannot be even of the form of memory; even should impressions be possible, "being qualified by the counter-correlate" cannot be the object of an impression, not having been perceived before; this is really a supplementary argument.

1·2 The author of the *Nyāyasudhā,* however, says thus: though pot etc. are sensed, (the cognition) "pot is real" and so on is blended with the reality of the substrate; hence there is no conflict. If it be asked "Why thus, should not (the cognition) 'pot is blue' and so on be blended with the blueness of the substrate?", no (we reply); what is said by Scripture about the thing, which is of the nature of reality, being the material cause of the world is accepted by all, because of absence of contradiction; when, in consequence, the appearance "pot is real" and so on is intelligible even as interpenetrated by that, there would be prolixity in the assumption of reality even in pot etc.; (while, however) since that (Brahman) is devoid of colour etc., blueness etc. have to be assumed in pot etc. alone; there is thus difference (between the two cases).

1·3 The learned author of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka,* however, says thus: though perception has the property of apprehending the reality of pot etc., yet, since for perception etc., whose content is what is external, there is no authoritativeness characterised by making known the truth, there is not, because of conflict with that, any suspicion of the sublation of Scripture etc., referring to non-duality. That, indeed, is a means of valid knowledge, which makes known what is unknown. And, in the case of pot etc., which are the contents of perception etc., there is not the property of not being known; for, since in respect of the inert there is not the act of obscuration, it is not admitted to be the content of ignorance. Since Brahman alone, which as self-luminous has the possibility of manifestation, is the content of ignorance, it is only what gives knowledge of that, which makes known the truth and is a means of valid knowledge. That (Brahman) alone is the content of valid knowledge. It is for that reason that Scripture too restricts valid knowledge to the self alone in "The self, verily, is to be seen" etc. By the words "to be seen", seeing is not, indeed, enjoined, since that, which is dependent on the means of valid knowledge, is not the sphere of an injunction; but, in the form "The self is worthy of being seen", it lays down the restriction that being the object of valid knowledge is appropriate to the self alone, because of its being unknown, and not to anything else.

Some, however, say thus: on the view that perception, which apprehends the reality of pot etc., is valid, even if there be not understood its inferiority to the means of valid knowledge applying to Brahman, the reality apprehended thereby ends up by being either of the form of the genus "reality", because of the cognition of its recurrence, or of the form of 1·4 particular spatial and temporal relations, because of the cognition of spatial and temporal relation in " Here and now the pot is real", or of the form of the existence of the pot etc., because of the cognition of the denial of that existence in " The pot does not exist ". And this is not in conflict with its own illusoriness. Even those who maintain illusoriness do, indeed, refuse to admit, in the case of pot etc., not their existence nor their spatial and temporal relations, nor generality etc., therein, but (only) their unsublatedness. Nor may it be said " Let unsublatedness alone be the reality apprehended by perception "; for it is not possible to apprehend through perception, which apprehends the present alone, that there is no sublation of this (cognition) in all the three times.

1·5 Others, however, say thus: though reality whose nature is unsublatedness be apprehended by perception, yet, from the text " The prāṇas are real; of these, this (self) is the reality ", there is cognised superiority and inferiority as between the reality of Brahman and that of the entire world, synecdochically indicated by the mention of the principal one, the prāṇa; in respect of reality of the nature of unsublatedness, there can be no superiority or inferiority except by way of being unsublated for all time and being unsublated for a little while, since there can be no superiority or inferiority by way of extensiveness or littleness of content, as in the case of the properties of rulership and beauty, which are the spheres of such expressions as "King of Kings, Cupid among Cupids"; even if this (distinction) were possible in some other way, that would but end in the (distinction of) superiority and inferiority here stated, because of unity of sense with other Scriptural declarations of the world being sublated by Brahman-knowledge; therefore, the reality of pot etc., apprehended by perception, is of the nature of unsublatedness, till there is Brahman-knowledge; hence, there is no conflict with the Scriptural declaration of illusoriness.

Yet others, however, say thus : of the two, Scripture and perception, which apprehend (respectively) the illusoriness and the reality of the world, though there is conflict it is Scripture alone that is stronger than perception, which is tainted with the suspicion of defect and comes into operation first, since the former is free from defect and subsequent (to perception), (as required) by the principle of the apaccheda (section); and because it is said in the traditional Code "Among those three (perception, inference and verbal testimony), superiority belongs to verbal testimony alone, because of its very nature (jāti)". Nor does this statement of the traditional Code have for content what can be known from the Vedas alone; for, there can be no suspicion, in that case, of conflict with perception, while the declaration of the superiority of the Veda is appropriate only in respect of that sense of the Veda, where conflict with perception is suspected. In the *Nāradasmṛti* too, in the section on witnesses, it is said, even of what is seen by perception, that, without putting faith in the perception, it should be investigated by valid teaching and so on: "Ether is seen to be like a surface, the glow-worm like a fire; 1·6 there is no surface in ether; nor is the glow-worm fire; therefore, it is proper to make an investigation even in respect of an object seen by perception; knowing objects after investigation, one does not swerve from righteousness." Nor, in the absence of the revealed teaching that, of the five (qualities) beginning with sound, sound alone is the quality of ether, could the perceived blueness of ether be refuted by perception etc. Nor does that sublation result from the ascertainment that, since blueness is not cognised in the ether near by, the cognition of that (blueness) at a distance is produced by the defect of distance; for, it is also possible (to infer) that, since blueness is seen at a distance, its non-cognition near by is produced by the defect of proximity, like the non-cognition of what is enveloped in mist; further, on the strength of experience, it is intelligible that the blueness of the ether exists non-pervasively.[3] Nor is there sublation by the perception of the absence of the cognition of blueness for one who has approached that (place in the horizon) where the ether seemed to touch the earth, at which place there was the cognition of blueness while the person was at a distance; for, it is intelligible that the appearance of proximity to the earth, in the case of the blueness that is but up above, is due to the defect of distance, as in the case of the clouds, stars etc. (which appear to touch the earth);[4] further, the superiority of revelation to perception is indubitable, since, in the case of odour etc., which are cognised as intermixed with earth etc., distinction has to be predicated only with the help of such revealed texts as: "If some unlearned ones say that odour is cognised in water, that is to be understood to belong to earth alone, as conjoined with water and air." Among connate qualities like odour, present in such loci as water, it is not, indeed, possible for those like us to discriminate through perception, in the form "Odour is the quality of earth alone, not the quality of water etc." If it be said that the perception, in which defect is suspected,—because, earth etc., being for the most part reciprocally related, the presentation of the attribute of one in another is possible,—is there corrected by revelation, then, here too, Brahman and the world being reciprocally related in the relation of material cause and effect, the presentation of the attribute of one in the other is possible; hence in perception, in which defect is suspected, distinction has to be made with the help of revelation, in the manner mentioned by the sage: "There are five aspects (of being), existence, appearance, attractiveness, form and name; the first three are of the nature of Brahman; the latter two are of the nature of the world"; thus, the position (of perception) is equal (in the two cases). Nor thus is there conflict with that on which it (verbal testimony) is dependent;[5] for, by revelation as a means of valid knowledge, which is dependent on the perception of the existence-aspect (alone) of letters, words and sentences, there is destruction of their truth-aspect, on which it is not dependent.

---

[3] The attribute of a substance would normally be expected to pervade the entire substance; but this expectation may be set aside where a quality is seen to be present in a substance, though not wherever the substance is cognised; in such a case, the proper procedure is not to deny its having that attribute, but to recognise the non-pervasive existence (avyāpya-vṛttitva) of that attribute.

---

[4] The cognition of blueness may be illusory in the case of the ether which seemed to touch the earth, but not in the case of the ether which is really up above.

2·1 Now, if revelation be superior to perception, for the word "sacrificer", in "The strew is the sacrificer," secondary implication need not be assumed in its reference to the strew; similarly, in "He is to sacrifice with the soma," the possessive implication "with the sacrifice possessing (i.e., characterised by) soma" need not be assumed in order that there may not be the conflict with perception (which results) when the construction has to be said to be appositional, because, (otherwise), in construing them as referring to different objects, there would have to be understood instrumentality to what is desired, in the case of the sacrifice, and instrumentality to the sacrifice, in the case of the soma, and through this difference in functions, sentence-split would result; for, in both the cases (of implication), even though there is conflict with perception, it should be possible for the superior revelation to disregard this (conflict) and establish the non-difference of the sacrificer from the strew and the non-difference of the soma from the sacrifice.

2·2 If this be urged, it is thus answered in the work (called) the *Bhāmatī*. It is indeed purportful Scripture that is of greater force than perception, not all Scripture; for mantras and arthavāda (eulogistic or condemnatory) passages, however, there is no purport in respect of their sense, which is a channel to the eulogy (or condemnation), any more than (there is purport) in the word-senses, which are channels to the sentence-sense. If it be said that if they had no purport, there would not result from them (even) what is not in conflict with other means of valid knowledge, such as the possession of forms by deities, since instrumentality to valid knowledge is restricted to purportful testimony alone, no (we reply); for, the said restriction is not established, since the viśiṣṭa-vidhi "With the revatī (ṛks) of this very (agniṣṭut), he who desires cattle is to treat the vāravantīya (sāman) as the agniṣṭoma-sāman and sacrifice therewith"[6] is seen to be authoritative in respect of the nature of the qualification (viśeṣaṇa), though that is not the sphere of the purport (of the text). Here, indeed, the vāravantīya, which is based on the revatī-ṛks, is the qualification of the sāman. And this is not established in ordinary experience, in the same way as qualifications like the soma, in which case, the text would be authoritative in respect only of the prescription of the sacrifice as qualified by that; nor is there implication of the qualification by the injunction of the qualified; for, reciprocal dependence would result, in that when the qualification is known by implication there would be the injunction whose sphere is the qualified, while when there is that (injunction), there would be the implication of qualification through that. Therefore, for the text whose purport is but the injunction of the qualified (viśiṣṭa-vidhi), authoritativeness has to be declared even in respect of the nature of the qualification. And there is no purport in respect of that (qualification) since, if there be purport in respect of both, sentence-split would result. Thus, for eulogistic passages too, whose purport is the praise of what is prescribed, there is no purport in respect of the sense which is a channel to the praise; since, consequently it is perception that is stronger than those, in order not to conflict therewith, a different signification is assumed in their case. In the text "He is to (achieve what he desires by) sacrifice with the soma", whose purport is the injunction of the qualified, if it be admitted that a sacrifice non-different from the soma material and qualified (thereby) is prescribed, then, since what is prescribed there is not established in ordinary experience, like the curds prescribed in "He is to (achieve what he desires by) sacrifice with curds", its establishment would have to be sought even from the text whose purport is the injunction of the qualified, without (this qualification) being the purport, in the same way as for the (other) qualification—the vāravantīya (sāman) based on the revatī (-ṛks). Truly, from a revealed text devoid of purport, there cannot result a sense opposed to the perception, which apprehends the difference between the sacrifice and the soma plant; hence, so as not to conflict with that (perception), there is resort to possessive implication in that case. The Scriptural texts of non-duality, however, whose purport is non-duality, as made known by the six kinds of marks beginning with the harmony of the initial and concluding passages, are of greater force than perception; hence, therefrom results sublation of perception itself, not the interpretation otherwise of Scripture, so as not to conflict with that.

---

[5] *I.e.*, the perception of words and sentences and their sense.

---

[6] Where the sacrificer desires not merely heaven hereafter, but cattle here as well, he is enjoined to employ the revatī-rks sung with the vāravantīya sāman. This is called a viśiṣṭa-vidhi, an injunction of the qualified, for he is not merely asked to do this or that, but he is also told how it is to be done; and we have not two injunctions, in which case there would be sentence-split, but one complex injunction. The purport of the injunction can be only one, the rite; but the qualification of the rite has also to be made known in this case by the prescription itself, since, unlike the soma plant or curds, it is not established in experience. Thus, the illustration shows that Scripture may be authoritative even in respect of what is not strictly its purport.

In the *Vivaraṇavārtika*, however, it is taught thus: 2·31 the superiority of Scripture to perception is not through its being purportful; for, though the injunction "Cook the golden grains" has for its purport the declaration of cooking as relating to the golden grains, yet, since, in the case of the golden grains, connection with cooking, in its primary sense of an act culminating in the origination of a difference in form and taste, conflicts with perception, so as not to conflict with that, there is admitted of the word "Cooking" a secondary implication in respect of heating alone; (similarly), though for the text "That thou art" the purport be the declaration of non-difference between the jīva and Brahman, yet, since the non-difference of the expressed sense of the word "Thou" from the expressed sense of the word "That" conflicts with perception, so as not to conflict with that, there is admitted secondary implication (for both words) in respect of intelligence distinguished (from the expressed senses of both words). Even in the case of eulogistic texts, as in the case of injunctions of subsidiaries like the prayāja, while knowing their respective senses, the objects (signified) are certainly known not as subsidiary to another; for these, there is subsidiariness to another (cognised later), because of the use (they should have); hence, for them too, as for the text about the prayāja etc., there does exist purport in respect of the intermediate syntactical connection; for, the syntactical unity (here) is that of a sentence (with another sentence, the injunction, not that of a word with a sentence); for, intermediate purport is not admitted (to be) solely where the syntactical unity is as of a word (with a sentence);[7] this having been established by the Vivaraṇācārya in the *Nyāyanirṇaya*, even for texts like "The strew is the sacrificer", there is a possibility of the primary sense being the purport; and secondary implication is admitted only so as not to conflict with perception.

How then is there the superiority of Scripture? The reply is: because of freedom from defect and posteriority in time.[8] That Scripture as such is superior to perception, is the general rule. But perception, though sublated by Scripture, should somehow be shown to be possible by the assignment of a suitable content, since there cannot be contentless cognition. Hence it is that perception, which has been diverted from making known the truth, because of conflict with non-dualist Scriptural texts, is justified by the assignment of empirical content capable of practical efficiency. Why elaborate? The perception of nacre-silver, though sublated by the perception "This is not silver" common to all, is yet justified in conformity with experience by the admission in front of us of (indeterminable) silver associated with nacre; but there is not assumed as the content, in opposition to that (experience), silver that is remote or within[9] or merely unreal. And thus, of the perception, which apprehends the difference of the strew from the sacrificer, and persists till Brahman-knowledge, as in accord with practical efficiency, justification is not possible by the admission of a merely apparent content; if sublated by the Scriptural text "The strew is the sacrificer", there would be no content at all (for that perception); consequently, in order to remedy this, the general rule is departed from, and the Scriptural text itself is otherwise interpreted in the manner declared in the section relating to "the achievement of that (sacrifice)."[10] Nor, as in the case of (conflict between) non-dualist Scriptural texts and perception, is it possible here to justify perception by the admission of absolutely and empirically true contents for Scripture and perception (respectively); for, it is not possible to declare absolutely true identity of the sacrificer with the strew by a single eulogistic passage opposed to a multitude of Scriptural texts whose declaration of the illusoriness of all except Brahman is justified by the six-fold marks of purport. Thus, if by the text "That thou art" there be taught in respect of the expressed sense of the word "Thou" the nature of Brahman as qualified by omniscience, non-enjoyership etc., the perception there of non-omniscience, enjoyership etc., would be entirely baseless; hence, in order to remedy this, secondary implication by partial abandonment is resorted to, adopting the distinction that enjoyership etc. belong to what is associated with individuation, while to the pure (being) distinguished from that (individuation) belongs the nature of the indifferent Brahman. Thus, even in "Cook the golden grains" etc., there being a possibility of perception being wholly contentless, in order to remedy this, there is secondary implication (recognised) for the Scriptural text. But the justification of the content being somehow[11] possible, in the case of "There are here no differents whatsoever", of this Scripture, which is superior, there is no interpretation otherwise; hence, there is no contingence at all of a failure to distinguish[12] (between the two cases).

---

[7] In the syntactical unity of a sentence with a sentence (vākyaikavākyatā), the first sentence conveys a novel significance, complete in itself but for the expectancy of fruit; hence its construction as one unit with the latter sentence. Where the syntactical unity is like that of a word (padaikavākyatā), even sentences apparently complete convey no novel significance, and what they mean can be expressed in each case by a word: e.g. "vāyu is the swiftest deity" as a sentence is but equivalent to the word "praise-of-vāyu (vāyuḥ-prāśastya)". As against this view of the *Bhāmatī*, the present view contends that even a eulogy is complete in itself but for the fruit, and that there is an intermediate purport in respect of that sentence-sense.

---

[8] The word "paratva" may mean merely supremacy; but posteriority in time would rather seem to be the sense intended, because of the application later on of the apaccheda-nyāya.

[9] *I.e.*, of the nature of cognition itself, as in the view of ātmakhyāti.

---

[10] Since the strew cannot literally be the sacrificer, what is the similarity which conditions the one being spoken of as the other? It is the fact that each is instrumental to the *achievement of the sacrifice.*

[11] By the assumption of duality, which, though not absolutely real, is practically efficient, perception is provided with a content.

2·32 Or else, in "Cook the golden grains", "Sacrifice with the soma (i.e., achieve what is desired with the soma sacrifice)" etc., the resort to secondary implication is not in order to conform to perception, but because of incapacity to perform (what is primarily signified by the words). Cooking, in the primary sense, cannot indeed be performed in the case of the golden grains, in the same way as mere heating; nor can a soma-sacrifice non-different from it (soma) be performed by any one, in the same way as a sacrifice to which the material, soma, is an accessory. Nor may it be said that it is the conflict with perception of what is considered to be that which ought to be performed, which is spoken of in other words as "incapacity to perform"; for, in the injunction "Make bright the lunar orb", though in respect of the lunar orb, the brightness, which is considered to be what ought to be performed, does not conflict with perception, there is seen incapacity to perform; therefore, the latter is different from the former. And thus, in that case, the resort to secondary implication is only because of that (incapacity). Therefore, there is no sublation whatever of the superiority of Scripture, as established by the apaccheda-nyāya.[13]

---

[12] There is such a failure on the view that it is purport which conditions the superiority of Scripture.

[13] The principle is explained in the succeeding paragraphs. Reference may be made to *PM*, VI, v. 49—55.

2·321 Now, how does the apaccheda-nyāya apply here? The reply is (as follows). In the jyotiṣṭoma, among those who go round (the fire) for the sake of (the ceremony called) the bahiṣpavamāna, (each succeeding priest holding him who goes before by the tucked up waist cloth), if there is a letting go by the udgātṛ, then, on looking at the Scriptural text "Should the udgātṛ let go, the sacrifice should be concluded without any fee, and the same sacrifice should be recommenced," there arises the cognition of an obligation to perform an expiatory rite occasioned by the udgātṛ letting go; later, if the pratihartṛ lets go, this (earlier cognition) is sublated by the contrary cognition, which arises on looking at the Scriptural text "Should the pratihartṛ let go, the whole of the sacrificial fee should be given," and relates to the obligation to perform another expiatory rite occasioned by the pratihartṛ letting go; similarly, the earlier perception of the reality of pot etc. is sublated by the subsequent Scripture-generated cognition of their illusoriness. " Though in the case cited the earlier cognition of the obligation to perform an occasioned rite is sublated by the subsequent cognition of the obligation to perform another occasioned rite, yet the sacred teaching which gives rise to the earlier cognition of obligation to perform an occasioned rite has scope where there is letting go by the udgātṛ alone, or there is a simultaneous letting go by both, or the letting go by the udgātṛ is subsequent (to the other's letting go); if, however, perception should be sublated by non-dualist Scripture, then, as having no other content, it would be baseless;" such a difference (between the two cases) should not be suspected; for, when, in respect of pot etc., there applies the perception sublated by Scripture, even in respect of that it obtains an empirical content and has its purpose fulfilled; hence, just as in the case of the sacred teaching connected with the earlier act of letting go, which is wholly sublated where there is a subsequent act of letting go, there is no need to look for some other content; further, here too, it is possible to say that perception has scope as relating to the reality of Brahman that is known in all cognition.[14]

(This is said by some): in the course of even a single sacrifice, there are obligations to perform different occasioned rites due to different occasions occuring in sequence; the two cognitions of obligation, since they originate in succession, like the two cognitions of colour in the case of the black and red colours of the cherry fruit, are certainly both valid; hence, the apaccheda-nyāya is not an example of the sublation of the earlier cognition by a subsequent (one); hence it is that in the *Śāstradīpikā,* in the section about letting go, there is this statement: "This indeed is the meaning of the sacred teaching about the occasioned rite: the sacrifice, that has to be performed in one way before the rise of the occasion, has to be performed in a different way, when there is (that) occasion." 2·3211

This is not (sound). Obligation to perform belongs to what is subsidiary. And the expiatory rite, 2·3212 whose occasion is the earlier act of letting go by the udgātṛ, is not a subsidiary in a rite characterised by a subsequent act of letting go by the pratihartṛ; for, just as the sacred teaching about the āhavanīya (as that into which all should be offered) relates to all oblations other than the oblation in the hoof-mark,[15] so too the sacred teaching "Should the udgātṛ let go" relates to a rite not characterised by a subsequent act of letting go by the pratihartṛ. This has, indeed, been said in the *Nyāyaratnamālā*: "The restriction of a sacred teaching, whose nature is general and settled, by particularising the content and so on, is called sublation of the established". In analysing the "sublation of the established" thus defined, it is said: "That being so, this is the meaning of the sacred teaching: in the case of the rite which is not characterised by a subsequent act of letting go by the udgātṛ and is characterised by the pratihartṛ letting go, the gift of the entire sacrificial fee is a subsidiary; the same is to be seen (to apply) even where the udgātṛ lets go."

---

[14] According to the commentator, this argument is for the benefit of those who refuse to recognise three grades of reality—absolute, empirical and merely apparent.

As for the statement cited from the *Śāstradīpikā*, that occurs towards the close of a passage declaring the sublation of the earlier obligation, in the words: "Therefore, the cognition of the earlier expiatory rite, though originated, becomes false, because of being sublated; for the subsequent (cognition), however, there is no sublation whatever"; therefore, its purport is a mere reflection on the assumption "though it would have to be performed in a different way, prior to the rise of the occasion, i.e., without the occasion having arisen, i.e., where there is not the rise of the occasion"; but its purport is not that prior to the rise of the subsequent occasion the obligation occasioned earlier existed in fact; for, there would result conflict with earlier passages of the context.

---

[15] As a general rule, all oblations should be offered in the āhavanīya fire. In the aśvamedha, however, there is the injunction to make the offerings in the hoof-marks of the horse. If this were over-ridden by the general rule, it would be entirely purportless. But by admitting its validity for the particular sacrifice alone, the general principle is restricted without being nullified.

Let be the conventions of the Mīmāṃsakas. Where is the conflict in admitting two obligations in succession, on the analogy of the black and red colours (of the cherry)? The reply is: what is this obligation which could be removed by the origination of an obligation in respect of a subsequent occasioned rite? It is not the capacity of the earlier occasioned rite to be accomplished by volition, since that is not lost even subsequently.[16] Nor is it the possibility of the fruit accomplished by volition; for, this has not been generated even earlier.[17] Nor does it consist in being that by the non-performance of which there would be a defect in the rite; nor (does it consist) in being a subsidiary; for, what causes a defect in the rite, in the event if its non-performance, is of the nature of a specific kind of effect;[18] while a subsidiary, whether (remote) as contributing to the ultimate fruit, or proximate (as contributing to the due performance of rite itself),[19] is a specific kind of cause; neither of these can be (merely) occasional; in order to maintain (therefore) that they are of the very nature (of the rite), they have to be particularised thus: in the case of the rite not characterised by an act of letting go occurring subsequently and contrary (to the earlier act), the rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go is a subsidiary, and it is only there that its non-observance is a cause of defect in the rite; therefore, in the case of a rite characterised by another subsequent act of letting go, (even) prior to the rise of the subsequent act of letting go, it is not possible either for the rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go to be a subsidiary to the (main) rite, or for its non-observance to be the cause of a defect in the rite. Truly, it has not been seen anywhere, nor does is stand to reason, that a certain thing is pervaded by another thing for a certain time, not subsequently, or is the cause (of that other) for a certain time, not subsequently. Nor may it be assumed that what is called obligatoriness is but some other attribute, capable of coming and going, since there is no evidence (for this), while a distinction is intelligible between the two contrary teachings about the act of letting go, in the same way as in the case of the sacred teachings about (the offering of obligations in) the hoof-mark and (in) the āhavanīya fire. Therefore, the statement about the origination of two obligations in sequence is baseless.

---

[16] Hence, it is not like the blackness of the cherry, which is destroyed by its subsequent redness.

[17] Therefore, it is not an object of valid knowledge, like the prior blackness of the cherry.

---

[18] The word "niyama-viśeṣa" would mean "a specific invariable feature". The commentator specifies this feature further as an effect (vyāpya, literally, the pervaded). This is how he arrives at it. Non-observance may be related to defect in the rite as originating it or as pervading it or as pervaded by it; what is of the nature of non-existence (abhāva) cannot originate anything; defect in the rite too may be treated as a mode of prior non-existence, which cannot be originated; nor is non-observance the pervader of the defect for even where there is need for that expiation alone and that is performed, defect may still arise from some other cause; the third possibility alone is left and that is here considered.

[19] Subsidiaries may be either remote (ārādupakaraka) or proximate (sannipatyopakarāka). An example of the former is the offering of the fore-sacrifice (prayāja) which contributes to the invisible (apūrva) result of the main sacrifice; the latter class too contributes to the apūrva, but through being accessory in the first place to something proximate, *e.g.*, though purifying the material, such as rice-grains by sprinkling. See *MNP* (Edgerton), sections, 182-192; Edgerton's equivalents, though not implausible, are not those usually accepted.

And now, on the principle of the section about the (superior force of the) initial passage, why should not perception itself be of greater force than revelation, since at its origination it has nothing opposed to it? 2·322

The reply is: where syntactical unity is cognised, there (the whole passage) should be understood to lead to one sense alone, since the cognised syntactical unity would be destroyed should there be different senses (in the course of the passage). Thus, here, the initial passage "Prajāpati gave a horse to Varuṇa" is a eulogistic passage analogous to parakṛti (as referring to what is apparently an act of Prajāpati); to this no contrary has arisen, in the first instance; by it the intellect of the donor is turned to (the performance of) a sacrifice (as his duty consequent on the gift); the combination of words in the concluding passage "As many horses as one *receives* in gift, so many four- 2·323 potsherd-sacrifices one is to offer to Varuṇa" conveys a sense opposed thereto; since (for these words), the (cognition of this) contrary has already arisen, they would not attain syntactical unity with that (opposite), if they were construed as heard (i.e., literally); in order to maintain the syntactical unity, the sense of the *ṇic*, (the causative suffix) is interpolated;[20] and it is only as in accord therewith that it (the later sentence) derives its own existence; hence the superiority of the initial passage. Where, however, reciprocal syntactical unity is not cognised, there the sentence which has come into existence without taking into account the earlier existent, and has a sense opposed thereto, does certainly make known its own sense; hence not here is the superiority of the earlier existent. Hence it is that the statement about the non-use of the ṣoḍaśin cup is admitted to make known its own sense, without taking into account the earlier existent statement of its use; but since for both there is no difference of content, there is recognised as inevitable optional performance even there (in the use of the cup). And thus, since there is no suspicion of syntactical unity between non-dualist revelation and perception, the capacity (of the former) to make known its own sense without taking into account the latter, though earlier existent, is unhindered. And in generating the knowledge of that sense, the principle of apaccheda alone applies, (as said in) "The earlier rises only as unsublated, since the later has not arisen; the later, since it cannot arise in any other way, cannot occur without sublating the earlier", not the principle of (the superiority of) the initial passage. Hence it is that even in ordinary experience the earlier existent perception of nacre-silver is sublated by the teaching of a trustworthy person.

---

[20] So that "receives" means "causes to receive".

3·0 Now, even thus, the superiority of perception, since it is that which is depended on, cannot be avoided. Of the two sacred teachings about letting go, since the earlier is not depended on by the later, the sublation of the earlier by the later is proper. Here, however, perception, as apprehending the existence of letters, words etc., is that which is depended on by the revelation teaching illusoriness; hence it is of the revelation that sublation is proper, in the form of not teaching the illusoriness opposed to that (perception). Nor may it be said "Though by the Scriptural texts about illusoriness the reality-aspect of letters, words etc. be denied, there is no denial of the existence-aspect (of letters, words etc.), which is what is depended on; hence there is no conflict with that which is depended on"; for, by such Scriptural texts as "There are here no differents whatsoever," there is taught the non-existence of the world, even in the existence-aspect.

3·1 To this some say thus: even for him who, because of a defect of hearing, hears "bring the vṛṣa" as "bring the vṛṣabha" and so on, there is seen valid knowledge through the words[21]; therefore, in valid knowledge through verbal testimony, only such perception of letters, words etc., as is common to valid knowledge and delusion, is needed; consequently, non-dualist revelation depends only on the perception of letters, words etc.; not the valid knowledge thereof; and thus, even though the existence of letters, words etc., be denied, there is no conflict with what is depended on.

---

[21] Both words mean the same thing "bull"; but the hearing as "vṛṣabha" is defective and delusive; what causes the valid cognition of "bull" is, then, a sound heard which is common to both the valid and the delusive hearing; this alone is what is depended on. The advaitin goes one step further and says that perception which is wholly delusive is yet depended on by the valid verbal testimony as to non-duality: thus the commentator.

3·2 Others, however, say thus: though, in valid knowledge through verbal testimony, the establishment of the existence of letters, words etc. be not needed, yet since valid knowledge does not arise from a sound that has not (the requisite) capacity, there does exist the need to establish the existence of capacity. Even in regard to this need, there is no conflict with what is depended on; for, though denied by the Scriptural text "There are here no differents", there is recognised the existence of the universe, which persists up to Brahman-knowledge, accords with practical efficiency, and is different from the unreal; else it would follow that perception and other empirically valid means of knowledge are contentless. Nor may it be asked "How can the world gain existence, despite the denial of the existence-aspect, since denial, if it did not remove its counter-correlate, would be self-contradictory?"; for, in conformity with the two cognitions "this is silver" and "this is not silver," in the case of nacre, there is admitted, of the non-existence of the superimposed in the substrate, a capacity to put up with the existence of a counter-correlate, which persists till sublation and is different from the unreal. Hereby, (the view that) for the world, if denied in respect of its existence, there would be but unreality as for the horns of a hare, is refuted; for, there is difference (from the horns of a hare) because of the recognition of an existence that is removable by Brahman-knowledge (alone). Nor may it be said: "If of the superimposed there be denial in the substrate, in respect of existence, the denial of it elsewhere, in respect of existence, would follow of itself; hence, because of the contingence of its being the counter-correlate of negation relating to all places and times, its unreality would be difficult to avoid; for unreality is defined only in this way—that unreality consists in being the counter-correlate of negation relating to all places and times, a definition of that in any other way not being possible"; for, by those who admit of the unreal that it is the counter-correlate of negation relating to all places and times, there cannot be given as evidence, in respect of its being so, either perception, since all places and times cannot be perceived, or revelation, since no such revelation is cognised; hence, inference alone has to be offered as evidence; consequently, that, which in that inference has to be said to be the *probans* of exclusion from the real, that itself, being cognised first (as compared with the other mark), may intelligibly define unreality.

Others, however, say thus: the purport of Scriptural texts like "There are here no differents whatsoever" is the negation of the world in respect of reality, not in respect of existence; for, if a negation in respect of existence did not remove (that) existence, it could not be the negation of that, while, if it did remove that (existence), there would be conflict with perception, 3·3

Nor may it be said that since reality too is established by such perception as "The pot is real", negation is not proper in that respect too; for, in order that there may be no conflict with Scripture, it is intelligible that perception may have for content empirical reality consisting in an appearance of reality. Nor, this being the case, is there the unintelligibility of the negation of the world in that respect, since in the world there is no possibility of the absolute reality present in Brahman; for, just as in nacre it is but the cognition of the appearance of silver that constitutes the possibility of real silver and consequently there is negation of that—hence it is that in "This is not silver, but that", "This is not my cow, but only that", "He who is present here is not Caitra, but (the one) in the room", of that which is denied, reality is understood elsewhere—similarly, it is but the cognition of the appearance of reality that constitutes the possibility of reality, and consequently, the negation of that is intelligible. Therefore, since there is not the suspicion of the denial of the existence of letters, words, capacity etc., there is no conflict with what is depended on.

3·4 Yet others, however, do not accept three grades of reality consisting of absolute reality in Brahman, empirical reality of the nature of an appearance of reality in the world, and a merely apparent reality inferior even to that, in nacre-silver etc.; for, even because of interpenetration by the absolute reality of the substrate, Brahman, the conceit of reality in pot etc., and in nacre-silver etc., is intelligible, and hence there is no evidence for assuming an appearance of reality.

And thus, since in the world there is no cognition of reality, and since, even from the cognition of that in Brahman which has been identified therewith, the possibility of that (cognition) in respect of the world is intelligible through non-discrimination (of the world from Brahman), there is, if there is negation of the world in respect of reality, neither conflict with what is depended on nor the negation of that of which there is no possibility.

Nor may it be asked: "If no appearance of reality be admitted in the universe other than the absolute reality present in Brahman, for what reason is there admitted in nacre the origination of an appearance of silver, other than the silver at a distance (i.e., elsewhere)?"; for immediacy being impossible in the case of what is at a distance and not in contact (with the sense organ), in order to account for that (immediacy) that (origination) is admitted. 3·41

Now, thus, even where there is delusion caused by reflection, there should be accepted the origination of an appearance of the face, in the mirror, other than the face on one's neck; for, in respect of the face on one's own neck, though immediacy is possible for the portion defined by the nose etc., there cannot be immediacy for such portions as the eye-balls and the forehead, while in the delusion caused by reflection there is seen immediacy for such portions as the eye-balls. Nor is there the contingence of the acceptable in admitting the reflection as other than the image; for, the jīva too that is a reflection of Brahman being different therefrom, there would be the contingence of illusoriness for that (jīva). 3·411

3·4111 To this the followers of the Vivaraṇa say thus: it is on the face on one's neck that, because of the defect, viz., the proximity of the mirror as an external adjunct, there occurs the superimposition of being present in the mirror, facing oneself, and difference from the (original) image; hence, there is not to be assumed the superimposition of a face on the mirror, because of prolixity (of assumptions); because there is sublation of the relation alone, in the form "The face is not in the mirror", while, if it were another illusory thing, there would be sublation of its existence in the form "This is not the face"; and because there is recognition of non-difference from one's own face in the form "My face appears in the mirror". Nor is immediacy impossible for the substrate, i.e., the face on one's neck; for, there is admitted the rule that the rays of light from the eyes obstructed by an external adjunct are turned back and apprehend the (original) image, like a creeper etc. (which, obstructed in its growth in one direction, grows in another); for, if that rule were not admitted, there would be the contingence of a visual delusion of reflection (even) in the case of primal atoms and in the case of gross objects though hidden by walls etc. Nor may it be said "There is the rule that visible delusion of reflection is only of what is not hidden, is gross and of perceptible form, not of anything else"; for, since the grossness and perceptible form of the image can be of use in the settled way of generating visual cognition, it is unintelligible to assume (their) use in any other way; further, if an interposition like a wall could serve here as an obstacle even without preventing the conjunction of the obstructed rays of light from the eyes (with the image), then, in the very same way, even in the case of pot-perception etc., there is the possibility of its being an obstacle, and it would follow that contact with the sense of sight would as such fail to be the cause (of visual perception).[22] Further, even by those who maintain the superimposition of an illusory face on the mirror, in order that there may result the memory-impression included in the three causes (of superimposition),[23] prior experience (of the face) has to be established only by the assumption of the apprehension of one's own face by the rays from the eyes which are sometimes turned back (by a reflecting medium). Nor is the memory-impression intelligible even with the prior experience (of the face) as defined by the nose and other such (visible) parts, since with this much the superimposition of the reflection of the eye-balls etc., is unintelligible; further, it is difficult to predicate prior experience in any way, where in the water of a tank there is superimposition of the reflection of an unseen person seated on the top of a tree by the side of the tank. And thus, it has necessarily to be said of the rays of light from the eyes, when obstructed by an external adjunct, that they reach the (original) image and apprehend it;[24] on the strength of the (experience) of the effect, (we have to say that) the capacity to reach the image and apprehend it belongs only to those which are obstructed by a mirror etc., not to those which are obstructed by a rock etc.; for those, which are obstructed by the not too pure copper etc., there is not the capacity to apprehend the specific configuration of the face, because of the defect of relation to an impure adjunct; since in the case of those (rays) which have reached an adjunct and have turned back, there is not the same obstruction by the sun's light, as in the case of those (rays) which desire to reach the sun direct, in looking at the reflected sun there is not the same inability as in looking at it direct; where there is contact with an adjunct like water, though some (rays) obstructed by the adjunct get (back) to the image, some apprehend the sand etc. within that (water etc.); there is no defect in making such assumptions.

---

[22] The interposition of an obstacle is supposed to obstruct contact of the object with the sense-organ. If the wall serves to obstruct visual perception, but not as obstructing the passage of rays from the eyes to the object, then, the passage of the rays would be immaterial, and sense-contact would fail to have causal efficacy in perception.

[23] The three causes are memory-impression (saṃskāra), defect (doṣa) and sense-contact (samprayoga) *or* cognition of the substrate (adhiṣṭhāna-jñāna).

3.1112 The author of the *Advaitavidyā*, however, states thus the view of the Preceptor Vidyāraṇya and others, who admit the illusoriness of the reflection and maintain three classes of jīvas. The reflection in the mirror, which is clearly seen by the bystanders to be different from and similar to Caitra's face, is certainly different therefrom and illusory in its own nature, like nacre-silver in relation to the silver in one's own hand. Nor is there conflict with the cognition of non-difference from the image, in the form "My face appears in the mirror"; for, because of conflict with the clear cognition of difference, duality, facing oneself etc., the cognition of non-difference is impossible; and the talk of "My face in the mirror" is of secondary import like the talk of one's shadow face as one's own face. Nor may it be doubted why, because of conflict with the cognition of non-difference, the talk of difference should not itself be of secondary import; for it is not possible to deny, in the case of children (i.e., the unsophisticated), the delusion of another person in the reflection, leading up to such practical activity as the desire to avoid or approach. Nor may it be said that since even prudent persons are seen to have recourse to the mirror etc., in order to know the special features of their own faces, the cognition of non-difference too leads to practical activity; for, this recourse is intelligible even because of the knowledge of the special rule that the reflection, though different, has (yet) a form similar to that of the image. As for the statement that the sublation "The face is not there" is only of the conjunction of the face (with the mirror), not of the face, that is not (correct); for, it would follow that even in "This is not silver", the sublation is only of the identity of silver with the this-object, not of the silver. And if because silver is superimposed by way of identity on the this-element, (the statement) "This is not silver" is the sublation certainly of the silver as identical and not of the identity alone, then, since the face is superimposed on the mirror, as in conjunction with it, (the statement) "The face is not there" is the sublation certainly of the face as in conjunction, and not of the conjunction alone; thus there is parity (between the two cases). As for the statement that there would be prolixity in assuming superimposition in the case of the substrate too, that is no defect, any more than the prolixity of the assumption of the appearance of silver (in nacre), (the assumption, in both cases) being based on evidence. Where there is delusion of reflection in respect of one's own eye-balls etc., there is no means of assuming immediacy for the (original) image; to assume because of this that the rays from the eyes obstructed by the adjunct reach to the (original) image, leads to much that is in conflict with experience. How, indeed can it be that on contact with water, while some rays from the eyes pass through unobstructed, others, which are so exceedingly delicate that they are obstructed even by conjunction with water, conquer the host of (solar) rays, that (ordinarily) obstruct the whole body of rays from the eyes,[25] and enter the solar orb situated in their midst? Again, since even in looking at the moon's reflection, as in looking at the moon, there is no distinction in respect of (sense) contact with the (original) image, which is agreeably cool as nectar, why should there not be satisfaction for the eyes, through the manifestation of coolness (in looking at the reflection)? How, again, can it be that those which are obstructed by conjunction even with water are not obstructed by conjunction even with rocks etc.? Or, how can it be that, if obstructed and turned back by them, they do not get conjoined with the eye balls etc.? Or, how can it be that, if they (the reflected) get conjoined with them (the eye-balls etc.), they do not perceive what is thus in conjunction? It is seen that even by a defect (where one exists) the apprehension of the specific aspect alone is obstructed, but not the apprehension even of the very existence of the substrate that is in (sense-) contact.

---

[24] The view summarised here has a superficial similarity to that of modern science about the reflection of the rays of light; but the similarity is not fundamental.

---

[25] In the attempt to see the sun directly.

On the view, however, that the reflected face is a superimposition, there need not be assumed anything in conflict with experience. It is thus: since visual superimposition is seen only in the case of that which has an unconcealed, gross and perceptible form, to the grossness and perceptibility of the (original) image, for which causality is settled in respect of the perception of their locus, there belongs causality even in respect of the superimposition of the reflection of their locus; and in the case of an obstructing substance like a wall, which is settled to obstruct the perception of a concealed substance by intercepting the contact with the eyes, which, on the analogy of the sense of touch and so on, is understood to function by reaching (to their objects), it is to be assumed that it (the obstructing substance) obstructs in no other way even in the superimposition of the reflection of what is concealed. What is the conflict in this, in assuming, on the strength of the effect, that for what is settled to be a cause etc., in some cases, there is causality etc. elsewhere too? Hereby is refuted (the statement) that if the rays from the eyes obstructed by the adjunct be not admitted to reach to the (original) image, there would be the contingence of the delusion of visual reflection in the case of what is concealed and is devoid of a perceptible form and so on.

Further, there is the contingence of the said defect only on the acceptance of that (turning back and reaching to the image). How? When, without turning one's eyes (towards the object), as in looking at the sun directly, one looks face downwards on the water, the rays from the eyes which are obstructed thereby go up and apprehend the prototype sun; when, without turning one's eyes sideways, one looks with eyes straight at a mirror, those (rays) obstructed thereby apprehend the face of him who is by one's side; similarly, even if one's face be not turned backwards, the apprehension by those (rays) obstructed by the adjunct, even in the case of what is concealed behind one's back, would be difficult to avoid; for, abandoning any principle regulative of the turning back of the rays from the eyes obstructed by the adjunct, it is admitted that the going (back) is only to where the (original) image is. Similarly, when in an impure mirror a fair face is reflected as dark, since the fair colour of the (original) image, though existent, is yet of no service in the visual cognition, the visibility of the prototype face has to be maintained only as qualified by an imposed colour, on the analogy of the delusion that the shell is yellow; hence, in the very same way, it would be difficult to avoid (this), that even the colourless may, as qualified by the darkness of the adjunct mirror, be the object of a delusion of visual reflection; for, in the case of ether, though of itself colourless, visibility is admitted as qualified by superimposed blueness. Therefore, only the view that the reflected face is in its nature a superimposition is more acceptable. Nor is there a weakness here too in respect of the memory-impression (needed as a cause, being a consequence) of prior experience; for, like the dream superimposition of an unseen person merely through the memory-impressions of the experience of persons in general, the superimposition of particular faces in mirrors is intelligible merely through the memory-impression of the experience of faces in general. This, however, is the difference: in dreams, the superimposition of the specific form of a person is in conformity with the unseen potency which is the cause of what is auspicious or inauspicious; here, however, the superimposition of the specific form of the face is in conformity with the proximity of the (original) image.

Nor is it a defect that, if the reflection be in its nature illusory, there would be the contingence of illusoriness even for the jīva that is a reflection of Brahman; for, though it be so in the case of the jīva (looked upon) as a reflection, yet since the jīva (that is Brahman) as defined is real, (his) experience of release is intelligible.

As for the view of some that the reflection in the mirror etc., being a variety of shadow cast by the face, is certainly real, that is not (sound). Indeed, what is called the shadow of a body and so on is only that darkness which, when by particular members (of the body), light that is pervasive is obstructed in some places, comes into being in those places. And shadowness of the nature of darkness is not appropriate in the case of the reflections of pearl, ruby etc., which are of white or red colour. Nor is that nature intelligible in 3·412 the case of the reflection of the sun etc., which are devoid of shadows of the nature of darkness.

3·413 Now, then, (it may be said that) if the shadow which is of the nature of a reflection cannot be of the nature of darkness, let it be another kind of substance, since the assumption of another substance is intelligible when there is non-inclusion among the recognised substances, as in the case of darkness;[26] if this be said, (we ask) will this other substance be associated with such cognized properties as the peculiar colour, size and configuration and with the property of facing oneself? Or, will it be devoid of these? On the latter (alternative), it is not possible through this other substance to explain the cognition of the reflection as associated with the particular colour etc.; hence its assumption is in vain. On the first (alternative), however, how is it possible to explain the reality of the reflections of numerous faces, large in size, which are cognised at the same time, without being mixed up, in a single mirror of small size? How, again, when a mirror, whose parts are closely packed, continues to remain like that, can there be within it the origination of another substance possessing many parts, low or prominent, like the jaw, the nose etc.? Further, in the origination of a reflection possessing many colours like whiteness, redness and yellowness, there is no cause of the like nature present in the mirror and in contact with it. (It may be said): "In the case of reflections, which are only of such a size as to be fit to abide in the (reflecting) adjunct, the cognition of large size and the similar cognition of lowness and prominence are but delusions; and some cause has to be assumed capable of originating that kind of reflection without conflicting with continuance as before of the mirror and its parts". If this be said, then, let nacre-silver too be real. For, there too, it would be intelligible to assume some cause capable of originating in the nacre, which continues even as before, the silver that gets to be identified therewith, and to lay down a rule in the case of that silver that it is apprehended by a sense-organ (only) in co-operation with a cause which is considered to be a defect.[27] Why then (follow) the maxim of (cooking) half the gourd,[28] and say that nacre-silver is unreal, while the reflection is real? Nor in that case, would there be for the nacre seen as silver the contingence of liquefaction when thrown into the fire, as (there is) for (real) silver; for, the non-existence of the capacity to liquefy in nacre-silver is intelligible in the same way as the non-existence of heat or sweet smell in the reflection of fire, musk etc. Now, it may be said: nacre-silver is not real, because of the sublation admitted by all, in the form "This is not silver, the silver appears but as an illusion"; then, (we say) because of the sublation established in all cases, in the form "The face is not in the mirror, the face appears there, in the mirror, only as an illusion", it stands to reason that the reflection too is but unreal. Therefore, the contention that the reflection is real is unsound.

---

[26] Darkness (tamas) is recognised as an independent substance by the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins, since it is cognised directly as possessing blue colour, though it is not included among the substances enumerated by the Naiyāyikas.

---

[27] As, for example, the glitter of nacre.

[28] The other half being left to grow.

3·414 Now, the contention of its illusoriness too does not stand to reason; for, there is not demonstrated (for it) as in the case of nacre-silver, any ignorance which causes (it) or any cognition which dispels (it), while being capable of co-presence or co-absence (with it).

3·4141 To this some (say): in the superimposition of reflection, which arises even after the full cognition of the substrate (e.g., the face), the ignorance which obscures the substrate is not the material cause (of the superimposition), nor is the cognition of the substrate in its specific aspect the dispeller (of that delusion); though (this is so), yet, since for the ignorance of the substrate, though dispelled in its aspect of obscuring energy, persistence is possible in its aspect of projective energy, that (ignorance) itself is the material cause; and cognition of the substrate in co-operation with the removal of the proximity of the (original) image to the adjunct, is the dispeller of that (delusion) together with its material cause.

3·4142 Others, however, say thus: it is not natural[29] for cognition to leave out the aspect of projective energy and dispel the aspect of obscuring energy alone; for, if by Brahman-knowledge, in the case of primal ignorance, and by the cognition of nacre etc., in the case of modal ignorance, the aspect of obscuring energy alone were dispelled, then, in respect of the projective energy there would be the contingence of its persistence for all time. Nor is that (persistence) determined by the presence of an obstacle to the removal of the aspect of projective energy, consisting in the proximity of the (original) image to the adjunct; for, even prior to the proximity (coming about) of the (original) image to the adjunct, when it is understood through perception that there is no relation of the (original) image, Caitra's face, to the mirror, or that Caitra's face is not in the mirror, there should necessarily be the removal even of the aspect of projective energy; hence it would follow that at that time, if there be proximity of those two, (yet) because of the non-existence of the material cause, there would not be the delusion of reflection. Therefore, primal ignorance alone is the material cause of the superimposition of reflection. Nor is there parity of the said defect[30] even here; for, though, in respect of external things, different forms of psychosis do overcome primal ignorance in its aspect of obscuring energy, in those parts of intelligence which are defined by the respective objects, yet, they do not dispel its aspect of projective energy; otherwise, there would be the contingence of the dissolution even of the empirical projections present in those places.[31] Nor, if the reflection is the product of primal ignorance, is there the contingence of its empirical reality; for, what is determinative of empirical reality is non-generation by a defect over and above nescience; and since in the present case there does exist a defect over and above that, viz., the proximity of the (original) image and the adjunct, (its) merely apparent character is intelligible. Nor may it be said: "When this is the case, there would be the contingence of even that cognition of the substrate, which is aided by the removal of the proximity of the (original) image and the adjunct, failing to remove the superimposition of reflection, since that has not the capacity to remove the primal ignorance"; for, there is no conflict;[32] though that (cognition) has not the capacity to remove ignorance about Brahman, yet, since the cognition of the true nature of the substrate has for content what is opposed to the superimposition of reflection which has that (ignorance) for material cause, it is intelligible that, in co-operation with the absence of obstacles, it has the capacity to remove that (superimposition); even on the view of modal ignorance as the material cause, since its obscuring energy has been removed by an earlier cognition of the substrate, there is failure of a common content;[33] hence, it (the obscuring energy) cannot be removed by that cognition of the substrate which belongs to the same time as the absence of obstacles; hence, it has to be accepted that merely the superimposition of reflection[34] is what is removed by that (cognition). Or else, let it be that this superimposition is removable only by Brahman-knowledge that has the capacity to remove (also) the ignorance that is the material cause of (the superimposition) itself. As for the contingence of empirical reality (for the reflection), that is answered on the ground of its being generated by a defect over and above nescience.

---

[29] That is to say, where the projective aspect is not removed, it must be due to the presence of obstacles to the removal thereof, and not due to the inherent capacity of knowledge to remove the obscuring aspect alone; such obstacles are projected by primal nescience and they will continue to exist for anything short of Brahman-knowledge; by such cognitions, therefore, there is the removal of the obscuring capacity alone of primal ignorance.

---

[30] *I.e.*, failure of a material cause for subsequent reflections, when once ignorance is dispelled.

[31] That is to say, not merely the reflection, but the mirror too, would disappear.

---

[32] Between removal of the superimposition and non-removal of primal ignorance.

[33] For ignorance and the cognition.

Thus, even in the superimposition of dreams, since there is superimposition on undefined intelligence, or on intelligence conditioned by individuation, (but) devoid of modal ignorance,[35] and since (in the words) "That darkness of ignorance is called sleep, which is the cause of dreaming and waking" it is said by the Preceptor that both the dreaming and waking worlds are products of one ignorance, that (dream-superimposition) is the product of primal ignorance and hence is sublatable only by Brahman-knowledge that has the capacity to remove its (the dream's) own material cause; its merely apparent character is only because of generation by a defect, such as sleep, over and above nescience: thus say some. 3·51

Others, however, say thus: because of the statement in the *Bhāṣya* "These chariots etc. seen in dreams are sublated on waking", because there is seen in the *Vivaraṇa* (the passage) "since it is opposed to bondage in the nature of ignorance, like waking cognition", and 3·52 because of the experience of the illusoriness of dreams by one who has woken up, waking cognition has the capacity to remove the superimposition of dreams; hence its merely apparent character is only because of its being sublated by cognition other than Brahman-knowledge. Nor may it be asked how the cognition, which has not for its sphere the true nature of the substrate and has not the capacity to remove the ignorance that is its material cause, can remove the superimposition; for, in the case of the superimposition of the rope-snake, removal is seen even by the delusion of a stick, which arises immediately after itself (i.e., the snake delusion), just as by the cognition which has the capacity to remove the ignorance that is its material cause and is of the true nature of the substrate.

---

[34] That is to say, merely the projective energy of ignorance.

[35] This is the witness-intelligence; it is conditioned by individuation; as the locus of the psychosis of pleasure, pain etc., it is devoid of modal ignorance.

3·53 Yet, others, however, (say) thus: not primal ignorance, but a distinct mode of primal ignorance, which is of the form of sleep, and which, when there is the quiescence of the karma that brings about enjoyment in waking, arises as veiling both the empirical jīva, the spectator of the waking world, who is of the nature of a reflection, as well as the waking world seen by him, (that) is the material cause of the superimposition of the dream world. Nor is there no evidence for sleep being a mode of ignorance; for, the empirical jīva, who is veiled by primal ignorance, who is the spectator of the waking world, who has in respect of himself without doubt or error such conceits as "I am a man, I am a brahmin, I am a son of Devadatta", and by whom such incidents of the waking world as the death of his own grandfather are always experienced as of one unobscured form in respect of himself because of his long association therewith, if for him there were no obscuration by something at the time of dreams, then, in dream too, as in the state of waking, there would be the contingence of the non-existence of such delusions as "I am a tiger, I am a śūdra, I am a son of Yajñadatta" and of such (other) delusions as that of his grandfather being alive; therefore, it is only for sleep that there is established the nature of a specific mode of ignorance, which arises at that time and obscures the empirical world and jīva. Nor thus, because of the jīva too being veiled, is there the contingence of the non-existence of a spectator for the world; for, there is a merely apparent superimposition of the spectator, the jīva too, along with that of the dream world. And thus, when consciousness is called up by karma which brings about waking enjoyment afresh, there is sublation of the dream world, only by the cognition of the nature of the empirical jīva, which has the capacity to remove the ignorance of the form of sleep, that is the material cause of (the dream) itself. Nor may it be said that there being thus the sublation thereby even of its spectator, the merely apparent jīva, there would not be the recollection "I experienced an elephant in the dream"; for, since the merely apparent jīva is superimposed on the empirical jīva, there is no undue extension even in admitting the empirical jīva's recollection of the (former's) experience.

Now, both the positions stated earlier, that there is superimposition of the dream world on undefined intelligence or on intelligence as conditioned by 3·541 individuation, do not stand to reason; for, on the first (view), the dream elephant etc., since they occupy space other than that of the witness conditioned by individuation,[36] cannot, like happiness etc., be manifested by that, independently of relation to a psychosis of the internal organ; and the sense of sight etc. being quiescent, the rise of a psychosis is impossible; hence, there cannot be manifestation by that, in dependence on the relation to that (psychosis); (while), on the second (view), there would be the contingence of (the experience) "I am an elephant" as of "This is silver", or of "I possess an elephant" as of "I am happy".

3·5421 Here, some justify the first view (thus): intelligence undefined by individuation is accepted as the substrate of the dream world, not as outside the body, but only as within it. Hence it is that absolute illusoriness is declared of the dream-elephant etc., since there is no space (in the body) corresponding to their perceived dimensions. And thus, though the internal organ, having no freedom (of action) outside the body, has need of the sense of sight etc., in order to originate, in waking, a psychosis whose sphere is the external this-element of nacre and so on, yet, in the case of the internal organ, (which) within the body is free, a psychosis is possible of itself (i.e., without dependence on any sense-organ etc.); therefore, there is no unintelligibility whatsoever in the undefined intelligence, which is manifested by the psychosis of the internal organ within the body, being the substrate. For the same reason there is this statement of Bhāratītīrtha in the *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*: just as, in waking, the nescience, that is present in intelligence as defined by the this-element of the nacre manifested by the psychosis generated by (sense-) contact, is illusorily transformed in the form of silver, similarly, in dream too, the nescience, that is present in intelligence manifested in the psychosis of the internal organ within the body when there is the association of defects like sleep, may illusorily transform itself in the form of the universe, when in co-operation with the memory-impressions of diverse objects called up by the unseen potency (adṛṣṭa) (of past karma).

---

[36] The witness, who is conditioned by individuation, is the percipient, but the dream cognitions are, on the first view, superimposed on undefined intelligence, not on the percipient; hence the difference from the experience of happiness etc., which are superimposed on the percipient,

Others, however, say thus: undefined intelligence is not the substrate of the dream world, as manifested by a psychosis. For, the origination is not possible of a psychosis whose sphere is undefined intelligence, except as based on verbal testimony, while the psychosis in the form 'I' is seen to rise only in intelligence as defined by individuation etc. Therefore, its substrate is that intelligence which is of itself immediate and is undefined by individuation etc. Hence it is that, in the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka,* there is (first) the verse: "The delusive cognition of objects in the form of immediacy comes about in dependence on a substrate cognised as immediate by the mind or of itself or by the sense of sight; for it is so cognised in dream, delusion etc."; after stating thus that the immediacy of the substrate needed by the superimposition cognised as immediate 3·5422 (comes) sometimes of itself, sometimes by a psychosis of the mind, sometimes by a psychosis of the external organs, the immediacy of the substrate is cited as resulting of itself in dream superimposition, by the immediately succeeding verses: "Here, in dreams, intelligence is immediately cognised of itself; yet, even in the absence of its substrate, the content of the sense of sight (i.e., visual forms etc.), delusion arises repeatedly only as with (such) form, because of the instrumentality of the mind. Just like the delusion of silver etc., in what is cognised by the sense of sight, so in the ether too, which is cognised by the mind, there is, because of the force of immediacy, the delusion which ascribes various colours to it such as whiteness." Nor may it be said that since the whole of intelligence undefined by individuation is veiled, there is no manifestation of it in the absence of a psychosis. For, it is admitted that Brahman-intelligence alone is obscured, while the jīva-intelligence, which is a reflection (of the former) in nescience, is, though undefined by individuation, not obscured. And thus, the dream-elephant etc. being superimposed on intelligence undefined by individuation, there is for the cogniser-intelligence too the empirical usage "I see this", because of the manifestation of non-difference effected by the psychosis of the internal organ etc., which arises invariably at the same time (as the superimposition) and has for its sphere the substrate (of the superimposition).[37]

---

[37] If non-difference between the cognising intelligence and the substrate intelligence were not thus manifested by a psychosis, the dream being imposed on undefined intelligence, the experience "I see an elephant" would not have been explained. The word "etcetera" after "internal organ" includes the possibility of the psychosis being a transformation of nescience (avidyā-vṛtti) such as has to be postulated for the cognition of sleep.

Yet others, however, justify the second view thus: in saying that intelligence defined by individuation is the substrate, it is not admitted that individuation enters into the substrate-aspect as its *proprium;* rather, it is that intelligence alone which is conditioned by individuation and is of the nature of a reflection therein, that is the substrate; therefore, there is not the contingence of experiences like "I am an elephant". 3·543

Thus, even nacre-silver is imposed on that reflection of intelligence which is defined by the this-element of the nacre and is present in the internal organ of which there is the psychosis; for, if it were superimposed on the prototype intelligence which is defined by the this-element of nacre and is common to all, there would be the contingence of the non-existence of failure to cognise by others, as in the case of happiness etc.;[38] thus say some. 3·5431

Some (others), however, admit the superimposition of that even on the prototype intelligence, and justify the failure to cognise by others on the ground that what has some one's ignorance as its material cause is perceptible by that one alone, not by another jīva. 3·5432

Now, in the case of the superimposition of nacre-silver, the experience of visibility is justified either directly or through the channel of the cognition of the substrate, since that is needed; the experience of 3·6 visibility in the case of the dream-elephant and so on, how is that to be justified?

---

[38] The experience of happiness etc. is cognisible by the experiencer alone, not by others; the same is the case with delusions; but this would be unintelligible if they were superimposed on the universal intelligence common to all experients; hence the need for defining the substrate as reflected intelligence.

3·61 The reply is: in order to justify this, it is not possible to predicate a merely apparent manifestation of the senses too, as of the dream body and objects, since for the merely apparent, there is no reality except as cognised; while, in respect of the reality of the senses which are super-sensuous, uncognised reality would have to be predicated. Nor is it possible to say even of the empirical sense-organs that they go forth from their respective orbs, locate themselves in the dream body and apprehend their respective objects; for, at the time of dream (sleep), there is declared of them quiescence consisting in the absence of functioning; further, the empirical tactile organ, which exists in the interior of the body, devoid of empirical spatial properties suitable to itself, cannot pervade the entire dream body which is (sometimes) of greater dimensions than itself;[39] and if it (the tactile sense) were located in some one part (of that dream body), it could not explain (the dream experience of) cold touch in all parts, generated by immersion in the water of the dream. Hence it is that there is refuted even the suspicion of the explanation that in dreams, though the sense-organs of waking life are quiescent, there exist subtle sense-organs, which are parts of the subtle body, which are of service in the empirical usage of Taijasa (the intelligence of dream-consciousness), and that the sensory nature of dream objects is due to these; for, there are not known any subtle sense-organs other than the sense-organs of waking life.

---

[39] The tactile sense is pervasive of the whole body, within and without; but since dreams are experienced *within the body*, only such part of the tactile sense as is within can function, if at all; and this, of course, does not pervade even the whole of the percipient's body or other similar bodies, to say nothing of bigger bodies like those of elephants. etc., envisaged in dreams.

3·611 Further, (the text) "Here, this person is self-manifest" teaches the self-luminosity of the self with reference to the dream state, since, in waking, the self-luminosity of the self is difficult to discriminate, because of intermixture with luminaries like the sun and because of (the self) functioning through psychoses of the sense of sight etc.; otherwise, since it is always self-luminous, the word "here" would be futile. Therefore, if even in dreams there be assumed functioning through psychoses of the sense of sight etc., then, even there, as in waking, its self-luminosity would be difficult to discriminate; consequently the cited Scriptural text would be affected.[40]

3·612 Now, in dreams, though there be assumed the quiescence of the sense of sight and so on, the internal organ remains non-quiescent; since thus elimination (of all organs) is not secured, there can be no discrimination of self-luminosity. (If this be said), not so. For, in the section "(The self is the) agent, since the sacred teaching (about rites) is purportful", it is said in the *Nyāyanirṇaya* that the internal organ is not instrumental to cognition except in dependence on some other organ like the sense of sight; in the *Tattavapradīpikā* it is said that since that (internal organ) stands as the object of cognition, through its transformation in the form of elephant etc., in dreams, it cannot, at that time, be the instrument of cognition; elimination (of all organs) may result in either of these two ways. Nor, if the internal organ did not function in dreams, would it be unintelligible for one who has woken up to recollect the elephant etc., seen in the dream; for, that is intelligible through the transformation of nescience settled (to exist) in sleep; while, on the view favoured by the *Vedāntakaumudī,* (in the words) "In sleep, what manifests ignorance, happiness etc. is but essential intelligence as conditioned by that state; the recollection by one who has woken up is due to the memory-impression generated by the destruction of the state (of sleep) which is the conditioning adjunct," that in sleep there is no transformation of nescience, here too, the recollection is intelligible, because of the memory-impression generated by the destruction of the dream state that is the conditioning adjunct of the intelligence that manifests the dream-elephant etc.

---

[40] In respect of its authoritativeness, *i.e.*, sublated.

3·613 Or else, because of such Scriptural texts as "That is sattva (i.e., the internal organ) whereby one sees dreams", let there be even in dreams, in the manner mentioned in the *Kalpataru,* a psychosis of the internal organ, having the dream-elephant etc. for its sphere. Nor with this is there non-establishment of elimination; for, the internal organ apprehended as "I" being always superimposed as identical with the jīva, its distinction therefrom is not well known from the viewpoint of ordinary experience; therefore, only the non-existence of the functioning of the sense of sight etc., is needed for the sake of elimination; for, there being the certitude that whatever is well known to be the seen[41] is capable of being manifested by the seer, nothing else is needed for the sake of elimination. Therefore, the functioning of the sense of sight etc., in dreams, being in any case impossible, the experience of visibility etc., in the case of the dream-elephant and so on, is but a delusion.

Now, in dream too, as in waking, there is cognised the concomitance of the experience of elephant etc. with the opening of the eyes and so on, so that when the eyes are open there is experience of elephant etc., not when they are closed; if this be said, like the experience "I see the silver with my eyes", this too may be some dream delusion, that superimposes on the experience of the dream-elephant etc., which is of the nature merely of the witness, either concomitance with the sense of sight etc., or a psychosis that is concomitant with that. What delusion, indeed, even though difficult to accomplish as it were, cannot māyā accomplish, especially when transformed in the form of sleep, by whose might the chariot cognised in the dream is in an instant cognised as a man and that again in an instant as a cat, while for the percipient there is no recollection of conflict between the earlier and later? Therefore, though there is parity in respect of the cognition of the concomitance of co-presence etc., it is only the waking experience of elephant etc., that is generated by 3·62 the sense of sight etc., not the dream experience of elephant etc.

---

[41] What is needed is the elimination of whatever may be an object of cognition (dṛśya); the exclusion of the internal organ is not necessary, since, from the empirical point of view, it is confounded with the seer.

3·71 Those, however, who maintain that perception is creation (dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vādins) accept, for the whole world of waking, creation contemporaneous with perception, since the uncognised reality of what is assumptive is unintelligible; and they say that even the waking experience of elephant etc., is not an object of the sense of sight, since the cognition of the concomitance of the perception of pot etc. with the contact with the sense of sight, which (concomitance) is irreconcilable with the non-existence of pot etc., prior to the perception, is justified by them, only as in the case of dreams.

3·711 Now, if basing oneself on (the view of) perception as creation, one admits of the whole world of waking that it is assumptive, who is he that posits it? Is it the unconditioned self or the self conditioned by nescience? Not the first; for, since even in release there exists the person who posits without the need of any other instruments, the world would persist, and there would be non-distinction from the state of migration. Not the second; for, since nescience has itself to be posited, the establishment of the person who posits has to be declared even prior to the assumption of that (nescience).

To this some say thus: he who is conditioned by the earlier posited nesciences is he who posits the subsequent nesciences. And since, in the case of the stream of positer and posited, it cannot be said "This is the first", there is not the defect of infinite regress.[42] Nor may it be said " Since beginninglessness is admitted of nescience, assumptiveness, as in the case of nacre-silver, is inappropriate; otherwise, the distinction between what has a beginning and what has not a beginning would be unintelligible"; just as the tower etc., posited in dreams, is in some part posited as already existent and, in some (other) part, as originated at that time, even so, in waking too, some (part) of what is to be posited is posited as with a beginning and some (other part) otherwise; hence, with this, the distinction between what has a beginning and what has not a beginning is intelligible. Hereby is explained even the distinction between effect and cause.[43]

Others, however, say thus: nescience etc.[44] are in reality certainly beginningless; in respect of these, it is not admitted that perception is creation, but only in respect of the (rest of the) world other than these. 3·712

Now, even thus, who is he that posits, in the case of ether etc., their creation, its sequence etc., which are cognised from Scripture alone? No one at all. What 3·713 basis then, have such Scriptural texts as "From the self, ether originated"?

---

[42] A continuous stream has neither beginning nor end; and this is no defect in what is recognised to be strictly like a stream; where, however, one arbitrarily assumes a beginning and says "This is first" the opponent can show that it is dependent on another and that on another, thus involving infinite regress; it is only thus that infinite regress can be a defect, not merely because of the indefiniteness of a continuous stream.

[43] With its consequence that the object, as cause of the cognition, should exist prior to and independent of the cognition.

[44] The six beginningless ones, according to this school of advaita are: jīva, Īśa, pure intelligence, the difference between jīva and Īśa, nescience, and the relation of nescience to intelligence.

3·7131 Know (then) that they have as basis the identity of the self and Brahman devoid of connection with the universe. Since the comprehension of Brahman devoid of connection with the universe comes about through superimposition and (subsequent) removal (thereof), as instrumental to that comprehension, there is in Scripture the mention of creation and destruction, not because of (their) being the purport; this is loudly proclaimed in the *Bhāṣya* etc. (It may be said) "Then, the attempt made in the quarters (of the *Sūtras*) relating to ether[45] and the vital air[46] to remedy the reciprocal conflict among the Scriptural texts about the creation of ether etc., about the order of that (creation) and so on, would, if there be no purport (in respect of them), be in vain." Not in vain (we reply); for, that (attempt) sets out on an assumption (that Scripture is purportful in regard to these), for the sake of understanding the principles (of interpretation). It has indeed been said in the *Śāstradarpaṇa*: "Assuming that the Scriptures have purport in regard to creation, this has been said here; but that is not (really) so, since they have the identity of Brahman and the self for purport".

✓

3·7132 The attainment of fruit by such observances taught in Scripture, as the jyotiṣṭoma, is on a par with the attainment of fruit produced by observances taught by

---

[45] *Ved. Sū.*, II, iii.

[46] *Ved. Sū.*, II, iv.

Scripture in dreams. And since, for the Scriptural texts about the jyotiṣṭoma etc., there is purport in regard to Brahman, through the channel of the purification of the intellect, there is no non-authoritativeness (for them); the elaboration of this and other ways, in which the position that perception is creation is supported, is to be seen, however, in the original works. This is one variety of the view that perception is creation, viz., that the creation of the universe is contemporaneous with perception.

Another variety, however, of the view that perception is creation is that which is thus shown in the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* etc.: perception itself is the creation of the universe, since there is no evidence of the difference of the seen from the seeing; also because of the traditional Code "The wise ones declare this world to be but of the nature of cognition; others, of defective vision, are deluded and see it as having an objective nature." 3·72

Some preceptors, who gain no peace of mind on either variety of the view that perception is creation, prefer the view that perception is of the created. The universe is created by the Supreme Lord in the order shown in Scripture and is certainly endowed with non-cognised reality; when in respect of each object the corresponding means of knowledge turns up, there results the perception of that (object). Nor may it be said: " If thus there be no assumptiveness for the world, (then), for that (universe) which has origination, destruction etc., as understood from Scripture, and which has practical efficiency, as understood from perception 3·8 etc., reality alone would have been admitted;" for, though there be not (mere) contemporaneity with the assumption, since it is not, like nacre-silver etc., generated by the three causes (of superimposition) consisting in sense-contact, memory impression and defect, or cognition of the substrate,[47] memory impression and defect, yet there is admitted (for it) illusoriness, consisting in removability by knowledge alone, or difference of nature from both the real and the unreal, or being the countercorrelate of the negation in all three times that is present in the locus of what is cognised;[48] on the view of reality, there would not be illusoriness of the said nature in the universe; hence, there is difference (of the present view) therefrom.

3·81 Now, thus, even for individuation and its attributes, illusoriness of the said nature results, as for ether etc., though there be no assumptiveness; hence, the attempt made in the *Bhāṣya,* the ṭīkā[49] and the *Vivaraṇa* to show the threefold cause in respect of their superimposition is in vain.

If this be said, the preceptor Citsukha says: even for individuation etc., merely apparent nature is acceptable, since, like nacre-silver, they are cognised by the bare witness (intelligence).

---

[47] Cognition of the substrate, *in its general nature,* is substituted for sense-contact, since the latter is absent from dream-delusion. Cognition of the substrate fully, in its specific nature too, removes delusion; this is what is referred to as knowledge (jñāna), when it is said that the illusory is what is removable by knowledge alone.

[48] The word "upādhi" here is used in the sense of locus (adhikaraṇa). Brahman is the locus of whatever is superficially cognised. In Brahman, the world is denied in relation to all three times—that it was not, is not and will not be; hence, there, it is the counter-correlate of such negation. The translation of "pratipanno-'pādhi" follows Kṛṣṇānanda's commentary.

[49] The "ṭīkā" in this context is the *Pañcapādikā.*

The preceptor Rāmādvaya says thus: this (attempt to show the three-fold cause) is only an argument on an assumption (of the opponent's view); for, if from the passage beginning with "For intelligence which is the evidence for the non-dual substrate, the Brahman-self", which establishes the three-fold cause there, intelligence were the instrument of valid knowledge, there would result contradiction of the postulation of the Vedānta as instrumental and so on: hence, it is clear that this is an extravagant argument (prauḍhi-vāda). 3·82

Now, since on both the views, that perception is creation and that perception is of the created, illusoriness is admitted, how is there practical efficiency for what is illusory by nature? 4·0

As in dreams we reply. Now, the practical efficiency, of the nature of bathing etc., accomplished by the dream-water etc., is certainly unreal. But what is accomplished with the water etc. of waking experience, is that real?[50] Practical efficiency of the same grade of reality (as the experience itself) exists without distinction in both: thus say some. 4·1

The author of the *Advaitavidyā*, however, says, thus: for dream objects, there is not merely such 4·2 practical efficiency as is sublated by waking; for, in the case of the damsel, the snake etc., of dreams, there is seen the generation of happiness, fear etc., unsublated by that (waking). For the happiness, fear etc., though generated by a dream content, no sublation is experienced immediately on waking; but since, on the contrary, even immediately on waking there is seen the continuance of those together with mental satisfaction, quaking of the body etc., it is concluded that they are certainly real even before (waking). Hence it is that for creatures there is desire again for the dream whose sphere is the object that produces happiness, and aversion to the dream which is not of that nature. And in a dream, the rise of happiness, fear etc., which like cognition, are of the nature of psychoses of the internal organ, is possible. Nor may it be said that it is the cognition of the dream-damsel etc., which produces happiness etc., and that that (cognition) is certainly real; for, that too, which is of the nature of such psychoses as sight and touch and is superimposed on the witness of the dream world, is established to be merely assumptive. Indeed, for him whose senses are quiescent, real psychoses of the sense of sight etc. are not possible. Nor may it be said that the mere immediacy of that content produces happiness, and that that (immediacy), being of the nature of the witness, is certainly real; for, there being experienced different grades of happiness and different grades of fear, as in touch as contrasted with sight, in the touch of the hand of the damsel as contrasted with the touch of the foot, and in the serpent's contact with a vital spot as contrasted with a non-vital spot, it must be said that in dreams too the respective grades of happiness, fear etc. are generated by different grades of the assumptive sight, touch etc.

---

[50] The translation follows the commentary. It is possible, however, to take the statement about the water of waking experience to be not a question, but a further affirmation of the objector, contrasting it with the dream content. The reply on either interpretation consists in pointing out that practical efficiency is in no case absolutely real, but corresponds to the grade of reality of the experience.

Similarly, in waking experience, darkness is assumed by one who has just entered a room, where there is a light which is capable of illumining pot etc. and is seen by another person present there; for this (darkness) there is seen such practical efficiency as is appropriate to well known darkness; for, by that (darkness) in respect of that (person) there is seen the obscuration of pot etc., the removal of that when a lamp or the like is brought in, and re-obscuration when that is taken away: thus too say some. 4·3

Others, however, (say thus): in such practical efficiency as drinking and bathing, it is the bare existence of water etc., that serves, not the reality thereof; since for that (reality) there is neither causality nor the determinant of that (causality), what (is the use) of it? Nor, this being the case, is there the contingence of such practical efficiency as is appropriate to well-known water etc., even for the water of the mirage, for nacre-silver etc. For, on the view of the author of the *Tattvaśuddhi* and others (like him), that in the water of the mirage and so on, the class water-ness etc. does not exist and that consequently the designation of the delusion with that content by the word "water" is due to its generation by a memory-impression of the former experience of what is so designated, there is not the (alleged) contingence, since there does not exist the 4·41 class water-ness etc., that brings about the respective practical efficiency.

4·42 On the view of those who, in the case of the merely apparent, adhere to empirical usage of the same class as that which was formerly seen, since even there the class, water-ness etc., does exist, as otherwise there would be conflict with the delusion designated as qualified by that, and there would be the contingence of the non-existence of activity in respect of that (delusion) on the part of those who need water, the non-existence of practical efficiency here and there is intelligible, in some cases because of the destruction of the superimposition, root and all, when the substrate is known specifically, in some (other) cases because of the destruction of the superimposition alone by the cessation (even) of the general knowledge of the substrate, and in some (other) cases (still), where by the sense of sight there is the superimposition of fire etc. on red beads etc., because of the non-superimposition of hot touch etc., that cause burning, cooking etc.; and in some cases, some kind of practical efficiency has to be recognised; further, if there has to be stated something which excludes the water of the mirage etc., and is of the nature of what is serviceable to practical efficiency, it is possible for one to give up unsublatability in all three times,[51] which is in conflict with Scripture[52] and is impossible of apprehension through perception etc., and predicate serviceability to such practical efficiency as is appropriate to silver etc., only of the silver-ness etc., not generated by special defects;[53] therefore, since practical efficiency is possible even in what is illusory, the world is certainly illusory, not real.

---

[51] This is the kind of reality that is sought to be claimed to account for practical efficiency; it is here suggested that a lower degree of reality will serve the purpose.

[52] *I.e.,* those texts which declare the illusoriness of the world.

Now, since, if illusoriness as an attribute of the world be real, there would be loss of the non-duality of Brahman, that (illusoriness) too should be said to be but illusory; consequently, whence the loss of the world's reality, when, in the manner stated by you, that the illusory connection of Brahman with the world is not opposed to its(real) non-connection, illusory illusoriness is not opposed to reality? 4·5

To this it is said thus in the *Advaitadīpikā*: illusoriness consists in having the same nature as the world of ether etc. And that negates the reality of the substrate (of which it is an attribute). And in an attribute negating an attribute opposed to itself, it is established for both disputants that what is determinative is the possession of reality of the same grade as the substrate, not of absolute reality; for, in pot-ness etc., which negate non-potness etc., absolute reality is not admitted by us. Since Brahman's connection with the world does not possess the same grade of reality as the substrate (Brahman), it does not negate the non-connection with the world. Hence too is refuted (the view), that if illusoriness be empirical, for the world's reality, which is opposed to that, and is not *merely apparent*, there 4·51 would be absolute reality; for, if illusoriness, which is of the same grade of reality as the substrate, is empirical, the substrate too should invariably be empirical.

---

[53] *E.g.*, defects of the sense-organs.

4·52 Or else, that attribute which cannot be removed by the intuition of its own locus, that is a negator of the attribute opposed to itself; for, there is seen the distinction that, in nacre, the identity with nacre, which cannot be removed by the intuition of its locus, is opposed to non-nacreity; while, in that very thing (nacre), the identity with silver, which is removable by that (intuition of the locus) is not opposed to non-silverness. And thus, since the world's illusoriness, though assumptive, cannot be removed by the intuition of the world, it is certainly the negator of (the world's) reality. As for Brahman's connection with the world, since that can be removed by the intuition of Brahman, it is not the negator of (Brahman's) non-connection with the world.

4·53 Hereby is refuted the following view: "If Brahman understood from verbal testimony be real, reality should be predicated of the capacity of verbal testimony, and of the authoritativeness of cognition through verbal testimony; for, there cannot be the establishment of an empirical object through the statement of an untrustworthy person, which has merely apparent capacity, or of a real object through such statements as those about the agnihotra, which have empirical capacity; hence, the establishment is invariably of that sense of verbal testimony which is of the same grade of reality as the capacity; and if authoritativeness consisting in non-sublation of content be unreal, the reality of the content would be inconsistent; and thus, because of the existence of a real object over and above Brahman, duality necessarily exists; consequently, even the world of ether etc. may be real". Because, practical efficiency having been established even of the empirical, the establishment of the real Brahman even from what has empirical capacity is possible; because the reality of Brahman is established from the existence of such terms as "real" in the Vedānta whose purport is Brahman; because difference (from statements about the agnihotra etc.) is intelligible in that that (reality) is not established, since such terms do not exist in the texts about agnihotra and so on, and since even where they do exist they are in conflict with the stronger Scriptural texts about the non-duality of Brahman; because, the rule about the sense of verbal testimony and its capacity having the same grade of reality has no authority; and because illusoriness is intelligible even of the authoritativeness of the knowledge of the real Brahman, since it is associated with what is other than that,[54] in the same way as the authoritativeness of the pot-cognition is associated with non-pot. Therefore, on the reasoning stated in the ārambhaṇa section, the illusoriness of the whole world of ether etc. is made firm as adamant.

Now, though illusoriness may be established of the non-intelligent world of ether etc., by such words as 5·1 ārambhaṇa,[55] since illusoriness is impossible in the case of intelligent beings, who are to experience release, it does not stand to reason that there is harmony (of the Vedāntas) in respect of the non-dual Brahman. Nor can the earlier mentioned non-difference of these from Brahman stand to reason, since for these, which are reciprocally different, non-difference from the one Brahman is impossible. Nor is their difference not established, since it is established by the distinctions of happiness, misery etc.

---

[54] Validity consists in being that experience wherein for what has Brahman-hood, Brahman-hood is cognised as the predicate; it is, therefore, associated with something over and above Brahman, viz., Brahman-hood; and in thus passing beyond the one absolute real, it becomes less than real, i.e., illusory.

5·2 If this be said, no (says the non-dualist), since, on their non-difference too, that distinction is intelligible even because of differences in the external adjuncts.

5·21 Now, since their non-difference is not lost, even though there be differences in the external adjuncts, how (can there be) the distinction? Indeed, the non-intermixture of conflicting attributes, which has to be explained through differences in the locus, does not result from the admission of difference in something other than that.

5·211 To this some say thus: the distinction of happiness, misery etc., does certainly result from difference in the external adjunct, viz., the internal organ, since by such Scriptural texts as "Desire, purpose, doubt, faith and the absence of it, firmness and the absence of it, modesty, keenness of intellect, fear, all these are in the mind alone," and "Vijñāna (*i.e.*, the mind) performs the sacrifice ", it is that alone which is declared to be the locus of all evil, while by such Scriptural texts as "Unattached indeed is this person", and "He who is unattached is indeed unaffected ", absolute indifference is declared in the case of intelligence. Nor, this being the case, is there conflict with the experience of the apposition of bondage, like agency, with intelligence; for, the internal organ being superimposed as identical with intelligence, the experience of the attributes of that (organ) as in apposition with intelligence is intelligible. Nor may it be said that, if the internal organ be the locus of bondage like agency, the intelligent one would not be the transmigrator; for, it is admitted that his transmigration consists only in being the substrate of the superimposition of identity with the knot of individuation,[56] which is the locus of bondage like agency; for, even with this, the conceit of the self as the locus of evil is intelligible, like the conceit "This is to be feared" in the rope etc., the substrate of the superimposition of identity with the snake, which is the locus of fearfulness; and it is in this view alone that there are found texts of Scripture and the traditional Code, such as "As if contemplating, as if moving" and "The self confounded by individuation thinks 'I am the agent' ".

---

[55] *I.e.*, "modification" of speech, that being the way in which the world is characterised by the Chāndogya, on the advaitin's interpretation of it.

Nor may it be said: "Since in one and the same self there are superimposed the respective internal organs, which are the loci of diverse happinesses and miseries, the distinction of the happiness, misery etc., of which there is a conceit in the self, does not result even thus"; for, just as in the case of the host of evil present in the internal organ, which has attained superimposition of identity, even of the reciprocal differences therein, there is the conceit of (their) belonging to the self; and the distinction in that (enjoyment) is intelligible, through difference, which is of the same kind as the self's experience of evil. Hereby is refuted (the objection): "Though happiness, misery etc., are attributes of the internal organ, yet since the experience of these is of the nature of the witness and since that is one, there does not result distinction in enjoyment consisting in the experience of happiness and misery (by different persons at different times)"; for, it is only for that witness, which, by attaining identity with the respective internal organs, is differentiated through the differences of the respective internal organs, that there is experience of the happiness, misery etc. of the respective internal organs; hence, that distinction too is intelligible.

---

[56] Individuation, the substrate of I-ness, is called the knot of the heart, for it is there that the strands of the self and not-self, the subject and the object, the "not-this" and the "this" appear to cross and get inter-twined, so that there is superimposition of either on the other,

5·212 Others, however, say thus: since the inert cannot intelligibly be the locus of bondage like agency, (and) because of the aphorism "(The self is) the agent, because the sacred teaching is purportful", which declares the intelligent one alone to be the locus of these, the locus of bondage is the reflection of intelligence in the internal organ; and since this, which is unreal, which is different from the (original) image, is different in each (individual's) internal organ, there are such distinctions as learned and unlearned, happy and miserable, agent and non-agent. Nor, if thus the superimposed be the locus of bondage, is there the contingence of bondage and release having different loci; for, since this reflection of intelligence is superimposed on the absolutely real jīva, which, as (intelligence) defined by the internal organ, is real in its essential nature and persists in release, his bondage is admitted to consist in being the substrate of the superimposition of identity with the reflection of intelligence, which (reflection) is the locus of agency.

Yet others, however, say thus: in the text "The wise ones declare him to be an enjoyer who is conjoined with the body, the organs and the mind," enjoyership is declared of that intelligent being, who is conjoined with the body and the organs as auxiliaries and with the mind, by way of identity; therefore, since through differences of the internal organ there are differences in what is qualified thereby, there is distinction (because of these latter differences). Nor is there a difference of locus (for bondage and release) in that bondage is for the (internal organ) qualified, while release is for the pure; for, the bondage present in the qualified does not fail to attach to the substrate (viśeṣya), while (the substrate included in) the qualified is not other (than that pure one).[57] 5·213

---

[57] The translation of "viśiṣṭasyā 'natirekāt" follows the explanation of the commentator: viśiṣṭā-'ntargata-viśeṣyasya kevalād anatirekād ity arthaḥ. The man with the staff is recognised to be non-different from the same man merely as man; this recognition is not sublated; therefore, the man, the substrate in the cognition of the qualified-man-with-the-staff, is essentially identical with mere man; the difference, as qualified or as not qualified, is assumptive.

5·214 Still others, however, say thus: let the pure intelligent being be the locus of bondage like agency, since on the analogy of the redness of the crystal, there is admitted the superimposition of another agency etc., even on the intelligent being, because of the proximity of the locus of agency etc., whether that be the internal organ or what is qualified thereby. Nor, because of that being one, is distinction unintelligible; for, that is intelligible even because of differences in the external adjunct. Nor may it be said that because of differences in one (thing), there cannot be a distinction among conflicting attributes in another (thing); for, merely through the external adjunct of the nature of the base or the top, there is seen in the tree the distinction between conjunction and the absence thereof;[58] it is also seen that in the case of the ether which has become the sense of hearing,[59] there are, through differences in the adjunct, viz., the respective ear-cavities of various persons, such diversities as perceiving or not perceiving sound, and perceiving what is high or low, pleasant or unpleasant.

5·215 A few, however, say thus: if the distinction among conflicting attributes has to be explained by difference of locus alone, then, on the intelligent being alone, that has been distinguished (from adjuncts), let there be positing of difference, because of the influence of adjuncts, since it is not admitted anywhere that only that difference, which has a non-assumptive locus, can effect the distinction;[60] while, through differences posited by such adjuncts as a gem, a mirror, and a sword, distinction is admitted among such attributes of the face as darkness, fairness, roundness or length, and (it is admitted) among such attributes as that of a lamp being nearer or farther away, through differences posited by the adjunct, viz., the pressing of the finger.[61]

---

[58] The same tree is both conjoined and not conjoined with a monkey, according as we are thinking of the base or the top of the tree. The difference of the adjunct, base or top, accounts for the distinction between conjunction and non-conjunction.

[59] According to the advaitavedānta, the sense-organs proceed from the various elements; the element of ether becomes the sense of hearing; similarly, the element of fire becomes the sense of sight; and so on. See the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

When thus it is possible to explain distinction as due to the influence of adjuncts, it should be determined which is the adjunct that accounts for the jīvas' non-recollection of one another's happiness etc. 6·0

Here, some say thus: the non-difference and difference of the abode of enjoyment constitute the adjuncts that account for recollection and non-recollection; for, the pain defined by the body is recollected as defined by that, while the pain defined by the foot is not recollected as defined by the hand, since there is not the cognition "I, as defined by the hand, experience the pain defined by the foot". How, then, is there operation of the hand to remove the thorn that has run into the foot? This operation of the hand is not due to a 6·1 recollection (of the pain) as (belonging to the self) defined by the hand; since, as between the organ and the organism, the foot and the body, there is no difference, the pain defined by the foot is recollected as (of the self) defined by the body, in the form " I have a pain in the foot"; (the operation of the hand) is due to this recollection, rather. Thus, since there is no non-difference between the bodies of Caitra and Maitra, the pain defined by Caitra's body is not recollected as defined by Maitra's body; nor is it recollected as defined by another organism common to both the bodies, since there does not exist even an abode of enjoyment consisting in an organism common to both (bodies); therefore, there is not the contingence of the operation of Maitra's body to remove the thorn that has run into Caitra's body.

---

[60] Vyavasthā is both distinction and adjustment consequent thereon; the same word "distinction" has been used throughout, but "adjustment" should be understood where suitable.

[61] The illustration is not very clear, but this seems to be what is meant: when the finger is pressed against the eye-ball, a lamp in front seems either to advance or to recede, *i.e.*, appear in front of where it really is (paurastya) or behind where it really is (pāścātya).

6·2 Others, however, say thus: what accounts for non-recollection is the difference of disjoined adjuncts. And thus, even if for that (self) defined by the hand there be admitted recollection of the pain defined by the foot, there is no defect. Nor, this being the case, is there the contingence of the recollection of the mother's happiness by the one in the womb,[62] for what are intended by the word "disjoined" are those which do not enter as organs into a single organism, and the two bodies of the mother and of the (being in the) womb are so (disjoined). Nor may it be said that recollection is understood (to exist) even where there is disjunction, because of the (following) statement of the *Bhārata*: "Lo! even (headless) trunks, with weapons held aloft in their arms, and looking through the eyes in their own severed heads, felled down (their) enemies"; for, even there, the head and the trunk are such as can enter (and had entered) as organs into one organism; further, when the head was cut off, there must necessarily have occurred either swooning or death; therefore, that kind of statement opposed to perception has for purport the praise of the excessive enthusiasm of combatants, on the *a fortiori* principle; and even if it be a praise of the existent, as having for content special persons endowed with such power, non-recollection being accounted for as a general rule by the (cause) set forth (by us) is not nullified. For the same reason, in the views stated and to be stated, there is not the contingence of defect because of the recollection of what occurs in another body, by yogins and those who remember (other) births.

---

[62] The upādhis of the child and the mother, in this case, are not disjoined (viślişṭa). To meet this objection, the word "viślişṭa" is more carefully defined in the next sentence.

Yet others, however, say thus: the identity and difference of bodies constitute the adjuncts that account for recollection and the absence thereof, since, in the case of the experience of infancy and another existence, there are seen (respectively) recollection and the absence thereof. Nor may difference of body be suspected even as between infancy and youth, since there is recognition (of the body as one). Nor may difference in that be understood because of difference in size; for, just as by differences of base and top in the case of the same tree, so, in the case of the same body, the attaching of more than one size is intelligible through difference in time. "Now, without the increase of parts, there is no 6·3 difference in size, and the parts that arrive later do not attach to the body as it exists already; hence, if there is a difference of size, a difference of body is necessary"; if this be said, no (we reply); for, the light, which pervades the central hall of a story, spreads out simultaneously with the lighting of the lamp, and contracts simultaneously with the veiling of it; by him who follows this (view of expansion and contraction), there is not admitted the view of the creation (of the effect) from the primal atom onwards (by accretion); and on the view of (the effect being an) illusory manifestation, the growth of the body is intelligible through māyā, even without the increase of parts, in the same way as (that of) the body exhibited by magic.

6·4 Still others, however, declare the distinction between recollection and non-recollection (to result) through the non-difference or difference of the internal organs. And this view has been explained earlier.

6·5 Some, however, adopt the manifoldness of ignorances, which are the adjuncts for the differences of the jīva, and declare the distinction between recollection and non-recollection (to result) through the non-difference or difference of that (ignorance).

6·61 Here some say thus: in the section (beginning with the aphorism) "A part, because of the teaching of diversity", (there are) the following aphorisms: "Since the unseen potency is not restrictive", "And even in the case of resolve etc., it is the same", "If it be said (that enjoyment is) from attachment to a (specific) locality, no, because of its entry (into other bodies as well)"; if, following these aphorisms and the commentary thereon, distinction be not admitted in (the experience of) one and the same self through differences of adjuncts, then, even on the view of different selves, in the manner of Kaṇāda and others, there is parity in the unintelligibility of the distinction (in respect of enjoyment). It is thus: when, by the thorn that has run into Caitra's foot, there is originated pain for Caitra, why is pain not generated for other selves too, since, all selves being all-pervasive, there is no difference (among them) as to the entry into Caitra's body? Nor is there the distinction that he, whose body the thorn has pierced and so on, for him alone there is pain, not for others; for, it is not possible to restrict the body, that is originated in the proximity of all the selves, to belong to some one (self) alone, not to others. Nor is there the restriction that the body originated by some one's unseen potency belongs to that one, since even for unseen potency restriction has not been established. When, indeed, in order to originate that unseen potency, the mind unites with some one self, it certainly unites then with other selves too; when the cause is common, how can that unseen potency originate in some one alone? "Now, though the mere union with the mind is common, the resolve 'I shall attain this fruit', the volition that is favourable to the act originating unseen potency, these and such others are distinct (for the different selves); hence, from this alone may result the restriction of unseen potency"; if this be said, no (is the reply); for, resolve etc. being originated by the conjunction with the mind, which (conjunction) is common (to all selves), distinction is not established even for them. "Now, since cognition with one's own mind is the cause of resolve etc., the conjunction of the mind becomes itself non-common"; that is not (so); for, it is not possible to restrict the mind, which is eternal and conjoined to all selves, as the property of any one alone. Nor because of particularities of unseen potency does there result for particular selves the relationship of property and owner, in respect of the mind; for, even of that unseen potency, as (said) before, distinction is not established. "Now, though the selves are pervasive, only particular loci[63] in them are subject to bondage; hence, since, for other selves, there is not (the occupation of) that particular locus in Caitra's body, there may be the distinction among happiness, misery etc."; that is not (so); for, when Maitra arrives at the very locus, which Caitra has left after enjoying happiness etc., happiness, misery etc., are seen even for the former; hence, into certain bodies there enter the loci specific to (unseen potency etc. of) other selves too. Therefore, even if the selves be different, the distinction is certainly difficult to explain. And in explaining it somehow, it is proper to recognise the unity of the self, because of conformity to Scripture and because of parsimony, and explain it on that (basis) alone.

6·62 "Let the selves, then, be but atomic, if distinction is not easy to make out, on (the view of their) pervasiveness". Not so; for, if the selves be atomic, the rise sometimes of happiness in all the parts (of the body), which (happiness) is (yet) located in the hand, head or foot, would be unintelligible.

---

[63] Pradeśa, locality, is here used in the sense of the locus of the unseen potency etc., belonging to the self: ātmano yaḥ pradeśo 'dṛṣṭādy-āśrayas sa evā 'tra pradeśa-śabda-'rthaḥ.

6·621 Here is a statement of what (some) moderns assume: because of the declarations of going up, departure and return being unintelligible otherwise, and because of the explicit declarations of atomicity in such Scriptural texts as "This self, whom these two, merit and demerit, bind, is indeed atomic", and "The hundredth part of the point of a goad", the jīvas are certainly atomic. Though they are atomic, there is no non-cognition of happiness in all parts (of the body), since cognition, happiness etc. have the property of pervading localities extending beyond their locus, on the analogy of the light of a lamp. Since jīvas have parts, in conformity with the traditional Code[64] "Droṇa is a part of Bṛhaspati", there is no unintelligibility whatever in the simultaneity of the happiness, misery etc., common to the head, hands, feet etc., or in the diversity of enjoyment of the yogins, who have entered a multiplicity of bodies. And thus, there being no confusion among the jīvas, because of their atomicity, there is the distinction of happiness, misery etc., as also difference from the Lord, who is pervasive.

6·6221 To this it is said (in reply) in the *Advaitadīpikā*: even thus, how does the distinction result? For, it is difficult to avoid Caitra's recollection of the happiness or misery present in Maitra, in the same way as Caitra's recollection of the happiness or misery present in different members of himself, in the form "There is pain in the foot, but a pleasant feeling in the head". The difference of his members from the jīva, Caitra, is not, indeed, distinct from that of Maitra (from Caitra); for, there is necessarily difference of the members from the jīva, in the case of those who, in animating a plurality of bodies, are capable of dissociating (themselves from one body) and passing on to another; and difference *cum* non-difference is admitted by you, as between the members and the whole.

---

[64] The word "smṛti" has been loosely used to refer to the *Bhārata*, which is an itihāsa.

6·6222 Nor may it be said that pure difference accounts for non-recollection. The purity of the difference should, indeed, consist in non-concomitance with the relation of member and whole or in non-concomitance with non-difference. Not the first; for, the jīva being taught to be a member of Brahman, by such Scriptural texts, traditional Codes and aphorisms as "He is, indeed, a member of the Supreme", "An eternal part of myself (having become a jīva) in the world of jīvas," "A part, because of the teaching of diversity," there is the contingence of confusion of enjoyment, as between the jīva and Brahman.[65]

Now (it may be said) the jīva is not a member in respect of Brahman, in the same way in which the members of the jīva are in respect of the jīva; being a member is (but) figurative and consists rather in being inferior while being similar to that (other), as "The orb of Jupiter is a hundredth part of the orb of the moon"; if this be said, (we ask) what other than this is membership in the principal sense which belongs to the members of the jīva in respect of the jīva and which is introduced into the body[66] of what accounts for non-recollection? It is not the relationship of creation as (there is) for threads in respect of cloth, since the jīva is beginningless; nor is it a relationship of locality, as (there is) for pot-ether etc., in respect of ether at large; nor is it that of being a piece, as of pieces of stone broken off with a chisel; for, being atomic, (the jīva) has no localities and cannot be broken up. If it be said that to be different and (yet) non-different is what it is to be considered a member, no (we reply); for, in that case, there is the contingence of confusion of enjoyment between the jīva and the Lord and among the jīvas themselves; for, among these, which are in themselves different, non-difference too is admitted by you, because of (their) being intelligent; further on the view of you, who maintain difference *cum* non-difference as between an assembly and its members, there exists even reciprocal non-difference among the jīvas included in a single assembly, since through the non-difference of (another from) the assembly non-different from oneself, the non-difference of oneself too (from that other) is difficult to avoid;[67] for, the rule that what is non-different from that which is non-different from another is non-different from that other[68] is admitted by you who say "If for conjunction etc., and for the genus there be location in more than one, then, because of the non-difference of the quality from what has the quality and so on, even for cloth etc., non-different from the conjunction that is non-different from pot, there would result non-difference from pot." Nor is there any other non-difference between members and the whole, which accounts for recollection even in the midst of difference, other than the non-difference based on such attributes common to other jīvas as similarity in respect of being intelligent or in respect of being included in one assembly; (if there were such non-difference) its mention could be intended, to avoid undue extension; for, if that were the case, it would follow that that alone should be distinctively mentioned. If it be said that it is distinctive of the non-difference between members and the whole not to be based on similarity of attributes etc., no (we reply); for, it is the case that their non-difference is based on similarity of attributes etc., since, as between the jīva and its members there is similarity of attribute in respect of being intelligent and so on, and since there is (membership of) an assembly, both when they (the jīva and the members) are defined by a single body, and when there is a gathering together of a plurality of bodies (animated by different members of a yogin's jīva). If it be said that though there may be another non-difference based on similarity of attributes etc., the non-difference between the jīva and its members, based on the relationship of members to the whole, is not based on that (other similarity), no (we reply), since there are not two non-differences between them; for, in your system, when the locus is identical, plurality is not admitted whether of difference or of non-difference, either through difference in the counter-correlate or in the form of it.[69] Therefore, undue extension is well established on the first alternative. Even by this is refuted the second alternative too; for, if difference non-concomitant with non-difference accounted for non-recollection, then, since, in the manner stated, there, is, in your system, non-difference too between the jīva and Brahman, and among the jivas, undue extension would be difficult to avoid.

---

[65] Brahman and the jīva are related as the whole and a member; pure difference is non-concomitant with this relation; therefore, there is not the condition which accounts for non-recollection; hence the possibility of confusion between the enjoyments of the two. The relation of aṃśa and aṃśin is, of course, assumed by the advaitin for argument's sake.

---

[66] *I.e.*, "is made a constituent of."

[67] A, a member of the assembly A_1, is non-different from A_1, which in turn is non-different from another member, B; therefore, A is non-different from B.

---

[68] That is to say, that A which is non-different from B, which again is non-different from C, is non-different from C.

"Now, since it is the perception of non-difference that accounts for recollection, in its absence, there is non-recollection; since the non-difference of oneself from oneself and from one's own members is perceived, there is recollection of misery etc., for him who sees that; since non-difference from other selves though it may exist is not perceptible to him, there is not the recollection of their misery etc.; in the case of him, who remembers other births, since there does exist perception of non-difference from the self of the earlier existence, there is recollection of incidents therein; since for others there is not that (perception), there is not (recollection); all such things are thus consistent". If 6·623 this be said, even on the view of the self as one, because of the ignorance that obscures its being the self of all, there is not for Caitra the perception of non-difference from the self of Maitra etc.; since all distinctions are intelligible even because of this, the admission of differences in the self, in conflict with Scripture, is futile.

---

[69] *I.e.*, in what defines the counter-correlateness (pratiyogitva).

6·624 Nor even thus can the distinction be supported by you who maintain the reality of the world; for, there being necessarily for the omniscient Lord the perception of the real non-difference from other jīvas, when the jīvas are miserable, there is (for the Lord) the contingence of the experience "I am miserable". In our system, however, the Lord, though perceiving transmigration in the jīva non-different from Himself, like the impurity in the reflected face, yet does not grieve, because of the certitude of (its) illusoriness; hence there is not that contingence.

6·625 "Be this so. Let not difference as among members be the substrate of hands, head, feet etc., and of the plurality of bodies (animated by a single jīva); since for the lamp of the self there is the indestructible pervasive light of knowledge, that itself may become the substrate of all". If this be said, no (we reply); for, of the experience of happiness and misery, which, like knowledge, is an attribute of the self, origination in dependence on knowledge is impossible; therefore, there is the contingence of the non-existence of diversity of enjoyment through differences of limbs like hands and feet, in the case of the organism, or through differences of bodies, in the case of him who has a plurality of bodies. If it be admitted that experience of happiness and misery and so on is an attribute of knowledge itself and not of the self, then, through their diversity, though difference may result for knowledge, which is an attribute of the self, difference does not result for the self; therefore, it is not possible through diversity of enjoyment and so on to negate the non-difference of the self; there is also the abandonment of the view that, because of the self, the locus of enjoyment etc., being atomic and consequently delimited for each body, there is not the contingence of the confusion of the attributes of all, as on the doctrine of its pervasiveness and on the doctrine of its non-difference. Therefore, the explanation of distinction by admitting the atomicity of the self does not stand to reason.

Nor even does the establishment thereby of the difference of that (jīva) from the Lord stand to reason. On the view of you, who say that, because of the Scriptural declaration of going up etc., and the express Scriptural declaration of atomicity, the jīva is atomic, it would follow that even the supreme (self) is atomic, because of the declaration of entry in such Scriptural texts as "Having created that, He entered that itself", "He, who, having entered the people, rules them", and "The two entered, dwelling on the highest summit," and because of the express declaration of atomicity in the Scriptural text "The small one, this mantra self, within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice or a grain of barley"; whence then the establishment of difference 6·6261 between the supreme (self) and the jīva through (their) pervasiveness and atomicity (respectively)?

6·6262 Now, (it may be said), the all-pervasiveness of the supreme (self) is established because of such Scriptural declarations as "All-pervasive like the ether and eternal" and "Greater than the sky, greater than heaven", and because of being the material cause of the entire universe; therefore, the Scriptural texts about His atomicity should be understood to be for the purpose of contemplation or (made) in the view of the difficulty of apprehending (Him); and the Scriptural texts about entry are to be explained as relating to adjuncts like the body. Nor may it be doubted that even the Scriptural texts about the jīva's going up etc. may be supported as relating to the adjunct, the intellect; for, (in the words) "That (jīva) going up, the prāṇa goes up after", the going up of the jīva is mentioned even as prior to the going up of the intellect, which is (here) called the prāṇa; there is also the Scriptural declaration of departure, even after release from name and form, (in the text) "Thus, the enlightened one, released from name and form, reaches the Shining Person, who is higher than the highest;" there is also cited the illustration of the waggon, which is naturally the locus of motion, (in the text) "Just as a well laden waggon goes creaking, even so this embodied self goes forth shouting, mounted by the intelligent self".

6·6263 If this be said, that is not sound (we reply); for, pervasiveness is declared even of the jīva in such Scriptural texts as "He is, verily, that great unborn self, who consists of knowledge," "Just as, when a pot is carried, the pot alone is carried, not the ether enclosed by it, even so is the jīva compared to the ether"; since, in your system, material causality in respect of the world belongs to Primal Nature alone, there is not for Brahman the material causality of the world; further, the material causality of the world is possible for it, though atomic, in the same way as the jīva's material causality of the happiness and misery present in a plurality of bodies (animated by itself); for these two reasons the pervasiveness of that (Brahman) is not established by that (material causality); if for the Scriptural texts about its entry there be assumed reference to the body as the adjunct, in the case of the Scriptural texts about the jīva going up etc., it is possible to admit reference to the intellect as the adjunct; since in the commentary on the aphorism "Five-fold activity is taught (of the prāṇa) as of the mind", difference is taught between the intellect and prāṇa because of difference in their products, it is intelligible that when the intellect-conditioned jīva goes up first, the prāṇa goes after it; the Scriptural declaration of the attainment of Brahman after release from name and form is opposed to pervasiveness as much in the case of Brahman, the attained, as in the case of the jīva who attains. In the system of him who maintains that, even after release from material name and form, Brahman has to be attained as associated with a non-material world, form etc., since even for the jīva who attains there exist non-material body, organs etc., there is no opposition to the declaration of the attainment of

Brahman (by the jīva) as conditioned by these; if by the mere citation of the example of the waggon, the natural locus of motion, there should result natural motion for the jīva, then, because of proximity to the jīva, the natural locus of entry, in "The two entered the cave", it is possible to establish entry as natural for Brahman too; for, the one word "entered", which attaches to both Brahman and the jīva, should be said to have for purport a single form of entry. Therefore, since in the system of others, there is not established the distinction between Brahman and the jīva, as pervasive and atomic, the desire to establish difference thereon has to be left far behind. In our system, since intermediate texts have to be interpreted in conformity with major texts, whose purport is the identity of Brahman and the self, the explanation of the Scriptural texts making out the difference of the jīva from Brahman is in some such way as that pervasiveness belongs to the jīva in his own nature and finitude to his form as conditioned by adjuncts; this (explanation) is clear in the *Bhāṣya* etc. Therefore, because of the illusoriness of the non-intelligent world and because of the non-difference of the world of intelligence from Brahman, there is no conflict whatever in the harmony of the Vedāntas in respect of Brahman that can be attained by knowledge alone.

END OF CHAPTER TWO.

CHAPTER III.

Now, when it is said, in the traditional Code, "The means of attaining that, O Great Sage, have been declared to be knowledge and karma," that karma too is a means of attainment, how can the attainment of Brahman be through knowledge alone? True, (but) (there is) the Scriptural declaration "No other path (is known)" etc.; further, nothing other than knowledge can be instrumental to the attainment of the eternally existent Brahman, (a process) analogous to the attainment of a golden necklet worn round the neck, but forgotten; because of these reasons, that kind of traditional Code signifies the need for karma (only) indirectly, in the attainment of Brahman. What, then, is the utility of karma? 1·0

Here, the followers of the *Bhāmatī* view say (thus): its utility is in respect of (generating) the *desire* to know, which is a means of attaining Brahman, through the acquisition of knowledge; (they say this), because of the text "This the brāhmaṇas desire to know, by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting." Now, why should it not be useful in respect of the knowledge (itself), which is to be desired? No; because of the sense of the suffix (i.e., the *san*-suffix, signifying desire), and because of the *Bhāṣya* on the section commencing with III, iv, 27, on *Sarvāpekṣā* which says "Calmness, equanimity etc. are proximate means to knowledge, being related (directly) to knowledge, while sacrifice etc. are (comparatively) 1·1 external means, being related (only) to the desire to know.'' Now, if he, who practises sacrifice etc. for the sake of the desire to know, has a desire (for the Veda), then, the desire to know exists already; if there is no (such) desire, there cannot result any desire for the desire to know, which (latter) is instrumental to knowledge; hence, since there would be no performance of sacrifice etc. for the sake of the desire to know, it is not meet to hold that sacrifice etc. are applied (i.e., directed) to the desire to know. If this be said, no (we reply). He, who has become lean because of distaste for food, has, in order to remedy that (leanness), a desire, of the nature of a turning to food; but there is not generated in him that taste (for food), which will lead him to activity in respect of it, because there is the defect of disordered humours, due to intense indigestion etc.; hence, medicine is prescribed to cure that disease. So too, for the person, who has, by virtue of the clarity of intellect, generated by obligatory and expiatory rites practised without a desire for fruit, during many prior existences, gained faith in respect of this sense (of Śruti) that Brahman is of the nature of unsurpassable bliss, and that knowledge is the means of attaining that, (for such a one) there is desire, in the nature of a turning towards the attainment of Brahman, and knowledge (as the means thereto); yet, such taste, as will lead to activity in respect of hearing (study) etc., which are means of knowing Brahman, does not arise, because of obstruction by the defect of sins accumulated in (prior) existences without beginning, which bring about a leaning towards enjoyment of (sense-) objects, in the same way as there is a leaning to prohibited acts, for a person subject to desires, even though he has faith in Scriptural authority; hence, as a consequence of the removal of the obstruction, that (taste) is brought about through sacrifice etc.; (and) the prescription of these is intelligible.

Those, who follow the *Vivaraṇa,* however, say thus: 1·2
the rule, that of the two—the sense of the stem and the sense of the suffix—the sense of the suffix is of greater force, is a general rule; of greater force than this is the special rule, established by (a consideration of) such texts as "He who desires heaven" etc., that the instrumentality taught by verbal testimony relates only to that which is taught by verbal testimony to be the object of desire. In such wordly usage as "He desires to go on a horse, he desires to kill with a knife," the means, such as horse etc., are understood to relate only to the going etc., the object of the desire signified by the *san*-suffix. So, too, in the case of the prescription signified by the imperative suffix, in such Vedic usage as "That is to be sought, that, verily, is to be desired to be known", "That is to be reflected on, contemplated." Hence, sacrifice etc. apply (i.e., are directed) to knowledge that is signified by the stem (in the word vividiṣanti).

Now, this being so, there would result the practice 1·21
of karma right up to the dawn of knowledge; there would then be contradicted, in respect of renunciation consisting in the abandonment of karma, its subservience to knowledge, as established by the Scriptural declarations like "Only by him who has renounced is

that to known." If this be said, no (we reply). Before the seed is sown, there is ploughing; after that, there is no ploughing; thus, the growth of rice etc. results both from ploughing and not ploughing; likewise in conformity with the saying "For the saint, who desires to attain yoga, karma is said to be the cause; for the same person, who has attained yoga, calmness (non-activity) is said to be the cause," there is practice of karma till, on the purification of the intellect, there is the rise of a leaning towards what is within (i.e., the self), in the form of a desire to know; thence follows renunciation; thus is admitted the rise of knowledge from both karma and the renunciation thereof. It is, indeed, said in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*: "Karmas, securing for the intellect through its purification a leaning towards what is within, achieve their object and disappear, even as clouds, at the end of the rainy season." Even on the view that karmas subserve knowledge, karma is practised only up to (the generation of) the desire for knowledge. If, therefore, it is asked "What is the difference between this view and that of subservience to the desire for knowledge?" this (we say) is the difference; on the view that karmas subserve knowledge, even though they are quiescent (i.e., are abandoned) after securing the desire for knowledge, which is a channel (to knowledge), yet there is a rule (understood) that they generate knowledge by securing the means, which lead up to the fruit when accompanied by cessation of activity, viz., unhindered hearing (study), reflection and contemplation, through the attainment of an excellent preceptor. On the view, however, of their subservience to the desire for knowledge, they achieve their object even with securing an intense desire capable of generating activity in respect of hearing (study) etc.; hence, there is no necessary rule that they generate knowledge; this is on the view that karmas subserve purification—consisting in the removal of impurities and the endowment of (good) qualities—which secures capacity for knowledge of the self, a view founded on the traditional Code "Of him for whom these eight and forty purificatory ceremonies" etc.

Now, of what karmas is the application taught by the Scriptural text cited?[1] 1·3

To this, it is said by some: by the words "study of the Veda" the duties of the student are indicated; similarly, the duties of the house-holder, by the words "by sacrifice and by gifts"; and the duties of the forest-dweller, by the words "by penance, by fasting"; hence, it is the duties of the various orders of life that alone serve (to bring about) knowledge. Hence it is that in the *Vedānta Sūtra*[2] "Even (for him who is not desirous of release) the karma of his own order of life (is compulsory) since it is enjoined", there is used, in respect of karma (which is) for the sake of knowledge, the term "karma of his own order of life." 1·31

---

[1] The reference is to *Bṛh.*, IV, 4, 22, "This, the brāhmaṇas desire to know" etc.

[2] III, iv, 32.

1·321 In the *Kalpataru*, however, it is said thus: it is not the duties pertaining to the various orders of life that alone serve (to bring about) knowledge; for, the utility in respect of knowledge, even of the acts of those, who, like widowers etc., are outside any order (of life), is established in the section[3] "Even for those outside (the orders of life), (there is competency for knowledge), that being seen." Nor may it be objected that this section is intended to establish, in the case of widowers etc., who being outside any order have (yet) had the desire for knowledge aroused in them by sacrifice etc. performed in prior existences, their competency for the means of knowledge, viz., hearing (study) etc., and (that it is) not (intended) to establish the utility of the karmas practised by them (in this life) in respect of knowledge; for, it is explicitly said in an aphorism[4] of that section, "And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed on them) through special acts," and in the commentary thereon, that even japa (prayer) etc., which are duties pertaining to caste, as such, (not to a particular order of life, in the caste), are useful in respect of knowledge; (as for) the expression "karma of his own order", in the aphorism "Even (for him who is not desirous of release), the karma of his own order of life (is compulsory) since it is enjoined", that is used to imply the duties of (one's) caste as well. In this view it is said: "Utility in respect of knowledge exists even in the case of duties other than those pertaining to the orders of life; it

---

[3] III, iv, 36.

[4] III, iv, 38.

(belongs), however, only to obligatory (rites). Their fruit, viz., diminution of sin, is, indeed, needed by knowledge, not the fruit of karma performed for a desired end, such as heaven etc."[5] Just as, when subsidiaries, whose utility is settled in the archetype (the prakṛti rite), are transferred (to a vikṛti rite),[6] no utility may be assumed for them, other than that obtaining in the archetype, even so, of sacrifice etc., enjoined in the case of knowledge, there may not be assumed, besides what (fruit) is settled for obligatory rites, i.e., the diminution of sin, any utility in respect of knowledge common to both obligatory and optional rites.

In the *Saṅkṣepaśarīraka,* however, there is 1·322 declared the application of both obligatory and optional rites; for, there is no distinction in (the denotation of) the words "sacrifice" etc. (in the Scriptural text). The subsidiaries, whose utility is settled in respect of the archetype, are related to the modelled rite by transfer, only through the transference of their utility as settled in the archetype; their utility is not assumed after their transfer; hence, there is not, in that case, the possibility of assuming any utility other than that settled in the archetype. Here, however, sacrifice etc.

---

[5] It may be said that though obligatory rites and optional rites (for particular ends) have different specific results of their own, yet there may be assumed some fruit common to both, so that both may subserve knowledge. Such a contention is answered in the next sentence.

[6] Rites may be broadly divided into principal and subsidiary. In some cases, a principal rite is enjoined together with its full complement of subsidiaries. This serves as the archetype (prakṛti) on which are modelled other (vikṛti) rites. The subsidiary rites of the vikṛtis have to be obtained by transfer (atideśa) from the prakṛti, except where explicitly prescribed.

are primarily enjoined directly by Scripture; utility has to be posited later, in their case, as in the case of subsidiaries primarily laid down (and not obtained by transfer). Why, then, should this not be assumed as common to all obligatory and optional rites, (which are) understood by the (use of the) general name (sacrifice), even though this be not settled as necessary to support the application (of sacrifice etc. to the pursuit of knowledge), as primarily understood? Even by those who inquire into (the regulations for) sacrifices etc., it is admitted that, in sacrifices etc., there is fixation to the fruit (already) settled, only where things are related (as subsidiaries to the vikṛti) through their utility (in the prakṛti). Where, however, utility is posited after the relation of a thing (as a subsidiary), utility, though not (already) settled, is to be posited in conformity with the nature of the thing which is applied (as a subsidiary). It is only in the acceptance of this principle that in order to secure (an occasion for) the commencement (of the discussion) of the nature of sublation, it is established in the beginning of the tenth chapter (of the *Pūrva Mimāṃsā*), that (the subsidiaries) of the archetype are related to the modelled rite, through their utility (in the former). Further, if it be admitted that there is an injunction only in respect of obligatory rites, because of there being no (other) settled utility, then, the injunction (in "by sacrifice, by gifts" etc.) would be futile, if the diminution of sin from (the performance of) obligatory rites and the rise of knowledge therefrom be otherwise established; if they be not otherwise established, there would be no distinction (between obligatory and optional rites), since the origination of the service needed by knowledge is not settled (as the fruit even) of obligatory rites; hence, it is difficult to avoid a prescription common to obligatory and optional rites. Now, it may be said, "Though it is otherwise established of obligatory rites (that their performance is) the cause of diminution of sin, in general, it is not established in particular that it removes the sin, which is an obstacle to the rise of knowledge; but, when there is this injunction, obligatory rites being performed with a view to knowledge, knowledge necessarily comes about; otherwise, purity alone (would result); the rise of knowledge being (thus) not invariable, the injunction is purposeful." (To this we say), then, even in the case of obligatory rites, the channels (of knowledge), viz., the destruction of the sin that is an obstacle to the rise of knowledge, and the unseen potency which secures the attainment of an excellent preceptor and hearing (study), reflection etc., are but unsettled as fruit, and have to be posited. Hence, there being no distinction in the matter of positing utility that is not settled, there is no need to suspend the injunction common to obligatory and optional rites, as understood from the use of the general term ("sacrifice").

Now, even thus, how is it possible to support such statements of traditional Codes, as "By karma alone did Janaka and others attain perfection" ? They do not refer to the practice of karma as subservient to knowledge; for, by the use of the word "brāhmaṇas" in the text about desire for knowledge, competency for 1·41 karma as subservient to knowledge appears (to exist) only in the case of brāhmaṇas. Hence, it must be said of the karmas practised by Janaka and others that they directly serve (to bring about) release. Not so; for, the use of the word " brāhmaṇa " in the text about the desire for knowledge is implicative of the three (twice-born) castes. As the venerable author of the *Vārtika* says, " The use of the word ' brāhmaṇa ' here implies all twice-born persons, since there is no distinction in respect of the competency of all (these) for knowledge of the self." Nor is it proper to take the word "brāhmaṇa" as indicating a special kind of competent person, in the paraphrased (injunctive) form, "Let him who desires knowledge practise karma," which enjoins competency in respect of him who desires knowledge; for, a qualification cannot attach to the subject (of the injunction).[7] Now, the injunction about the rājasūya, "Let the king who is desirous of absolute empery sacrifice with the rājasūya", prescribes competency for him who desires absolute empery; this means "Let him who is desirous of absolute empery sacrifice with the rājasūya which is to be performed by a king"; the "king" thus prescribed as a qualification of the sacrifice, in the capacity of the agent, enters by presumption (arthāpatti) into the body of qualifications of him who is competent (to sacrifice), since no one who is not a king can accomplish a sacrifice that is to be performed by a king; even so, here too, the

---

[7] *I.e.*, the uddeśya, the person desirous of knowledge. If it did so attach, the injunction would prescribe, for the performance of karma, two independent qualifications, brahminhood, and the desire for knowledge, and would thus suffer from the defect of vākya-bheda or sentence-split.

"brāhmaṇa" prescribed as the agent in sacrifice etc. (for the sake of knowledge), enters by presumption into the body of qualifications for him who is competent (to sacrifice). Even this is not intelligible. For, it is established in the *Sūtra* "In any case, the same duties (have to be performed), because of the two-fold marks", that, in the text about the desire for knowledge, there is an injunction relating to special fruit, only in respect of those sacrifices etc., which have been already enjoined elsewhere (than in connection with knowledge), and that there is no injunction in respect of sacrifice etc. not already established. Hence, if, in that one text, which is a supplementary reference to the sacrifice etc. already established, one understood two prescriptions—a subsidiary prescription of an agent, and a prescription relating to fruit,—there would result the defect of sentence-split.

(Now, it may be said as follows): On the view which holds that there is no prescription of the king as agent in the text about rājasūya, a qualified agency results even from the mere proximity of the word "king"; so, here too, in order that there may be no sentence-split, though the "brāhmaṇa" is not prescribed as the agent, yet performance by a brāhmaṇa results even from the mere proximity of the word "brāhmaṇa". Hence, (the text) leads up to the (sole) competency of the brāhmaṇa. Even this (we reply) does not stand to reason. For, in the case of sacrifice etc., which are established elsewhere as competent for persons of (all) the three castes, and which are prescribed as subservient to knowledge of the self for which persons of (all) the three castes are competent, it is proper that competency should belong to (all) the three castes. It is not possible to restrict this competency by the mere proximity of the word "brāhmaṇa," which is not conjoined to a prescription; hence, it is preferable to take the word "brāhmaṇa" to imply the entire range of those competent for knowledge, as already established.

1·421 Now, if the entire range of those competent be implied, then, since desire for knowledge may occur even to the śūdra, there would result competency for him too, in respect of karma subservient to knowledge. If this be said, no (we reply); for, on the ground that there is competency for Vaidika rites for him alone, who has studied his section of the Veda by adhyayana and has knowledge of it generated thereby, competency for knowledge is denied in the apaśūdra section[8] in respect of the śūdra, who is devoid of adhyayana, the hearing (study) of the words of the Scripture etc.; because of traditional Code "Give not knowledge to a śūdra", there cannot result for him, as a means (to release), even a superficial realisation of the glorious might of knowledge; hence, desire for that (knowledge) cannot result; for these reasons, there cannot be for him competency for knowledge. Thus say some.

1·422 Others, however, say thus: there is competency for karma subservient to knowledge even in the case of the śūdra; for, though there cannot be for him the study of the Veda, performance of agnihotra etc., yet there can be competency for the incantation of the Pañcākṣara, which is the mantra-rāja-vidyā, and (the performance of) penance, gifts and pāka-yajñas,[9] which are means for the diminution of sin, in the case of (all of) which competency for all castes is explicitly declared. Further, since the instrumental suffix is used independently in the case of each of the means,—study of the Vedas, sacrifice, gifts etc.,—and since widowers and others are permitted the practice only of incantations, gifts etc., as subservient to knowledge, there is no need to combine the study of the Veda (with these other means).

---

[8] The section of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, wherein is discussed the competency of the śūtra for Vedānta study and is decided on adversely to the śūdra.

Nor is it that desire for knowledge does not come about for the śūdra. For, since there is the traditional Code "Discourse unto the four castes, placing the brāhmaṇa foremost" declaring competency for (all) four castes in respect of hearing epics, purāṇas etc., there can come about the desire for knowledge, even for him (śūdra), who has realised the might of knowledge from the purāṇas etc. As for the traditional Code "Give not knowledge to a śūdra", that prohibits the imparting of knowledge (only) about agnihotra and other rites, which are not useful for his observance. Or else, there being no means for him to know even the duties of his own caste, there would result non-authoritativeness consisting in non-observance for the texts which specify his duties thus: "The śūdra is a fourth caste; he is once-born (not twice-born, like the others); his (duties are): truth, freedom from anger, purity; the cleansing of the hands and feet, which is according to some the only purificatory ceremony (for him, not ācamana, the ceremonial sipping of water);[10] the performance of (all five kinds of) śrāddhas; the support of servants; being content with a wife of his own (caste); service of the higher castes."

---

[9] These seem to be sacrifices offered in the household fire, not in the three-fold sacrificial fire. The competency of the śūdra for these is mentioned in *Hārīta Smṛti*, II, vv. 11-14, and referred to by Gautama in Chapter X, 64. The commentary on the latter explains the term as "pāka-sādhyāḥ, aṣṭakādayaḥ."

Nor does the apaśūdra section thus become contentless. In the case of the śūdra, who is devoid of the purificatory rite, subsidiary to knowledge, viz., upanayana, known as the approach to a preceptor, in consequence of such texts of the traditional Code as "Neither is there sin for a śūdra, nor is he fit for any purification," that section denies competency for meditation on Brahman as endowed with attributes (saguṇa) and for the hearing (study) etc. of the Vedānta as the means of knowing the Attributeless. It cannot negate the śūdra's desire for the knowledge of the Attributeless, since that desire is prompted by the attractiveness of the subject; and in the case of what is not prescribed, there is no possibility of competency (therefor), other than the desire for it; hence, the denial of competency is improper. Nor may it be said that since hearing (study) of the Vedānta does not come about for him, knowledge will not arise, even though the practice of karma subservient to knowledge may come about, and that, consequently, his practice of the karma subservient to that end would be futile. For, though he has no competency for the hearing (study) of the Vedānta, competency in respect of that means of knowledge, which consists in the hearing of purāṇas etc., whose purport is the unity of the self and Brahman, is shown by the Bhagavatpāda in the concluding words of the commentary on (*Sūtra* 38 of) the apaśūdra section: " Since, moreover, there is the traditional Code 'Discourse unto the four castes,' declaring competency for (all) four castes, in respect of the understanding of epics, purāṇas etc., it is settled, however, that there is no competency for śūdras (in regard to knowledge) through the Vedas.[11] " And there is no conflict in the śūdra practising karma subservient to knowledge, since it may subserve the rise of knowledge through creating (in another birth) the body of a person of one of the three (higher) castes fit for the hearing (study) of the Vedānta. This is analogous to the practice by the three higher castes of the meditation on that which is endowed with attributes (saguṇavidyā), whose fruit is release by stages, since it (the meditation) subserves release through the creation of pure divine bodies (deva-śarīra), fit for the rise of (the higher) knowledge. Since, therefore, the word "brāhmaṇa" in the text concerning the desire for knowledge has for content all those who are established to be competent for knowledge, there does result for the śūdra too competency for karma subservient to knowledge.

---

[10] Gautama mentions this as the view of some, since, in his own view, śūdras, like women, have the duty of sipping once, not thrice, for ceremonial purposes. An alternative explanation is that, according to some, bathing for śūdras consists in washing the hands and feet, while Gautama holds that they should bathe, but without any mantras.

---

[11] The punctuation, which is adopted in most printed texts and is followed by Thibaut, puts in a full-stop after "legends etc.", the words "it is settled" etc. commencing a fresh sentence. If this punctuation be adopted, there would be no point in including the second sentence in the quotation. The punctuation of the present text seems preferable, if the sense of this paragraph is to be conveyed with adequate force.

2·0 Now, let it be that karma subserves knowledge through the purification of the intellect; in what way does renunciation (saṃnyāsa) serve that (end)?

2·11 Some say (thus): since the sins that obstruct the rise of knowledge are infinite, some are removable by the practice of sacrifice etc., some are removable by the unseen potency from renunciation; hence, renunciation too subserves that end (viz., knowledge), only through the purification of the intellect, in the same way as karma. And thus, for those house-holders, who practise hearing (study) etc., in the intervals of karma, there is attainment of knowledge, not in this life, but only after attaining renunciation, in another life. As for those like Janaka and others, who attain knowledge, even while being house-holders, their attainment of knowledge is due to renunciation in a prior life. Hence, there is not even the suspicion of the inconstancy of unseen potency (resulting) from renunciation, in the case of knowledge.

2·12 Others, however, declare its subservience to knowledge (thus): in the text "Calm, tranquil, quiescent" etc., renunciation as understood by the word "quiescent" is included in the four means to knowledge; in the commentary on the aphorism *sahakāry-antara-vidhiḥ,* it is declared: "For those who possess that, i.e., for those who possess knowledge, i.e., for ascetics, there is prescribed mauna (excellence of knowledge), which is the third in relation to bālya and pāṇḍitya"; for, in the text "Therefore, let the brāhmaṇa having acquired pāṇḍitya" etc., eligibility is understood for the ascetic from the earlier words "they lead a life of mendicancy"; further, it is said in the *Vārtika,* "There is competency for what comes at the end of the three Vedas, only for those who have abandoned activity without any residue, those who desire to overcome transmigration and those who desire to know the unity of the self". For these reasons, the unseen potency from renunciation is a special qualification of him who is competent for the means to knowledge such as hearing (study) of the Vedānta.

Yet others, however, (say) thus: since it is said in the *Vivaraṇa,* "Renunciation, being a subsidiary to hearing (study) etc., produces knowledge of the self as its fruit", its subservience to knowledge consists in the generation of hearing (study) etc., free from any other activity; for, when there is a visible channel (of utility), an unseen (channel) should not be assumed. If the non-indolent, intelligent, heroic man can attain to hearing (study) etc., in the intervals of karma, even though stationed in other orders of life (but that of the ascetics), then, a restrictive injunction has to be admitted,—that hearing (study) etc., should 2·13 be brought about only by holding to the ascetic's order among the four orders of life.[12]

2·14 Now, on both these views, how is there practice of the hearing (study) etc. of the Vedānta by kṣatriyas and vaiśyas? For, renunciation is competent for the brāhmaṇa (alone), because of the use of the word "brāhmaṇa" in texts about renunciation, such as "Let the brāhmaṇa attain non-attachment", "Let the brāhmaṇa rise above", "Let the brāhmaṇa renounce", and because of the saying in the *Vārtika*: "For the reason that the word brāhmaṇa is used in the text to make known the specially competent person, there is no prescription of renunciation for kṣatriyas and vaiśyas".

2·141 If this be urged, some reply (thus): from the text "Or else, let one renounce even from the student's order of life, or from the house (-holder's) or the forest (-dweller's)", which makes no distinction (of caste) and is supported by the traditional Code "Let him renounce from the house (-holder's order), be he brahmāṇa, kṣatriya or vaiśya, (for) these four orders (of life) are for (all) the three castes", there results competency for renunciation even for kṣatriyas and vaiśyas; the use of the word "brāhmaṇa", therefore, in other texts is implicative of the three (castes). Hence it is that in the *Vārtika* itself, after the expression of the view of the *Bhāṣya* in the verse (above cited) about special competency, there is shown in the succeeding verse his (the Vārtikakāra's) own view that there is competency for renunciation even for kṣatriyas and vaiśyas: "For the reason that there is declared in Scripture the renunciation of all the three (castes), without distinction, the use of the word 'brāhmaṇa' is for the purpose of implying (all the three)". This is how these establish the coming about of the practice of hearing (study) etc., for those (two castes).

---

[12] Renunciation does have the visible result of securing undisturbed study and so on. But those who have not renounced may occasionally gain knowledge even in the intervals of karma. To rule this out, there is a *niyama-vidhi* as to renunciation.

2·142 Others, however, say thus: competency for renunciation is for the brāhmaṇa alone; for, the word "brāhmaṇa" is used in more than one text prescribing renunciation; and though the word "brāhmaṇa" is not used in the prescription of renunciation cited from the *Jābala-śruti,* it (none the less) relates to the brāhmaṇa in the text "He who wears no sacred thread at the stage of renunciation, how is he a brāhmaṇa?", which assumes competency for the brāhmaṇa alone, as established by other texts. (Further), in accordance with the principle of the *virodhā-'dhikaraṇa,*[13] only that sense of the traditional Code should be apprehended as does not conflict with Scriptural texts. As for the saying of the *Vārtika* that renunciation is competent for all, that relates to the renunciation of the knower; it does not, in conflict with the view of the *Bhāṣya,* have for purport the declaration of competency for all, in respect of the renunciation by the distressed one who desires knowledge. For, in the next verse, restrictive rules about competency are denied only in the case of the renunciation of him who knows, which (renunciation) is made by one liberated (even) while embodied, after the dawn of the knowledge of Brahman: "If knowledge which cuts at the root of all competency be attained, on the strength of what may one lay down rules of competency in respect of renunciation?" Thus, renunciation is subsidiary to the practice of hearing (study) etc., only for brāhmaṇas; for kṣatriyas and vaiśyas, competency for hearing (study) etc. is not dependent on that (renunciation). Thus is upheld the practice of hearing (study) etc., by those two (castes). On the view that renunciation is needed for hearing (study) etc., it is not possible, verily, to lay down a rule that all hearing (study) etc. is dependent on that (renunciation); for, in the case of those who have attained the nature of divine beings by saguṇa meditation, which brings about release in stages, there has necessarily to be predicated non-dependence on renunciation for hearing (study) etc.; for, since for divine beings there is no possibility of engaging in karma, there cannot result for them renunciation consisting in the abandonment of that (karma).

---

[13] The maxim is to the effect that where there is conflict between śruti and smṛti, the latter is to be disregarded, while in the absence of conflict, a śruti in support of smṛti may be inferred, though non-existent.

2·143 Yet others, however, say thus: he, of whom, in the words "He who is well-established in Brahman attains immortality", Scripture declares being well-established, or ending in Brahman, that is to say, being fixed therein, which consists in not engaging in any other activity, for him there is eligibility, in the principal sense, for hearing (study) etc.; for, constant enquiry is prescribed in such texts of the traditional Code as "Going or standing, awake or asleep, he whose mind is not directed to the enquiry (into Brahman) is said to be dead", "Spend thy time in reflection on the Vedānta, right up to sleep, yea, right up to death". And this being well-established in Brahman does not come about for those who remain without renunciation, in other orders of life, because of distraction due to the performance of duties prescribed for each one's order (of life); hence, for kṣatriyas and vaiśyas, devoid of renunciation, there is no eligibility in a principal sense for hearing (study) etc. For these (castes), in whose case there is no prohibition as for the śūdra, there is, rather, as in the case of widowers etc., permission for such hearing (study) etc., as will bring about knowledge in another body, because of eligibility merely in a non-principal sense; this is on the principle enunciated in the *Bhāṣya* on the section *antarā cā'pi tu taddṛṣṭeḥ*: "Further, knowledge, which has a visible result, makes any one who seeks it eligible for hearing (study) etc. even by the mere absence of prohibition". Nor can it be said that, in the said section, the eligibility recognised for widowers etc., who do not belong to any order of life, is in the principal sense; for, it is made clear by the aphorist himself in "Better than this, however, is the other (i.e., belonging to an āśrama), because of indicatory marks" that their eligibility is non-principal. Nor may it be objected that what is mentioned is not their eligibility at all for hearing (study) etc., but the fact of their acts favouring knowledge;[14] for, that is opposed to the already cited *Bhāṣya* on that section, to the effect that knowledge has a visible result. (It may be objected that) if there be eligibility in a non-principal sense for kṣatriyas and vaiśyas, because of absence of renunciation, then, for the same reason, there would be eligibility only in a non-principal sense for divine beings too, in respect of hearing (study) etc.; and it would necessarily have to be said of those who, after having attained divine bodies through saguṇa meditation that brings about release in stages, practise hearing (study) etc., that they should be reborn as brāhmaṇas, in order to be capable of renunciation, for the purpose of knowledge; hence, there would be conflict with such texts and aphorisms as "He, who attains the world of Brahma does not return again", "Because of the declaration of non-return", and so on. This too may not be said; for, since for divine beings there is no distraction through karma to be practised, the not engaging in any other activity results of itself in their case; hence, because of the authoritativeness of the teaching which prescribes saguṇa meditation as producing release by stages, eligibility in the principal sense is admitted for those (divine beings) even in the absence of renunciation.

2·1431 Now, by those who are eligible in a non-principal sense, the inquiry into the Vedānta has to be undertaken for the purpose of the *visible* result of understanding the sense of the statements (therein), in the same way as the unprescribed inquiry into other sacred teaching;[15] how, then, can it serve towards the attainment of knowledge in another birth? It is not, indeed, proper to hold that the inquiry of to-day is the cause of the realisation on a different day of what is inquired into; remote indeed is the possibility of the causation of that in another birth.

---

[14] Through some apūrva result.

(Now), the hearing (study) undertaken even by ascetics who are eligible in the principal sense has but a visible result, realisation being a visible result; it is determined (however), in the section " Even here, if there is no active obstruction, that being seen " that this (hearing), which does not generate its fruit in this birth, because of obstruction by a variety of prārabdha-karma, does generate its fruit in another birth, the obstruction being removed; this may be so, even in the case of that (hearing etc.) undertaken by those eligible in a non-principal sense. This too, may not be said; for, on the view that hearing combined with the other subsidiaries inculcated by the sacred teaching is the object of an apūrva-vidhi, it generates an apūrva leading up to the result; or, on the view that it is the object of niyama-vidhi, it produces the adṛṣṭa consequent on the restrictive complementation (niyama); and it is proper to hold that that (adṛṣṭa), like the adṛṣṭa, which brings about remembrance of another birth, rouses impressions belonging to a former existence, and links up the inquiry, which is at their root, with subservience to knowledge in another birth; hearing, however, which is devoid of the subsidiaries inculcated by Scripture (i.e., here, devoid of renunciation), cannot generate the adṛṣṭa; whence, then, the intelligibility of its subservience to knowledge in another birth? For, there is undue extension (of principle) in recognising that, in the absence of an adṛṣṭa to link up, the functioning of means of knowledge in one birth is the cause of realisation in another birth.

---

[15] Like the inquiry into the Nyāya &c.

2·1432 The reply is: the hearing (study) that has to be performed by him in whom has arisen the desire to know, though he be qualified but in a non-principal sense, is prompted by the apūrva generated through the former practice of sacrifice etc., for the sake of knowledge, which (practice) generates the channel, viz., the desire to know. The very same apūrva functioning up to the stage of the fruit, viz., knowledge, links up the hearing (study) effected by it, as subservient even to knowledge in another birth; in this there is nothing unintelligible. On the view that there is no injunction in respect of hearing (study) etc., since even that hearing (study) which is performed in the wake of renunciation does not generate any unseen potency, the fact that, where there are obstacles, it causes knowledge in another birth alone has to be explained only thus.[16]

---

[16] That is to say, through the apūrva of sacrifice etc. performed earlier.

The preceptor,[17] however, says thus: this is the only explanation possible even on the view of there being a restrictive injunction (in respect of hearing etc.); for, prior to the attainment of fruit by the repeated practice of hearing (study), the unseen potency, consequent on the restrictive complementation, does not, for the most part, arise. For, that has to be accomplished by the exclusive practice of hearing (study), characterised by repetition until the attainment of the fruit. The restriction to hearing (study), which generates the unseen potency consequent on that restrictive complementation, cannot, verily, be accomplished by the bare commencement of the hearing (study), which ought to be repeated till the attainment of the fruit; in such a case (indeed), the unseen potency consequent on the restrictive complementation which is generated by that (much of hearing), might be considered to arise, even prior to the repetition of hearing (study) till the attainment of fruit. Since it is only as characterised by repetition that hearing, in the same way as pounding, is a means to the fruit, prior to the origination of that thing which is the means to the fruit, the talk of the accomplishment of that restrictive complementation is baseless. Further, if the restrictive complementation were secured even with the bare commencement of hearing (study) or pounding, even with that would be secured the observance of[18] the teaching of restrictive complementation; hence it would follow that even though it were not repeated there would be no defect. 2·1433

---

[17] Vivaraṇā-'cārya.

[18] *I.e.*, conformity to.

2·144 Some, however, say thus: to the hearing (study) of the Vedānta, though it has a visible result, there belongs the origination of an unseen potency of its own, on the authority of such statements as this: "From the daily hearing (study) of the Vedānta, conjoined with devotion, and gained through serving a preceptor, one obtains the fruit of eighty kṛcchras". Because of the force of (such) statements, the subservience to two ends is intelligible, in the same way as the ceremonial kindling of fire, which serves to purify the fire, yet because of being enumerated among the ceremonies which purify a man, serves that latter purpose too. Thus, the subservience of the means, viz., hearing (study), reflection and contemplation, to knowledge in a hereafter, is only through the might of the unseen potency generated by daily hearing (study).

3·0 Thus, the attainment of knowledge is through the channel of the practice of the means—hearing (study), reflection etc. There being agreement among all in this matter, Bhāratītīrtha, in the *Dhyānadīpa*, declares yet another means to the attainment of knowledge. There are seen such statements of Scripture and the traditional Code, as the following: "That cause is to be comprehended through sāṅkhya and yoga", "That state which is reached by sāṅkhya, that is reached by yoga too." Hence, in the same way as the sāṅkhya, which is the inquiry into the Vedānta, denoted by the word hearing (śravaṇa) and aided by reflection etc., is a means to the attainment of knowledge, even so is the contemplation of the Nirguṇa Brahman, denoted by the word yoga. Nor may it be objected that there is no contemplation at all of the Nirguṇa. For, in the Śaibya-praśna of the *Praśnopaniṣad,* contemplation is taught of the Nirguṇa alone, in the words: "He, again, who contemplates the Supreme Person with this very syllable OM of the three mātras" etc. The Nirguṇa Brahman, that is designated as the object of sight, in the next text about the fruit of contemplation, "He who sees the Supreme Person, who is higher than this collective soul (Hiraṇyagarbha), resting in the city", that itself, not anything else, is the object of contemplation even in the text about contemplation; for, seeing and contemplation, which are effect and cause, are confined to the same object. This sense is recognised by the author of the *Bhāṣya* and others in the section on the object of sight (īkṣati-karma). The contemplation of the Nirguṇa is elaborated even elsewhere, in other Scriptures like the *Tāpanīya,* the *Kaṭha-vallī* etc.

Further, it is shown by the aphorist himself, in the quarter (of the *Sūtras*) relating to the combination of attributes, which is commenced for the purpose of determining the attributes to be contemplated (in the different meditations), that, even in the case of the Nirguṇa, there is combination of positive attributes like knowledge, bliss etc., as shown in the aphorism, "Bliss etc., since they belong to the subject", and of negative attributes like non-grossness etc., (as shown) in the aphorism "But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the imperishable (akṣara) are to be comprehended, on account of the equality and of the object being the same, as in the case of the upasad; this has been explained".

Now, if it be said that, where there is combination of attributes like bliss, what is contemplated is not the Nirguṇa at all, no (we reply): for, contemplation is possible in the form "I am that impartite, homogeneous Brahman qualified *per accidens* by bliss etc., and non-grossness etc.," without detriment to the attributelessness (of Brahman).

Now, if it be said that, because of the text " Know that alone to be Brahman, not this which is contemplated here", the Supreme Brahman is not the object of contemplation, no (we reply); for, then, because of the text " It is, verily, other than what is known ", it would follow that It cannot be the object of knowledge either. If it be said that, since Its being the object of knowledge is known from other texts, the text about not being known signifies not being really an object of knowledge (over against a subject), then, since contemplation thereof is well known from the Ātharvaṇa-śruti etc., even the text about Its not being an object of contemplation signifies its real nature (as not an object over against a subject). And thus, they for whom, in accordance with the text, " Of which many are not able even to hear", hearing (study) etc. do not result, because of dullness of intellect or failure to obtain an eminent preceptor skilled in explaining the principles (of interpreting Scripture), those persons, having obtained a superficial understanding of the unity of the self and Brahman, through the Vedānta learnt by adhyayana, attain by stages to an intuition of the contemplated Nirguṇa Brahman, even without an inquiry into that (Vedānta), through the practice of the contemplation of Nirguṇa Brahman, ascertained from preceptors whose knowledge extends only to traditional practice; this (contemplation) is declared in the *Praśnopaniṣad* etc., and the teaching of the mode of its observance, which lies scattered in many branches (of the Veda), in the writings of sages, in codes like the *Brāhma, Vāsiṣṭha* etc., and in other works like the *Pañcīkaraṇa,*[19] is brought together, in the same way as the teaching about agnihotra (is brought together) in the *Kalpa-sūtras.* On the analogy of the illusion that does not fail to accord (with experience in practice), even contemplation may in some cases lead to true knowledge, at the time of fruition. On being asked by one who conceals five cowries in one's hand "How many cowries are there?", if a person replies "five cowries", even in the absence of basic evidence in the nature of knowledge of the particular number which should be the basis for framing the answer, (that reply) of the nature of an arbitrary supposition yet happens to be true. Even thus, contemplation of Nirguṇa Brahman does not stand in need of the indubitable basic evidence which discriminates the object as of the nature (contemplated), and is to be performed in dependence on the teaching of contemplation alone, in the same way as the contemplation of the small ether within the heart etc.; yet, the intuition of its own content, which the contemplation of the Nirguṇa generates, in the same way as the contemplation of the small ether etc., necessarily relates to a true content, even like the intuition generated through means of knowledge like hearing (study) etc. This, however, is the difference (between the two): for the person devoid of obstacles, the intuition of Brahman comes about soon, through the channel of hearing (study) etc.; hence the path of sāṅkhya is the better alternative. Through contemplation, however, (the intuition comes) with delay; hence the path of yoga is the inferior alternative.

---

[19] This work, attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, starts with premising an inquiry into samādhi and ends with saying that samādhi consists in remaining rooted in non-difference, holding firmly, "I am the self, the witness....not ignorance or its products, but....I am Brahman itself". For the present context, the emphasis is on the word "samādhi".

4·0 Now, on both of these views, what is the (specific) instrument for the intuition of Brahman?

4·1 Some say that it is but deep meditation consisting in the repetition of a cognition; for, this exists as contemplation from the very first in the path of yoga, and as contemplation succeeding reflection in the path of sāṅkhya. Nor is it that there is no evidence of its being instrumental to the intuition of Brahman; for, there is the text " Thereupon he perceives that partless one by contemplation"; further, contemplation is settled to be the instrument in the love-lorn swain's intuition of the absent adored one; moreover, in the sections "Up to death, for then too it is thus seen (in Scripture)", and " There is option, the results being non-different", in the case of those who contemplate the small ether etc., as (identical with) themselves, it is admitted that through deep meditation there is intuition of the Saguṇa Brahman that is contemplated.

4·11 Now, deep meditation not being enumerated among the means of valid knowledge, the intuition of Brahman generated thereby cannot be valid knowledge. Nor can validity result through the non-sublation of the content, as in the case of the supposititious knowledge of the particular number of cowries, which happens to accord (with fact, only) in the manner of the crow causing the fall of the palm-fruit; for, that which is not based on valid evidence cannot be valid knowledge; the activity of supposition, like the activity of contemplation, being a mental act other than cognition, validity is not admitted of it, as in the case of desire, even where the content is not sublated.

4·12 Not so (we reply); for, though not based on established means of knowledge, validity is intelligible, as in the case of that modification (vṛtti) of māyā, which belongs to Īśvara;[20] further, there is agreement (between the two cases) in respect of non-sublation of content; deep meditation on either of the paths is based on the understanding of the identity of the self and Brahman resulting from the Vedānta, whether subjected to inquiry or not; and hence, even the intuition of Brahman generated by deep meditation is based on means of valid knowledge. It has indeed been said by the author of the *Kalpataru*: "The immediate cognition generated by contemplation of the knowledge generated by Vedānta texts does not become delusive[21] because of the strength of the basic means of knowledge.[22] Nor is there the contingence of validity being extrinsic;[23] for, the purity of the basic (means of knowledge) is considered only for refuting (the possibility of) exceptions".

---

[20] Īśvara is said to be omniscient. There must be a vṛtti for Him, on the analogy of the vṛtti of the internal organ for the jīva. A vṛtti of māyā is therefore postulated and the postulation is valid.

[21] Like the love-lorn swain's intuition of the absent adored.

[22] *I.e.*, the Vedānta texts,

4·2 Others, however, say thus: the mind alone is the instrument of the intuition of Brahman, because of such texts as "This subtle self is to be understood by the mind", "(This) is seen by the concentrated intellect" etc.; for, there is settled of it instrumentality in respect of the valid knowledge consisting in the psychosis "I", in the case of the conditioned self. It is taught to be thus even in the following words of the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*: "Of the internal organ, which is the means of the knowledge of the cogniser etc., of a nature opposed to the dream-world" etc. Moreover, in the text "He thinks (in dreams) 'all this is but myself, I am all,' this is his supreme world (i.e. enjoyment)," the instrumentality of the mind is accepted even in the intuition of Brahman in dreams, there being no other instrument (active) then. Deep meditation, however, is of service as an auxiliary to the mind. For, there is the saying of the *Bhāmatī*: "The internal organ, aided by maturity of contemplation of the sense of the text, manifests in the case of the immediately experienced denotation of the *thou*[24] its being the denotation of the *that*,[24] through the negation of the respective adjuncts." Even in the text "(Becoming) pure of intellect through clarity of knowledge, thereupon he perceives that partless one by contemplation", contemplation is accepted only as the cause of mental concentration signified by "clarity of knowledge". Deep meditation is not, however, of itself the instrument; for its instrumentality in respect of knowledge is not settled anywhere; and the instrumentality of the mind itself as aided by deep meditation being intelligible even in the case of the intuition of the adored by the lover and so on, it is not proper to assume another instrument of knowledge (whose instrumentality is) not settled.

---

[23] The Vedāntins, unlike the Naiyāyikas, hold that the validity of a cognition is self-revealed, not revealed by something other than that, e.g., an inference based on practical efficiency.

[24] In the Upaniṣadic text "That thou art."

Yet others, however, say thus: (1) because of the declaration of release while embodied (jīvanmukti), on the rise of the intuition of Brahman, immediately after instruction by the preceptor, in such texts as "To him, verily, who knows this", "He shows what is beyond darkness", "That person knows who has a preceptor, for him there is delay only so long (as he is not released from the body)", (2) because of the declaration of the non-expectancy of any other (instrument, say) contemplation, in the text "Those who have well ascertained the purport of Vedānta lore" etc., and (3) because of the declaration of Brahman as knowable through the Upaniṣads alone, in the text "That person propounded in the Upaniṣads" etc., only the major texts of the Upaniṣads are instruments for the intuition of Brahman, not the mind; for its instrumentality to the intuition of Brahman is denied by the text "That which is not thought by the mind". Nor does this (text) relate to the immature mind; for, all mind is 4·3 understood in the complement of the text "That by which the mind, they say, is thought."

Nor may it be objected that the instrumentality of verbal testimony too is denied in respect of that (intuition of Brahman, by the text) "That which is not expressed by speech"; for, even those who maintain the instrumentality of mind have to admit of verbal testimony that it is instrumental to the mediate cognition of the non-particularised (Brahman); in conformity with the text "That from which words return together with the mind, failing of attainment", this (other) text should be said to have for purport the denial of instrumentality in respect of that (intuition) for verbal testimony, through its primary significance consisting in the comprehension of the sense *expressed* by the word; hence there is not opposition to its instrumentality in respect of that, through secondary implication consisting in what is related to the expressed (sense).

Nor may it be said that the instrumentality of the mind too, as established by the text "By the mind alone it is to be seen", cannot be set aside; for, the instrumental case (in "by the mind") is intelligible even on account of its being a cause (not the distinctive cause), since concentration thereof is needed even in the generation of intuition through verbal testimony; for, this (usage) is seen in "He sees with the mind, he hears with the mind" etc.; the declaration of the instrumentality of the mind by the Bhāṣyakāra in the gloss on the *Gītā* is set forth to express a view different (from his own).[25]

Now, even thus, it may be said, the generation of immediate cognition is not consistent with verbal testimony whose nature it is to generate mediate cognition. 5·1

To this some say thus: verbal testimony, though itself devoid of capacity (therefor), does give rise to immediate cognition, when favoured by (the presence of) the mirror, viz., the mind, which has attained concentration on Brahman through the host of impressions generated by the repetition of the cognition preceded by the hearing of and reflection on the sacred teaching; this is assumed in the same way as that the oblation made in the fire consecrated by the purificatory ceremonies laid down in the sacred teaching generates an unseen result; for, there is the authority of sacred teaching (here too) "He who knows the self crosses sorrow"; the superimposition of agency etc., which is immediate, cannot cease in the absence of immediate cognition of the locus (the self); since in respect of Brahman propounded in the Upaniṣads no other means of knowledge can apply, if immediate cognition be not originated even from verbal testimony, impossibility of release would follow.

Others, however, establish it thus, in conformity with what is seen: it is seen that an intuition of the lost damsel is generated by the mind, when in conjunction 5·2 with intense meditation, though by itself it is not capable of (creating) anything external; hence, the generation of immediate cognition even by verbal testimony, as in conjunction with contemplation, stands to reason.

---

[25] Presumably the view is that of the vṛttikāra who comes in for criticism so often in the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*.

5·3 Yet others, however, say thus: what is called the immediacy of cognition consists in its having for content an object which is immediate, since no other explanation (of that immediacy) is possible. Nor does the immediacy of the object consist in its being the content of immediate cognition, so as to involve reciprocal dependence; rather does it consist in the non-difference (of the object) from the intelligences of the respective individuals (who cognise); there is no non-pervasion (of the definition) in respect of any case, since the internal organ and its properties (pleasure, pain etc.), being posited in the witness, are non-different therefrom; and for the pot etc., posited in the intelligence outside, there is, because of the manifestation of non-difference of the intelligence outside from the intelligences of the respective individuals, as effected by the psychoses, non-difference from those (individual intelligences). Nor does immediacy result for merit, demerit and impressions, there being no distinction in respect of their being posited in the witness, in the same way as the internal organ and its properties like cognition; for they (merit etc.) are imperceptible, while it is admitted only of a perceptible inert substance that there is immediacy when there is non-difference from intelligence. And thus, since (Brahman) is ever non-different from the intelligences of all persons, and since (knowledge from verbal testimony) has for content an immediate object as stated by Scripture itself in the words "immediate Brahman" in the text "That Brahman which is direct, immediate", the declaration of immediacy of the knowledge of Brahman even through verbal testimony stands to reason.

The Advaitavidyācārya, however, says thus: the immediacy of cognition does not consist in (its) having an immediate object for content, for, it does not cover the cognition, immediate in nature, of the happiness which is of the self's nature, since self-luminosity is denied to be that which consists in having itself for content; rather (is it thus): just as in the case of respective objects immediacy of the object consists in the non-difference from such intelligence as is favourable to empirical usage in respect of itself,[26] even so the immediacy of cognition consists in the non-difference of the intelligence, favourable to the respective empirical usages, from the respective objects. And thus, this immediacy is an attribute of intelligence alone, not, however, an attribute of the psychosis of the internal organ, like the attribute of being inferential knowledge. Hence it is[27] that there is immediacy in respect of the witness whose nature is to illumine 5·4 happiness etc., (resulting from objects), and of the intelligence whose nature is to illumine the happiness which is of the nature of the self. Nor is this contradicted by the experience (of immediacy) in the psychoses of the senses, in respect of pot etc.; for, it is intelligible that that experience has for content the immediacy present in the intelligence as defined by the psychosis.

---

[26] All objects being superimposed on intelligence, they are always non-different therefrom; yet they are not always immediately present; hence the qualification "favourable to empirical usage in respect of itself", i.e., at the stage when it is defined by a psychosis whose sphere is the particular object.

[27] Because immediacy is an attribute of intelligence, not of a psychosis; on the latter view, happiness etc., being witness-revealed, not psychosis-revealed, could never be immediate.

Now, the immediacy (here) declared in the case of the cognition and its object, is unduly wide, as applying to the psychosis, viz., verbal knowledge having for its sphere the heart etc., (which are within the body and do not require the going forth of a psychosis), as also the content of that (knowledge); for, if perchance, there be at some time a conjunction of the psychosis and the content (as there may well be, both being within the body), the manifestation of the non-difference of the psychosis-defined intelligence from the content-defined intelligence could not be avoided. If this be urged, no (we reply); for, a mediate psychosis is not capable of removing the ignorance investing the content-defined intelligence; hence, for the content-intelligence obscured by ignorance there is no manifestation of non-difference from the non-obscured psychosis-defined witness-intelligence; hence there is no possibility of immediacy.[28] Hence it is that though, in the stage of transmigration, there is in fact non-difference of the jīva from Brahman, there is no immediacy thereof; for, there is the difference effected by obscuration due to ignorance.

---

[28] Either for the heart etc., which are mediate, or for the mediate cognitions, of the nature of intelligence defined by a verbal psychosis etc., whose sphere is the heart etc.

Nor thus does there result lack of omniscience (for Brahman), there being for Brahman too no immediacy of the jīva;[29] for, since ignorance is not an obscuring agent in respect of Īśvara, it does not bring about in Him (cognition of) difference from the jīva; the ignorance, which is an obscuring agent in respect of a particular person, brings about in respect of that person alone, (cognition of) the difference from its own locus.[30] Hence it is that, when by Caitra's cognition his ignorance of the pot is removed, Maitra's ignorance, which has not been removed, brings about the difference of the content-intelligence (from himself) in respect of Maitra alone; consequently there is no unintelligibility of Caitra's experience of the immediacy of the pot.

Now, if thus immediacy, which consists in the manifestation of non-difference between intelligence as defined by the psychosis and as defined by the content, be brought about by the removal of the ignorance present in the intelligence defined by its own content, it (the immediacy) could not be what brings about the removal of ignorance; hence, knowledge as such (not immediate cognition) would be what removes ignorance. If this be said, no (we reply); for (of the knowledge that removes ignorance) there is the qualification that that cognition alone, which, when arising, does, because of the excellence of its cause, arise only as in conjunction with its content, removes ignorance, since sense-cognitions are of this character. And thus, since Brahman-knowledge, though arising from verbal testimony, arises only as in conjunction with its own content, viz., Brahman-intelligence which is the material cause of all, its capacity to remove ignorance, and its immediacy, because of the resolution of difference grounded on that (ignorance), with the removal of ignorance—these are quite intelligible.

---

[29] On this very ground of the existence of difference effected by obscuration due to ignorance.

[30] That is, difference whose counter-correlate is the object-defined intelligence, which is the locus of that ignorance.

Now, thus, why should there not be immediacy through the removal of primal ignorance even by the knowledge of that (Brahman) generated by the Vedānta learnt through repetition (adhyayana)? Nor may it be said that that is not what removes ignorance, since it is not of the nature of certitude of existence for, even thus, that (ignorance) being removed by indubitable knowledge through verbal testimony for him who has performed the hearing (study of the Vedānta), there would follow the futility of reflection etc. If this be said, no (we reply); for, though indubitable knowledge may be present as the result of hearing (study), ignorance is not removed, because of the obstacle, the defect of mental distraction; in the removal of this (obstacle), the practice of the content of the restrictive injunctions as to reflection and contemplation is fruitful; and in the case of one who has conquered mental distraction by the practice of reflection etc., in a former existence, the (realisation of the) immediacy of Brahman through the bare teaching is (certainly) to be recognised.

Now, even thus, in the case of him who has performed contemplation, why should there not be removal of ignorance concerning Brahman, through the knowledge of pot etc., in the same way as through the knowledge of Brahman? Nor may it be said that, since that (knowledge) has not Brahman for content, there cannot result therefrom removal of ignorance concerning Brahman; for, of such psychoses of the intellect as "the pot is real", it is admitted that Brahman as reality is the content. Nor may it be said that when, by the psychosis with the form of pot etc., ignorance relating thereto is removed, the intelligence defined thereby shines forth as reality even by self-manifestation and that this (intelligence) is not the content of a psychosis in the form of pot etc.; for, if it were not (the content), then, knowledge would have the pot for content, while ignorance would have for content the intelligence defined thereby; consequently, by the knowledge, which has a different content, there could not be the removal of that ignorance; for, the pot is not the content of ignorance since there can be no obscuration in respect of what is inert. Nor may it be said that though the psychosis, in the form of pot etc., have for content the intelligence defined thereby, there cannot result therefrom the removal of primal ignorance, since it has not the form of impartite bliss; for, that form is absent even from the intuition generated by the Vedānta. Verily, impartite-ness or bliss-ness is not present there as a 6·1 mode, as (otherwise) there would result detriment to the Vedāntas having an impartite sense consisting in the generation of valid knowledge whose sphere is not the relational. Nor may it be said that there is a restriction as to the removal of that (primal ignorance) by that knowledge alone which is generated by the Vedānta; for, when there does exist other knowledge too, whose nature is settled to be the bringing about of the removal of ignorance, it is not possible to effect any such restriction. Nor may it be said that since even the defined intelligence, whose content is the psychosis in the form of pot etc., is but posited, it has not for content that which is the content of primal ignorance, viz., the true, undefined intelligence, and that consequently there is not for the psychoses, in the form of pot etc., even the settled cause (of removal) consisting in having the same content as the ignorance desired to be removed; for, though the defining element there be posited, what is defined is of the nature of non-posited intelligence, which is the content of primal ignorance; if this (too) were posited, it would be inert like pot etc., and could not be the content even of modal ignorance; consequently, modal ignorance should be said to have for content the non-posited intelligence, which is the content of primal ignorance; and even the cognition of pot etc., which removes that (modal ignorance) should necessarily have that (non-posited intelligence) for content; hence, even on this view, the contingence of the removal of primal ignorance by that (modal knowledge) cannot be helped.

To this the preceptor replies thus: intelligence is not the content of a psychosis generated by the sense of sight etc.; for it is taught by such texts as "His form does not stand within the range of vision; no one perceives him with the sense of sight", "The self-existent forced the senses outward; therefore they perceive what is without, not the self within", that it is incapable of being perceived by the sense of sight etc., in the same way as primal atoms etc.; there is also the qualification "Him who is propounded in the Upaniṣads". Nor is there conflict with the statement of the *Vārtika* "The nature of Brahman being settled to be such as may be known by all cognitions whatsoever" etc.; for, that has for purport the being known in a figurative sense by the psychosis (in the form) of pot etc., since, when the psychosis in the form of pot etc. arises, obscuration is dispelled, and Brahman, of the nature of self-luminosity and reality, becomes, like the pot itself, the object of empirical usage, in the words "the pot is real". And the dispelling of obscuration by the cognition of the pot etc., is intelligible even because of the latter having pot etc. for content; for, pot etc. are also the content of ignorance, since modal ignorances are experienced to have pot etc. for content, in "I know not the pot; by cognition of the pot, ignorance of the pot is destroyed". 6·2

Nor may it be said that there (in the case of pot etc.) it is not meet to recognise ignorance, the function of obscuration being absent, while the non-manifestation of that (pot etc.) is intelligible even because of the obscuration of the intelligence that should reveal it and is defined by it; for, though, in the manner indicated, being directly the content of ignorance is denied of the inert, yet being indirectly the content of ignorance is admitted, in that for the luminosity of intelligence as defined by the inert there is obscuration by ignorance, and that thence results for the inert, though conjoined to the eternal luminosity of intelligence, the capacity for such empirical usage as "It does not exist, it is not manifest"; for, that which is obscured by ignorance directly or indirectly, it is the having of that as content by a cognition, which constitutes what causes removal of that ignorance.[31] Nor does it follow from this that, since in the manner stated pot etc. may be the contents of primal ignorance too, there should be the removal of primal ignorance even with the intuition of pot etc.; for, on the strength of the result (we conclude that) effective-ness in the removal of that (primal ignorance) belongs to that (knowledge) alone, which has for its content what is other than the effects of that (primal ignorance).[32]

Or else, the inert is not a content of primal ignorance at all; but the respective inert things are the contents only of the modal ignorances located in the defined intelligence as, otherwise, if the intelligence of

---

[31] For knowledge and ignorance to be opposed, it is enough that there should be some identity of content; the content need not be the same in all respects.

[32] The content of primal ignorance, other than its own effects, is Brahman; and primal ignorance can be removed by Brahman-knowledge alone, since we see from the event that it is not removable by any knowledge short of that.

(i.e., defined by) a piece of sandal wood be manifested by a psychosis of the sense of sight, there would result immediacy even for the smell associated with that, while, if that (intelligence) be not manifested, there would follow non-manifestation even of the existence and colour of the sandal-wood. Nor may it be said that because of the manifestation of the intelligence defined by the existence and colour of sandal-wood, through a psychosis of the sense of sight, these two are revealed, while, because of the non-manifestation of intelligence defined by the smell, in the absence of a psychosis of the nature of smell, the latter is not revealed; for, intelligence cannot exist twice over;[33] the properties of a single substance, which are pervasive of the whole of their locus, cannot each define intelligence separately, any more than they can define ether separately;[34] since these (properties) are revealed even by the intelligence defined by the substance which is their locus, in the same way as nacre-silver (is revealed) by the intelligence defined through the this-element of nacre, from the manifestation of that (intelligence) there would follow the revelation of smell too, and from the non-manifestation of that (intelligence) there would follow the non-revelation even of colour etc. Nor is there any restriction that smell is revealed in that intelligence alone, which is associated with a psychosis of the nature of smell; for, the word "revealed" signifies only what is conjoined with illumination; in the case of what is conjoined with unobscured illumination, therefore, the assumption of non-revelation would be self-contradictory, even in the absence of a psychosis with that form; (and) it is impossible to say of the manifested intelligence, which is the material cause of smell, that it is not conjoined to smell. Therefore, in the same way as, when there is for Caitra a psychosis in the form of pot, there is removal of the obscuring ignorance for him alone, and consequently revelation of the content (pot) for him alone, not for another, even so, through the psychosis in the forms of the respective contents, there is removal of the respective obscuring ignorances alone, and consequently, there is no immediacy for any other content; for immediacy is admitted only for those which are not obscured, because of their non-difference from intelligence; hence, differences of modal ignorance have to be predicated of the one intelligence, through differences in the content as through differences in the cogniser; modal ignorances having thus the respective inert things as contents, there is no unintelligibility whatever in psychoses with the form of pot etc. removing modal ignorances; nor does it follow that they should remove primal ignorance (as well). Nor does it follow, even thus, in the case of the psychosis in the form "I", whose content is the jīva, that it should remove primal ignorance; for, the content of that is but the non-intelligent element associated with the self-luminious intelligence; even the recollection "I am he" has but for content the qualification of the self-luminous intelligence by earlier and later temporal properties, along with the qualification of it by the internal organ, and hence, it has not intelligence for its content.

---

[33] As defined by colour and again as defined by smell.

[34] Ether is not delimited in one way by the smell of the pot, in another way by its colour and in a third way by its configuratiin; so too of intelligence.

6·3 Some, however, admitting that psychoses with the form of pot etc. have for content intelligence as defined by the respective objects, say thus: it is said in the *Vārtika* "All means of knowledge being possible (in the case of Brahman), because of its being the locus of the fruit of all means of knowledge, there is the statement 'it is to be heard', in order to restrict (the means) to the Vedānta"; in conformity with the restrictive injunction of the Vedānta, signified by the text about the obligation to hear (study), it is that knowledge of Brahman, which is generated by the Vedānta alone, that, in conjunction with the unseen potency due to the restriction, removes unhindered the ignorance about Brahman; hence, there is no possibility of its removal by the cognition of pot etc.

6·4 Others, however, say thus: that knowledge alone, which is generated by texts like "That thou art" and pertains to the non-difference of the jīva from Brahman, removes primal ignorance, since primal ignorance has that non-difference for its sphere; hence, there is no possibility of its removal by the cognition of pot etc., which has for sphere the bare existence of intelligence.[35] Nor may it be said that if the non-difference taught by the means of knowledge, which makes known the truth, were other than intelligence, duality would result, that, therefore, intelligence itself is non-difference, and that, consequently, the cognition of pot etc. which has that (intelligence) for its sphere, has non-difference too for its sphere. We do not, indeed, declare a difference in respect of content, when we speak of the "knowledge of non-difference";[36] rather does the knowledge of non-difference consist in having intelligence for content through a special relation *sui generis,* under the control of special causes, such as the reflection[37] on the two substrates, which are the expressed senses of "That" and "Thou". Though there is no distinction in respect of having for sphere the qualification, the substrate and their relation, yet, for the knowledge as qualified, the property of being knowledge as qualified, which is other than the comprehension of an aggregate, consists in having for its sphere those very three, (but) through a special relation *sui generis*, under the control of special causes, such as the knowledge of the qualification (as qualification); or again, doubt is different from the arbitrary supposition "This has the property of a post as well as that of a man;" (in neither case)[38] is there a difference ascertained in respect of content. Similarly, in respect of pot etc., the knowledge "This is that pot" has the pot for content through a special relation *sui generis*; and this alone constitutes the knowledge of its non-difference, differentiated from the knowledge generated by the mere word "pot" etc.; for there is not ascertained any non-difference other than this. Cognitions of non-existence and similarity are linked by relations *sui generis* to the locus and counter-correlate; with the locus there is a special relation *sui generis*, viz., the relation of support and what is supported; with the counter-correlate (there is another special relation, viz.,) the relation between correlate and counter-correlate; in these and other ways, there are assumed secondary distinctions among relations *sui generis*. Even so, in the case of psychoses which are conjoined with their contents by a relation *sui generis*, viz., the relation of content and cogniser of the content, conjunction and identity being too wide[39] (as relations) in respect of the content, when it is not possible to establish a difference in respect of content, it is possible to maintain reciprocal distinction as between knowledge of non-difference (and knowledge of intelligence as such), through the assumption of secondary distinctions even in the settled relation *sui generis*. And thus, since it is not admitted of Brahman-knowledge that it has for its sphere some relation called non-difference, there is no detriment to the impartiteness of the sense of the Vedāntas.

---

[35] Not the non-difference of jīva-intelligence from Brahman-intelligence.

---

[36] *I.e.*, we distinguish knowledge of non-difference from knowledge of the existence of intelligence, not in respect of content, but in respect of mode.

[37] Consideration of the incompatibility of apposition between the expressed senses, and resort to secondary implication by abandoning part of the expressed sense.

[38] Whether as between doubt and supposition, or between knowledge as qualified and knowledge of the qualification, substrate and their relation.

---

[39] If the psychosis were in a relation of bare conjunction with the content, since it is in such conjunction even with the eye-ball etc., the latter too would become contents of the psychosis; if it were in a relation of identity, such objects as pot could never be cognised, since they are not identical with the psychosis, which is a modification of the internal organ; else, it would follow that the internal organ is the content of the psychosis with the form of the pot etc.

6·5 Now, the removal of primal ignorance by Brahman-knowledge stands to reason as little as by the knowledge of pot etc.; for, what is effective in the removal is conflict consisting in not suffering the continuance of that, while, for the effect, there is no such conflict with its material cause; if this be said, no (we reply); for though such conflict be not seen elsewhere between the effect and the cause, there does exist here such conflict, caused by knowledge and ignorance having the same content; further, such conflict is seen even as between the effect and the cause, as between conjunction (of a cloth) with fire and the cloth. Nor may it be said that according to the teaching of the parts being disjoined on the conjunction (of the cloth) with fire,[40] the destruction of the cloth results only from the destruction of the conjunction, which is the non-intimate cause, and not from the conjunction with fire; for, since even in the burnt cloth, there is seen the continuance of the earlier configuration, while disjunction of parts is not seen as in the case of a pot pounded with a hammer, there is no evidence for the assumption of disjunction of parts and the like. Nor does it stand to reason that, threads too being burnt in that case, the destruction of the cloth results from the destruction of the intimate cause; for, the burning of the cloth being seen to be simultaneous with that of the filament, threads etc., it is not proper to assume a sequence; further, since lower down[41] there is no destruction of parts, in the case of those parts, destruction should be said to result only from the conjunction with fire.

---

[40] The reference is to the Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika teaching about the nature of destruction.

[41] *I.e.*, below the dyads or dvyaṇukas; for, the parts thereof, the primal atoms, are indestructible.

7·0 Now, let this be so. Even thus, this Brahman-knowledge, which is the destroyer of ignorance with all its developments, how could it be destroyed, there being no other destroyer?

7·1 If this be asked, some say thus: just as the powder of the clearing nut mixed with water, while causing the precipitation of the mud already conjoined (with the water) causes its own precipitation as well, even so, Brahman-knowledge superimposed on the self, while removing the whole of the universe superimposed earlier, removes itself as well.

7·2 Others, however, cite, in respect of the removal of oneself after the removal of others, the analogy of water consumed by the heated metal[42]; yet others, however, cite here the example of the fire that has burnt up a heap of grass.[43]

7·3 Nor is there any restrictive rule that destruction is generated by something other than the counter-correlate, since there is no ground (for such a rule), and since there is inconstancy in such destruction as that of the fuel-less fire. Nor may it be said that, since there would be undue extensiveness in the generation of destruction by the counter-correlate alone, some other cause should necessarily be stated, and that, even in the case of such destruction as of the fuel-less fire, there are other causes such as time, unseen potency, the Lord's desire; for, undue extensiveness is not understood (by him who urges that as a defect here). There is no undue extensiveness in the sense that no other cause would be needed even for the destruction of pot etc.; for non-requirement of another cause is not declared in respect of all destruction. Nor does it (undue extensiveness) help to establish the need for another cause even in respect of the destruction of Brahman-knowledge, on the analogy of the destruction of the pot, as on that analogy it should help to establish even the need for hitting with a hammer. Nor is there undue extensiveness in the sense that because of agreement in respect of being destruction of knowledge, the destruction of the knowledge even of pot etc., would need no other cause; for, though for the destruction of fire which has fuel a visible cause such as sprinkling water is needed, that is not needed for the destruction of fire which has no fuel; again, though for the destruction of a waking cognition there is needed another special quality[44] of a contrary nature, that is not needed for the destruction of the cognition immediately preceding sleep; even so, though for the destruction of knowledge which does not remove primal ignorance there is need for another cause, yet for the destruction of the knowledge which does remove (that ignorance), that (cause) not being needed is intelligible.

---

[42] The water, while removing the heat, removes itself as well.

[43] That is to say, the fire, after removing by combustion what can be so removed, dies out and removes itself.

---

[44] Of the soul, that is to say, another cognition.

Nor is there undue extensiveness in the sense that if another cause be not needed, there would be destruction even at the moment succeeding its own origin; for, this is a contingence of the acceptable; the entire universe superimposed on Brahman being consumed at the very moment succeeding the rise of that (knowledge), it is admitted that that (knowledge) which is included in that (universe) is also consumed even then; further, on the analogy of the destruction of the fuel-less fire, there is no opposition to the destruction of Brahman-knowledge too being generated by other causes like time, unseen potency or the Lord's desire; for, what is admitted is not that, after the removal of the entire universe, there is the removal of Brahman-knowledge, the solitary residue; and, in the moment prior to the simultaneous consumption of all, existence does belong to time, whether as the relation between intelligence and nescience or as an independent substance, to the unseen potency, whether as the grace of the Lord or as a special quality of the internal organ, and to other (such causes). Nor may it be said that, if a cause other than knowledge be needed here (for destruction), there would result the non-illusoriness of Brahman-knowledge, since illusoriness is admitted to consist in removability by knowledge alone; for the meaning of that (definition) is removability by knowledge, while not being removable by any accessory not conjoined with knowledge; even the text "No other path" etc. has but this purport. Therefore, the analogy of the fire that has burnt up what was to be burnt up is certainly appropriate.

7·4 Some, however, say thus: Brahman-knowledge, which is of the nature of a psychosis, is not what removes ignorance and the universe based thereon; for, because of the rule that ignorance is removable by illumination, its removability by an inert psychosis is not possible; what removes it is, rather, the luminosity of intelligence associated with that (psychosis); though, in its own nature, as the witness of that ignorance etc., it cannot remove that, yet, as associated with the psychosis of the nature of the impartite, its capacity to remove that (ignorance etc.) is intelligible; for, there is the saying of the wise: "The sun's light, which reveals grass etc., burns it also, when conjoined with a burning glass; that analogy is to be applied here". Thus, just as fire associated with some one faggot, while burning up villages, cities etc., burns up that faggot too, even so the luminosity of the impartite intelligence, associated with the final psychosis,[45] while rooting out the entire universe, is capable of removing that (psychosis) as well; hence there is no unintelligibility whatsoever in the destruction of that.

7·5 Others, however, say thus: Brahman-knowledge removes ignorance alone, since there is direct opposition only as between knowledge and ignorance; as for the universe, its destruction results from the destruction of its material cause;[46] thence alone the destruction of Brahman-knowledge too, which is included in that universe. Nor would the illusoriness of the universe be unintelligible, if it be not removable by knowledge; for, though the removal of the universe is not directly generated by knowledge, it is generated by the destruction of ignorance, which in turn is generated by knowledge; for, it is recognised that illusoriness consists in removability by knowledge alone, whether directly or indirectly.

---

[45] That is to say, the intuition of Brahman.

[46] Ignorance.

And thus is intelligible the appearance of a body etc., even after the rise of the intuition of the truth, in the case of one who is released while embodied; for, even after the rise of the intuition of the truth, it is intelligible that, because of the obstruction due to prārabdha-karma, there may persist a trace of nescience, which (trace) is the material cause of the persistence of prārabdha-karma and its effect, the appearance of the body etc. If, like ignorance, the universe too were directly removable by the intuition of Brahman, this would not be intelligible; for, where there exists its opposite, the intuition of Brahman, the existence of prārabdha-karma being itself impossible, that (karma) cannot be an obstruction to the removal of (all) trace of nescience.

END OF CHAPTER THREE.

CHAPTER IV.

Now, what is this trace of nescience, by the persistence of which there is release while embodied? 1·1

Some say that it is an element of the projective energy of the primal nescience endowed with both obscuring and projective energies, this (element) being the cause of the persistence of prārabdha-karma, the present body etc.

Others say that it is the impression left behind by nescience, comparable to the smell of garlic, which persists in the vessel which contained garlic, (even after being) cleansed. 1·2

Yet others say that it is but primal nescience itself which persists, on the analogy of the burnt cloth (which retains its configuration). 1·3

1·4 The preceptor, Sarvajñātman,[1] however, mentions this (following) too as a view: there cannot be the persistence even of a trace of ignorance, on the rise of the intuition that is opposed to it; hence, the sacred teaching about release while embodied is only for the purpose of eulogising the injunction to hear (study) and so on; for, there is no purpose in the sacred teaching setting forth release while embodied. Therefore, for him who has performed contemplation, there is, by the mere rise of the intuition of Brahman, the removal of ignorance with all its effects and its impressions.[2]

---

[1] According to a writer in the *IHQ*, VII, 301, the expression in the text should be rendered as "the preceptor of Sarvajñātman" *i.e.*, Sureśvara. But the construction is tortuous, while the information about Sureśvara is incorrect. Sarvajñātman's guru was one Deveśvara and there is no sufficient warrant for equating him with Sureśvara. It would appear from a Ms. of the *Pramāṇalakṣaṇam*, a work of Sarvajñātman's, that the author's parama-guru was Devānanda, not Śaṅkara, and that Devānanda's teacher was Śreṣṭhānanda. Nowhere does this approximate to the Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman, tradition. See *Travancore Archaeological series*, Vol. II, pp. 144-146.

2·0 Now, what is this removal of ignorance?

2·1 It is but the self, says the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*. Nor is there futility of knowledge, since that (self) is eternally existent; for, that (knowledge) is sought, since, in the absence of knowledge, nescience, the cause of evil, being existent, evil too would continue; further, the removal of nescience, though (such removal is) of the nature of the self, is what is effected by knowledge, according to the definition "When on the existence of one, there is the existence of another at the next instant, when, in the absence of that, there is the absence of that (other), that (latter) is what is effected by that (former);" for, the said definition applies in that where there is knowledge, the next instant there is the removal of nescience, which (removal) is of the nature of the self, while in the absence of that (knowledge), there is the non-existence of that, consisting in (the presence of) its counter-correlate, nescience.

---

[2] The commentator, Acyuta Kṛṣṇānanda, seeks to make out that, on this view, though avidyā is destroyed, its impressions may persist, just as trembling etc. may continue for a while even after the rope is known to be but a rope. Such a view which is indistinguishable from that of para 1·2, except perhaps, in that impressions on the latter view cannot bind, is in substance that of Maṇḍana Miśra, as set forth in the *Brahmasiddhi*.

The removal of nescience is certainly (something) other than the self. That is not real, as non-duality would (otherwise) be abandoned; nor is it unreal, as (then) that could not be effected by knowledge; nor of a nature, real and (yet) unreal, because of contradiction; nor indeterminable, since the indeterminable has a beginning and has, as a rule, ignorance for its material cause, so that there would follow, even in release, the persistence of its material cause, viz., ignorance, and the possibility of its removal by knowledge; rather is it a mode other than the above-said four modes: thus says Ānandabodha Ācārya. 2·2

The removal of nescience, like nescience (itself), is certainly indeterminable. Nor is there the contingence of non-release because of the rule that where there is persistence of that (removal), there is persistence of its material cause, ignorance, as well; for, there is no evidence for the persistence of that (removal); for, just as origination is a modification of existence relating to the first instant alone, it is intelligible that removal too is a modification of existence relating to the last instant alone. Hence it is that just as there is the usage in the present tense "is originated" only in reference to the first instant of that origination, which, earlier and later, is referred to as belonging to the future or the past, in the words "will be originated" or "originated", even so, there is the usage of the present tense in "is 2·3 removed, perishes, is destroyed'' in reference to the last instant alone of the removal, which, earlier and later, is referred to as belonging to the future or the past, in the words "will be removed'' or "removed''. If, however, the removal were to persist, then, even in reference to a pot long since destroyed, there would be the usage "is now destroyed'' and so on; for, the conjugational suffixes signify the sense of relation to present time etc., as attaching to the sense of the stem.

Now, let it be that these (suffixes) signify the sense of relation to present time etc., as attaching to what is the subject or object of the sense of the stem and is the locus of the number expressed by (the suffixes) themselves, or the sense of relation to present time etc., as attaching to the operation, which is favourable to the sense of the stem and is signified by themselves; thus, since there is no relation to present time in the case either of the subject of the act of destruction, viz., the pot long since reduced to dust, or in the case of the operation favourable to the destruction thereof, there is not the above-mentioned defect of undue extensiveness; if this be said, no (we reply); for, on the first (alternative), even in reference to a pot already originated, there would result the usage "is (being) originated'', since the pot, the subject of the act of origination, belongs to the present time; on the second (alternative), in the body torpid with constipation and flatulence, when an effort is made to rise, though rising may not occur, there would (still) result the usage "it rises'', since for the operation of the nature of effort, which is signified by the suffix and is favourable to the sense of the stem, viz., rising, there is relation to present time. Therefore, the sense of the conjugational suffix is the relation of present time etc., as attaching to the sense of the stem alone; hence, if destruction should be permanent, it would be difficult to avoid the usage "is (being) removed" even in the case of the pot long since removed.

And if in the case of a pot broken by a hammer etc., there be recognised a variety of non-existence, which is called destruction, which has that (pot) as counter-correlate, is permanent and has the ground etc. for its locus, then, when the heap of potsherds has been removed or when, even without its removal, there is not seen any special configuration in the potsherds distinguishing them from the shards of a jug or basin, why should there not be the perception of that (non-existence)? If it be said that the destruction of pot etc. is to be inferred from the special configuration of the potsherds etc., and is not perceived, then, since from that the inference is possible of a destruction which belongs to the time when the hammer falls, and which, being like origination a modification of existence, has the counter-correlate for its locus, there does not result from this a destruction which persists subsequently and is of the nature of a non-existence resting in the same locus as the counter-correlate. As for the usage in respect of the ground that it is the locus of destruction, in the words "On this ground, the pot has been destroyed", that, like (the usage) "On this ground, the pot has been originated", is intelligible as having for content the locus of the counter-correlate, as conjoined to a modification of existence; as for the usage of the non-existence of the pot on the ground, after the destruction of the pot, that, like the usage as to its non-existence, on the pot being taken away, is intelligible as based on absolute non-existence as related to distinct times; and it need not be assumed to have destruction for content.[3] If it be said "This being so, since even the usage of the non-existence of the pot prior to its origination has its function fulfilled by absolute non-existence, there would be no antecedent non-existence either", let that too not be.

2·31 Now, thus, it will no longer be possible to define prior time as the time which is the basis of antecedent non-existence and subsequent time as that which is the basis of destruction; what, then, would be the basis of earlier and later in regard to time? Let it have for its sphere some unanalysable (indefinable) attribute, like the usage of "being a counter-correlate" etc., in the case of pot etc.; for even if there were admitted a permanent destruction, of the nature of non-existence, it would have to be said of the property of being destruction and so on, (present) in these, that they are unanalysable (indefinable). Nor is it that the property of being destruction is certainly analysable, as it is of the nature of originated non-existence; for, in respect of the pot, which is the antecedent non-existence of destruction, there would result the property of being its own destruction.[4] Nor is it that there is intended non-existentiality of the nature of the seventh category; for it would follow that even in respect of the antecedent non-existence of the pot, there would result non-existence of the property of destruction, and thence it would follow that the usage in the case of the pot, when it exists, that it belongs to the period subsequent to that of antecedent non-existence, would be baseless. Nor is the destruction of antecedent non-existence something other than the counter-correlate; in that case, on the same principle, the antecedent non-existence of destruction too would be other than the counter-correlate; consequently, even for the destruction of antecedent non-existence there would be another antecedent non-existence; of that too there would be some destruction; of that too there would be another antecedent non-existence; there would thus result the assumption of unevidenced infinite destructions and antecedent non-existences. Nor is it possible to define the property of being destruction in any other way without involving self-dependence. That it is thus with antecedent non-existence too has been elaborated elsewhere. Therefore, there is not antecedent non-existence earlier; nor subsequently is there non-existence due to destruction; in the middle alone, there is for a time the superimposition of pot etc., endowed with modifications of existence in the nature of indeterminable origination, sustentation and destruction.

---

[3] It is not a persistent mode of non-existence, as it is liable to be removed by the pot being brought back, in the case of the pot that was taken away.

---

[4] The pot is originated and it is non-existence, as the antecedent non-existence of destruction; hence, it would follow that the pot is its own destruction, if the latter be taken to be originated non-existence.

And thus, the removal of nescience too is a modification of existence, present in the instant immediately succeeding the rise of the intuition of Brahman; hence, it does not persist in release; consequently, there is no defect in its being indeterminable: thus says the Advaitavidyācārya.

2·41 Now, if thus the removal of nescience be momentary, release would not be a permanent human goal. If this be said, (we reply) deluded art thou. The removal of nescience is acknowledged to be accomplished by knowledge, not, indeed, because it is of itself the human goal, since it is other than both happiness and the absence of misery; but the manifestation of impartite bliss and the destruction of the misery of transmigration result on the destruction of the nescience which obscures the impartite bliss and causes the misery of transmigration; hence, it is as subserving these that it (the removal of ignorance) is acknowledged to be accomplished by knowledge.

The preceptor, Citsukha, however, says thus: even the non-existence of misery in release is not of itself the human goal; since in every case the non-existence of misery is subsidiary to happiness, as being the non-existence of obstacles to the manifestation of the happiness that is of the nature of the self, happiness alone is of itself the human goal; all others are subsidiary thereto; therefore, when it is possible even for the knowledge of the instrumentality to happiness to be the cause of that (removal), it is not proper to assume of the non-existence of misery that it is of itself the human goal, and, in order to comprehend the prompting to activity in respect of the means thereto, assume (besides) that what prompts (the removal) is knowledge of instrumentality to what is desired, this being more prolix by the introduction of "being the content of desire."[5] Nor would the reverse position follow that the non-existence of misery is alone the intrinsic human goal, while happiness is desired as subsidiary thereto; for, activity is seen in respect of blame-worthy acts like (prohibited) sexual intercourse, which generate momentary happiness, though accomplished with long-standing misery; there, if the non-existence of misery contemporaneous with the momentary happiness were the human goal, the experience of long-standing misery for the sake of that would be unintelligible. Nor is there parity of defect, even if momentary happiness be the human goal; for, in the case of happiness, which is of the nature of an existent, superiority and inferiority are established in experience, and consequently, for the sake of some very superior happiness, though for a moment, the experience of misery for a long time is intelligible;

---

[5] When it is possible to define the cause of the removal as knowledge of instrumentality to happiness, it is uneconomical to define it as instrumentality to what is desired, introducing the new element, viz., content of desire; nor do the facts require such cumbrousness, for, the absence of misery is not an intrinsic human goal and cannot of itself prompt the removal.

while, in the case of the non-existence of misery, superiority and inferiority are not possible. Therefore, in release, even the removal of the misery of transmigration is, like the removal of nescience, subsidiary to happiness; hence, it is only the attainment of undefined bliss that is of itself the human goal.

3·1 Now, undefined bliss, being of the nature of the inner (self), is eternally attained! True; undefined bliss, though eternally attained, is yet made non-existent as it were, in the state of transmigration, by nescience, which, while obscuring that, exhibits objects of a nature contrary thereto; hence it becomes an object not achieved; on the removal of that (nescience), the projection of all evil being got rid of, it is attained as it were, like the forgotten golden ornament round one's neck; hence, its attainment is figurative: thus say some.

3·2 Others, however, say thus: in the state of transmigration, there is established for all the cognition "For me unexcellable bliss does not exist", because of obscuration by ignorance, whose nature it is to be capable of the empirical usage "it does not exist, it is not manifest"; hence, there persists, as long as nescience persists, a posited non-existence of the bliss of Brahman, as the basis of that (cognition); and, on the removal of nescience, it too ceases, because of being based on that; consequently, in conformity with the definition "when, on the existence of one, there is at the next instant" etc., the being attained of that (bliss) is certainly primary (in sense, not secondary or figurative).

3·31 Yet others, however, say thus: since what is not cognised is not a human goal, and since, in the state of transmigration, there is no immediacy for undefined bliss, though real (even then), that is not the human goal. Nor may it be said "There is immediacy even then, through the knowledge which is of the nature of the self, since that is ever non-different from the happiness which is of the nature of the self; as for immediate cognition through a psychosis, that does not exist even in release".[6] For, immediacy does not consist in *any* non-difference from the intelligence favourable to empirical usage in respect of itself; for, when there is the manifestation of intelligence as defined by pot, for the smell too of pot, which is non-different therefrom, there would result immediacy; rather (does it consist in) non-difference therefrom of an object that is not obscured. And thus, since the element of non-obscuration is present only when there is intuition of the truth, it stands to reason that the human goal, the immediacy of unexcellable happiness, is *attained* by knowledge.

3·32 Some others, however, say thus: let it be that immediacy consists in any non-difference from intelligence favourable to empirical usage. Even thus, because of the might of ignorance, there is superimposed the difference of intelligence from bliss, in the same way as the difference of the jīva (from Brahman); hence, in the state of transmigration, there is no immediacy of undefined bliss, any more than there is immediacy of the intelligence of one person for another person; on the removal of ignorance, however, the difference of intelligence from bliss being resolved, there is immediacy for that (bliss); consequently there is for it the property of being accomplished by knowledge.

---

[6] There being no psychoses at that stage.

4·0 Now, for him who has turned away from the state of the jīva, because of the resolution of external adjuncts on the rise of knowledge, is there the attainment of the state of the Lord (Īśvara)? Or is there mere subsistence as pure intelligence? This has to be discriminated.

4·1 The reply is (as follows): on the view of a single jīva (alone), on the rise of knowledge for him, there is resolved the entire world of difference, such as the distinction between the jīva and the Lord, (the whole of which is) posited by the ignorance of that one (jīva); therefore, there is but subsistence as pure intelligence.

4·21 When the view of many jīvas is admitted and a distinction is recognised between the bound and the released, though on the rise of knowledge for some one, the universe produced by his nescience is dissolved, yet the world of differences, such as that between jīva and the Lord, produced by the nesciences of other persons persists. Even thus, on the view that, like the jīva, the Lord too is a variety of reflection, for the released one there is but subsistence as pure intelligence, which is the prototype (of which jīva and the Lord are reflections); for, where there are reflections of one in many external adjuncts, on the resolution of one adjunct, it is meet that the reflection therein should subsist as the prototype alone; hence, the attainment of the nature of another reflection (i.e., the nature of Īśvara) is not possible. If that were possible, the attainment sometimes even of the nature of another reflection that is a jīva, would be difficult to avoid; consequently there would be the contingence of fresh bondage for the released, as on the view of (the jīva as a) definition (of pure intelligence). That is why on the view of many jīvas, the view of (the jīva as a) definition is not supported; for, when there has been release (for intelligence) as defined in a particular way, and when another internal organ attaches to it as so defined, there would be contingence of fresh bondage.[7]

---

[7] This position is neither clear nor sound. The jīva is pure intelligence as defined by the internal organ etc. When there is release of what is defined by one internal organ, with that disappears the distinction of what defines and what is defined. It is pointless to suppose that another internal organ may attach to intelligence *as defined by the internal organ of the released jīva;* for, in release, the internal organ as what defines has disappeared, as also the jīva in the form of defined intelligence. Should bondage result from the contact of intelligence with another internal organ, there is no reason to hold that the jīva now bound is the one that was released. One may say that it is the body which defines intelligence. Because of the association of the internal organ with intelligence thus defined, there is bondage. Though this association vanishes in release, the intelligence defined by that same body may get associated with another internal organ; hence fresh bondage. Such a view has at least two defects: it applies only to jīvanmukti, where the body persists and defines. And even here, it assumes that the jīva is intelligence as defined by the body alone, whereas it is intelligence as defined by the internal organ as well. When this is realised, surely the jīva that is bound afresh (*sic*) cannot be said to be the very jīva that was released. The view that mukti is Īśvara-bhāvā-'patti is restated in the *Śivādvaitaṇirnaya*, (pp. 115-120) where, however, this statement about the avaccheda-vāda does not recur. And by the time he came to write the *Parimala*, the Dīkṣita himself seems to have veered round to avaccheda-vāda; see the last paragraph of the *Parimala* on I, 1, 4.

4·22 On the view, however, that the jīva is a reflection, while the Lord is in the position of the prototype and pure intelligence is common to both, there is recognised for the released one, until the release of all, attainment of the nature of the Supreme Lord, characterised by omniscience, agency in respect of all, lordship over all, the possession of desires which come true and so on. When there are reflections of one face in many mirrors, on the removal of one mirror, the reflection therein subsists but as the prototype, not as the mere face,[8] since even then the face is not rid of the property of being a prototype, which is occasioned by the proximity of other mirrors; similarly, when the one Brahman-intelligence is reflected in the many adjuncts, when on the rise of knowledge in one reflection its adjunct is thereby resolved, it must necessarily be that that reflection subsists as the prototype.

4·221 Nor is lordship over all, characterised by such attributes as possession of desires which come true, unintelligible, since for the released there is no nescience;[9] for, though there is no nescience for him, there do exist the nesciences of other persons then bound. Truly, the Lord's lordship and characterisation by such attributes as possession of desires which come true are not produced by His own nescience, since He is flawless;[10] rather should all this be recognised to be produced by the nesciences of bound persons.

---

[8] *I.e.*, without reflection, actual or possible.

[9] These attributes are manifestations of nescience.

[10] *Lit.*, free from añjana, another name for nescience.

Nor does there follow non-difference of release 4·222 from the fruit of saguṇa meditation, since, even for those who meditate on the saguṇa, there is declared union with the Lord, in such texts as "As a man's resolve is in this world, so shall he be on leaving this", "in the respective manner in which one contemplates that" and so on. Since for those who contemplate the saguṇa there is no intuition of the impartite, there is neither the removal of nescience nor the resolution of individuation etc., grounded thereon; since the obscuration is not removed, there is no manifestation of impartite bliss. For them there is equality with the Supreme Lord in respect of enjoyment, on the principle enunciated in such aphorisms as "With the exception of the world-operations, (the Lord) being the topic (where those operations are referred to) and (souls) not being proximate (to that context)" and "And on account of indication of equality in respect of enjoyment alone"; they are also capable of creating by their mere resolve resplendent bodies, organs, damsels etc., to subserve their enjoyment; yet theirs is not the unlimited lordship, characterised by freedom in respect of the creation, destruction etc. of the entire universe; to the released, however, who have attained the state of the Lord, in all respects,[11] all this belongs; great therefore is the distinction (between release and the fruit of saguṇa meditation).

---

[11] The word "nissandhibandha" is explained by the commentator to mean "sarvātmanā, wholly, in all respects". It occurs once again later, where this idea is made clear otherwise in the sentence. The word occurs twice, in the form "nissandhibandhana", in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (sambandhokti to II, 18 and III, 6). The *Candrikā* and *Sārārtha* explain it as "free from sublating cognition (bādhaka-pratyaya-rahita)". This is not adopted in the present translation.

4·223 Nor is there the contingence of fresh bondage for the released, if they attain the state of the Lord, since ignorance, association with misery and so on are declared for the Supreme Lord in such incarnations as Raghunātha; for, that has for purport only the acting of these (ignorance etc.,) by the Lord, like an actor, in order to uphold the rule made by Himself as to the non-futility of the curses of sages, and to create faith somehow in the curse of Bhṛgu etc.;[12] otherwise, there would be conflict with the Scriptural declaration of His being eternally released, unrestrictedly free, without an equal or superior and so on. Therefore, on the view that the Lord is the prototype, there is no flaw in the released having the status of the Supreme Lord, till the release of all.

4·2241 This view alone is in conformity with Scripture, the (*Vedānta-*) *Sūtra*, the *Bhāṣya* etc. It is thus. First, in the chapter on the harmony (of Scriptural texts), there is the section "The small (ether is Brahman), because of what follows". Here it is determined that the small ether mentioned in such texts as "Now, in this city of Brahman, there is the abode, the small lotus; small is the ether within that", is neither elemental ether nor the jīva, but the Supreme Lord, because of the two reasons, viz., (i) the subsequent complementary texts which proclaim "Both heaven and earth are contained within it", "As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart", "It is the self free from sin, free from old age, deathless, griefless, hunger-less, thirst-less, possessing desires which come true, purposes which come true", and (ii) the property of being the support of heavens, earth and so on. (Then) in the discourse between Indra and Prajāpati, which comes immediately after (the teaching of) the meditation on the small ether, in the words "the self free from sin" etc., there is introduced the self which is to be taught and is associated with the eight qualities beginning with freedom from sin. Then there is the teaching of the jīva who in waking is present as the seer in the eye, as stated in the text "The person who is seen in the eye is the self", who has attained the dream-state, as stated in the text "He who moves about happy in dreams, he is the self", who has attained the sleeping state, as stated in the text "When a man being asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, sees no dreams, that is the self", and who has passed beyond the three states, as stated in the text "That serene being, arising from this body, is manifested in his own form, as soon as he has approached the highest light;

---

[12] In the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* is narrated the following story: in a protracted battle between the devas and the asuras, the latter being hard pressed took refuge in the hermitage of Bhṛgu, where Bhṛgu's wife gave them sanctuary. Viṣṇu who came in hot pursuit did not respect the laws of sanctuary but killed both Bhṛgu's wife and the asuras. Bhṛgu who saw this on his return was exceedingly wroth and cursed Viṣṇu to be born on the earth in various forms and to suffer. Hence the incarnations. Here, we are told that Īśvara put up with the curses so that the words of righteous indignation from his well beloved sages might not be falsified. Ardent Śaivas, however, see in this incident a proof of the inferiority of Viṣṇu. And Appayya takes up the same position in works like the *Rāmāyaṇasārasaṅgraha*. In such works Viṣṇu appears not as the Saguṇa Brahman, but as just inferior to him. Another proof of *SLS* being an early work of our author's!

he is the highest person." Hence, the eight qualities beginning with freedom from sin exist in the jīva too. Consequently, that is not determinative of the small ether being the Supreme Lord. For, in the recurrences (of the teaching) "He who in dreams" etc., it is said in each recurrence "This itself I shall explain to you further"; hence there is no room to object that the jīva is the content of the second and subsequent recurrences alone, because of the express marks of the jīva such as dreaming, while Brahman is the content of the first recurrence.

This doubt being raised, it is taught, by the aphorism "If it be said that from the subsequent chapter (the jīva appears to be meant) that (which is referred to there is the jīva, in so far) as its true nature has become manifest", that the jīva ascertained in the fourth recurrence is that whose true nature has been manifested through being released from all bonds, not that tainted by the difference incidental to the state of transmigration; for, such properties as the possession of purposes which come true are sublated in this (latter state); the mention of the three states is for the understanding of their subsidiariness to the teaching of the fourth recurrence, through the mention of their respective defects. The aphorist, who gives this explanation, clearly declares that for the released (soul) expounded in the fourth recurrence there is attainment of the state of the Lord; for, in the absence of that, possession of purposes which come true and so on would be inconsistent even in release; and, if the enumerated eight properties existed even elsewhere than in the Lord, there would not be gained any answer to the objection raised. The commentator (Śaṅkara) too states very clearly that for the released there is attainment of the state of the Lord endowed with attributes, in (the commentary on) that aphorism: "Hence, that non-absolute form of the jīva, established by nescience, tainted by the flaws of agency, enjoyership, attachment, aversion and the rest, united to manifold evil—by the dissolution of that, what is opposed thereto, viz., the true nature of the Supreme Lord, possessed of the properties of freedom from sin etc., is attained through knowledge."

Even in the chapter showing the absence of conflict (among texts or with reason)[13] (it is thus). The section "A part, because of the declaration of difference" is introduced for the purpose of establishing the relationship of part and whole, as between the jīva and the Lord, who are understood to be in the relation of the helped and the helper, being respectively the agent in various acts and he who causes the performance of various acts, because of such texts as "He, verily, causes those, whom he wants to lead up from these worlds, to perform good deeds; he verily causes those, whom he wants to lead downwards, to perform evil deeds". In that there is the statement of an objection: "If the jīva be admitted to be a part of the Lord, then, from his experience of the miseries of transmigration, there would be experience of misery for the Lord 4·2242 too, in the same way as in ordinary experience, by the pain present in the hand, foot or some other part, there is experience of pain for Devadatta, of whom that is a part; and thence, for those who have attained that, there will result greater misery; better than that would be the prior state of transmigration; hence, it would follow that perfect knowledge is fraught with evil". By this (statement of objection) and by the answer which accepts the non-confusion effected by the relationship of prototype and reflection, made clear in the *Bhāmatī* etc., the commentator has made it clear that for the released there is attainment of the state of the Lord.

---

[13] Chapter II of the *Sūtras*.

4·2243 Even in the chapter which deals with the means[14] (it is thus). The illusoriness of the dream-world is established in the section: "In the intermediate place,[15] there is creation; (Scripture) indeed declares that". There, it being doubted if the jīva is the creator of the illusory dream-world, the aphorist says, in the aphorism "But by meditation on the Supreme, that which is hidden (is made manifest); from Him, indeed, proceed bondage and its opposite", that, though the possession of purposes which come true and so on pertain to the jīva because of non-difference from the Lord, yet, since they are obscured by the defect of nescience, creatorship in respect of the dream-world is not possible for him; the commentator explains the view of that aphorism thus: "That, again, which is obscured, is manifested in some beings alone, who, having their ignorance dispelled by strenuous meditation on the Supreme Real, attain perfection by the grace of the Lord, just as the power of clear vision is recovered by the potency of medicine, on the removal of the obscuring film; (it is) not (manifested) naturally in all beings". By their recognition of the manifestation of the possession of purposes which come true and so on, (properties) which serve in the creation of dreams etc., both these have made it clear that for the released there is attainment of the state of the Supreme Lord.

---

[14] Chapter III.

[15] *I.e.*, in dreams.

Even in the chapter about the fruit[16] (it is thus). **4·2244** In respect of the Scriptural text "is manifested in his own form" whose content is the released one, there is the desire to know in what form the manifestation is intended to be described. In the aphorism "In the form of Brahman (thinks) Jaimini, because of the reference etc.," (we are told that) this is the view of Jaimini: manifestation is in that form of Brahman (the description of which) begins with freedom from sin, ends with possession of purposes which come true, and includes omniscience and lordship over all, (as seen) from the reference in "That self, free from sin" etc., and the making known of lordly powers in "He moves about there laughing, playing, rejoicing with women or vehicles" etc. In the next aphorism "In the nature of intelligence alone, that being the nature of the self; thus (says) Auḍulomi", another view is introduced that, since the true nature of the self is understood to be intelligence alone, from such texts as "Thus, verily, this self has neither inside nor outside, but is a mass of intelligence alone", manifestation is in that form alone. In the aphorism stating the final view "Though it be thus, because of the reference to and the existence of the qualities mentioned earlier, there is absence of conflict; so (thinks) Bādarāyaṇa", the aphorist says there is no conflict (between the above two views), since, though from the view-point of truth (the released self) is intelligence alone, yet from the empirical view-point of the person in bondage, there is the possibility of the above-mentioned host of properties which are understood from the reference etc., and are wholly of the nature of māyā, and since therefore there is no conflict between the two Scriptural texts. (By the aphorist who says this) and by the commentator, who interprets the three aphorisms in the sense mentioned, it is clearly recognised that for the released there is the attainment of the state of the Lord.

---

[16] Chapter IV,

4·2245 The author of the *Bhāmatī* too and those whe came after him adopt in this sense alone the group of aphorisms supported by Scriptural texts and the above cited statements of the revered commentator.

4·2246 Nor does it stand to reason to say of this extensive host of aphorisms and statements from the commentary supported by Scripture that it is an assumption for argument's sake, in the manner stated in *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*. "What the aphorist says about the embodied one, that his lordly powers, being obscured by ignorance, are manifested by contemplation, that, for reasons already mentioned, is stated only as an assumption (for argument's sake)".

Therefore, since it has necessarily to be admitted that for the released there is attainment of the state of the Lord, the impossibility of this is itself the defect in the view that the Lord is a reflection. Thus, the author of the *Kalpataru* says: "What is reflected in māyā is not (that which is) attained by released ones". The same impossibility constitutes the defect in the view of a single jīva and in the view of absolute difference of the jīva (from the Lord). 4·23

As for what is stated by some dualists—that though because of difference being absolute there is not in release the attainment of the Lord by the jīva, even then there is the possibility of the properties of freedom from sin etc., as for the Lord, and that thus there is no contradiction—that is absurd; if that were so, since freedom from sin etc. would belong to the jīva (too), they could not be distinctive marks of Brahman; hence, there does not result an answer to the (stated) objection; consequently, there is conflict with the aphorism "If it be said that from the subsequent chapter (the jīva appears to be meant) that (which is referred to there is the jīva, in so far) as its true nature has become manifest"; further, in the aphorism "In the form of Brahman, (thinks) Jaimini", in the case of (1) the qualities of freedom from sin etc. present in the jīva, and (2) the laughing etc., mentioned by the text "laughing, playing, rejoicing", which are 4·231 considered even by the opponents to be the sense of the word "etcetera" in "because of the reference etcetera" (of the same aphorism), there would be conflict with the mention (of these) as of the nature of Brahman. On the view of difference, those properties being real, there would be conflict with the recognition by the aphorism stating the final view "Though it be thus" etc., that released jīvas are but intelligence alone, as stated in the aphorism "In the form of intelligence alone" etc.; there would also be conflict with the section beginning with (the aphorism) "On having approached (the supreme light), there is manifestation (of the self's own nature)" etc. There, indeed, in the text "(He) is manifested in his own form" manifestation in some adventitious form is not declared; for, there would result the futility of the words "in his own"; of that adventitious form in which he is manifested, it cannot be said that it is his own; therefore, because of the use of the word "own" signifying one's self, it is established that the manifestation intended to be declared is only in one's own eternally established form, not through some (adventitious) attribute. Further if this freedom from sin etc. were adventitious to the jīva in release, there would be conflict (1) with the denial of an adventitious form in release, in (the aphorism) "On having approached (the supreme light), there is manifestation" etc., and (2) with the declaration, in respect of freedom from sin etc., that they are obscured in bondage and manifested in release, in (the aphorisms) "But by meditation on the supreme, that which is hidden (is made manifest)" etc., and "If it be said that from the subsequent chapter (the jīva appears to be meant) that (which is referred to there is the jīva, in so far) as its true nature has become manifest"; hence they should be said to be eternally established; consequently, the illusoriness of bondage is difficult to avoid. Eternally established freedom from sin is, indeed, the absence of sin always. Nor in the case of him who is in fact always devoid of sin is there the possibility of a relation to sin or a relation to agency and enjoyership based thereon being absolutely real.

And thus, even non-difference of the jīva from the 4.2311 Lord is difficult to avoid, since there is no reality for the bondage which is opposed to their non-difference taught by Scripture; and besides, the statement that the eternally established possession of desires which come true is obscured for the transmigrating person would not fit in. Nor is it recognised even by the opponents that there is, as persistent in the state of transmigration and as having something for its sphere, some non-futile purpose, which is (yet) obscured; rather has it to be explained thus alone, that the Lord's eternally established, unrestricted possession of desires which come true, that itself is obscured in the case of the jīva, not being presented as his, because of the non-manifestation of non-difference from the Lord, in the state of transmigration; thus, it is the story of (the carter who turned up at) the toll-house at break of day.[17]

---

[17] The story behind the maxim is that a carter, to evade paying toll, drove off into the fields and by-ways in the dark, but, as luck would have it, found himself approaching the toll-house at break of day.

4.23111 Now, it may be said, freedom from sin consists not in the absence of sin, but rather in the possession of a power that obstructs the origination of sin, even when one performs acts that cause sin; hence, not through this being eternally established is there the contingence of the illusoriness of bondage; similarly, even the possession of purposes which come true is to be defined as of the form of a power;[18] consequently, there is not the contingence of non-difference from the Lord.

4·23112 Not so (we reply); for, there is no authority for assuming such a sense for the words. The power that obstructs the generation of sin cannot, indeed, be assumed for the sake of non-origination of sin, in the stage of going round in the migratory cycle; for, at that time, the origination of that (sin) is acceptable. That ever after the rise of knowledge, there is non-clinging, even because of the might of knowledge, is shown by the aphorism "On the knowledge of this, (there are) the non-clinging and destruction (respectively) of subsequent and earlier sins, this being declared (by Scripture)". Even from this, the non-clinging of sin in release too is intelligible; hence, the assumption of a power is in vain. Therefore, it is established that by those who conform to the cited Scriptural texts and aphorisms this must be supported, viz., that, till the release of all, released jīvas attain perfectly and in all respects that which is not opposed to their real nature as bare intelligence, and is the state of the Supreme Lord, that is qualified by unrestricted lordly powers and a host of other attributes suitable thereto—(all of) which are produced by the nesciences of the persons (still) in bondage,—and is the manifestation of unexcellable bliss.

---

[18] Which comes into being and is not eternally established.

To Raṅgarāja Makhin, the learned preceptor, the performer of the Viśvajit sacrifice enjoined (in Scripture), the son of the performer of the Sarvatomukha-mahā-vrata, the devotee of Him who wears the moon on His head, there is a son known as Appa Dīkṣita. (1).

He has written this compendious exposition of the rudiments of the different final positions (of advaitins), following Scriptural basis as well as tradition, after having studied all the works, made clear to him by a mere portion of the (preceptor's) constant skill in clear exposition. (2).

If there be anything here erroneously set down by me, in ways other than those of the (respective) final positions, may that be looked upon with grace by scholars skilled in the examination of right tradition! (3).

END OF CHAPTER FOUR

OF THE ŚĀSTRASIDDHĀNTALEŚASAṄGRAHA.

HERE ENDS THIS BOOK.

ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
5	28	attempts	attempt
105	20	another	another's
119	10	is	in
233	22	manifestated	manifested
255	24	revatī-rks	revatī-ṛks
265	25	if	of
266	29	ārādupakaraka	ārādupakāraka
„	30	sannipatyopakarāka	sannipatyokāraka
„	34	though	through
320	31	śabda-'rthaḥ	śabdā-'rthāḥ
334	1	to known	to be known
337	13	Saṅkṣepaśarīraka	Saṅkṣepaśārīraka
338	22	Mimāṃsā	Mīmāṃsā
349	16	Jābala-śruti	Jābāla-śruti

Acc २२३२८/२२३२४ वेदान्त.